{ "id": 2492292, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES E. SHOCKLEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Shockley", "decision_date": "1990-03-16", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201488\u20140381", "first_page": "148", "last_page": "159", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 148" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 774", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3564659 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784" }, { "page": "784-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/0774-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3569197 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3503266 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/150/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 S. Ct. 131", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 842", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 601376, 600516, 599429, 599272, 600169, 600650, 601608, 601164, 600750, 602032, 600145, 601105, 601778, 599319, 600920, 601855 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0842-13", "/us/484/0842-06", "/us/484/0842-08", "/us/484/0842-14", "/us/484/0842-09", "/us/484/0842-04", "/us/484/0842-10", "/us/484/0842-11", "/us/484/0842-15", "/us/484/0842-01", "/us/484/0842-16", "/us/484/0842-07", "/us/484/0842-05", "/us/484/0842-12", "/us/484/0842-03", "/us/484/0842-02" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 888", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3643043 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0888-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3604084 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" }, { "page": "318" }, { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2609324 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" }, { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S. Ct. 1618", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 L. Ed. 2d 802", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "480 U.S. 951", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1131233, 1131426, 1131146, 1131316, 1131478, 1131161 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/480/0951-01", "/us/480/0951-05", "/us/480/0951-06", "/us/480/0951-03", "/us/480/0951-02", "/us/480/0951-04" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542174 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 979", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3480997 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "985" }, { "page": "984" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0979-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 951", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3466588 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "961" }, { "page": "961" }, { "page": "961" }, { "page": "960" }, { "page": "962" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0951-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3495469 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" }, { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3613819 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323-24" }, { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 785", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2433020 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" }, { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/178/0785-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499168 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737" }, { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/0729-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1061, "char_count": 28713, "ocr_confidence": 0.73, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.445245598433026e-08, "percentile": 0.39783400499411353 }, "sha256": "051ba01ccae132b3193334c6ad1d56b5032a3fed4493cf40df6b1beedf24c9e1", "simhash": "1:bc6b3dca07542a63", "word_count": 4821 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:46.192333+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES E. SHOCKLEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE INGLIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, James Shockley, was charged by indictment with aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201414(a)(2)). The grand jury later amended the indictment to charge defendant with criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201413(a)(1)). Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) his right to confront witnesses was violated by not requiring the State to disclose the complainant\u2019s new address. We affirm.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s first witness was the complainant, Fritzi. Fritzi testified that on August 8, 1987, she went to the Wrens Roost bar with two friends, John Cerqua and Janice Cohen. Fritzi stated that they arrived at the bar at approximately 4:30 p.m., sat down at a table, and were joined shortly thereafter by a person known as \u201cJames.\u201d Fritzi began to talk to James about his tattoo on his arm depicting \u201ca naked lady with a dragon wrapped around it.\u201d James told her that he was from Kentucky and currently lived in Aurora, Illinois. Fritzi later identified James as being the defendant in this case.\nFritzi further testified that they stayed at the Wrens Roost for approximately one hour and drank two beers each. After leaving the bar, Fritzi, her two friends, and defendant went to a nearby bar, the Cove. Fritzi and defendant each had one beer at the Cove and left approximately 30 to 45 minutes later to visit defendant\u2019s friend in a nearby apartment. Fritzi stated that both of her friends accompanied her and defendant to the apartment in defendant\u2019s automobile, although defendant was the only one to actually go into the apartment. Defendant parked the car in an alley and returned approximately 15 minutes later and drove to another bar, Bernie\u2019s.