{ "id": 2507931, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL O'DONNELL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. O'Donnell", "decision_date": "1989-12-18", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201487\u20143737", "first_page": "321", "last_page": "325", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 321" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "406 U.S. 404", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6171091 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/406/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 447", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11338986 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482-83" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "3174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0447-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 522, "char_count": 8350, "ocr_confidence": 0.716, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7817273071113374e-08, "percentile": 0.29993621249733093 }, "sha256": "3760ba2edd0a697da1524d2623182c35616b9e3efc9c0ccd8a68ef6bd1bf9d35", "simhash": "1:e2f22b2e6f3fadbb", "word_count": 1381 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:46:08.994081+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL O\u2019DONNELL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Daniel O\u2019Donnell was convicted of residential burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 19\u20143(a)), after a bench trial. O\u2019Donnell appeals, arguing that his waiver of a jury trial was not made knowingly or understandingly. For the reasons below, we affirm.\nOn May 11, 1987, Chicago police officers Raymond Bell and Thomas Puzinski answered a burglar alarm at the home of Ms. Susan Mauro. At Ms. Mauro\u2019s residence, Officer Bell walked to the back of the house and noticed the back door ajar with signs of forced entry. Returning to the front of the house, Officer Bell saw someone leaving the house through the bathroom window,' carrying a pink-colored sack.\nOfficer Bell chased the suspect down a gangway toward an alley, where the suspect dropped the sack. The officers radioed for assistance, and the suspect was caught. Throughout the entire chase, Officer Bell had not lost sight of the suspect.\nThe suspect was identified as the defendant, Daniel O\u2019Donnell, also known as Harold Sonnenberg, William T. Boley, and John Fleming. The police recovered the pink sack, which was a pillow case containing a clock, several screwdrivers, jewelry, a cosmetic kit, and a pair of gloves. O\u2019Donnell was charged with residential burglary.\nBefore trial, O\u2019Donnell waived his right to a jury trial in the following colloquy:\n\u201cDEFENSE COUNSEL: Mr. O\u2019Donnell is present in open court, your honor. At this time, he\u2019s executing a jury waiver.\nTHE COURT: Mr. O\u2019Donnell, do you understand that under the Constitution, you are entitled to a trial by jury?\nDEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Now, a jury trial would involve selecting 12 people from our community. We have about 50 or 60 people in here and we\u2019d talk to them find out things about them, and your lawyer would participate and the State\u2019s Attorney would participate. Eventually, we would select 12 people to sit as a jury.\nThose 12 people would hear the evidence and the arguments of the lawyers. And I would give them very specific instructions as to what the law is that applies to your case.\nAnd in a jury trial, those 12 jurors would decide by unanimous vote, at some point, whether or not you are going to be found guilty or not guilty.\nDo you understand what a jury trial is?\nDEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: When you signed [the waiver] did you understand, you were saying, I Dan O\u2019Donnell, want to give up my right to a jury trial? Is that what you want to do?\nDEFENDANT: Yes, your honor.\u201d\nAt trial, the police officers testified to the events leading to O\u2019Donnell\u2019s arrest. Ms. Mauro identified as her property the pink pillow case and its contents, except for the screwdrivers and gloves.\nO\u2019Donnell testified that he had run from the police because he had just bought some drugs in the neighborhood and thought the police were making a drug raid. O\u2019Donnell denied carrying anything during the chase. The prosecution impeached O\u2019Donnell with evidence of two prior convictions for burglary. The trial court found O\u2019Donnell guilty of residential burglary and sentenced him to eight years\u2019 imprisonment.\nO\u2019Donnell argues that the trial court\u2019s explanations concerning a jury trial were insufficient to allow an informed waiver because the trial court failed to explain the consequences of a non-unanimous verdict. O\u2019Donnell urges that a trial court must inform a defendant that if just one juror votes contrary to the majority to deadlock or \u201chang\u201d the jury, a new trial will be held if the State chooses to exercise that option. Although O\u2019Donnell raises an issue of first impression, his argument is without merit.