{ "id": 2505775, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CURTIS HALL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hall", "decision_date": "1989-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201486\u20143064", "first_page": "819", "last_page": "827", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 819" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3012326 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "884-85" }, { "page": "884" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0880-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 802, "char_count": 14485, "ocr_confidence": 0.736, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.647526417808124e-08, "percentile": 0.35250259764179304 }, "sha256": "afd8a1ed2138534389bb582049faa77def6f1f530b5b5903de8aa19a7164517f", "simhash": "1:3524bc2e693ca380", "word_count": 2390 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:46:08.994081+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CURTIS HALL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Curtis Hall, was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 12\u201414(a)(2)) and robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 18\u20141) following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County. The trial judge sentenced defendant to the penitentiary for concurrent terms of 60 years on the aggravated criminal sexual assault conviction and 14 years on the robbery conviction.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial due to the admission of irrelevant evidence. Defendant also contends that he was denied a fair trial because, during closing argument, the trial judge expressed his opinion that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt defendant\u2019s guilt, and the prosecutor made improper and prejudicial remarks. Defendant lastly contends his extended-term sentence for robbery must be vacated.\nWe affirm, as modified.\nBackground\nThe record contains the following pertinent facts. Defendant was charged in a 15-count indictment with various offenses relating to criminal sexual assault, robbery, and kidnapping. Prior to trial, the State entered a nolle prosequi on all but four counts. Defendant was tried to a jury on aggravated criminal sexual assault based on the victim\u2019s bodily harm, robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated criminal sexual assault based on kidnapping.\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial is summarized as follows. On the afternoon of July 30, 1984, the victim, a 16-year-old girl, left her home to pick up a relative, her godparents\u2019 grandchild, at school. After she exited a bus near 120th Street and Racine Avenue, she began walking on a dirt road towards Racine Avenue. As she walked, she saw defendant appear approximately 20 feet in front of her.\nAs they neared each other, defendant crossed the victim\u2019s path. He then wrapped his arms around her neck, choking her and inflicting pain. When she attempted to escape, he tightened his grip so that she could not breathe. He dragged her backwards into a vacant lot. He pulled her through the lot and under a broken fence, and into an area of tall bushes and trees.\nDefendant threw the victim to the ground. She screamed for her mother; defendant struck her forehead with his fist. Defendant then pulled the victim\u2019s pants down and forcibly subjected her to sexual intercourse. Defendant then sat next to the victim for approximately five minutes, took her pants off, again punched her face, and subjected her to sexual intercourse a second time. Defendant then took the victim\u2019s social security card, told her to \u201cshut up\u201d and \u201cstay there,\u201d and then departed.\nSeconds after defendant left, the victim got up and ran. She climbed over a barbed wire fence, sustaining injuries to her legs and hands. She found newspapers to cover the bottom half of her body. The victim ran to a nearby house where a woman assisted her and called the police and the victim\u2019s mother.\nPolice officers took the victim to Roseland Hospital, where she was met by her mother and other relatives. Her mother observed the victim\u2019s cuts and bruises. The victim gave Chicago police officer Leroy Johnson a description of the defendant. The victim was then taken to a medical clinic at 111th and State Streets. There the treating physician noticed swelling around the victim\u2019s neck and bruises on her forehead. As part of the examination, the physician prepared a Vitullo kit, a medical test used in sexual assault investigations, which included samples taken from the victim\u2019s vagina.\nA police criminologist examined the Vitullo kit, as well as blood and saliva samples from both the victim and defendant. Semen was present in the samples. The criminologist concluded essentially that she could not specifically identify the semen as defendant\u2019s. However, she also concluded that the test did not exclude defendant as the source of the semen. She stated that the test results were consistent with defendant being the source of the semen.\nThe victim subsequently identified defendant\u2019s photograph and swore out a criminal complaint. Defendant was arrested on September 16, 1984. A lineup was held the next day; the victim identified defendant.\nDefendant\u2019s case consisted of an examination of Officer Johnson, to impeach his testimony regarding defendant\u2019s description.