{ "id": 2511815, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARIO ALFONSO, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Alfonso", "decision_date": "1989-11-28", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201487\u20143650", "first_page": "963", "last_page": "967", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 963" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "360 N.E.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 977", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2893997 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "979" }, { "page": "979" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0977-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 59", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5429886 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 59", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5429886 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" }, { "page": "268" }, { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0264-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 479, "char_count": 10130, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6785289131531444e-07, "percentile": 0.6970979775268751 }, "sha256": "ea148dc40c1d3b7f5850b55ff9c374d6bdca5a0de12e45ee8606df08a1c7d6e4", "simhash": "1:a5708c15414d8eb6", "word_count": 1664 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:26:25.592248+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARIO ALFONSO, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe subject of this appeal concerns the application of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 504 (107 Ill. 2d R. 504), which provides, in part, that appearance dates for traffic cases shall be set \u201cnot less than 14 days but within 49 days after the date of the arrest, whenever practicable.\u201d The State contends the circuit court erroneously granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on the grounds that it was practicable to schedule defendant\u2019s appearance date within the time period set forth by Supreme Court Rule 504.\nOn September 2, 1987, defendant was arrested in Schaumburg, Illinois, and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, following too closely, failing to signal when required, driving on a revoked license and transportation of open alcohol, The arresting Schaumburg police officer scheduled defendant\u2019s first court appearance for September 15, 1987, 13 days after the arrest. Defendant appeared on September 15 and requested a continuance to arrange for an attorney. The continuance was granted to October 20, 1987. On that date, defendant\u2019s attorney appeared and orally moved to dismiss pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 504; in response, the State requested a continuance.\nOn October 27, 1987, a hearing was conducted on defendant\u2019s written motion to dismiss. The arresting officer testified that he scheduled defendant\u2019s court appearance on September 15, 1987. Although this date was one day earlier than the 14-day minimal time limit set forth in the guidelines of Supreme Court Rule 504, it was the officer\u2019s first scheduled court date following defendant\u2019s arrest. The officer\u2019s next scheduled court date was October 20, 1987, 48 days after the arrest. The officer testified he did not set the court appearance on the later date because he thought it should be scheduled before the 46-day statutory summary license suspension deprived defendant of his driver\u2019s license. The officer also stated that he was away at a five-day seminar beginning on October 5, 1987, and on vacation for nine days beginning on October 10,1987.\nDefense counsel argued that the courtroom in which defendant\u2019s case would have been heard was in the same facility in which the police station was located. Counsel also claimed there were at least nine court dates for the Schaumburg police department on the court calendar prosecuted by the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office within the prescribed time period. Lastly, defense counsel stated that the adjoining communities of Elk Grove Village, Hoffman Estates, and Hanover Park had assistant State\u2019s Attorneys available during the time period at issue. In response, the State admitted that the case was not set within the 14- to 49-day period prescribed by Rule 504, but contended it was not practicable for the officer to do so.\nThe circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 504. In determining that it was practicable for the arresting officer to schedule defendant\u2019s court date within the 14- to 49-day period, the court observed that\n\u201cthe officer was present in court and did testify on the 49th day on one of his regular key dates. *** [Ejvidently it was very practicable to be here because he was here and that was his scheduled date.\u201d\nThe court then concluded:\n\u201cThe officer had a practicable date on the 49th day, undisputed. He chose, in good faith, to set a different date because he was concerned about the 46 days of the summary suspension. *** However, under those Supreme Court Rules, I do not believe that Rule 504 was followed. It was obviously practicable to set the uniformed [sic] traffic citation for the 49th day. And, therefore the uniform traffic citation charges will be dismissed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 504.\u201d\nThe State appeals.\nThe State first contends the circuit court abused its discretion when it granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, suggesting defendant waived his right to present the motion by failing to do so at his initial court appearance. This contention is without merit; defendant\u2019s objection to his appearance date was raised in a timely fashion and addressed thoroughly by the circuit court at the October 27, 1987, hearing.