{ "id": 2498181, "name": "BEVERLY SUNDERLAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRI-CITY COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Sunderland v. Tri-City Community Unit School District No. 1", "decision_date": "1990-01-18", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201489\u20140523", "first_page": "266", "last_page": "270", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 266" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "437 N.E.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3023870 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 N.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3618089 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/171/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "1986 Ill. Laws 3740", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 S. Ct. 131", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 842", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 601376, 600516, 599429, 599272, 600169, 600650, 601608, 601164, 600750, 602032, 600145, 601105, 601778, 599319, 600920, 601855 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0842-13", "/us/484/0842-06", "/us/484/0842-08", "/us/484/0842-14", "/us/484/0842-09", "/us/484/0842-04", "/us/484/0842-10", "/us/484/0842-11", "/us/484/0842-15", "/us/484/0842-01", "/us/484/0842-16", "/us/484/0842-07", "/us/484/0842-05", "/us/484/0842-12", "/us/484/0842-03", "/us/484/0842-02" ] }, { "cite": "499 N.E.2d 1019", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 888", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3643043 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0888-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. App. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5253021 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/82/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 1025", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 760", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3171445 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0760-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 426, "char_count": 6951, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.667075707363722e-08, "percentile": 0.45223408777886276 }, "sha256": "db14c21982ef4ba95bea38fc1cd6627adf396438471b95dc310c49bf2fece6ae", "simhash": "1:b8a25a8e3a0d35d3", "word_count": 1141 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:46.192510+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BEVERLY SUNDERLAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRI-CITY COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SPITZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff sued for injuries allegedly caused by defendants Tri-City Community Unit School District No. 1 (School) and Lisa Nunes (Nunes). The trial court granted defendant School\u2019s motion to dismiss. Defendant Nunes subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, which was also granted. The trial court held that Nunes was covered by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 85, par. 1 \u2014 101 et seq.) and that plaintiff had filed suit after the one-year statute of limitations contained in the Act. Plaintiff now appeals Nunes\u2019 dismissal from the suit.\nOn January 8, 1987, plaintiff, Beverly Sunderland, was injured at the Tri-City School gymnasium due to the alleged negligent acts or omissions of defendants School and Nunes. Plaintiff argues that her foot was injured when Nunes, a student at the school and manager of the school\u2019s volleyball team, wheeled the volleyball stand onto the gym floor. The stand separated from its support and landed on plaintiff\u2019s foot, causing severe injury.\nPlaintiff filed suit on January 4, 1989, against both defendants. The school district filed a motion to dismiss (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619(a)(5)), citing the statute of limitations for bringing civil suit against local governments and their employees (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 85, par. 8 \u2014 101). The trial court granted defendant School\u2019s motion to dismiss because plaintiff failed to commence her action within the one-year limitations period provided by the Act.\nDefendant Nunes filed an answer and affirmative defense to plaintiff\u2019s complaint on February 15, 1989. However, on March 10, 1989, Nunes filed a motion to withdraw answer, and on April 24, 1989, filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619). The motion to dismiss cited the statute of limitations provided in sections 8\u2014 101 and 1 \u2014 202 of the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 85, pars. 8 \u2014 101, 1 \u2014 202 (defining local government employees).) The trial court found Nunes to be an employee of the school district as defined by section 1 \u2014 202 of the Act at the time of the occurrence alleged in plaintiff\u2019s complaint. The court further found that plaintiff had failed to commence her action within the one-year limitations period provided in section 8 \u2014 101 of the Act. Consequently, the trial court granted Nunes\u2019 motion to dismiss. Plaintiff now appeals.\nPlaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in finding Nunes, a student manager of the volleyball team, an employee under the Act. Plaintiff claims that because the Act is in derogation of common law, it should be strictly construed against the local public entity. (Clark v. City of Chicago (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 760, 410 N.E.2d 1025.) A strict construction of the definition of \u201cemployee\u201d under the Act, plaintiff argues, does not include a student manager of a volleyball team.\nSection 1 \u2014 202 of the Act states in pertinent part:\n\u201c \u2018Employee\u2019 includes a present or former officer, member of a board, commission or committee, agent, volunteer, servant or employee whether or not compensated, but does not include an independent contractor.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 85, par. 1 \u2014 202.\nAt issue is whether the term \u201cvolunteer\u201d in section 1 \u2014 202 of the Act includes a student team manager. We find that under the facts of this case, defendant Nunes was a volunteer at the time of the alleged incident, and thus an employee, for the purposes of section 8 \u2014 101 of the Act.\nA volunteer is one who gives his services without any express or implied promise of remuneration. (Chicago & E.I. R.R. Co. v. Argo (1898), 82 Ill. App. 667.) At the time of the alleged accident, Nunes was acting solely as an unpaid manager of the school\u2019s volleyball team. She was under the direction and supervision of teachers and coaches when she moved the volleyball stand. As such, Nunes was a volunteer. The Act includes volunteers in its definition of employee, and where the language of a statute is clear, its meaning should be given effect without resort to supplementary principles of statutory construction. (People v. Server (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 888, 499 N.E.2d 1019, cert. denied (1987), 484 U.S. 842, 98 L. Ed. 2d 88, 108 S. Ct. 131.) A janitor moving a volleyball stand would be protected by the Act. There is no reason why a student moving a volleyball stand as a volunteer should not be afforded the same protection simply because she is a student.\nOur finding is strengthened by the fact that the legislature amended section 1 \u2014 202 of the Act effective November 25, 1986, by inserting the words \u201cagent\u201d and \u201cvolunteer.\u201d (1986 Ill. Laws 3740, 3741.) The purpose of this change was to broaden the scope of immunities provided for under the Act.\nPlaintiff\u2019s second contention is that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Nunes to withdraw her original answer and file a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff claims that Nunes waived her right to withdraw her original answer and raise an affirmative defense.\nSection 2 \u2014 616(a) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 616(a)) states that amendments raising new defenses may be allowed at any time before final judgment. This statute is to be liberally construed, and any doubts should be resolved in favor of allowing amendments. People ex rel. Foreman v. Village of Round Lake Park (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 443, 525 N.E.2d 868.\nThe trial court has discretion to allow such amendments to pleadings. (Kupianen v. Graham (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 373, 437 N.E.2d 774.) Factors to be considered in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion include whether proposed amendment would cure defective pleading; whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of proposed amendment; and whether previous opportunities to amend pleadings could be identified. Kupianen, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 377, 437 N.E.2d at 776-77.\nDefendant\u2019s motion to withdraw answer and the subsequent filing of a motion to dismiss were intended to raise an affirmative defense. Plaintiff does not allege any prejudice or surprise, but only that defendant waived her right to raise an affirmative defense. Section 2 \u2014 616(a) of the Code, however, specifically allows such amendments. We find no abuse of discretion here.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLUND and STEIGMANN, JJ, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SPITZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "Burger, Fombelle, Zachry & Rathbun, P.C., of Decatur (Norman J. Fombelle and James E. Zachry, of counsel), for appellant.", "Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Springfield (Kurt M. Koepke and Frederick P. Velde, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BEVERLY SUNDERLAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRI-CITY COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201489\u20140523\nOpinion filed January 18,1990.\nBurger, Fombelle, Zachry & Rathbun, P.C., of Decatur (Norman J. Fombelle and James E. Zachry, of counsel), for appellant.\nHeyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Springfield (Kurt M. Koepke and Frederick P. Velde, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0266-01", "first_page_order": 288, "last_page_order": 292 }