\nFritzi stated that the four of them stayed at Bernie\u2019s for an hour or more, consuming approximately two beers each. Fritzi saw a friend of hers, Dave Dieters, at the bar, but did not talk with him. Shortly thereafter, Fritzi left Bernie\u2019s with defendant to go to another bar, John\u2019s B & B. John and Janice both stayed at Bemie\u2019s and did not go to John\u2019s B & B. Fritzi testified that she rode with defendant in his car to get to John\u2019s B & B, arriving at approximately 8:30 p.m. Fritzi and defendant each drank two or three beers at John\u2019s B & B before leaving at approximately 9:30 p.m. to visit another bar, Nickels.\nFritzi stated that defendant stopped for gas on the way to Nickels and purchased a six-pack of beer. Defendant told Fritzi that he wanted to drive around and drink the beer, but she requested that he take her home. Defendant continued to drive around and eventually stopped at the Hesed House, which Fritzi described as a shelter for the homeless to stay in the winter. After arriving at the house, Fritzi stated that she saw a blue pickup truck nearby and started to run toward it. However, defendant stopped her, grabbed her mouth and told her to stop screaming. Defendant told her that he had a gun, pushed her onto the ground and removed her pants. Defendant then got on top of her and engaged in sexual intercourse with her. Fritzi stated that she was afraid that defendant would kill her if she did not cooperate with him.\nFritzi further stated that defendant drove her into downtown Aurora following the sexual activity. Defendant dropped her off approximately one block from the Wrens Roost, and Fritzi walked toward the bar. She saw her friends John and Janice standing outside of the bar and told them that she had been raped. She asked John to call the police, and an officer arrived approximately 10 minutes later. The officer drove Fritzi back to the Hesed House before taking her to the hospital to receive medical treatment. Fritzi stated that the blue pickup truck was still parked at the Hesed House when she returned. Fritzi testified that her foot hurt after the attack, but X rays did not reveal any broken bones.\nOn cross-examination, Fritzi testified that she participated in a lineup in which she had an opportunity to hear and see five individuals. Fritzi stated that she did not think defendant was one of the five persons, \u201c[b]ut if he is, it\u2019s [sic] No. 2.\u201d After being shown a picture of the lineup, she agreed with defense counsel\u2019s statement that defendant \u201cis the only person in this courtroom who\u2019s in the picture.\u201d She also stated that she spoke with Detective Deborah Porter of the Aurora police department on August 12, 1987, and told her that someone removed some money from her pocket after the incident. However, she was unsure of the amount of the money taken from her, although she was sure that it was less than $30.\nJohn Cerqua testified that he went to a \u201ccouple of bars\u201d with Fritzi and Janice Cohen on August 8, 1987. Cerqua stated that they met a man known as \u201cHillbilly James\u201d at the Wrens Roost. Cerqua later identified defendant as the man he knew as Hillbilly James. After visiting two bars, Fritzi and defendant went on their own to go to another bar. Cerqua stated that he and Cohen did not accompany them because they did not have any more money.\nCerqua further testified that he and Cohen went back to the Wrens Roost at approximately 11 p.m. and saw Fritzi walking toward the bar. Cerqua described Fritzi as \u201call shooken [sic] up, crying and walking with a limp.\u201d Cerqua also noticed that Fritzi had mud on the back of her shirt and that her jeans and feet were dirty. Cerqua stated that Fritzi did not have mud or dirt on her before she went to the bar with defendant. Fritzi told Cerqua that she had been raped, and he went inside the bar to call the police. Cerqua stated that he went in the police car with Fritzi and Cohen to visit the rape scene and then to the hospital.\nCerqua stated that he, along with Dave Dieters, saw defendant again on August 11, 1987. Cerqua noticed defendant \u201cpeeking around the corner\u201d near the Wrens Roost, and he began to chase after defendant. Cerqua chased defendant into an apartment building and waited for the police to arrive. Cerqua stated that defendant left the apartment building after the police arrived and began to talk with the officers.\nThe State\u2019s next witness, Dave Dieters, testified that he saw defendant with Fritzi at Bernie\u2019s Bar on August 8, 1987. Dieters stated that he was a friend of Fritzi\u2019s but did not talk with her because she was with defendant at the bar. Dieters did not see Fritzi again that night.\nDieters also testified that he saw defendant again on August 11, 1987. Dieters stated that he \u201cchased down\u201d a police officer, explained what was happening, and began to run after defendant with John Cerqua. Dieters did not see defendant enter the apartment building, but did observe him leave the building and begin to talk to the police officers.\nOfficer Danny Crissip of the Aurora police department testified that he was directed to investigate a possible sexual assault on August 8, 1987, at approximately 11 p.m. After arriving at the Wrens Roost, Officer Crissip saw Fritzi and was told that she had just been raped. Fritzi also provided a description of her attacker to Officer Crissip. Officer Crissip noticed that Fritzi had some red marks on her face, that her clothes were dirty and in disarray, and that she appeared to be \u201cquite upset.