{ "id": 2506360, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Robinson", "decision_date": "1989-12-15", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201487\u20141365", "first_page": "225", "last_page": "232", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 225" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2993679 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 964", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5435086 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "967" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/0964-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473000 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3172942 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2969687 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2993769 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 760, "char_count": 14981, "ocr_confidence": 0.731, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.843227755255563e-08, "percentile": 0.3629354452711336 }, "sha256": "b03b2e95af0bb2995b4ed3f087cede21a7d981463f66218c127ffc64ac3171a9", "simhash": "1:d362dfc450a4dd47", "word_count": 2453 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:46:08.994081+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE MURRAY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Larry Robinson appeals from his jury convictions of murder and robbery, for which he was sentenced to concurrently serve 60 years for murder and seven years for robbery. On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to meet the guilty beyond a reasonable doubt standard and, further, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.\nWilliam Delemore was found dead with his body set afire at approximately 5:30 a.m. on April 29, 1986. He was lying in the building lobby at 511 East Browning Street (511 building) near a blood-spattered wall. No wallet or identification was found on the body. In response to a call, several hours later police officers were given articles belonging to Delemore, e.g., credit cards, paycheck, by a resident living in apartment 502 in a building located at 514 East 36th Street (514 building); defendant lived almost directly above in apartment 601. The resident had found the items on the floor approximately one foot from the elevator which was near her apartment.\nThe record reveals the following facts. During the evening of April 28, 1986, there was a social gathering at which liquor was consumed in an apartment in a building located at 540 East 36th Street (540 building). (All three buildings being discussed are a part of the Chicago Housing Authority Ida B. Wells project.) Andre Daniel, a State witness, lived in this apartment with his fiancee. Sometime during the evening, defendant\u2019s girl friend, Mugette Jackson, called the party and asked defendant to come home; it is not known when defendant actually left the 540 building. Defendant lived with Jackson in the 514 building.\nDaniel testified that around 4:30 a.m. on April 29, he was returning home from a store with a six-pack of beer when he met defendant, either outside or in the lobby of the 514 building. The two men had a short, general conversation during which Daniel noticed a man asleep on the lobby floor. According to Daniel, defendant grabbed the sleeping man (later identified as Delemore) by his collar, and with two hands, started banging Delemore\u2019s head against the wall. When defendant asked Delemore his name, there was no response. Daniel said that Delemore did not fight back. When Daniel grabbed defendant and told him to let the man alone because he was drunk, defendant said that he would do the same to him (Daniel). Daniel left the building while defendant was still banging the victim\u2019s head and ran into Lee Moore. The two men returned to the 514 building and pulled defendant off Delemore. Daniel noticed that the victim was bleeding around his head. As the men held defendant, Daniel told Delemore to run. Delemore ran toward the 511 building with defendant running after him. Buildings 514 and 511 are across a playground from each other.\nDaniel then went to his fiancee\u2019s apartment in the 540 building, told her what was happening, and then went back down to the 511 building 5 or 10 minutes later. As he walked into the building, he saw defendant beating Delemore and stomping on his face and chest for quite a while. Delemore did not speak or move and had blood all over his face. Defendant then went through Delemore\u2019s pockets, removed his wallet, and took money from it. Daniel returned to the 540 apartment, but went back to the 511 building no more than 10 minutes later. He saw that a man\u2019s outstretched legs were on fire and returned to his apartment and called the \u201cWe Tip\u201d emergency service. This call was later verified. However, it is not clear whether Daniel made the call during his second return to his apartment or after seeing the fire.\nLee Moore also testified for the prosecution. He stated that during the early morning hours he descended the inside stairs to the lobby of the 514 building and saw defendant and Delemore fighting, with Daniel watching. Delemore was stumbling and weaving from side to side, and he and defendant were swinging at each other. Moore and Daniel broke up the fight but defendant broke loose and started hitting Delemore again. Moore and Daniel stopped the fight a second time, after which defendant picked Delemore up off the floor and threw him out of the building. Moore last saw the stumbling and tripping victim head towards the 511 building, followed by defendant. On cross-examination, Moore stated that both defendant and Delemore had blood on them and that they both had their fists raised (as though they were protecting their faces). Although both men were trying to kick each other, only defendant succeeded and, at some time, Delemore was knocked to the ground. Moore also said that he heard both men speak and that he saw defendant start the second fight.