{ "id": 2504521, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEIL BLITSTEIN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Blitstein", "decision_date": "1989-12-15", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201488\u20140953", "first_page": "281", "last_page": "285", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 281" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 757", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 887", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3423171 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0887-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 112", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12050514 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" }, { "page": "161" }, { "page": "860" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0112-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 581, "char_count": 10500, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.121491057675486e-08, "percentile": 0.4274687443167536 }, "sha256": "410b8612adbaf5e32655d1cb291e7c3ab35e16c6e6096fbf8e3e7af390c8503a", "simhash": "1:d5fbac3e0e4a13d1", "word_count": 1779 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:46:08.994081+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEIL BLITSTEIN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Neil Blitstein, was convicted of theft by deception following a trial without a jury. The trial court sentenced defendant to two years\u2019 probation. On appeal, defendant contends that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the three-year statute of limitations had run when the State filed its indictment. Although we find that the statute of limitation issue is dispositive of the appeal, we shall set forth the facts in some detail.\nOn March 21, 1986, defendant was indicted by a grand jury for the continuing theft of checks belonging to Scrap Corporation of America (SCA). The indictment alleged that defendant \u201cobtained by deception control over property, to wit: checks or orders for the payment of money of an amount in excess of $300 *** intending to permanently deprive the owner of the use and benefit of said property.\u201d The indictment stated further that the offense was \u201cone of a series of such offenses performed at different times *** and for which period of limitations prescribed by chapter 38, section 3 \u2014 8, begins at the time when the last such act is committed, to wit: on or about March 22, 1983.\u201d\nOn May 2, 1986, defendant requested a bill of particulars. The State answered that it had tendered the 91 checks which created the $101,000 figure charged in the indictment. The court found this was sufficient answer to defendant\u2019s request.\nOn September 30, 1986, defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. Defendant argued that the last \u201covert act\u201d of the continuing theft was March 16, 1983, the date of the last alleged nondelivery of goods, or on March 18, 1983, the date of the check issued by SCA to defendant\u2019s company. The State maintained that the last overt act occurred on March 30, 1983. The court denied the motion to dismiss, relying on the fact that defendant\u2019s bank stamped the check on March 22, and SCA's bank paid the check on March 23, thereby falling short of the statute of limitations by one and two days, respectively.\nAt trial, it was established that defendant worked for SCA, which was in the business of buying steel scrap, as a yard foreman from 1980 until March 30, 1983. At the same time, defendant owned two businesses, Bartco and U.S. Tank, which provided steel scrap to scrap companies. In 1981, Bartco began selling scrap to SCA. In 1982, U.S. Tank began selling scrap to SCA. During 1981, 1982 and 1983, SCA had paid out 91 checks to Bartco and U.S. Tank, for a total of $101,988.21.\nThe \"method of delivery of scrap and payment therefor was established at trial as the key to the alleged fraud. When a truckload of scrap entered the SCA yard, it was weighed at a scale by the scale-master, whose work station overlooked the scale platform. An instrument printed the weight on a receiving ticket, which was time stamped by the scalemaster. The truck left the scale. The scrap on the truck was inspected by a yard inspector or foreman, who completed an inspection ticket and had the truck unloaded. The empty truck was then reweighed. The scalemaster recorded the second weight, time stamped the ticket, and recorded the load\u2019s receipt in a purchase log. The yardmaster or his assistant made out a check for the delivery.\nJames Sargent, SCA\u2019s manager of trucking, testified for the State that on March 30, 1983, he arrived at work at 5 a.m. His second-floor office overlooked the truck scale. At 5:45 a.m., Sargent heard defendant arrive in his first-floor office. No one else was present. Patrick Tang, SCA\u2019s general manager, had instructed Sargent to watch to see if trucks weighed on the scale corresponded with receiving tickets. Sargent heard defendant go upstairs, and he then twice heard the scale operating. Sargent looked out the window facing the scale and saw nothing on it. There were no trucks in the yard. When Sargent returned to his office, he saw on the scalemaster\u2019s desk a receiving ticket for Bartco, which had not been present several minutes earlier.\nTang testified that in March 1983 SCA had hired a private investigation firm to survey the traffic coming into the yard. Tang personally went through the yard on various dates, including March 7, 11, 18, and 30, 1983, looking for Bartco loads after being notified of a Bartco entry in the scalemaster\u2019s record. He could find no Bartco loads in the yard. On March 30, Tgng met with defendant, who stated that Bartco owned a red truck and a white truck. Defendant was terminated that day. During Tang\u2019s employment with SCA he never saw any Bartco or U.S. Tank trucks in the yard. The traffic control reports on several occasions showed no entry of Bartco trucks on days when the purchase logs showed that a Bartco delivery and payment had been made. With the exception of four inspection reports, the remaining 87 inspection reports on Bartco and U.S. Tank loads were prepared by defendant. Most of the receiving tickets were unusual because they had no time stamp or carrier designation on them, and after April 1982 they were not signed by the scalemaster. Also unusual was the fact that the purchase logs showed the Bartco and U.S. Tank loads were usually listed as either the first or last entries of the day. Defendant was authorized to weigh and inspect early deliveries if the scalemaster was not yet on duty.