{ "id": 2492998, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN D. HELTON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Helton", "decision_date": "1990-03-22", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201489\u20140376", "first_page": "410", "last_page": "421", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 410" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "484 U.S. 842", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 601376, 600516, 599429, 599272, 600169, 600650, 601608, 601164, 600750, 602032, 600145, 601778, 601105, 599319, 600920, 601855 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0842-13", "/us/484/0842-06", "/us/484/0842-08", "/us/484/0842-14", "/us/484/0842-09", "/us/484/0842-04", "/us/484/0842-10", "/us/484/0842-11", "/us/484/0842-15", "/us/484/0842-01", "/us/484/0842-16", "/us/484/0842-05", "/us/484/0842-07", "/us/484/0842-12", "/us/484/0842-03", "/us/484/0842-02" ] }, { "cite": "390 N.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2982955 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 N.E.2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3505102 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3650716 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 N.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 785", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3551462 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/169/0785-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 N.E.2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 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App. 3d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2642782 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/42/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 N.E.2d 924", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3080395 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 N.E.2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 2d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Ct.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "499 N.E.2d 1019", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1024" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 888", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3643043 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0888-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 N.E.2d 1363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3516704 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0737-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 N.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 Ill. App. 3d 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2666513 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/187/0832-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1079, "char_count": 23060, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4795841021141533e-07, "percentile": 0.6608698036063106 }, "sha256": "eeceea6d40ded52d78c224a59f8df92ce614384b8a75382d4e58f1a80dad4e90", "simhash": "1:2a2795563755bc44", "word_count": 3805 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:46.192333+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN D. HELTON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201414(b)(1).) Defendant argues (1) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) he was denied a fair trial by comments in opening statement and testimony concerning an exhibit which was not admitted into evidence; (3) he was denied an opportunity to conduct an effective cross-examination of the victim; (4) the trial court committed plain error in admitting evidence of a prior conviction; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing. Defendant also argues he is entitled to 186 days\u2019 credit against his sentence.\nWe affirm and remand for proper sentence credit.\nOn October 5, 1988, defendant was charged with one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201414(b)(1)) and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201416(c)(1)(i)). During opening statement, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney noted the victim\u2019s mother found bloody underwear belonging to the victim soon after defendant moved out of their home.\nAt trial, Sherri Diane Condardy testified that she lives with her six-year-old daughter, M.J., and her three-year-old son, EJ. Between August 15, 1988, and August 26, 1988, defendant lived with them. She had known defendant for 20 years. He is 37 years old. No one else was staying in her apartment at that time. Defendant watched M.J. and F.J. while Condardy worked. Condardy noticed a change in M.J.\u2019s behavior after defendant moved in. She became angry, was difficult when getting dressed, did not want Condardy to bathe her, did not want Condardy to enter the bathroom while she was in the room, and became shy. Around the time defendant moved out, Condardy looked at M.J.\u2019s vaginal area. M.J. fought Condardy, turning away from her and facing the wall. Condardy took M.J. to a physician, who examined her on September 13, 1989. After the examination, Condardy contacted the police.\nCondardy then stated that after defendant moved out, she found four pairs of M.J.\u2019s panties with bloodstains on them. Condardy began to cry, and the trial judge ordered a recess so she could compose herself. Condardy then testified that prior to the time defendant lived with them, M.J. put her panties in her laundry basket. Condardy found the stained panties under a pile of clothes in M.J.