{ "id": 2506270, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETER SANTORO et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Santoro", "decision_date": "1989-12-22", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201488\u20141076", "first_page": "895", "last_page": "900", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 895" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "437 N.E.2d 1285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3023675 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 F.2d 1189", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 818101 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/445/1189-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 N.E.2d 89", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5408777 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 N.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Ill. App. 3d 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2648910 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/185/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 N.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3615720 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" }, { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0090-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 686, "char_count": 13333, "ocr_confidence": 0.728, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8938968314160866e-08, "percentile": 0.36897286289663994 }, "sha256": "4c5ca13bf32abeb63b547d2b82972b84616df42885069ca4fc2bed1069101321", "simhash": "1:3e29f1bfcc56fb8f", "word_count": 2287 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:46:08.994081+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETER SANTORO et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE EGAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is a State appeal from an order allowing the defendants\u2019 motion to suppress evidence.\nThe defendants, Peter Santoro and John Kopel, were arrested on August 10, 1987. The State charged both defendants with possession of cocaine; Kopel was also charged with possession of cannabis. At the suppression hearing, the only witness was Officer Thomas Villa, who was called by the defendants. The defendants also introduced some documents. Villa\u2019s testimony, in substance, is as follows:\nAt approximately 4 a.m. on August 10, 1987, Villa, a Burbank police officer for five years, was on routine patrol duty in a marked police vehicle driving southbound at the 8100 block of Long Avenue in the Village of Burbank. He noticed a Ford LTD, approximately three car lengths in front of him, that had a partially open trunk with a bicycle sticking out. He believed the trunk obscured the driver\u2019s vision, a traffic violation. He then ran an information check on the car\u2019s license plate, 733 788.\nThe radio communications dispatcher, Vicki Guiterrez, informed Villa that the plate was registered to a 1973 Dodge van owned by Peter Santoro and that the plate had expired in November 1986. He thought that Guiterrez might have told him that the status of the plate was unavailable.\nAfter receiving that information, Villa, who was alone, called over his radio for a backup and stopped the car. Santoro was driving, and Kopel was a passenger. It was dark out as Villa approached the car, and he turned on his flashlight. He went to the car window, which had been lowered, asked Santoro for his driver\u2019s license and used his flashlight to see into the car. He saw between Santoro\u2019s feet the butt of a gun sticking out from underneath Santoro\u2019s seat. At the time he saw the gun he was asking for Santoro\u2019s driver\u2019s license. After he observed the gun he pulled out his own gun and told both men to get out of the car; both men did so. For his own safety he had them put their hands on the vehicle, and he waited for his backup to come before he did any further investigation. After his backup arrived, he gave Kopel a \u201cpat-down search.\u201d\nWhile patting down Kopel to check for weapons, he came across a hard object in the crotch area of Kopel\u2019s pants. He had Kopel pull down his pants, and Villa retrieved a metallic pipe in a clear plastic bag that also contained a green leafy substance that appeared to Villa to be cannabis. He continued his search and found a cardboard cigarette package in Kopel\u2019s left shirt pocket. That package contained cigarettes and a small white envelope, identified on the street as a \u201csnow seal,\u201d that contained a white powdery substance.\nOfficer Danny Gafney searched Santoro and pulled from his left pants pocket a white envelope \u201csnow seal\u201d with white powder, suspected cocaine. Gainey conducted a full search of Santoro, not just a pat-down search. After the defendants were arrested, Villa took the gun from the car. It was a toy replica of an Uzi submachine gun. Villa took both men to the police station and issued a traffic ticket to Santoro for fictitious plates. He never gave Santoro a ticket for driving while his vision was obstructed.\nBefore he issued the ticket, Villa received the computer printout on the license plate. The printout indicated that the status of the plate was \u201cunavailable.