\u201d Officer Crissip took Fritzi to the Hesed House before taking her to the hospital. He testified that he did not see any cars at the Hesed House for the 5 to 10 minutes that they were there. On cross-examination, Crissip did not recall Fritzi mentioning anything about a pickup truck at the Hesed House, and he did not recall seeing a truck there during his investigation that night.\nSergeant Raymond Weaver of the Aurora police department testified that he was working on August 11, 1987, at approximately 9 p.m. when he was \u201cflagged down\u201d by three persons in downtown Aurora. Sergeant Weaver stated that he went to a nearby apartment building to question \u201ca suspect in a rape.\u201d The suspect was later identified as defendant. Sergeant Weaver then called for another squad car to take defendant to the police station for questioning.\nDetective Deborah Porter of the Aurora police department testified that she interviewed Fritzi on August 12, 1987, at the police station. Detective Porter stated that Fritzi told her that defendant took $30 out of her pocket on the night of the incident. Fritzi also told her that she suffered a \u201chairline fracture\u201d of her foot.\nMary Christian, a nurse at Copley Memorial Hospital in Aurora, testified that she treated Fritzi in the emergency room on August 8, 1987, at approximately 11:35 p.m. Nurse Christian stated that she examined Fritzi and prepared a Vitullo evidence kit, which she gave to the police. She also stated that she did not believe that Fritzi was intoxicated that evening, so she did not test Fritzi\u2019s blood sample for its alcohol content. However, on cross-examination, she noted that the treating physician, Dr. Sarroca, wrote \u201cETOH\u201d in his notes on Fritzi. Nurse Christian stated that ETOH is an abbreviation for alcohol.\nDr. Manuel Sarroca testified that he was an emergency room physician at Copley Memorial Hospital in Aurora. Dr. Sarroca stated that he treated Fritzi on August 8, 1987, and noticed that she had a contusion of the lip, a small cut on her finger, and a sore foot. An X ray was taken of Fritzi\u2019s foot but found no fracture or other bone injury. Dr. Sarroca also performed a pelvic examination on Fritzi in which he found no injuries to the genital area, but did notice \u201csome small dirt particles on the outside, also inside the vagina that looked like some of which looked like either a piece of grass or a piece of leaf.\u201d\nArlene Hall, a forensic serologist for the Illinois State Police department, testified that she tested the contents of the Vitullo evidence kit used in this case, along with a sample of defendant\u2019s blood. Hall noted that both Fritzi and defendant were classified as ABO secretors, but testing revealed no activity on the ABO typing. Hall explained that she was unable to make a conclusion as to the source of the semen sample on Fritzi\u2019s vaginal swab. It was Hall\u2019s opinion that no male could be excluded as the source of the seminal material based on the tests that she performed.\nThe first defense witness, James Davis, testified that he worked with defendant and lived at the apartment where defendant ran to after being chased on August 11, 1987. Davis let defendant into the apartment and looked out the window to see men with \u201csticks and things\u201d in their hands. Davis then saw police officers arrive. Defendant then left the apartment, telling Davis that \u201cI\u2019ll [defendant] go down and get this mess cleared up.\u201d\nPam Shockley, defendant\u2019s wife, testified that she took her six-year-old son to a drive-in movie on August 8, 1987. When she returned from the movie at approximately 10 p.m., she saw defendant sleeping on the sofa. Pam left her home a short time later and returned about 10 minutes later to find defendant still asleep on the sofa.\nDefendant testified at trial that he went to the Wrens Roost on August 8, 1987, and began to talk with a \u201cSpanish gentleman\u201d and \u201ctwo ladies.\u201d Defendant drank beer with the three people at the Wrens Roost before moving on to the Cove and Bernie\u2019s. Around 8 p.m., defendant and Fritzi left Bernie\u2019s and went to John\u2019s B & B, where they continued to drink beer. Defendant described Fritzi as being \u201cvery intoxicated\u201d by the time they arrived at John\u2019s B & B. Defendant stated that he went to the bathroom soon after arriving at John\u2019s B & B, and upon returning to the table noticed that a \u201cSpanish guy\u201d had sat down at the table and had three lines of cocaine drawn out on the table. Defendant stated that he did not sit down at the table, but instead left the bar and went home by himself. Defendant denied raping anyone on August 8, 1987.\nOn cross-examination, defendant testified that both he and Fritzi were intoxicated by the time that they arrived at John\u2019s B & B. Defendant again stated that he left the bar, without Fritzi, after seeing the cocaine on the table. He noticed that Fritzi\u2019s clothes were clean when he left the bar. Defendant denied going to the Hesed House at any time on August 8, 1987, and further denied striking Fritzi or engaging in sexual intercourse with her. In addition, defendant admitted that he had a tattoo of a naked woman and a serpent on his arm, which he showed to the jury.\nDefendant further stated that he went back to the Wrens Roost on August 11, 1987. As he was leaving the bar, he noticed three unidentified persons running toward him with sticks in their hands. Defendant ran toward James Davis\u2019 apartment, nearly being hit in the head by a rock thrown by one of the men chasing him. Defendant stated that he waited in Davis' apartment for the police to arrive, at which time he went downstairs and told the police that he wanted to \u201cfile charges on these people.