\u2019s bedroom.\nM.J. stated she was seven years old, and her brother was three. Before school started, defendant lived with them. He baby-sat while her mother worked. While defendant was baby-sitting, M.J. stated \u201che touched me in my private parts.\u201d M.J. drew a circle around the vaginal area on a girl picture. Although M.J. could not remember how many times defendant had touched her vaginal area, she stated he did so on more than one occasion. M.J. could not remember whether she was dressed when defendant touched her. She stated it hurt when he touched her.\nPam Waterman, an investigator with the Department of Children and Family Services, interviewed M.J. Diane Beggs, a police officer, was present. M.J. stated defendant had touched her vaginal area with his fingers. M.J. could not remember how many times defendant had touched her. M.J. stated defendant\u2019s fingers touched her skin. On cross-examination, Waterman testified M.J. could not remember dates, times of day, or what she and defendant were wearing. Beggs\u2019 testimony about M.J.\u2019s statements was consistent with Waterman\u2019s testimony.\nVictor Wilson, M.J.\u2019s pediatrician, testified that on September 2, 1988, he saw M.J. at his office. He attempted to examine her abdomen and genital area. M.J. was very resistant to disrobing, being touched, and lying down. On a subsequent day, he attempted to examine her again, but was unsuccessful. On September 13, 1988, he admitted M.J. to the hospital and placed her under general anesthesia.\nWilson observed the exterior of M.J.\u2019s genitals appeared normal. There was no bruising, tearing, or significant trauma. Upon examining the inside of M.J.\u2019s genitals, he found the vaginal opening was \u201cabnormally large.\u201d A normal vaginal opening for a child of M.J.\u2019s age is one-sixth to one-eighth inch. M.J.\u2019s vaginal opening was one-half to three-fourths of an inch. The rim of the hymen was thickened and irregularly rolled, rather than thin. Wilson also found a tear in the hymen, which had healed, indicating the injury was approximately 10 days old. The inside of the vagina showed small blood vessel lesions. Wilson stated these lesions were typical of Osler-Webber-Rendu syndrome, from which M.J. suffers.\nWilson further stated that the syndrome does not affect intelligence, would not cause the enlargement of the vagina, and would not cause the tear in the hymen. The tear and enlargement of the vaginal opening could easily cause bleeding and would most likely cause pain. In Wilson\u2019s opinion, on more than one occasion, at least one of which was 10 days or more prior to the examination, M.J. had suffered a vaginal penetration. Wilson stated the size of the object causing the injuries was \u201cat least the size of an adult\u2019s finger or larger.\u201d Wilson formed an opinion that the penetration had occurred on more than one occasion.\nOn cross-examination, Wilson stated Osler-Webber-Rendu syndrome is an inherited disorder. It causes clots in blood vessels in moist tissues of the body, such as the mouth, respiratory tract, lungs, and vagina. The blood vessels can bleed spontaneously or with trauma. The clots within M.J.\u2019s vagina could bleed spontaneously. Penetration of M.J.\u2019s vagina could likely have occurred over a long period of time. However, his findings were consistent with a short time frame. A penetration could possibly have occurred less than 10 days before September 13, 1988.\nOn redirect examination, Wilson stated M.J. had spontaneous nosebleeds. He was not aware of any spontaneous vaginal bleeding. She would bleed easily if she suffered trauma.\nThe trial judge sustained defendant\u2019s objection to the admission of the panties. He stated he could not tell if the stains were blood, the minor had not testified she removed them, and no typing of the stain occurred. Therefore, the court found the panties were not relevant. The trial judge instructed the jury to completely disregard the exhibit and any testimony offered about the panties.\nVirginia Helton, defendant\u2019s mother, testified in his behalf. She stated defendant lived with Condardy in August 1988. He moved back into her home on Wednesday, August 24,1988.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of both counts. On August 7, 1989, the trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years\u2019 imprisonment on the aggravated criminal sexual assault conviction. The court vacated the judgment of guilty on the aggravated criminal sexual abuse conviction, finding both offenses arose out of the same act.\nDefendant argues he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated criminal sexual assault because M.J. did not testify that penetration occurred, the fact that touching caused pain does not indicate penetration occurred, and the medical evidence of penetration is \u201cinsignificant\u201d because it does not corroborate the victim\u2019s testimony.\nSection 12\u201414(b)(1) states that a person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if he \u201cwas 17 years of age or over and commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 13 years of age when the act was committed.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201414(b)(1).) Penetration as applicable to the instant case is defined as any intrusion of any part of the body of one person into the sex organ of another. