{ "id": 2500828, "name": "RAYMOND E. RUDD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANVILLE METAL STAMPING COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Rudd v. Danville Metal Stamping Co.", "decision_date": "1990-02-08", "docket_number": "No. 4-89-0297", "first_page": "1009", "last_page": "1012", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 1009" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "545 N.E.2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2677663 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/189/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3553816 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/175/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 N.E.2d 314", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" }, { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179637 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0482-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 405, "char_count": 6986, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2656820295630262e-07, "percentile": 0.6135156914553705 }, "sha256": "9dff178c46aa88d9a9c478013fe15c736102f4c1f92b56e0131a5879709d909b", "simhash": "1:b3bcfdbf6b122cb2", "word_count": 1087 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:46.192510+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RAYMOND E. RUDD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANVILLE METAL STAMPING COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Raymond E. Rudd (Rudd), brought this action against defendant, Danville Metal Stamping Co., Inc. (DMS), claiming breach of an alleged employment contract between him and DMS. Rudd claims that language appearing in DMS\u2019s employee handbook created an enforceable contract binding DMS to certain procedures before it could terminate Rudd\u2019s employment. The trial court found that DMS\u2019s employee handbook did not create a contract and dismissed Rudd\u2019s complaint with prejudice under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615). Rudd appeals.\nWe affirm.\nIn January 1986, DMS hired Rudd and provided him with a copy of DMS\u2019s employee handbook. Rudd was required to read and acknowledge the receipt of the handbook by signing a verification form which states:\n\u201cI will read the foregoing Employee\u2019s Handbook of Plant Rules and Regulations, and I expect to be guided by them.\u201d\nIn October 1986, DMS terminated Rudd\u2019s employment. At the time of Rudd\u2019s termination, the employee handbook was in effect.\nThe language at issue is contained in a section of the employee handbook that provides, in pertinent part, that the purpose of the rules and regulations is to \u201cgovern our activities on a daily basis *** [and] to define and protect the rights of all and insure cooperation.\u201d The section further states:\n\u201cThe following rules have been established for our mutual cooperation. In any organization, however, there may be a few individuals who do not wish to work within the framework of rules and regulations. It then becomes a matter of rules being established for the few rather than the majority. In any case, violation of the rules and regulations may result in disciplinary action for the offender. This disciplinary action will be taken up to and including discharge depending on the seriousness of the offense.\u201d\nIn this same section, 44 rules and regulations are listed. Immediately following the list is the following statement:\n\u201cViolations will be grounds for progressive disciplinary action, which may include a correction interview, written warning, probation, suspension without pay, or termination.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe next paragraph states:\n\u201cCertain serious offenses may be considered grounds for immediate termination upon the first offense. Those offenses include, but are not necessarily limited to ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIn his complaint, Rudd alleges breach of contract based upon the following: (1) he was employed by DMS from January 1986 through October 1986; (2) upon and as a condition of being employed, he received an employee handbook; (3) he was required to sign and acknowledge receipt of the handbook as a condition of employment; (4) the handbook constituted a contract between plaintiff and defendant; (5) the handbook provided for progressive disciplinary procedures; and (6) DMS breached the contract by the manner in which it terminated Rudd\u2019s employment. The pleadings are not clear as to which benefits of the progressive disciplinary scheme plaintiff claims to be entitled.\nIn November 1988, DMS filed a motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615) and asserted that, as a matter of law, the employee handbook did not create a contract. After a hearing on DMS\u2019s motion, the trial court entered an order dismissing Rudd\u2019s complaint and denying his motion to amend that complaint. The court found that the handbook did not contain sufficient language to bring it within the holding of Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314, and specifically held that a DMS employee could not reasonably believe that the language contained in the handbook created a contractual offer.\nIn Duldulao, the Illinois Supreme Court held that an employee handbook or other policy statement creates enforceable contractual rights if the traditional requirements for contractual formation are present:\n\u201cFirst, the language of the policy statement must contain a promise clear enough that an employee would reasonably believe that an offer has been made. Second, the statement must be disseminated to the employee in such a manner that the employee is aware of its contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer. Third, the employee must accept the offer by commencing or continuing to work after learning of the policy statement. When cthese conditions are present, then the employee\u2019s continued work constitutes consideration for the promises contained in the statement, and under traditional principles a valid contract is formed.\u201d (Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 490, 505 N.E.2d at 318.)\nAll three conditions must be met to create enforceable contract rights. Koch v. Illinois Power Co. (1988), 175 Ill. App. 3d 248, 529 N.E.2d 281.\nThe issue in this case concerns the first factor specified in Duldulao, i.e., whether the language of the employee handbook contains a promise clear enough that an employee would reasonably believe that an offer has been made. Rudd argues that the language of the employee handbook led him to reasonably believe that he would not be terminated without the benefit of the progressive disciplinary provisions set forth in DMS\u2019s handbook. In his argument, Rudd emphasizes that according to the handbook, the rules and regulations govern and define the rights of all and set forth specific grounds for an employee\u2019s discipline or dismissal. He further argues that under Duldulao, the language, \u201c[violations will be grounds for progressive disciplinary action\u201d (emphasis added), is mandatory and thus created enforceable rights. We disagree.\nIn Duldulao, the employee handbook contained specific disciplinary procedures, stating in part that \u201cpermanent employees \u2018are never dismissed without prior written admonitions and/or an investigation that has been properly documented\u2019 (emphasis added)\u201d and that \u201c \u2018three warning notices within a twelve-month period are required before an employee is dismissed.\u2019 \u201d (Duldulao, 115 Ill. 2d at 491, 505 N.E.2d at 318.) In the present case, DMS\u2019s handbook contains no description of specific disciplinary procedures and does not purport to promise that specific disciplinary procedures will even be used. Articulated procedures are a fundamental and necessary part of an employment contract. Tolbert v. St. Francis Extended Care Center (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 503, 507, 545 N.E.2d 384, 386.\nFor the reasons stated, the order of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH and SPITZ, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Manion, Janov & Devens, Ltd., of Danville (Rick E. Janov, of counsel), for appellant.", "Joan E. Gale and Kathleen M. Moran, both of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fair-weather & Geraldson, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RAYMOND E. RUDD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DANVILLE METAL STAMPING COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-89-0297\nOpinion filed February 8,1990.\nManion, Janov & Devens, Ltd., of Danville (Rick E. Janov, of counsel), for appellant.\nJoan E. Gale and Kathleen M. Moran, both of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fair-weather & Geraldson, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1009-01", "first_page_order": 1031, "last_page_order": 1034 }