{
  "id": 2494677,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams",
  "decision_date": "1990-03-22",
  "docket_number": "No. 4\u201489\u20140877",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:46.192333+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant George Williams pleaded guilty to burglary on July 11, 1989, and was sentenced on October 3, 1989, to serve six years\u2019 imprisonment. On November 7, 1989, the trial judge denied the defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. The defendant has filed a timely appeal.\nThe defendant argues a new sentencing hearing is necessary because the trial court erroneously believed that it had no discretion to place the defendant on probation under the Illinois Alcoholism and Other Drug Dependency Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111\u00bd, par. 6360\u20142).\nThe issue being limited, only those matters appearing in the record which are pertinent to this disposition will be discussed.\nThe pertinent statutory section of the Act is:\n\u201cAn addict or alcoholic who is convicted of a crime may elect treatment under the supervision of a licensed program designated by the Department *** unless *** (g) the person has been convicted of residential burglary and has a record of one or more felony convictions.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111\u00bd, par. 6360\u20141.\nSection 5 \u2014 5\u20143 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20145\u20143) also must be considered. It states:\n\u201c(a) Every person convicted of an offense shall be sentenced as provided in this Section.\n* * *\n(c)(2) A period of probation, a term of periodic imprisonment or conditional discharge shall not be imposed for the following offenses.\n* * *\n(F) A Class 2 or greater felony if the offender had been convicted of a Class 2 or greater felony within 10 years of the date on which he committed the offense for which he is being sentenced.\n* * *\n(8) When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after having twice been convicted of any Class 2 or greater Class felonies in Illinois, and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts, such defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender. This paragraph shall not apply unless (1) the first felony was committed after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1977; and (2) the second felony was committed after conviction on the first; and (3) the third felony was committed after conviction on the second.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 1005\u20145\u20143(a), (c)(2)(F), (c)(8).\nAt the sentencing hearing, the trial court found the provisions of section 5 \u2014 5\u20143 mandatory in requiring a penitentiary sentence. With respect to sentencing options, the court stated in part:\n\u201cThe provisions of Chapter lllVa apparently don\u2019t disqualify defendant from the treatment alternatives, but treatment alternatives are discretionary with the Court, and that which is discretionary must yield to that which is mandatory.\u201d\nThe defendant\u2019s presentence report reveals the following documented history of criminality:\nSeptember 8,1981 Defendant found guilty on a plea of burglary and robbery, sentenced to Department of Corrections, three years plus two years\u2019 mandatory supervised release.\nDecember 17,1984 Upon a plea of guilty, the defendant was convicted of residential burglary, sentenced to the Department of Corrections, four years with two years\u2019 mandatory supervised release.\nThe presentence report shows other criminal offenses not pertinent to this disposition.\nThe record further shows that the trial court at the time of sentencing stated:\n\u201cThe defendant needs treatment. The Court would like to see him get treatment. There is no question that he is an addict. * * *\n*** The Court has no discretion. ***\n*** So, I can\u2019t understand the act, other than it was caused by alcohol or cocaine abuse. That\u2019s why I\u2019m concerned about mandatory sentencing in this case. But I have no discretion.\u201d\nIn People v. Teschner (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 187, 407 N.E.2d 49, the defendant was found guilty of burglary. Within the prior 10 years, he had twice been convicted of burglary. The supreme court stated,\n\u201cUnder the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act, probation is not considered a sentence. Under the language of the Act, one is not \u2018sentenced\u2019 to probation as under the Unified Code of Corrections but rather \u2018placed\u2019 on probation.\nWe have held on previous occasions that the term \u2018probation\u2019 may have different meanings in different statutes. *** In our case the trial court\u2019s exercise of discretion in admitting a defendant to probation and requiring treatment under the Dangerous Drug Abuse Act is a disposition imposed as a rehabilitative treatment rather than a criminal sanction.\u201d Teschner, 81 Ill. 2d at 193, 407 N.E.2d at 52.\nThe determination of the supreme court in Teschner does not dictate the result in this case. The Dangerous Drug Abuse Act, which contained certain exceptions in determining the eligibility of a defendant to be released pursuant to that program, has been repealed. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 120.8.) There are specific exceptions in section 10 \u2014 101 of the Act, one of them being that the defendant is not eligible to be released under that program if he \u201chas been convicted of residential burglary and has a record of one or more felony convictions.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111\u00bd, par. 6360\u20141(g).) Here, the defendant has three prior felony convictions including the residential burglary conviction of 1984. That the instant proceeding was not a conviction for residential burglary does not require a different result. It is clear that under the exceptions created in section 10 \u2014 101 of the Act, the defendant is not eligible for release under that, program and the trial court was correct in determining that it had no discretion in sentencing the defendant to either probation or treatment under the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111\u00bd, par. 6360\u20141.\nPeople v. Tucker (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 333, 539 N.E.2d 243, is not helpful in a disposition of this case. In Tucker, the defendant was convicted of residential burglary and the trial court denied the defendant\u2019s petition pursuant to the provisions of the Act because the trial court mistakenly believed that the defendant\u2019s offense was nonprobationable, thereby rendering defendant ineligible for treatment under that statute. The reviewing court, following Teschner, stated the trial court\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s petition was based upon its misapprehension of the law and that the defendant could have otherwise qualified for addiction treatment under the Act. In Tucker, there is no showing that the defendant had any prior criminal record, which makes its finding inapposite to this case.\nIn summary, the defendant did not qualify for treatment under the Act. His immediate conviction is for burglary. He had prior burglary and robbery convictions in 1981 and a residential burglary conviction in 1984. Defendant falls within the exception stated in section 10 \u2014 101(g) of the Act for a person who has been convicted of residential burglary and has a record of one or more felony convictions. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 111\u00bd, par. 6360\u20141(g).\nThe trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGREEN and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daniel D. Yuhas and David Bergschneider, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.",
      "Charles Colburn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Jacksonville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201489\u20140877\nOpinion filed March 22, 1990.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and David Bergschneider, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nCharles Colburn, State\u2019s Attorney, of Jacksonville (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0433-01",
  "first_page_order": 455,
  "last_page_order": 459
}