{ "id": 8499061, "name": "JOHN FOY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Foy v. City of Chicago", "decision_date": "1990-02-13", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201488\u20140687", "first_page": "611", "last_page": "616", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "194 Ill. App. 3d 611" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "436 N.E.2d 12", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3032082 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "820 F.2d 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1704636 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/820/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 980", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2678397 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/189/0980-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 N.E.2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5083684 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 N.E.2d 923", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549492 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0022-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 573, "char_count": 11706, "ocr_confidence": 0.734, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.301981745586104e-08, "percentile": 0.3876878536161761 }, "sha256": "e75308b354708b5c1fee6a93477fba2da90dba96639e15a09ff16c38d9776578", "simhash": "1:1ceae13e471b5d7e", "word_count": 1868 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:32.853539+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BUCKLEY, P.J., and O\u2019CONNOR, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "JOHN FOY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CAMPBELL\ndelivered .the opinion of the court;\nPlaintiff, John Foy, appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, the City of Chicago, John Halpin in his capacity as commissioner of the Department of Streets and Sanitation, and Jesse Hoskins in his capacity as commissioner of personnel (collectively referred to as the City). Plaintiff had filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the termination of his employment as a probationary career service business manager for the Department of Streets and Sanitation (the Department) was without legal merit and that he be restored to his probationary career service position. On appeal, plaintiff contends that: (1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment when there were genuine issues of material fact; and (2) the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and to attach depositions. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nThe record indicates that on November 15, 1983, plaintiff was appointed to the position of probationary career service business manager in the Department. Pursuant to section 1 of Rule IX of the Personnel Rules of the City of Chicago (the Personnel Rules), plaintiffs probationary period was for one year. On March 22, 1984, the deputy commissioner of the department completed a written performance evaluation of plaintiff, signed and dated by plaintiff, which indicated that plaintiff had \u201cexceeded] requirements\u201d in all evaluated areas, and included the comment, \u201cThis man is an excellent Financial officer. Handles all assignments in a professional manner!\u201d Subsequently, on July 3, 1984, per written notice, the commissioner of personnel discharged plaintiff from his probationary position, effective June 29, 1984. The notice stated \u201cpoor performance\u201d as the reason for discharge.\nOn August 17, 1984, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment, which he amended on February 26, 1985. Plaintiffs first amended complaint set forth two counts. Count I alleged, inter alia, that: (1) plaintiffs discharge was without any factual basis; and (2) plaintiff\u2019s discharge was retaliatory and that defendants had abused their discretion and had conspired to act arbitrarily and capriciously and without justification toward plaintiff. Count II alleged that: (1) because the Personnel Rules of the City of Chicago were not enacted pursuant to the City\u2019s powers as a home rule municipality, the Personnel Rules must conform to the statutory requirements concerning probationary employees which mandate that a department head notify the Civil Service Commission in writing as to the reasons for the discharge and that the Commission consent to the discharge; and (2) the Personnel Rules do not conform to the statutory requirements.\nThe City then moved to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s first amended complaint. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Although, on its face, the written order denied the motion as to both counts, at the hearing, the court had only addressed count I and had not referred to count II. As a result, the City moved for reconsideration as to count I and for a specific ruling as to count II. On January 2, 1986, the trial court entered an agreed order which denied the City\u2019s motion for reconsideration as to count I and granted the City\u2019s motion to dismiss count II.\nThereafter, on November 12, 1987, the City moved for summary judgment as to count I on the ground that probationary career service employees do not possess any protected property or other interest in continued employment with the City and may be terminated without cause. Following arguments on the summary judgment motion, plaintiff moved to amend the pleadings and to attach depositions. The trial court denied plaintiff leave to file his amended complaint on the ground that it alleged only insufficient conclusions of law and fact and granted summary judgment in favor of the City. Plaintiff\u2019s timely notice of appeal followed.\nInitially, plaintiff contends that his termination as a probationary employee was invalid because the City failed to follow its own procedures for preparing performance evaluations of probationary employees. The parties agree that Personnel Rules IX and XIV govern the manner in which performance evaluations are to be prepared. Section 2 of Rule IX of the Personnel Rules provides:\n\u201cThe department head shall report to the Department of Personnel on the performance of the probationer, at the time and on the forms prescribed by the Commissioner of Personnel, making at least one such report prior to the completion of the probationary period.\u201d\nSection 4 of Rule XIV of the Personnel Rules provides:\n\u201cThe supervisor responsible for the rating shall inform the employee of the results of a performance evaluation prior to its submission to the department head. The employee shall sign and date the performance evaluation to indicate that she or he has been informed of the rating.\u201d\nContrary to plaintiffs contention, the City did not fail to follow the aforementioned Personnel Rules. It is undisputed that a written performance evaluation of plaintiff, dated March 22, 1984, was prepared by the deputy commissioner of the Department and signed and dated by plaintiff. This procedure expressly conforms to the requirements of Personnel Rules IX and XIV.