{ "id": 2511243, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO FELTON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Felton", "decision_date": "1989-12-04", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201488\u20140125", "first_page": "599", "last_page": "603", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 599" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5589174 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 1107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 994", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3531832 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0994-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 1055", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5657906 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 N.E.2d 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3530464 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 1050", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3544098 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 U.S. 52", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6197970 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/474/0052-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 484, "char_count": 7895, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.125630625676509e-07, "percentile": 0.5745255804488988 }, "sha256": "16b0ae638f7c38990a78770508684e44332145d2676ebacd5f010c23efaa0efa", "simhash": "1:b0d85fdd128feaf7", "word_count": 1254 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:26:25.592248+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO FELTON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOWERTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nDefendant pled guilty to aggravated criminal sexual assault and two counts of aggravated battery to a child. The victim, defendant\u2019s five-month-old daughter, had numerous fractured ribs, two broken bones in her leg, an acute vaginal laceration, third-degree burns on her chest and chin, fresh bruises on her forehead and temple area, and had retinal hemorrhages consistent with Shaken Baby Syndrome. The circuit court of St. Clair County sentenced defendant to six years for aggravated sexual assault, three years for one count of aggravated battery, four years for the other count of aggravated battery and ordered that all sentences run consecutively.\nDefendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied and he appeals. We affirm.\nDefendant first argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he advised defendant to plead guilty to criminal sexual assault without realizing that defendant\u2019s act of sexual penetration was not criminal if it was conducted for a medical purpose. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201418(b).) Claiming that trial counsel was ineffective, defendant concludes that his guilty plea was involuntary and must be vacated. We do not agree.\nWhen challenging the quality of representation following a guilty plea, a defendant must show that the level of representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would, instead, have insisted on proceeding to trial. (Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 106 S. Ct. 366; People v. Robinson (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 622, 510 N.E.2d 1050.) If a reviewing court may dispose of the defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance on the ground that he failed to demonstrate sufficient prejudice, then it may do so without determining whether counsel\u2019s performance was deficient. People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246.\nHere, the defendant has not shown sufficient prejudice. The factual basis for defendant\u2019s guilty plea revealed that the victim had received an acute vaginal laceration. Doctors would have testified that the laceration could not have occurred accidentally. Defendant did not dispute the doctor\u2019s claim. Defendant admitted inserting his finger approximately three-quarters of its length into the victim\u2019s vagina, but claimed that he was merely cleaning her.\nThe severity of the victim\u2019s injury along with the doctor\u2019s conclusion that the laceration could not have happened accidentally leads us to find that defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice. It may be true, as defendant claims, that his lawyer did not tell him that he might not be found guilty of aggravated sexual assault if the penetration in this case was for a medical purpose. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201418(b).) But, even if he had so advised defendant, we find it difficult to see prejudice.\nWe are persuaded from the facts of this case that even if counsel had advised defendant of the medical purpose exception, nevertheless, counsel would have recommended a plea of guilty. Competent counsel would realize the futility of attempting to persuade 12 rational people selected at random from the community that defendant\u2019s jamming his finger three-fourths of its length into his five-month-old daughter\u2019s vagina, acutely tearing it, was for a medical purpose.\nFurthermore, if counsel had pressed the point, or if defendant intrepidly, but foolishly, had chosen to order counsel to press the point, our own experience as trial judges and trial lawyers compels us to predict that beyond our own doubt a jury in whom is reposed accumulated wisdom, not to speak of plain, common sense, would have made short shrift of defendant\u2019s claim. In short, we are convinced defendant came out better by accepting the plea than he would have by gambling on the trial he now so cavalierly says he wanted.\nBecause we find that defendant had no viable defense, he has failed to demonstrate that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by recommending that defendant plead guilty.\nDefendant also argues that his guilty plea was involuntary because the circuit court failed to admonish him as to the maximum sentence he could receive if he was given the maximum sentences on each count and if the court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively.\nSupreme Court Rule 402 requires only substantial, not literal, compliance with its provisions. 107 Ill. 2d R. 402; People v. Baker (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 620, 479 N.E.2d 372.\nPrior to accepting the defendant\u2019s guilty pleas, the circuit court told defendant that he could receive a sentence of 30 years\u2019 imprisonment for the Class X offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The court also informed defendant that he was eligible for consecutive sentences. Because the defendant\u2019s aggregate sentence was far less (13 years) than what he was told he could receive on the Class X offense alone, the failure of the circuit court to admonish the defendant as to the maximum sentence he could receive if all sentences were to be served consecutively did not prejudice defendant. See People v. Baker (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 620, 479 N.E.2d 372.\nDefendant next argues that the circuit court erred in ordering that the two aggravated battery sentences run consecutively because there was an insufficient showing that they were not a part of the same course of conduct. We find, however, that the record establishes a sufficient basis for the circuit court\u2019s conclusion that defendant\u2019s acts occurred separately and were not part of a single course of conduct. (See People v. Perruquet (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 293, 454 N.E.2d 1055.) Therefore, the decision that the aggravated battery sentences should be served consecutively was proper.\nDefendant also complains that because he had no prior felony convictions, the circuit court abused its discretion in ordering that defendant serve his sentences consecutively.\nIt is within the circuit court\u2019s discretion whether multiple sentences are to be served concurrently or consecutively, and that court\u2019s decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20144(a); People v. Berry (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 994, 489 N.E.2d 1107.) Here, the victim\u2019s injuries were severe. The court considered it necessary to deter defendant and others from committing similar offenses. The defendant had three prior convictions. We find, therefore, that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment.\nDefendant next lodges a three-pronged attack on the constitutionality of the criminal sexual assault statute. Defendant\u2019s arguments, however, have been fully discussed and rejected by the supreme court of Illinois. People v. Terrell (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 178.\nFinally, defendant argues, and the State concedes, that defendant is entitled to 18 days\u2019 credit against his sentence of imprisonment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20147(b).) Therefore, we order defendant\u2019s sentence to be credited for the 18 days he served prior to sentencing. The circuit court otherwise is affirmed.\nAffirmed and remanded with directions.\nWELCH, P.J., and HARRISON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOWERTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, and Lori J. Lanciani Mosby, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "John Baricevic, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Gerry R. Arnold, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO FELTON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201488\u20140125\nOpinion filed December 4, 1989.\nDaniel M. Kirwan, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, and Lori J. Lanciani Mosby, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJohn Baricevic, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Gerry R. Arnold, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0599-01", "first_page_order": 621, "last_page_order": 625 }