\u201d\nAt the conclusion of defendant\u2019s testimony, the defense rested. Following closing arguments, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of criminal sexual assault. The trial court then sentenced defendant to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.\nDefendant\u2019s first contention on appeal is that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, defendant argues that Fritzi\u2019s testimony was not clear and convincing and was not substantially corroborated by other witnesses. As such, defendant contends that his conviction must be reversed. We disagree.\nIt is our opinion that the evidence in the present case was sufficient to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In a prosecution for criminal sexual assault, the complainant\u2019s testimony must be clear and convincing or corroborated by other facts or evidence. (People v. Gramc (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 729, 737; People v. Jackson (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 785, 793.) However, clear and convincing evidence is not synonymous with uncontradicted or unimpeached testimony. (People v. Henne (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 315, 323-24; People v. Redman (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 691, 703.) Minor variances or discrepancies in the complainant\u2019s testimony may occur and do not constitute grounds for reversal. (People v. DuPree (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 951, 961.) Instead, such discrepancies affect only the complainant\u2019s credibility. (DuPree, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 961.) It is for the trier of fact to weigh any discrepancies, and if they are so minor as to not detract from the reasonableness of her testimony, her testimony may be found to be clear and convincing. Henne, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 324; Redman, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 703.\nIn the case at bar, defendant argues that the complainant\u2019s testimony was not clear and convincing since it conflicted with other evidence. Specifically, defendant points out that Fritzi\u2019s testimony conflicted with the testimony of Aurora police officers to whom she made statements. At trial, Fritzi testified that she saw a blue pickup truck at the Hesed House during the offense and further stated that Officer Crissip spoke to a person in the pickup during his investigation later in the night. However, Officer Crissip testified that he did not see a pickup truck at the Hesed House during his investigation.\nDefendant also points out inconsistencies in Fritzi\u2019s testimony regarding the time when defendant arrived at the Wren\u2019s Roost, whether defendant stopped his car in an alley before proceeding to the Cove, whether her foot was injured during the attack, and whether her attacker took any money from her following the attack. Defendant also asserts that Fritzi\u2019s inability to positively identify him at a lineup held on November 3, 1987, rendered her testimony less than clear and convincing.\nDefendant contends that People v. Byas (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 979, supports his argument that Fritzi\u2019s uncertainty at the lineup rendered her testimony less than clear and convincing. In Byas, the victim had trouble identifying the defendant during a photographic display, a lineup, and at the preliminary hearing. She was also unable to provide an accurate description of her attacker to the police. Her only positive identification of the defendant came at trial, and only after being shown three photographs of the defendant. (Byas, 117 Ill. App. 3d at 985.) The appellate court reversed the defendant\u2019s conviction, holding that the evidence of the defendant\u2019s identity was insufficient to sustain his conviction. 117 Ill. App. 3d at 984.\nWe find the Byas decision to be readily distinguishable from the identification issue present in this case. A review of the record indicates that defendant\u2019s appearance changed from the time of the attack to the time of the lineup. Fritzi testified that defendant had a moustache at the lineup, which he did not have on the night of the assault. In addition, she stated that he was thinner and had longer hair on the date of the lineup. Fritzi also stated that she was \u201cextremely nervous, not real sure of myself\u201d at the time of the lineup, mainly due to being photographed and questioned by defendant\u2019s attorney during the lineup. Fritzi stated that she thought that person number two (defendant) at the lineup was her assailant, but she couldn\u2019t be sure.\nIt is well settled that any alleged discrepancies or inconsistencies in identification testimony go to the weight and credibility of the testimony, a function properly left for the trier of fact. (People v. Johnson (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 170, 190, cert. denied (1987), 480 U.S. 951, 94 L. Ed. 2d 802, 107 S. Ct. 1618; People v. Graham (1989), 179 Ill. App. 3d 496, 506.) While we agree that a conviction cannot be sustained based solely on a doubtful or uncertain identification (Graham, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 506), we do not believe such to be the case under the facts here. While there was some doubt or uncertainty regarding Fritzi\u2019s identification of defendant at the lineup, it does not require reversal in this instance. The record indicates that defendant\u2019s appearance had changed from the time of the assault to the lineup date. In addition, Fritzi was able to provide a description of defendant to Officer Crissip on the night of the attack and was able to positively identify defendant at trial as her assailant. Fritzi also stated that she noticed a tattoo of \u201ca naked lady with a dragon\u201d on defendant\u2019s arm, which in fact defendant displayed to the jury during his testimony. Under these facts, Fritzi\u2019s identification of defendant was, unlike Byas, not so vague and uncertain to render her testimony less than clear and convincing.