\nIn an attempt to establish that the City had violated the Personnel Rules, plaintiff refers to an unsigned and undated \u201csubstantively blank purported evaluation form dated August 14, 1984\u201d that was obtained through discovery. However, the record does not support plaintiff\u2019s characterization of the card as an \u201cevaluation form.\u201d Although the fine print on the bottom of the card identifies it as a \u201cDepartment of Personnel Performance Rating Card,\u201d the area reserved for ratings is blank, the word \u201cterminated\u201d appears in the space reserved for the employee\u2019s name, and it is signed and dated by two individuals. For filing purposes, plaintiff\u2019s name and other identifying codes are typed across the top of the card. Although the card may have been labeled \u201cPerformance Rating Card,\u201d it is clear that its use in the present case was merely to note plaintiff\u2019s terminated status for the Department\u2019s records. Thus, the fact it was not signed and dated by plaintiff is irrelevant.\nFurther, plaintiff\u2019s reliance on DiFalco v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen\u2019s Pension Fund of the Wood Dale Fire Protection District No. One (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 22, 521 N.E.2d 923, and Farmer v. McClure (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 246, 526 N.E.2d 486, as support for his position is misplaced. In DiFalco, the supreme court addressed the issue of whether pursuant to section 4 \u2014 110 of the Illinois Pension Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 1081/2, par. 4 \u2014 110), a probationary fire fighter is entitled to a disability pension when the fire fighter first applies for the pension a year after his discharge. We find DiFalco to be factually inapposite and unpersuasive as to the issues in the present case. With respect to Farmer v. McClure, although Farmer addresses the issue of the propriety of the discharge of a probationary employee, its factual distinctions render it unpersuasive. In Farmer, the State agency employer had failed to follow its own procedural rules for termination of probationary employees by neglecting to obtain plaintiff\u2019s signature on his performance evaluation form. The reviewing court affirmed the trial court\u2019s mandamus order and mandatory injunction directing the employer to certify plaintiff, to restore his benefits and to refrain from enforcing the order of discharge on the ground, inter alia, that plaintiff had the right to have administrative rules followed. As discussed, in the present case, the City followed its Personnel Rules when it terminated plaintiff.\nNext, plaintiff contends that the City violated its duty of good faith toward him by terminating him for a false reason. As a matter of law, the implied duty of good faith is inherently incongruous with an employment contract which gives the employer the right to terminate employment without cause. (Harrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 980, 546 N.E.2d 248.) Moreover, we find plaintiff\u2019s suggestion that his excellent evaluation in March evidences that his termination in June was improper to be extremely tenuous. In March, half of plaintiff\u2019s probationary period remained within which his job performance was to be evaluated. A favorable performance for one half of a probationary period does not guarantee the same performance for the second half. Furthermore, even if his performance rating in June had remained the same, that fact would be irrelevant to the propriety of plaintiff\u2019s termination. Nothing in the Personnel Rules requires an unsatisfactory performance rating as a prerequisite to firing a probationary employee. (See Fontano v. City of Chicago (7th Cir. 1987), 820 F.2d 213.) In its memorandum of opinion, the trial court acknowledged this legal principal when it stated, \u201c[W]here the rules do not require that any reason be given much less an accurate reason a discharge for a \u2018false reason\u2019 does not violate the Personnel Rules.\u201d In our view, Illinois law supports this conclusion.\nPlaintiff next contends that the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to amend the pleadings and to attach depositions filed after the hearing on the City\u2019s motion for summary judgment was a clear abuse of discretion. In support of his contention, plaintiff relies on section 2 \u2014 1005(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1005(c)) and on Fryison v. McGee (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 537, 436 N.E.2d 12. In our view, neither of these authorities supports plaintiff\u2019s position.\nSection 2 \u2014 1005(c) provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201cThe opposite party may prior to or at the time of the hearing on the motion file counteraffidavits.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1005(c).)\nIn the present case, not only did plaintiff wait until one week after the hearing on the summary judgment motion to request leave to amend the pleadings, he attempted to attach depositions, not counter-affidavits, to the amended pleading. In our view, even the most liberal construction of section 2 \u2014 1005(c) would not support plaintiffs attempt to amend the pleadings at that time and in that manner.\nPlaintiffs reliance on Fryison v. McGee (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 537, 436 N.E.2d 12, is equally unpersuasive. Plaintiff cites to Fryi-son as support for the general legal principle that in determining a summary judgment motion, the court has the duty to review the entire record and to construe the evidence strictly against the moving party and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. As a general statement of law, plaintiffs statement is correct. However, as support for his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing him to file his amended pleading, it is inapplicable. The court\u2019s obligation to review the record extends only to timely filed, well-pled pleadings. As discussed, plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint did not satisfy these prerequisites.\nFor the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBUCKLEY, P.J., and O\u2019CONNOR, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CAMPBELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Anne M. Burke and Adrienne M. Geary, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Judson H. Miner, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Ruth M. Moscovitch and Lynn K. Mitchell, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appel-lees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOHN FOY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201488\u20140687\nOpinion filed February 13, 1990.\nAnne M. Burke and Adrienne M. Geary, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nJudson H. Miner, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Ruth M. Moscovitch and Lynn K. Mitchell, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appel-lees." }, "file_name": "0611-01", "first_page_order": 633, "last_page_order": 638 }