\nO\u2019Donnell contends that although the issue of informed waiver was not preserved, it affected his substantial rights and should be reviewed under the doctrine of clear error. But the facts show that this was not a close case. The police responded to a burglary in progress, saw signs of forced entry at the victim\u2019s house, and saw O\u2019Donnell leave the house with property that belonged to the victim. O\u2019Donnell offered a different version of events, but was properly impeached. The record offers not a scintilla of doubt that the prosecution\u2019s witnesses were credible. O\u2019Donnell does not question the sufficiency or reliability of any of the evidence, nor does he suggest that the evidence was presented in any prejudicial way. The reliability of the evidence and its presentation cast grave doubt on whether a jury could reasonably have returned a verdict of not guilty. Given the overwhelming evidence, an uninformed waiver of a jury trial would not have constituted prejudicial error. O\u2019Donnell\u2019s argument does not meet the requirements for review under the doctrine of plain error.\nEven were the court to consider the merits of O\u2019Donnell\u2019s argument, he cannot prevail. O\u2019Donnell concedes that the trial court\u2019s procedure in obtaining the waiver was correct so far as it went, but argues that it did not go far enough. O\u2019Donnell contends that once the trial court explained the need for a unanimous jury verdict, it was required to explain the results of a hung jury. No contention such as O\u2019Donnell\u2019s has been addressed in any jurisdiction, but it is without merit.\nThe historical basis for the jury trial lies in the desire to protect the individual defendant against abuses of power by the State. Thus the right to a jury trial protects the right to have an authentic representation of the community ascertain the relevant facts and pass on the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. (See Spaziano v. Florida (1984), 468 U.S. 447, 482-83, 82 L. Ed. 2d 340, 367, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3174 (Stevens, J., dissenting).) The sixth amendment guarantees the defendant\u2019s right to a trial by jury, but does not include the right to a unanimous verdict. (Apodaca v. Oregon (1972), 406 U.S. 404, 32 L. Ed. 2d 184, 92 S. Ct. 1628.) Therefore, discussion of the effect of a non-unanimous verdict, where such is required for a guilty verdict, does not implicate the sixth amendment right to a jury trial.\nDiscussions of non-unanimous verdicts may affect choices of trial strategy, however, which is more properly the province of defense counsel. The trial court may provide the information, since it takes little time to impart and may greatly benefit the defendant, but the court is not obligated to discuss non-unanimous verdicts to enable the defendant to intelligently waive his sixth amendment right to a jury trial. Where a defendant is informed of his right to a trial by a jury that will determine his guilt or innocence, and of his ability to participate in selecting the jury, he has the minimum information necessary to exercise that right or waive it, because that is what the right encompasses.\nHere, O\u2019Donnell was an \u201cexperienced\u201d defendant who signed a waiver of a trial by jury in open court, after the court explained that in a trial by jury, both O\u2019Donnell\u2019s attorney and the State\u2019s Attorney would participate in selection of the jury from members of the community. O\u2019Donnell received, and indicated that he understood, the information necessary to intelligently waive his right to a jury trial. No further information was constitutionally required from the trial court, under the circumstances of this case, to enable O\u2019Donnell to execute an informed waiver of his right to a jury trial.\nIn summary, the issue O\u2019Donnell raised was not preserved for appeal, and given the reliability and the overwhelming nature of the evidence of his guilt, O\u2019Donnell cannot rely on the plain error doctrine to seek review. O\u2019Donnell could not prevail on the merits of his appeal in any event. He received the information necessary to make an informed waiver of his right to a jury trial, and no discussion of the effects of non-unanimous verdicts was necessary. Accordingly, we affirm O\u2019Donnell\u2019s conviction.\nAffirmed.\nMANNING, P.J., and BUCKLEY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Jeffrey M. Howard, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, David Butzen, and Dominick T. Dimaggio, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL O\u2019DONNELL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201487\u20143737\nOpinion filed December 18, 1989.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Jeffrey M. Howard, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, David Butzen, and Dominick T. Dimaggio, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0321-01", "first_page_order": 343, "last_page_order": 347 }