{
  "id": 2493058,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRELL A. EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Edwards",
  "decision_date": "1990-03-21",
  "docket_number": "No. 2\u201489\u20140359",
  "first_page": "454",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:46.192333+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRELL A. EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE GEIGER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, the defendant, Darrel A. Edwards, appeals from convictions on four counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse for which he received five-year sentences. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201416(d).) He argues that the court erroneously allowed evidence of other crimes, that two of the convictions were neither properly charged nor proved, that the court improperly struck psychological evidence, and that the sentences are excessive. We affirm in part and reverse in part.\nUnder the Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code), a defendant commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if he commits sexual penetration or sexual conduct with a victim who is at least 13 years old, but under 17 years old, and at least five years younger than himself. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201416(d).) The Code defines \u201csexual conduct,\u201d in pertinent part, as \u201cany intentional or knowing touching or fondling by *** the accused *** of the sex organs *** of the victim *** for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201412(e).) The Code further defines \u201csexual penetration,\u201d in pertinent part, as \u201cany contact, however slight, between the sex organ of one person and the sex organ, mouth or anus of another person.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201412(f).\nThe female victim testified that her birth date was May 10, 1972. She further testified as to her consensual sexual relations with the defendant in January and February 1988. Over the defendant\u2019s objection, the State presented evidence that the defendant provided the victim with ether, freon and/or marijuana to use in connection with all the couple\u2019s sexual conduct. The defendant\u2019s birth date is February 28,1961.\nIn connection with the evidence of ether, freon and marijuana, the defendant\u2019s first argument on appeal is that the court committed reversible error in allowing evidence of use of intoxicants and drugs. We disagree.\nEvidence of other crimes is admissible if relevant for some purpose such as modus operandi, intent, identification, motive, or absence of a mistake. (People v. Richardson (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 322, 528 N.E.2d 612.) However, because it is overly persuasive, such evidence is not admissible if relevant merely to establish the defendant\u2019s criminal propensity. (Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d at 338-39.) The erroneous admission of other-crimes evidence is not reversible if it was harmless error. 107 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d 322.\nWe find no relevant purpose for admission of the instant evidence. Although the evidence of intoxicants and drugs was clearly intertwined with the continuing narrative of sexual conduct, it in no sense tended to prove or disprove the elements of the offense: the parties\u2019 ages and sexual behavior. Consequently, its admission was error.\nNevertheless, we find that the court\u2019s erroneous admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Importantly, this was a bench trial and, thus, there was no risk of overpersuading a jury. Furthermore, the court\u2019s comments reveal no emphasis upon the improper evidence. Given the unrebutted evidence of the parties\u2019 ages and their consensual sexual conduct, the admission of improper evidence did not prejudice the defendant\u2019s case.\nThe defendant\u2019s second argument on appeal is that he was not properly charged or proved guilty on counts II and IV, which were based upon his \u201csexual contact\u201d with the victim. In charging the instant counts II and IV, the State alleged that the defendant \u201cknowingly committed an act of sexual conduct with [the victim], who was at least 13 years of age but under 17 years of age, in that [he] placed his mouth on the vaginal area of [the victim, and] was at least five years older than [the victim].\u201d We agree that the charges were insufficient.\nAs the defendant emphasizes, the instant charges omitted the Code\u2019s provision that the relevant sexual conduct was \u201cfor the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201412(e).) That provision was not, as the State urges, inessential merely because its source is the statutory definition of \u201csexual conduct\u201d rather than the statutory definition of the charged offense, aggravated criminal sexual abuse.\nThe instant offenses of aggravated criminal sexual abuse cannot be fully defined without reference to the definition of \u201csexual conduct.\u201d In fact, the instant charges were generally couched in the language of the \u201csexual conduct\u201d definition. However, the charges omitted one element in the definition of \u201csexual conduct\u201d and, thus, an element in the instant offenses: that the relevant conduct was committed with the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. In omitting that element, the instant charges failed both to set forth fully the nature and elements of the offense and to be as fully descriptive as the language of the statute. (See People v. Nibbio (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 513, 536 N.E.2d 113.) Consequently, we reverse the defendant\u2019s convictions on the inadequately charged counts II and IV.\nConsidering the possibility of new charges of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against the defendant, we find, contrary to the defendant\u2019s argument, that, although the State brought insufficient charges, it presented sufficient evidence to properly prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Taylor (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 289.\nThe defendant\u2019s third argument on appeal is that the court erroneously struck evidence of his cognitive and psychological development. According to the defendant, evidence that \u201cthe accused was at least 5 years older than the victim,\u201d as required by the Code\u2019s definition of the offense (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12\u201416(d)), can be rebutted by expert evidence that the defendant\u2019s psychological maturity is not five years greater than that of his sexual partner.\nThe defendant presents no authority for his creative argument. We find no reason to diverge from the unambiguous statutory language. That language refers to a chronological age disparity between the defendant and victim, not a psychological age disparity. See People ex rel. Gibson v. Cannon (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 366, 357 N.E.2d 1180.\nThe defendant\u2019s fourth and final argument is that his sentences are excessive. According to the defendant, his five-year sentences are unjustified by aggravating circumstances and could only have been the product of the court\u2019s disregarding of substantial mitigating factors.\nSentencing is a matter for the trial court\u2019s discretion; absent an obvious abuse of that discretion, a sentence may not be altered on review. People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882.\nThe defendant\u2019s two Class 2 felonies were each punishable with between three and seven years\u2019 imprisonment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 12\u201416(e), 1005\u20148\u20141(a)(5).) The record shows that in imposing the midrange five-year sentences, the court considered the defendant\u2019s previous criminal conduct, the defendant\u2019s parole status at the time of the instant offenses, and the psychological harm to the victim threatened by the defendant\u2019s conduct. The record also shows that the court considered mitigating factors: factors relating to the defendant\u2019s prior criminal conduct, the defendant\u2019s psychological maturity, and defendant\u2019s community support system. The record reveals no abuse of discretion.\nBased on the foregoing, we reverse the defendant\u2019s convictions based upon counts II and IY and vacate the sentences imposed thereon. We affirm the remainder of the court\u2019s judgment.\nReversed in part; affirmed in part.\nUNVERZAGT, P.J., and DUNN, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE GEIGER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Phyllis J. Perko, of Harlovic & Perko, of West Dundee, for appellant.",
      "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton, and Mary E. Gentile, of Chicago (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DARRELL A. EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201489\u20140359\nOpinion filed March 21, 1990.\nPhyllis J. Perko, of Harlovic & Perko, of West Dundee, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton, and Mary E. Gentile, of Chicago (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0454-01",
  "first_page_order": 476,
  "last_page_order": 480
}