\nAs to the other inconsistencies pointed out by defendant, it is our opinion that they do not detract from the reasonableness of Fritzi\u2019s version of the events occurring on August 8, 1987. Inconsistencies regarding the time that defendant arrived at the bar, whether he stopped his car en route to another bar, and whether any money was taken from the pocket in Fritzi\u2019s jeans were collateral matters not relating to the specifics of the sexual assault. (See DuPree, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 961.) Fritzi\u2019s testimony concerning her injured foot was substantiated by Dr. Sarroca, who testified that X rays were taken of her foot due to her complaint of pain. We find little or no significance to the fact that Fritzi did not inform the police officers that her foot was injured during the assault.\nWith respect to the inconsistency concerning the pickup truck at the Hesed House, we again disagree with defendant\u2019s characterization of the significance of the discrepancy. It is entirely possible that Officer Crissip did not notice the pickup truck during his brief investigation at the Hesed House. In any event, situations like this concern matters of credibility which are properly reserved for the trier of fact to decide. We do not believe that the inconsistencies sufficiently detracted from the reasonableness of Fritzi\u2019s testimony to render her testimony unclear and unconvincing.\nDefendant also argues that Fritzi\u2019s testimony was not substantially corroborated by other witnesses. In a sexual assault case, the complainant\u2019s testimony must be corroborated by other facts and circumstances in evidence unless the testimony is clear and convincing. (DuPree, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 960; People v. Wright (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 302, 313.) While we have already determined that the complainant\u2019s testimony was clear and convincing in this case, we also note that her testimony was sufficiently corroborated by her prompt complaint of the incident. Gramc, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 738; People v. Server (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 888, 895, cert. denied (1987), 484 U.S. 842, 98 L. Ed. 2d 88, 108 S. Ct. 131.\nDefendant also argues that Fritzi\u2019s testimony in this case was \u201cincredible and beyond belief.\u201d Defendant asserts that it is \u201cdifficult to conceive\u201d that he would drop her off only one block from the Wrens Roost after sexually assaulting her and then return to the Wrens Roost three days later. Defendant cites People v. Jackson (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 785, and People v. Wright (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 302, to support his contention.\nIn Jackson, the appellate court reversed the defendant\u2019s conviction of sexual assault, noting that it was \u201cfarfetched\u201d for the defendant to take the complainant to a motel room, register for the room using his correct name, address, and driver\u2019s license number, and then forcibly rape her. (Jackson, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 789.) In Wright, the appellate court reversed the defendant\u2019s rape conviction, finding that the victim\u2019s version of the events \u201chas greater value as fiction than as credible evidence.\u201d (Wright, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 318.) The court also described the victim\u2019s testimony as \u201chighly unlikely, improbable and unbelievable.\u201d 147 Ill. App. 3d at 318.\nWe disagree with defendant\u2019s assertion that the evidence in the case at bar is at all similar to that presented in Jackson or Wright. Again, we agree with defendant that the complainant\u2019s testimony contained some inconsistencies in this case. However, we fail to perceive how these inconsistencies transform the complainant\u2019s testimony into \u201cfiction\u201d or render it highly unlikely, improbable or unbelievable.\nA court of review will not disturb a conviction unless the evidence is so palpably contrary to a guilty determination, or is so unreasonable or improbable that it raises a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. (DuPree, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 962.) In the case at bar, Fritzi made a prompt complaint to her friends and the police, described her attacker to the police, and gave a description of the incident to the medical personnel in the emergency room. In addition, Dr. Saccora found dirt particles on the outside of Fritzi\u2019s genitalia and a piece of a leaf or grass inside her vagina. Testimony at trial also indicated that Fritzi\u2019s blouse and jeans contained dirt after the incident, although they were clean earlier in the evening. Even with the inconsistencies outlined above, we cannot find that the jury\u2019s verdict was so unreasonable or improbable that it raises a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt in this case.\nDefendant next contends that his right to confront witnesses was violated when the State was not required to disclose the complainant\u2019s new address. Defendant argues that the failure to require disclosure in this case prevented him from conducting a sufficient pretrial investigation to effectively challenge complainant\u2019s credibility at trial. As such, defendant asserts that his right to confrontation was violated and this requires a reversal of his conviction.