\u201d No stops were in effect; there were no convictions of Santoro in the preceding 12 months, and he was not wanted on any warrants.\nThe defense established that the plates had been transferred from a 1973 Dodge to the 1978 Ford LTD on May 28, 1987, more than two months before Santoro\u2019s arrest.\nIn the ruling sustaining the motion to suppress, the judge made several observations with some of which we agree, but we do not agree with his determination of what constituted the ultimate factual issue. It appears to us that the issue in this case was misunderstood by defense counsel and the judge. The issue was not whether Villa had probable cause or reasonable grounds to issue the ticket for defective plates; the issue was whether he was justified first in stopping the vehicle, then in conducting a pat-down search and finally in conducting a full search. It is our judgment that Officer Villa was justified in taking each step.\nIt would needlessly lengthen this opinion to recite all that was said by the judge, but some of his remarks are appropriately set forth. During the hearing on the first day, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney objected to questions concerning what had transpired after the defendants were taken to the police station. He said, \u201cThe only thing in issue is the stop of the defendants and the subsequent search.\u201d The judge correctly agreed when he responded, in part, \u201cThe number one issue that is brought here today is the question of a police officer\u2019s credibility as to the stop and to the subsequent search.\u201d\nA lengthy discussion ensued between the judge and counsel over whether the proof would establish that on the day of the arrest the license plate on the Ford LTD was, in fact, registered with the Secretary of State on the Ford LTD and not the Dodge van. The State\u2019s Attorney would not agree that the proof would show registration on the LTD, and the case was continued.\nApproximately 3Vs months later, the hearing resumed. The defendant offered documentary evidence showing that the plates had been transferred from the 1973 Dodge to the 1978 Ford LTD on May 28, 1987, more than two months before Santoro\u2019s arrest. Therefore, it was clear that Santoro had not violated the registration statute.\nImmediately after both sides had rested the court said, \u201cMotion to suppress is granted.\u201d When the State\u2019s Attorney asked the basis of the judge\u2019s ruling, the judge said the following:\n\u201cIt\u2019s very simple. It\u2019s the credibility of the officer. He had the report in his hand at the time he wrote \u2018fictitious plates.\u2019 There was no evidence to show that in any way it was traced back.\nI really don\u2019t blame the officer for stopping him, but the problem is I can\u2019t put myself in that position because I have got to be available to have this thing done as the court of law in which there has to be probable cause for the purpose of the stop. It\u2019s kind of on a higher standard than what we think of generally applicable.\nWhat happened here, in reality, is that the bicycle kicked inquiry. I would be suspicious of somebody having a bicycle in the back. The problem is upon the check in with the license plates and things of that nature, now the officer is positive with the question of trying to, in effect, justify the stop. That\u2019s where it pops. Even this document [the computer printout] that they put in here, the status is not available. The credibility really comes down to issue when he goes and writes the ticket for fictitious plates and no document of any form that there is fictitious plates. It comes all the way back down the spindle.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nInitially, we observe that the trial judge applied the wrong standard applicable to the initial stop. The test is not whether Officer Villa had \u201cprobable cause\u201d to make the stop; the test is whether he had a \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d that the driver of the vehicle had violated the law. (People v. Repp (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 90, 94, 518 N.E.2d 750, 753; see also People v. Ohlinger (1989), 185 Ill. App. 3d 763, 542 N.E.2d 382.) But the application of the wrong standard, in our judgment, did not cause the error. We interpret all of the judge\u2019s remarks to mean that he did not believe that the officer had probable cause to issue the ticket for fictitious plates, that he believed that the officer knew he did not have probable cause to issue the ticket and that the officer issued the ticket in an attempt to justify the initial stop. What the officer believed or knew at the time he issued the ticket is not determinative of the issue.\nIt is uncontradicted that the police officer saw a bicycle in the car trunk causing a possible traffic violation. The judge believed that testimony. It is also uncontradicted that the officer called in and received information that the car had plates which were registered to another vehicle and which had expired. Villa\u2019s testimony is not only uncontradicted on this point but is corroborated by the computer printout which was introduced by the defendants. Regardless of whether Villa knew that the current status of the license registration was unavailable, it is uncontroverted that he did not know the status. Therefore, at the time of the stop, Villa had a \u201creasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to warrant the stop.