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201412(f).) A conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault when defendant testifies and denies the charge will be upheld where the complainant\u2019s testimony is clear and convincing or substantially corroborated by other evidence. (People v. Harris (1989), 187 Ill. App. 3d 832, 543 N.E.2d 859; People v. Jones (1988), 174 Ill. App. 3d 737, 528 N.E.2d 1363.) Corroborating evidentiary matters include eyewitness accounts, confessions or admissions, prompt reporting of the incident by the victim, or medical testimony which supports allegations of abuse. (People v. Server (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 888, 895, 499 N.E.2d 1019, 1024, cert. denied (1987), 484 U.S. 842, 98 L. Ed. 2d 88, 108 S. Ct. 131; People v. Morgan (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 733, 738, 500 N.E.2d 1121, 1125.) When evidence of penetration is presented at trial, the question of whether penetration occurred is one of fact for the jury to determine. (Harris, 187 Ill. App. 3d 832, 543 N.E.2d 859; Morgan, 149 Ill. App. 3d 733, 500 N.E.2d 1121.) A reviewing court will only set aside a guilty verdict when the evidence is so palpably contrary to the finding or so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt about the accused\u2019s guilt. Morgan, 149 Ill. App. 3d 733, 500 N.E.2d 1121.\nM.J. testified defendant touched her \u201cin\u201d her private parts on more than one occasion and it hurt. Wilson testified penetration of M.J.\u2019s vagina with an object at least as large as an adult finger had occurred on at least one occasion. Wilson also stated penetration had probably occurred on more than one occasion. Defendant\u2019s contention that pain does not indicate penetration because of M.J.\u2019s medical condition is not based on the record. Wilson did not state and was not asked whether the blood disorder caused pain. Therefore, M.J.\u2019s indication that it hurt when defendant touched her vagina may be viewed as a statement that penetration had occurred. However, we need not decide whether M.J.\u2019s testimony by itself may sustain the conviction. Here, extensive medical testimony corroborated the allegation of penetration. Defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIn opening statement, the prosecutor commented that Condardy had found the victim\u2019s bloodstained panties after defendant moved out. Subsequently, Condardy testified she found the panties in an unusual place. However, the exhibit was not admitted as the State\u2019s evidence had not connected it to the offense. All of Condardy\u2019s testimony concerning the panties was stricken. The court advised the jury to disregard the testimony.\nDefendant argues that the prosecutor\u2019s reference in opening statement to the bloodstained panties, which were not admitted into evidence, and the subsequent testimony denied him a fair trial. We do not agree. The purpose of opening statement is to inform the trier of fact of what the evidence will show. It is improper for a prosecutor to comment on what evidence will be introduced and then fail to produce the evidence. (People v. Warmack (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 112, 413 N.E.2d 1254.) In order to constitute reversible error, remarks by counsel must be such as to give reasonable grounds for believing the jury was prejudiced by the remarks and its verdict was affected. People v. Talley (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 971, 978, 504 N.E.2d 1318, 1322.\nHere, defendant does not allege intentional prosecutorial misconduct. Additionally, all of the cases relied upon by the defendant involve cumulative error situations. In none was the impropriety in opening statement independently sufficient for reversal. See People v. Weller (1970), 123 Ill. App. 2d 421, 258 N.E.2d 806; People v. Weinger (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 857, 428 N.E.2d 924; People v. Rogers (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 499, 356 N.E.2d 413.\nThe issue presented to this court is whether the remarks prejudiced the jury and affected its verdict. (Talley, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 978, 504 N.E.2d at 1322.) Defendant argues the reference coupled with the effect of the stricken testimony denied him a fair trial. However, defendant does not argue the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial based upon Condardy\u2019s testimony. Generally, errors corrected by the trial court with instructions to the jury do not require a reversal. This is based upon the premise that juries follow instructions. We note the exception to this rule is found in situations where no jury could disregard the inadmissible evidence. (People v. Sandoval (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 159, 192-93.) In the instant case, Wilson provided uncontradicted expert opinion that penetration had occurred. Additionally, Wilson stated that penetration had most probably occurred on more than one occasion. M.J.\u2019s physical condition supported a finding that penetration had occurred. Therefore, we find the verdict was not affected by the improper opening statement, even when coupled with any residual impact of the stricken testimony.\nDefendant next argues M.J.