\nThe jury convicted defendant of aggravated criminal sexual assault based on the victim\u2019s bodily harm, and robbery. The jury acquitted defendant of kidnapping and aggravated criminal sexual assault based on kidnapping.\nAt the sentencing hearing, the trial judge denied defendant\u2019s post-trial motion. At the close of the hearing, the trial judge sentenced defendant to the penitentiary for a term of 60 years on the aggravated criminal sexual assault conviction, and an extended term of 14 years on the robbery conviction, the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant appeals.\nOpinion\nI\nDefendant contends that he was denied a fair trial due to the admission of irrelevant evidence. He claims that the results of the blood and enzyme tests were irrelevant to whether he committed the offense.\nThe general test for the admissibility of evidence is its relevance. Evidence is admissible where it fairly tends to prove the particular offense charged. Any circumstances which tend to make the proposition at issue more or less probable may be put into evidence. Evidence is therefore relevant where the fact or circumstance offered tends to prove or disprove a disputed fact or to render the matter at issue more or less probable. Relevance can also be established by means of inference. People v. Jones (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 880, 884-85, 439 N.E.2d 1011, 1015-16.\nThe determination of whether evidence is relevant rests in the discretion of the trial court. The trial court\u2019s decision will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of discretion to the prejudice of defendant. Even where there is error, if the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, i.e., it is so convincing that the jury would have convicted even if the irrelevant evidence had been excluded, reversal is not required. Jones, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 884, 439 N.E.2d at 1015.\nAs we mentioned earlier, the blood and enzyme tests could not identify defendant as the particular source of the semen. Rather, all that the test could do, statistically, was place defendant in a large group of possible sources of the semen, between 40% and 60% of the black male population. Defendant argues that his membership in such a large category of possible offenders is not relevant to whether he committed the offense. Thus, defendant concludes that the criminologist\u2019s testimony that the test results were consistent with defendant being the offender were irrelevant and prejudicial.\nWe disagree. \u201cThis court and others have recognized heretofore that evidence of hair, blood, and semen found at the scene of the crime may be admitted, with appropriate foundation, even though its probative value may not be considerable.\u201d (People v. Johnson (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 328, 332, 345 N.E.2d 531, 535 (and cases cited therein).) The evidence in the case at bar was relevant insofar as it tended to exclude other persons and failed to exclude defendant as a possible offender. (See Johnson, 37 Ill. App. 3d at 332, 345 N.E.2d at 534.) Here, as in People v. Wright (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 159, 542 N.E.2d 367, the victim\u2019s identification of defendant, with the other corroborating evidence, \u201cserved to define the group of possible assailants (one), and the tests supported the identification by showing that he could not be ruled out. Thus, the blood group tests were admissible.\u201d Wright, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 165, 542 N.E.2d at 371.\nAs our supreme court noted in People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 378, 416, 447 N.E.2d 218, 236, \u201c[w]e must not confuse the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and its probative value.\u201d In the case at bar, defendant was entitled to argue to the jury the lack of any connection between him and the semen. He could have stressed the weak probative value of the test results, but he could not have barred their admission. (See Free, 94 Ill. 2d at 417, 447 N.E.2d at 237.) We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the blood and enzyme test results, and the criminologist\u2019s opinion based on those results.\nII\nDefendant contends he was denied a fair trial also because, during closing argument, the trial judge expressed his opinion that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt defendant\u2019s guilt.\nDefendant misreads the record. In a supplemental record, a court reporter certified as follows:\n\u201cI reported in shorthand the proceedings had in the above entitled cause; that page 373 [page 458 of the record on appeal] has been corrected from \u2018Not every piece of evidence has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, certainly every piece has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 To, \u2018Not every piece of evidence has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, certainly every piece has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 which I hereby certify is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nWe hold that the trial judge\u2019s comments did not deny defendant a fair trial.