\u201d (Repp, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 94.) It is of no significance that subsequent events did not bear out his suspicion. Any holding that the evidence in this case was insufficient to justify the initial stop would be clearly erroneous.\nAfter the initial stop, the officer saw what appeared to be a weapon extruding from under Santoro\u2019s seat. At that point he had every right to suspect that he was dealing with someone more dangerous than a traffic law violator. It is again of no significance that the weapon later proved to be a toy. The order for both men to get out of the car was a minimal intrusion into the defendants\u2019 personal liberty, and a subsequent pat-down search of Kopel was justified under the circumstances.\nA case similar on its facts to this case is People v. Williams (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 189, 328 N.E.2d 89, in which police officers stopped a vehicle for speeding at 6 a.m. The defendant was a passenger. Before stopping the car the officers ran a registration check on the license plate which showed that the vehicle was owned by a corporation. The driver had no driver\u2019s license, and a search of his person disclosed a cylindrical flask containing a white powder which the officer suspected was cocaine. The officer then told the defendant to get out of the car, and the officer searched him for the officer\u2019s protection. Before he searched the defendant he searched the car and found a revolver under the seat where the defendant was sitting. His search of the defendant disclosed heroin. The court upheld the search and cited United States v. Berryhill (9th Cir. 1971), 445 F.2d 1189, 1193, in which the court held as follows:\n\u201cWe think that Terry [Terry v. Ohio (1967), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868] recognizes and common sense dictates that the legality of such a limited intrusion into a citizen\u2019s personal privacy extends to a criminal\u2019s companions at the time of arrest. It is inconceivable that a peace officer effecting a lawful arrest of an occupant of a vehicle must expose himself to a shot in the back from [the] defendant\u2019s associate because he cannot, on the spot, make the nice distinction between whether the other is a companion in crime or a social acquaintance. All companions of the arrestee within the immediate vicinity, capable of accomplishing a harmful assault on the officer, are constitutionally subjected to the cursory \u2018pat-down\u2019 reasonably necessary to give assurance that they are unarmed.\u201d\nSee also People v. Bradi (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 594, 437 N.E.2d 1285.\nWe conclude, therefore, that Villa properly performed a pat-down search of Kopel and that in the course of that search and the later search of his shirt pocket properly discovered the evidence which the State sought to introduce.\nIn the trial court each defendant was represented by his own attorney and each filed his own motion to suppress. In this court both defendants are represented by the same attorney. In both the trial court and in this court they have presented the same argument and only that argument: The judge decided the case on the officer\u2019s credibility and concluded that the stop and search were unjustified. Kopel, the passenger, has not argued that a distinction should be made between the right to search a driver and the right to search a passenger. Nor has Santoro, the driver, made any attempt in the trial court or in this court to show or argue that the search by Gafney was unjustifiably extended beyond a pat-down search. Neither Gafney nor Santoro was called by the defendants to testify to the circumstances under which Santoro was searched. The record shows at least that Officer Gafney was justified in making a pat-down search. Villa testified simply that Gafney pulled from Santoro\u2019s left pants pocket a \u201cwhite envelope with white powder, which they suspected was cocaine.\u201d\nSince Santoro has not made any argument that Gafney\u2019s search was unreasonably extended and has introduced no proof to show that it was so unreasonably extended, any such argument is waived.\nFor these reasons we conclude that the motion to suppress should have been denied as to both defendants. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nMcNAMARA and LaPORTA, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE EGAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund and Linda Woloshin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Callie Baird and Vicki Rogers, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETER SANTORO et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201488\u20141076\nOpinion filed December 22, 1989.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Inge Fryklund and Linda Woloshin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Callie Baird and Vicki Rogers, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0895-01", "first_page_order": 917, "last_page_order": 922 }