\nSheila Green, the scalemaster from 1980 to 1985, testified for the State. The digital weigher could be operated manually so that a weight could be entered without a truck being on the scale. Most of the relevant inspection reports and receiving tickets were completed by defendant. Most of the receiving tickets were time stamped to show the time of delivery arid were all processed by defendant. She had never seen a Bartco or U.S. Tank delivery, or processed any weighing information for their loads while she was scalemaster. She often found Bartco receiving tickets on her desk when she arrived in the morning. Trucks could bypass the guardhouse and go directly to the scale.\nDefendant testified that materials from Bartco were delivered by independent truckers, including Lucien Ouelletter and Bobby Goss. As yard foreman, he filled out 30 or 40 inspection reports at the end of each day without viewing the loads. In 1982, he began dismantling a ship for which he sold the scrap to SCA. It was transported in SCA trailers in 20 or 30 different loads. He had five to seven men on the crew working for U.S. Tank, but could only remember one named \u201cAmelio.\u201d He had no record of payments to Bartco drivers because they were paid in cash.\nWe initially consider defendant\u2019s contention that the three-year statute of limitations had run at the time he was indicted.\nOn March 21, 1986, defendant was indicted. The applicable statute requires that defendant be charged within three years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 3\u20145.) A statute of limitations begins to run when the alleged offense is completed. (Toussie v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 112, 115, 25 L. Ed. 2d 156, 161, 90 S. Ct. 858, 860.) The State bears the burden of proving that the offense occurred within the applicable statute of limitations. (People v. Steinmann (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 887, 373 N.E.2d 757.) The March 30, 1983, fraudulent receiving ticket allegedly completed by defendant obviously would not be covered under the indictment, and we reject the State\u2019s argument to the contrary. The other relevant dates showing the time the offense was completed establish that the statute of limitations had expired when the indictment was filed.\nOn March 16, 1983, the last nondelivery of scrap allegedly took place.\nAs the State apparently concedes, on March 18, 1983, SCA\u2019s check bearing that date was received by defendant personally, since the check showed no mailing address.\nOn March 22, 1983, defendant\u2019s bank stamped the check when defendant cashed it. On March 23,1983, SCA\u2019s bank paid the check.\nThe indictment states that by deception defendant obtained control over property, specifically \u201cchecks or orders for the payment of money.\u201d The evidence establishes without question that the last time defendant obtained control over a \u201ccheck or order for the payment of money\u201d was on March 18, 1983. Moreover, the State\u2019s answer to defendant\u2019s bill of particulars was that the checks themselves were \u201cthe property herein involved.\u201d\nThe theft statute defines \u201cproperty\u201d as \u201ccommercial instruments.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 15 \u2014 1.) The value of a commercial instrument is its \u201cmarket value.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 15 \u2014 9(a).) The check itself, therefore, and not the cash ultimately received for that check, satisfies the theft statute.\nWe find that the theft of the March 18 check was complete when defendant obtained control over it. He could not commit a second, separate theft of the same check when he cashed it. See People v. Steinmann (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 887, 373 N.E.2d 757.\nMoreover, it would be absurd to require the State to delay an arrest until a defendant actually cashed a check which he had stolen by deception. The State had every right to arrest defendant on March 18, as soon as he had the check in hand. If, as the State argues, there could be insufficient funds in SCA\u2019s account to cover the check, or if SCA stopped payment on the check, the theft would still be complete. Under the State\u2019s logic, the theft would not be complete if defendant could not find a bank willing to cash a check made out to Bartco, or the check was accidentally destroyed after defendant obtained it, or a third party stole the check from defendant before he could cash it.\nAlthough the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we hold that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that the offense occurred within the applicable three-year statute of limitations. Thus, the conviction must be reversed.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nEGAN, P.J., and LaPORTA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "John Thomas Moran, Jr., of Law Offices of John Thomas Moran, and Mitchell C. Ex, of Kessler & Ex, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund and Bonnie Meyer Sloan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEIL BLITSTEIN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201488\u20140953\nOpinion filed December 15, 1989.\nJohn Thomas Moran, Jr., of Law Offices of John Thomas Moran, and Mitchell C. Ex, of Kessler & Ex, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund and Bonnie Meyer Sloan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0281-01", "first_page_order": 303, "last_page_order": 307 }