\u2019s inability to remember the details of her prior statement to Waterman and Beggs deprived him of an opportunity for effective cross-examination. Defendant maintains his sixth amendment right to confront witnesses was infringed upon. (U.S. Const., amend. VI.) Defendant did not object at trial that M.J.\u2019s inability to recall the substance of the prior conversation deprived him of an opportunity for cross-examination. He did not raise this issue in his post-trial motion or supplemental post-trial motion.\nDefendant has waived review of this issue. In a criminal case, both the trial objection and a written post-trial motion raising the issue are necessary to preserve an error for review. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 185-91, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1129-32, cert. denied (1988), 488 U.S. 917, 102 L. Ed. 2d 263, 109 S. Ct. 274; People v. Crowder (1988), 174 Ill. App. 3d 939, 529 N.E.2d 83.) Waiver applies to constitutional issues as well as nonconstitutional issues. (People v. Thomas (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 172, 526 N.E.2d 467.) Plain error or errors affecting substantial rights may be addressed although they were not raised in the trial court. (107 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); People v. Precup (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 7, 382 N.E.2d 227.) However, review of issues pursuant to Rule 615(a) only occurs where the evidence is closely balanced or the error denied the defendant a fair trial. People v. Lucas (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 245, 430 N.E.2d 1091.\nOn the merits, defendant was not denied his right to cross-examine M.J. The sixth amendment right to confront witnesses is a fundamental one, which affords a defendant the opportunity to test the truth of his accuser\u2019s assertions. (People v. Dixon (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 340, 434 N.E.2d 369.) A gap in a witness\u2019 memory concerning the content of a prior statement does not necessarily preclude an opportunity for effective cross-examination. People v. Flores (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 66, 538 N.E.2d 481; see generally United States v. Owens (1988), 484 U.S. 554, 98 L. Ed. 2d 951, 108 S. Ct. 838.\nDefendant next argues the trial court committed plain error in denying his motion in limine to preclude use of a prior Arizona conviction for impeachment. In the alternative, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in balancing the probative value of prior conviction with its prejudicial effect. In People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill. 2d 510, 516, 268 N.E.2d 695, 698, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (Fed. R. Evid. 609). The rule stated:\n\u201c(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere, is admissible but only if the crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment unless (3), in either case, the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\n(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of conviction or of the release of the witness from confinement, whichever is the later date.\u201d Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516, 268 N.E.2d at 698.\nIn People v. Yost (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 292, 399 N.E.2d 1283, the court stated the proposed rule as adopted in Montgomery, and not subsequent revisions of it, would be utilized by Illinois courts. Defendant\u2019s prior convictions were based upon pleas of nolo contendere.\nHowever, defendant has waived review of this issue. In Luce v. United States (1984), 469 U.S. 38, 83 L. Ed. 2d 443, 105 S. Ct. 460, the Supreme Court held that in order to preserve appellate review of a denial of a motion in limine, the defendant must testify at trial. Luce elected not to testify after the trial court denied his motion to preclude impeachment by use of a prior felony conviction. The Supreme Court noted that the harm caused by the in limine ruling is \u201cwholly speculative\u201d where a defendant does not testify. See also People v. Redman (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 691, 490 N.E.2d 958.\nDefendant has also waived review of the propriety of the denial of the motion because the prior conviction was based on a plea of nolo contendere. Although Montgomery adopted the version of the Federal rule which excluded use of convictions based upon a nolo contendere plea, defendant did not object to use of the prior conviction on this ground. Specific objections at trial level waive all other grounds for objection. (People v. Barrios (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 265, 500 N.E.2d 415.) In People v. Alexander (1989), 184 Ill. App. 3d 855, 540 N.E.2d 949, the court ruled the defendant waived review of the propriety of using a conviction based upon a nolo contendere plea for impeachment purposes. Defendant had failed to raise the objection in the trial court. We find Alexander persuasive and follow it. We note that the trial court did balance the prejudicial effect of the testimony with its probative value.\nThe trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant\u2019s presentence report indicates he was convicted of burglary in 1969 and was placed on two years\u2019 probation. In 1980, he was convicted of two counts of sexual conduct with a minor and sentenced to two 7-year terms of imprisonment. Defendant was also convicted of a misdemeanor offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. During the sentencing hearing, defendant denied commission of the instant offense. He also stated the girls in Arizona had initiated the conduct leading to the offenses.