\nBefore trial, the State filed a motion requesting the trial court to deny disclosure of Fritzi\u2019s new address to defendant. The motion was based upon Supreme Court Rules 412(i) and 415(d) (107 Ill. 2d Rules 412(i), 415(d)). In the motion, the State alleged that Fritzi received a telephone call from a person who identified herself as defendant\u2019s wife and that his wife requested that Fritzi not continue to prosecute the case. Since receiving the phone call, Fritzi changed residences and obtained an unlisted telephone number. The State argued in the motion that \u201cthere is substantial risk of harm, intimidation, bribery, and unnecessary embarrassment to the victim if her new address is released to the defendant.\u201d Attached to the motion was Fritzi\u2019s affidavit, in which she stated:\n\u201cThat during this conversation, the woman who said she was Pam Shockley suggested that I could drop charges or not appear in court, that she did not think her husband should go to jail but should receive counselling, and that he had just gotten out of jail in Kentucky in addition to other things.\u201d\nThe trial court conducted a hearing on the State\u2019s motion. Defendant argued that he needed the address to allow him to investigate Fritzi\u2019s reputation for truthfulness and veracity in her community. The trial court disagreed and granted the State\u2019s motion, stating that the State was required to disclose her previous address, but not her new address. The court also stated that \u201cthe State will make the victim available to the defense.\u201d\nDefendant argues that the trial court\u2019s ruling deprived him of an opportunity to conduct a sufficient pretrial investigation to effectively challenge Fritzi\u2019s credibility at trial. Defendant notes that section 114 \u2014 9(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 114\u20149(a)) allows a defendant to obtain a \u201clist of prosecution witnesses and their last known addresses\u201d from the State. While defendant agrees with the State that Supreme Court Rule 412(1) (107 Ill. 2d R. 412(i)) can, in certain circumstances, allow a court to deny disclosure, he argues that this is not such a case.\nSupreme Court Rule 412\u00ae provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201cThe court may deny disclosure *** if it finds that there is substantial risk to any person of physical harm, intimidation, bribery, economic reprisals, or unnecessary annoyance or embarrassment resulting from such disclosure which outweighs any usefulness of the disclosure to counsel.\u201d (107 Ill. 2d R. 412(1).)\nThe purpose of this rule is to assist the defendant in the investigation of the witness and to prevent surprise or unfair advantage which prejudices the defendant at trial. (People v. Morissette (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 431, 440; People v. Smith (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 21, 29.) It is incumbent upon the defendant to show that surprise or other prejudice resulted from the State\u2019s failure to supply the witness\u2019 address. People v. Gutierrez (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 774, 784.\nIt is our opinion that the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s request to obtain Fritzi\u2019s new address in this ease. The court could properly conclude that providing defendant with Fritzi\u2019s new address could result in \u201cunnecessary annoyance or embarrassment,\u201d especially after considering that defendant\u2019s wife apparently tried to get Fritzi to stop the prosecution of the case.\nFurthermore, defendant has failed to demonstrate how the nondisclosure of Fritzi\u2019s new address prejudiced him at trial. Defendant argued that he needed her new address to investigate her reputation for truth and veracity in her new neighborhood in order to effectively cross-examine her. However, we fail to see how any information concerning her reputation for truth and veracity could reasonably be expected to be obtained from her new neighbors. The trial court ordered the State to disclose Fritzi\u2019s last address before her new address. Defendant was able to effectively cross-examine Fritzi at trial, including eliciting some inconsistencies in her testimony. Defendant has failed to show how the outcome of the trial would have been different had he been provided with Fritzi\u2019s new address. (See Gutierrez, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 784-85.) Thus, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s ruling denying defendant disclosure of Fritzi\u2019s new address.\nFor the above-stated reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nREINHARD and DUNN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE INGLIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and Daniel D. Yuhas and Jeffrey Bergschneider, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Gary V. Johnson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (William L. Browers and Robert J. Biderman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES E. SHOCKLEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201488\u20140381\nOpinion filed March 16, 1990.\nG. Joseph Weller, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and Daniel D. Yuhas and Jeffrey Bergschneider, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nGary V. Johnson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (William L. Browers and Robert J. Biderman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0148-01", "first_page_order": 170, "last_page_order": 181 }