{ "id": 8498953, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY W. NEWBOLDS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Newbolds", "decision_date": "1990-03-01", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201488\u20140709", "first_page": "539", "last_page": "542", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "194 Ill. App. 3d 539" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "884" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 N.E.2d 1325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1331" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3502761 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/150/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 U.S. 164", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1775119 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" }, { "page": "173" }, { "page": "2332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/487/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.E.2d 1051", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1052" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2891648 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0399-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 521, "char_count": 7972, "ocr_confidence": 0.733, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.2050565496289552 }, "sha256": "0c82c86f45830c4a607ef58bf9bcd9514bfabcd8c90d02af845edf70ecc378f7", "simhash": "1:f83c9ead2a13fd54", "word_count": 1359 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:32.853539+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "LEWIS, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY W. NEWBOLDS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOWERTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant escaped from the Williamson County jail while being held there after he had been found guilty of, but not yet sentenced for, unlawful use of weapons by a felon.\nDefendant was charged with escape. The information charged that he had escaped on June 23, 1988,\n\u201cin that [defendant] having been convicted of the offense of Unlawful Use of Weapons by a Felon *** intentionally escaped from the Williamson County Jail.\u201d\nSection 31 \u2014 6(a) of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 31 \u2014 6(a)) provides:\n\u201cA person convicted of a felony, or charged with the commission of a felony who intentionally escapes from any penal institution or from the custody of an employee of that institution commits a Class 2 felony ***.\u201d\nDefendant appeals, contending that he had only been found guilty, but was not convicted, and therefore, his conviction for escape must be reversed. He argues that there can be no conviction until sentence is imposed, and a mere finding of guilt is not a conviction, and he points to section 2 \u2014 5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 and section 5 \u2014 1\u2014 5 of the Unified Code of Corrections which define \u201cconviction\u201d as follows:\n\u201c \u2018Conviction\u2019 means a judgment of conviction or sentence entered upon a plea of guilty or upon a verdict or finding of guilty of an offense, rendered by a legally constituted jury or by a court of competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without a jury.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 2 \u2014 5, 1005\u2014 1-5.\nThe adoption of defendant's way of reading the statute leads to this result: a person who has been sentenced for a felony can commit a felonious escape; a person who is in jail awaiting trial for a felony can commit a felonious escape; but, a person who has been found guilty of a felony but who has not yet been sentenced cannot commit escape, felonious or otherwise.\nFocusing on the statute, it may be viewed as if it were a spectrum. If it is read as defendant urges, the spectrum of those capable of escape consists of two bands. One band in the spectrum is made up of all those who have been arrested, but are awaiting trial. The remaining band is made up of all those who have been sentenced. But, between these bands is a black hole \u2014 and that black hole is made up by those who have been found guilty, but not yet sentenced. Defendant argues, therefore, that none who are in this black hole are capable of committing escape.\nInstead of this reading, we see the statute as intending to render all who are arrested and in jail capable of committing escape. The statute should be read with the disjunctive \u201cor\u201d not being a word of exclusion, but rather one that extends the spectrum upward from the pastel hue of \u201carrest,\u201d through the brighter, more primary shade \u201carrested, tried, found guilty, but not yet sentenced\u201d and on upward still to the shining, neon brilliance of \u201ctried, found guilty and sentenced.\u201d Read this way, there is no black hole. The law should presume against black holes being found smack in the middle of a statute; after all, the other parts eventually gravitate toward the black hole, which inevitably will swallow the intention of the legislature.\nDefendant\u2019s conduct falls within the proscription of the statute, his argument to the contrary notwithstanding. See People v. Pruitt (1976), 45 Ill. App. 3d 399, 400, 359 N.E.2d 1051, 1052.\nDefendant lastly contends that the imposition of an extended term to be served consecutively to his conviction for unlawful use of firearm by a felon is an abuse of discretion. Defendant\u2019s conviction for escape is a Class 2 felony, which is usually punishable by a determinate penal sentence of not less than three years\u2019 and not more than seven years\u2019 imprisonment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 31\u2014 6(a), 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(5).) Due to defendant\u2019s conviction in 1980 for burglary, a Class 2 felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 1(b)), defendant was eligible to be sentenced to an extended determinate penal sentence of not less than seven years\u2019 and not more than 14 years\u2019 imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 1005 \u2014 5\u2014 3.2(b)(1), 1005 \u2014 8\u20142(a)(4).\nThe presentence report reveals an extensive history of criminality in addition to the burglary conviction: 1980, attempted escape, Florida, one-year suspended sentence; two theft convictions in Illinois; 1983, two counts of aggravated battery, two consecutive five-year terms of imprisonment; 1988, 364 days\u2019 imprisonment, battery; and 1988, unlawful use of weapons by a felon, nine years\u2019 imprisonment. He has juvenile adjudications starting from the time he was 13.\nIn sentencing defendant, the court stated:\n\u201cYou\u2019re going to have to receive some punishment. Society has to be protected against these wrong-doings. You are not prone to want to live in society and obey the rules. You have a variety of things here \u2014 you have escape, an attempted escape, burglary, two counts of theft, plus other things. I don\u2019t know what you might get into next, if anything. But there is before me a history of your having been prone to want to violate the criminal laws and not get along in organized society. You have not seemingly corrected that in anyway. One comes on the heel of another.\u201d\nDefendant contends that the trial court failed to consider his excellent work record. The presentence report indicates that defendant operated a body shop during the three months he was on mandatory supervised release. So he worked three months. That still did not stop him from committing unlawful use of weapons by a felon soon after being released from prison. A Menard Correctional Center employee told the probation officer that defendant was a hard worker on a construction crew and that he was allowed to work outside of the fence. That is good so far as it goes. But it does not change the fact that his criminal record does not spark hope of his early rehabilitation. An ability to conform to the rules of the Department of Corrections reveals nothing about a defendant\u2019s character except that the defendant can exist in the highly structured environment of a prison without endangering others. See Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988), 487 U.S. 164, 185, 101 L. Ed. 2d 155, 173, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 2332 (O\u2019Connor, J., concurring).\nDefendant lastly contends that the court should have given more weight to his trial defense that he escaped because he was concerned that his fiancee was abusing drugs and alcohol, which led to the neglect of her 11-year-old son. The court did consider defendant\u2019s trial testimony concerning the reasons for escape; however, it could also have rejected those reasons, as well as defendant\u2019s statement that he intended to return to jail, as self-serving. It is not the function of this court to reweigh the factors which led to the imposition of the sentence. (People v. Joy (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 310, 318, 501 N.E.2d 1325, 1331.) Defendant\u2019s almost constant contact with the criminal justice system since the age of 13 renders this court unable to find that the sentence is an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154, 368 N.E.2d 882, 884.) This court cannot hold that the trial court erred in imposing both a consecutive and extended-term sentence to protect the public from further criminal activity by defendant. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u2014 4(b).\nThe judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLEWIS, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOWERTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Michelle A. Zalisko, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Charles Garnati, State\u2019s Attorney, of Marion (Kenneth R. Boyle and Stephen E. Norris, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, and Robert W. Mueller, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY W. NEWBOLDS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201488\u20140709\nOpinion filed March 1, 1990.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Michelle A. Zalisko, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nCharles Garnati, State\u2019s Attorney, of Marion (Kenneth R. Boyle and Stephen E. Norris, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, and Robert W. Mueller, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0539-01", "first_page_order": 561, "last_page_order": 564 }