\nDefendant testified that he had stayed at Daniel\u2019s home until 2 a.m., when he started home. When he got to the 514 building (where he lived), Delemore came up behind defendant and put a hand on his shoulder. Defendant objected, and Delemore said that he was putting his hand back on his shoulder, after which defendant slapped Delemore. Daniel then came into the building. Delemore put up his hands to fight, and defendant asked him if he wanted to fight. Delemore said yes, and the two men went to a clearing between the 511 and 514 buildings. Defendant hit Delemore exactly 14 times and only with an open hand, periodically asking Delemore in between hits if he wanted to continue fighting. Defendant won the fight and said that he had left Delemore, bleeding but conscious, sitting against a door of the 511 building. Defendant then went home at approximately 2:30 a.m. He cleaned blood off his shoes with a wet rag and then went to sleep.\nTestifying for the State, Mugette Jackson said that defendant did not come home from the party until 6 a.m. on April 29. When she came home from work later that day, Jackson saw the gym shoes that defendant had been wearing that morning soaking in a bucket of water. Later that evening, she gave the wet shoes, two pairs of defendant\u2019s jeans, and other clothing to the police when they came to the apartment. One leg of a pair of jeans was also wet.\nDefendant\u2019s brother testified that in May 1986, he was present when Daniel told defense counsel that he (Daniel) did not see defendant take anything from the victim.\nAn assistant Cook County medical examiner testified that the victim suffered extensive head and face injuries with brain damage and also had injuries in the chest area. In her opinion, the medical examiner believed that Delemore died as a result of cranial cerebral injuries, which injuries were consistent with those incurred by having one\u2019s head banged on a wall or floor. She also reported that Delemore was dead before he was burned and that he had an ethanol intoxication level of 223 milligrams per deciliter. The doctor stated that this amount of alcohol would normally affect a person\u2019s coordination and make him drowsy and lethargic. There were no injuries on Delemore\u2019s hands indicating that he had been in a fight. There were, however, burn injuries.\nAfter rejecting defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict, the court refused to tender a voluntary manslaughter instruction to the jury, concluding that the evidence presented did not warrant such an instruction. We agree and affirm the trial court for the following reasons.\nDefendant\u2019s reasons for asserting that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt are legally deficient. Although the \u201cguilty beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d standard has no explicit definition, it has been interpreted to mean that the burden has not been met where a reasonable juror could not return a guilty verdict (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237) or, a guilty verdict must be set aside where the evidence is so improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive so as to be unworthy of belief (People v. Ellis (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 489). Defendant further argues that because his conviction rests solely upon circumstantial evidence, his guilt must be thoroughly established to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See People v. Garrett (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 151.\nFirst, we are not so certain that, in a circumstantial evidence case, the \u201cevery other reasonable hypothesis of innocence\u201d element should be elevated to a standard of proof. (People v. Bryant (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 497.) However, as a practical matter, in order to meet the \u201cguilty beyond a reasonable doubt\u201d standard, the prosecution would need to overcome any theories based on the facts that would reasonably indicate the possibility that a defendant could be innocent. The key word here is \u201creasonable.\u201d Defendant claims that reasonable doubt as to his guilt exists because of conflicts in the witnesses\u2019 testimony: Daniel\u2019s account of defendant\u2019s unprovoked assault on an unresponsive Delemore versus Moore\u2019s and defendant\u2019s mutual combat descriptions; discrepancies between Daniel\u2019s and Moore\u2019s statements regarding where they met up with each other (inside or outside the building); and Jackson\u2019s inconclusive testimony regarding the time defendant arrived home. Defendant further contends that the function of the jury to assess credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence is not an issue here; the real issue is whether the evidence was insufficient for a jury to make a determination of guilt.