\nIll\nDefendant contends he was denied a fair trial also because the prosecutor made improper and prejudicial remarks during closing argument. He cites four instances of this alleged misconduct. A prosecutor has great latitude in presenting his or her closing argument. A reviewing court is reluctant to set aside a verdict based on remarks made during closing argument and does so only where the remarks are clearly prejudicial. In determining whether the remarks are prejudicial, a court must refer to the content of the language used, its relation to the evidence, and the effect of the argument on the rights of the accused to a fair and impartial trial. (People v. Franklin (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 408, 421, 355 N.E.2d 634, 645.) Also, the trial court is in a better position than a reviewing court to determine the prejudicial effect of a remark made during closing argument. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, its ruling should be upheld. People v. Smothers (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 172, 176, 302 N.E.2d 324, 327.\nA\nDefendant claims that the following remark by the prosecutor during closing argument was improper and prejudicial:\n\u201cNow ladies and gentlemen, the word reasonable doubt, has come up during the course of this trial. And I want you to understand something. We are not under an obligation to prove every piece of evidence that you heard from that stand, the testimony, beyond any reasonable doubt.\u201d\nThe trial judge sustained defendant\u2019s objection and instructed the jury with the remark discussed in Part II of this opinion. Thus the error, if any, was cured. See People v. Lloyd (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1025, 418 N.E.2d 131, 136.\nB\nDefendant claims that the prosecutor made \u201cpersonal attacks on the integrity and tactics of defense counsel\u201d and, therefore, were beyond the scope of proper argument. During his closing rebuttal argument, the prosecutor urged the jury not to allow defense counsel to put a \u201cguilt trip\u201d on them to obtain an acquittal.\nThe record shows that defense counsel invited these remarks. Defense counsel exhorted the jury not to judge defendant harshly. He even invoked the ancient admonition \u201cJudge not [lest] ye be judged.\u201d Since defense counsel invited the prosecutor\u2019s remark, defendant cannot now rely on the statement as error. See People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 329, 344, 385 N.E.2d 671, 677.\nC\nThe prosecutor also argued that one reason why the victim\u2019s identification of defendant was accurate was because his \u201cface would be the last face she might ever see on this earth.\u201d Defendant argues that this statement was not based on the evidence.\nWe disagree. It is quite settled that \u201ca prosecutor may reflect unfavorably upon an accused and indulge in invective in urging the fearless administration of the law, based upon the evidence and legitimate inferences drawn from it.\u201d (People v. Hovanec (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 401, 424, 394 N.E.2d 1340, 1356.) In the case at bar, the defendant literally snatched the victim from the street, choked her and treated her violently, and struck her twice. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the complained-of remark was a legitimate inference drawn from the evidence.\nD\nDefendant assigns error to the following statement: \u201cPam Fish [the police criminologist] said that the enzymes are consistent with what you could expect to find if [defendant] had raped [the victim].\u201d Defendant claims that this remark was not based on the evidence.\nWe disagree. The criminologist did testify that the blood and enzyme test results were consistent with defendant being the source of the semen found in the victim. That the semen might have come from another source did not preclude the argument that it came from defendant. The State was not prevented from arguing and drawing the inference which connected the victim with defendant. (See People v. Smith (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 138, 145, 310 N.E.2d 818, 823.) We hold that none of the prosecutor\u2019s remarks, considered individually or cumulatively, denied defendant a fair trial.\nIV\nDefendant lastly contends that his extended-term sentence of 14 years on the robbery conviction must be vacated. The State concedes error. (See People v. Jordan (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 192, 203-06, 469 N.E.2d 569, 574-75.) Robbery is a Class 2 felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 18\u20141(b).) The prescribed sentence for a Class 2 felony is a prison term of not less than three years and not more than seven years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20141(a)(5).) We reduce defendant\u2019s sentence on the robbery conviction from 14 years to 7 years. 107 Ill. 2d R. 615(b).\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed as modified by this opinion.\nAffirmed, as modified.\nJIGANTI, P.J., and McMORROW, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Thomas J. Long, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Kenneth T. McCurry, and Inez Toledo-Bargioni, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CURTIS HALL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201486\u20143064\nOpinion filed December 21, 1989.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Thomas J. Long, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Kenneth T. McCurry, and Inez Toledo-Bargioni, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0819-01", "first_page_order": 841, "last_page_order": 849 }