{
  "id": 8499552,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KAREN SACHS, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sachs",
  "decision_date": "1990-03-02",
  "docket_number": "No. 2\u201489\u20140021",
  "first_page": "994",
  "last_page": "997",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "194 Ill. App. 3d 994"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
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    {
      "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 263",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        3188213
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "270-71"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:32.853539+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "DUNN and WOODWARD, JJ., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KAREN SACHS, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE GEIGER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals from the trial court\u2019s dismissal of a criminal complaint against the defendant, Karen Sachs. The State argues that the court incorrectly found that it lacked jurisdiction over the defendant\u2019s criminal prosecution under sections 3 \u2014 909 and 3 \u2014 915 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, pars. 3\u2014 909, 3 \u2014 915). We reverse the judgment and remand the cause.\nThe defendant was charged by Secretary of State police citation and complaint with violations of sections 3 \u2014 909 and 3 \u2014 915 of the Code. She moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the charged violation should have been addressed as a Secretary of State\u2019s administrative hearing. She also argued that the circuit court had no original jurisdiction over the alleged Code violation. The court granted the defendant\u2019s motion, and the State brought this appeal.\nThis case requires us to address article IX (the article) of chapter three of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 3 \u2014 900 et seq.). Generally, the article covers licensing and obligations of \u201cremittance agents\u201d who may accept vehicle tax, license, or registration fees for remittance to the State. The article also covers such agents\u2019 obligations for remittance to the State, provides for suspension or revocation of an agent\u2019s license, and provides penalties for \u201cviolations\u201d of the article. Section 3 \u2014 913 of the Code also provides for administrative hearings and judicial review under the article. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 3-913.\nThe complaint against the defendant was based upon section 3\u2014 909 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 3 \u2014 909), which addresses an agent\u2019s obligations to forward monies to the State. Section 3 \u2014 915, which is also cited in the defendant\u2019s charge, is the article\u2019s \u201cviolations\u201d section; it provides that violators \u201cof any provision of this Act *** shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 3-915.\nThe State argues on appeal that under the plain language of section 3 \u2014 915, which provides for a criminal sanction, violators of the article\u2019s provisions are subject to criminal prosecution in the circuit court. According to the State, section 3 \u2014 913\u2019s specific provisions for administrative hearings and judicial review (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 3 \u2014 913), upon which the trial court relied, do not call for administrative hearings on charged violations. Rather, according to the State, section 3 \u2014 913 applies only to an agent\u2019s opportunity for an administrative hearing in connection with a possible license suspension or revocation under section 3 \u2014 907 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 3 \u2014 907).\nThe defendant asserts that there is no basis to support the State\u2019s contention that section 3 \u2014 913\u2019s hearing provision is related merely to license suspensions or revocations. According to the defendant, section 3 \u2014 913 reveals that the legislature intended that violations charged under section 3 \u2014 909 be heard as administrative hearings by the Secretary of State, to the exclusion of original circuit court proceedings. Also, in addressing section 3 \u2014 915\u2019s provision that a violation of the article is a Class B misdemeanor, the defendant asserts that the legislature intended that violations under the article be punished by the maximum $500 fine applicable to Class B misdemeanors.\nAs both parties agree, in construing the statute at issue we must ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent (People v. Haywood (1987) 118 Ill. 2d 263, 270-71). To do so, we first focus on the section 3 \u2014 915 provision that violations of the article shall be a Class B misdemeanor. The potential sanctions for a Class B misdemeanor are not only a $500 fine (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 9\u20141(a)(3)), to which the defendant refers, but also six months of imprisonment (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20143(a)(2)).\nWe are aware of no basis to conclude, as the defendant does, that although it defined violations of the article as Class B misdemeanors, the legislature intended that potential penalties include only the relevant potential fines, not the relevant potential periods of imprisonment. We find that the plain language of the statute calls for criminal sanctions for violations of the article.\nFurthermore, we find that section 3 \u2014 913\u2019s provision for administrative hearings is in no way inconsistent with a legislative intent to punish criminally violations of the article. Section 3 \u2014 913 provides, inter alia, that \u201c[hjearings under this Article shall be governed by [administrative hearing procedures described elsewhere in the Code] and the Administrative Review Law.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 3 \u2014 913.) It does not, however, provide that only administrative procedures are available under the article; neither does it enumerate any issue which must be determined by an administrative hearing. We find that the legislature enacted section 3 \u2014 913 to cover those administrative hearings which may arise under other provisions of the article (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, pars. 3 \u2014 906, 3 \u2014 907), not to exclusively require administrative procedure.\nThe plain language of the Code provides for criminal penalties for the violation charged against the defendant; it does not mandate administrative testing of charged violations. Because the Code does not mandate an administrative hearing (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 3 \u2014 913), and because an administrative officer or agency cannot impose the criminal penalties which the legislature clearly prescribed for the instant charged violation (Ford v. Environmental Protection Agency (1973), 9 Ill. App. 3d 711, 714-15), we find that the legislature intended that the circuit court have original jurisdiction over the instant charge.\nBased on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County. We remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with our decision.\nReversed and remanded.\nDUNN and WOODWARD, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE GEIGER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and Marshall M. Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.",
      "John J. Cresto and Anne V. Swanson, both of Schillerstrom & Cresto, Ltd., of Naperville, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KAREN SACHS, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201489\u20140021\nOpinion filed March 2, 1990.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and Marshall M. Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nJohn J. Cresto and Anne V. Swanson, both of Schillerstrom & Cresto, Ltd., of Naperville, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0994-01",
  "first_page_order": 1016,
  "last_page_order": 1019
}