\nContrary to defendant\u2019s assertions, this is not a case where a guilty finding was based solely on circumstantial evidence. There is both direct and circumstantial evidence here. Daniel\u2019s eyewitness testimony is direct evidence that defendant savagely and unprovokedly beat Delemore, who appeared to be intoxicated and uncoordinated. Moore\u2019s testimony is direct evidence that there was an unequal combat between defendant and an ineffectual Delemore that, after being stopped by the witnesses, was reinstigated by defendant. The medical examiner\u2019s determination that the injuries which caused Delemore\u2019s death were consistent with the type of beating described by Daniel is circumstantial evidence. Daniel\u2019s observation of defendant\u2019s robbery of Delemore is direct evidence; the finding of the victim\u2019s empty wallet and papers right below defendant\u2019s apartment is circumstantial. Thus, it is clear that the jury\u2019s assessment of the witnesses\u2019 testimony and the weight assigned thereto do play a role in the reasonable inferences it may draw. The jury apparently gave more weight to the testimony of Daniel, who was the only witness to see the beginning and the end of the \u201cfight.\u201d\nIn any event, looking at Moore\u2019s testimony in its entirety, it is corroborative of Daniel\u2019s account regarding important facts. Both witnesses observed defendant\u2019s assault on, or fight with, a man who was at an obvious disadvantage and, further, defendant became the aggressor after the fight was initially stopped. Both witnesses saw Delemore, shortly before his burning body was found, stumble towards the 511 building with defendant in pursuit. Without reiterating all the evidence presented to the jury, it is clear that there were sufficient facts to support the inference drawn by the jury that defendant killed Delemore. In fact, given the time frame, absent any evidence of the intervention of a third party or another possible cause of death, the only reasonable inference the jury could have drawn is that defendant severely beat an intoxicated man, which beating resulted in the victim\u2019s death. Thus, the evidence in this case does support the jury\u2019s determination that defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nDefendant\u2019s argument that the court erred by not instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter is also without merit. A court must give such an instruction in a murder trial if there is any evidence presented that, if believed by the jury, would reduce the crime to manslaughter. (People v. Leonard (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 411.) Defendant claims that the trial court should have given the instruction because he was acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9\u20142(a).) However, before the instruction is given, the court must decide if enough evidence of serious provocation has been presented to put the issue to the jury.\nIn Illinois, mutual combat constitutes provocation sufficient to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter. (Leonard, 83 Ill. 2d 411.) Mutual combat has been interpreted as \u201ca fight or struggle which both parties enter willingly or in which two persons, upon a sudden quarrel, and in hot blood, mutually fight upon equal terms and death results from the combat.\u201d (People v. Neal (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 964, 967.) Although very slight evidence indicating voluntary manslaughter can justify the giving of the appropriate instruction, that evidence must demonstrate more than slight provocation; the provocation must be serious enough so as to excite a reasonable person to intense passion. People v. Simpson (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 497.\nEven if we were to believe defendant\u2019s version of the facts, there is no evidence of provocation sufficient to require a manslaughter instruction. By his own account, defendant stated that Delemore put his hand on defendant\u2019s shoulder, and after defendant knocked it off, Delemore said he would do it again. After this, defendant slapped Delemore once and asked him if he wanted to fight. After going outdoors, defendant slapped Delemore once, causing him to fall, slapped him exactly 13 more times \u2014 stopping between each slap to ask Delemore if he wanted to continue the fight \u2014 until Delemore fell down a second time, thus ending the combat. Defendant testified that he had noticed that Delemore had been drinking and also stated that he had twice knocked down Delemore. Defendant said that he was hit four or five times but was never knocked down. Were it possible to consider the placing of a hand on one\u2019s shoulder to be adequate provocation (a consideration we emphatically reject), defendant\u2019s behavior, by his own testimony, was indicative of a calm and deliberate state of mind which belies the existence of any sudden and intense passion or, for that matter, mutual combat upon equal terms.\nAccordingly, the evidence in this case is insufficient as a matter of law to mandate the giving of a voluntary manslaughter instruction to the jury.\nAffirmed.\nPINCHAM and COCCIA, JJ., concur.\nJustice Pincham participated in the decision prior to his resignation.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE MURRAY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Martin Carlson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, and Winston & Strawn, both of Chicago (William G. Miossi, of counsel), for appellant.", "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Renee G. Goldfarb, and Jerry D. Bischoff, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201487\u20141365\nOpinion filed December 15, 1989.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Martin Carlson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, and Winston & Strawn, both of Chicago (William G. Miossi, of counsel), for appellant.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Renee G. Goldfarb, and Jerry D. Bischoff, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0225-01", "first_page_order": 247, "last_page_order": 254 }