\nThe State next contends the dismissal was improper because it was impracticable to schedule defendant\u2019s appearance date between the 14- to 49-day period set forth in Supreme Court Rule 504. It is undisputed that the appearance date was not set within the specified period. That fact, however, is not sufficient in and of itself to require dismissal; the rule is not absolute and is directory only as to the time limitations. (Village of Park Forest v. Fagan (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 264, 356 N.E.2d 59; People v. Hutson (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 977, 360 N.E.2d 548.) If the appearance date is not set within the rule\u2019s time period, the State is required to establish it was impracticable to do so. (Fagan, 64 Ill. 2d 264; People v. Hutson, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 979.) Further, the circuit court\u2019s determination regarding the impracticability of setting that date within the prescribed period will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Hutson, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 979.\nThe question on appeal, therefore, is not whether the failure to schedule defendant\u2019s appearance date within the time period of Rule 504 caused \u201cany injury to [the] public interest or [to] private rights,\u201d as suggested by the dissent. (See 191 Ill. App. 3d at 967.) We do not read Fagan to allow noncompliance with the time periods prescribed in Rule 504 as long as no \u201cinjury to the public interest or to private rights\u201d results; that language in Fagan supported the supreme court\u2019s conclusion that those time limitations were directory. The court then states in the following paragraph (Fagan, 64 Ill. 2d at 268):\n\u201cTo comply with the rule, an arresting officer should schedule [timely] appearance dates \u2018whenever practicable, \u2019 notwithstanding the directory construction we hereby give to the rule.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe good intentions of the arresting officer or the convenience of the parties are irrelevant where, as here, it was practicable to set the appearance date within 14 to 49 days after the date of the arrest.\nTherefore, we must determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion in finding that it was practicable to set the appearance date within the rule-prescribed 14- to 49-day period after defendant\u2019s arrest. In the instant case, defendant\u2019s appearance date was scheduled 13 days after his arrest, rather than the 14-day minimum specified in Rule 504. The circuit court expressly noted, however, that the arresting officer was scheduled for a regular court date, and in fact did appear in court, within a 49-day period after defendant\u2019s arrest. Based upon these facts, the court found that it was practicable for the appearance date to be set within the time period provided in Rule 504. The record further indicates that the court recognized but rejected the \u201cgood faith\u201d reason for setting the date outside of the 14- to 49-day span, instead closely following the plain language of the rule.\nIn light of its careful review of the circumstances, we simply cannot say the circuit court abused its discretion in finding that it was practicable to set the appearance date within the guidelines of Rule 504. The order of dismissal must be affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBILANDIC, P.J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARTMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE SCARIANO,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent. As the majority opinion notes, the supreme court held in Village of Park Forest v. Fagan (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 264, 267, 356 N.E.2d 59, that the language of Rule 504 \u201cclearly indicates that the 45-day period is not meant to be absolute.\u201d The court went on to \u201cobserve that Rule 504 contains no language which denies the municipality\u2019s right to prosecute or the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction to hear the case where the appearance date is not timely set. *** Nor do we believe that violation of the rule would ordinarily cause any injury to public interest or private rights.\u201d Accordingly, the court held \u201cthat the time limitations in Rule 504 are directory.\u201d 64 Ill. 2d at 268.\nHere, although it appears to have been practicable to have set the case within the time frame of the rule, the record establishes that the officer did not do so because he thought he had to schedule the matter before the defendant\u2019s statutory summary suspension went into effect. The trial judge acknowledged that the officer \u201cchose, in good faith, to set a different date because he was concerned about the 46 days of the summary suspension. Nobody could fault him for that.\u201d Nevertheless, the judge dismissed the \u201ccharges pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 504\u201d because \u201cit was .obviously practicable to set the *** citation for the 49th day.\u201d\nDefendant does not disagree with the trial judge\u2019s finding that Officer Young acted in good faith when he missed complying with Rule 504 by one day; nor does he dispute that the officer's good faith was based on the honest belief that defendant\u2019s case had to be scheduled before the statutory summary suspension went into effect \u201cbecause my next court day was the 20th of October, and I thought for the law enforcement sworn report it had to be 46 days or prior, or earlier.\u201d\nI therefore find it difficult to understand how Officer Young\u2019s sincere attempt to accommodate defendant, in the words of our supreme court in Fagan, caused \u201cany injury to [the] public interest or [to] private rights.\u201d Nor do I read the supreme court\u2019s holding in Fagan \u201cthat the time limitations in Rule 504 are directory\u201d to be regarded as ad hoc. 64 Ill. 2d at 268.\nAccordingly, I would reverse and remand the cause for trial.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE SCARIANO," } ], "attorneys": [ "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Lacoulton Walls, and Brian Grossman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Massucei, Blomquist, Brown & Judson, of Arlington Heights (Ernest Blomquist and Brian Crowley, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARIO ALFONSO, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201487\u20143650\nOpinion filed November 28, 1989.\nS CARI ANO, J., dissenting.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Lacoulton Walls, and Brian Grossman, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nMassucei, Blomquist, Brown & Judson, of Arlington Heights (Ernest Blomquist and Brian Crowley, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0963-01", "first_page_order": 985, "last_page_order": 989 }