\nAbsent an abuse of discretion, the trial court\u2019s sentencing determination should not be altered upon review. (People v. Ward (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 516, 499 N.E.2d 422, cert. denied (1987), 479 U.S. 1096, 94 L. Ed. 2d 168, 107 S. Ct. 1314.) The trial court is in the best position to assess the proper sentence based upon the particular circumstances of the case. (Ward, 113 Ill. 2d at 525-26, 499 N.E.2d at 425; People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882; People v. Jones (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 527 N.E.2d 521.) Before reversing a sentence imposed by the trial court, it must be clearly evident that the sentence was improperly imposed. In making this determination, the reviewing court should not focus on a few words or statements by the trial court. Instead, the determination of the propriety of the sentence should be based upon consideration of the entire record. (Ward, 113 Ill. 2d at 526-27, 499 N.E.2d at 425-26.) Aggravated criminal sexual assault is a Class X felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201414(c).) As such, a defendant may be sentenced to not less than six years nor more than 30 years. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20141(a)(3).\nDefendant relies extensively on People v. Harris (1989), 187 Ill. App. 3d 832, 543 N.E.2d 859, and cases cited within it in arguing his sentence is excessive. In Harris, defendant\u2019s 25-year sentence was \u201ccautiously\u201d found to be an abuse of discretion. The Harris court noted the trial court considered all factors in aggravation and mitigation prior to imposing sentence. The court also noted that the sentence was within the statutory range. However, the reviewing court then reweighed those factors. Reweighing of sentencing factors has been repeatedly disapproved of by the Illinois Supreme Court. We decline to do so in the instant case.\nAs a matter of substance, Harris was a first offender, had an alcohol problem, his alcohol problem contributed to the offense, and he supported his family. None of those mitigating factors are present in the instant case. Defendant also relies upon cases cited by Harris as illustrating the excessiveness of his sentence. Sentencing was not at issue in any of those cases. (See People v. Watson (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 796, 533 N.E.2d 1011; People v. Daniels (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 518 N.E.2d 669; People v. Fisher (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 785, 523 N.E.2d 368; People v. Bayer (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 218, 513 N.E.2d 457; People v. McCoy (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 194, 509 N.E.2d 567.) Therefore, no discussion of the factors relevant to a sentencing determination occurred in those cases. The cases, thus, are not authority for the proposition that defendant\u2019s sentence is excessive.\nThe trial court properly considered defendant\u2019s lack of rehabilitative potential, prior offenses, attitude toward his past convictions, and the need to protect the public from this type of offense. The court\u2019s statement that this was defendant\u2019s third Class X offense was erroneous. However, the error did not affect the sentence. Defendant was sentenced to 15 years\u2019 imprisonment. The maximum sentence was 30 years, and the State requested a 25-year sentence. In light of the entire record, no abuse of discretion occurred in sentencing. See Ward, 113 Ill. 2d at 525-26, 499 N.E.2d at 425-26.\nHowever, we find defendant is entitled to 186 days\u2019 credit against his sentence. He was arrested on October 4, 1988. Bond was set the next day. However, defendant did not post bond. He was sentenced on April 7, 1989. The court did not credit his sentence. The judgment on sentence also does not reflect any credit for time served. A defendant is entitled to credit against his sentence for all time served in custody on the offense for which he is sentenced. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20147; People v. Scheib (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 244, 390 N.E.2d 872.) Thus, defendant is entitled to credit against his sentence.\nFor the above reasons, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence and remand for entry of 186 days\u2019 credit for time served.\nAffirmed and remanded with directions.\nLUND and SPITZ, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and M. Jeffrey Bergschneider, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Lawrence R. Fichter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Gwendolyn W. Klingler, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN D. HELTON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201489\u20140376\nOpinion filed March 22, 1990.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and M. Jeffrey Bergschneider, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nLawrence R. Fichter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Gwendolyn W. Klingler, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0410-01", "first_page_order": 432, "last_page_order": 443 }