{
  "id": 2491148,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VINCENT M. MADSEN, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Madsen",
  "decision_date": "1990-04-11",
  "docket_number": "No. 2-89-0735",
  "first_page": "220",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VINCENT M. MADSEN, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE INGLIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Vincent Madsen, was charged by uniform traffic citation with the offenses of failure to signal as required (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 11\u2014804(b)) and driving while license revoked (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 6\u2014303(a)) in Du Page County, Illinois. On defendant\u2019s motion, the trial court dismissed the charges for failure to comply with the speedy-trial provision contained in the local court rules. The State appeals, contending that the trial court erred due to defendant\u2019s failure to make a specific demand for a speedy trial. We reverse and remand.\nDefendant first appeared in court on June 21, 1988, and requested to have counsel appointed for him. The trial court denied this request.\nDefendant next appeared in court on July 19, 1988, stated that he was unemployed and again requested that counsel be appointed. The case was continued until August 2, 1988. On August 2, 1988, the case was transferred to the field court in Addison and continued until September 20, 1988. It was subsequently given a new date of November 22, 1988.\nOn November 22, 1988, counsel for defendant filed an appearance and requested a jury trial. The case was transferred again and continued to December 14, 1988. On December 14, 1988, the case was continued to February 28, 1989.\nOn February 9, 1989, the State filed a motion for continuance, supported by affidavit, requesting a trial date sometime after March 7, 1989, because of the unavailability of a witness. On May 4, 1989, defendant filed a motion requesting that the case be continued until a date following May 20,1989.\nOn May 25, 1989, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw as attorney for defendant. The court conducted a hearing on defense counsel\u2019s motion on June 13, 1989. The trial court denied the motion. Counsel then orally moved to dismiss the charges against defendant, stating that more than 160 days had passed since defendant made a demand for a jury trial and that \u201ca demand for jury trial is ipso facto speedy trial demand.\u201d The court indicated it would hear argument on defendant\u2019s motion at the afternoon session of court.\nIn the afternoon court session, defense counsel argued that 169 days had passed between the time he made his demand for jury trial on November 22, 1988, and his request for a continuance on May 10, 1989. He argued that with respect to uniform traffic tickets, a jury demand is a speedy-trial demand.\nThe State argued that because defendant had requested a continuance after the speedy-trial period had allegedly run, defendant had waived any demand for a speedy trial. The State requested time to prepare a response, and the court again continued the case.\nOn June 16, 1989, the State filed a written response to defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. The State argued, inter alia, that \u201c[i]n this county [Supreme Court] Rule 505 only applies to citations issued by the Illinois State Police,\u201d and that pursuant to the local court rules, defendant did not comply by serving a written demand for speedy trial upon the State\u2019s Attorney.\nOn June 22, 1989, the court heard argument on defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. The State insisted that defendant never made a demand for speedy trial and that a jury demand could not be so interpreted. Defendant noted that the local court rule that the State cited made an exception to the requirement of a written demand for a speedy trial in the situation in which the State has actual notice of the demand. The trial court, finding that the State had actual notice of defendant\u2019s demand for jury trial, granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.\nInitially, we note that defendant has not filed an appellee\u2019s brief in this case. Nevertheless, the record is simple and the claimed errors are such that this court can easily decide them without the aid of an appellee's brief. Therefore, we choose to address the merits of this appeal pursuant to the guidelines in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133.\nWe must first determine if Supreme Court Rule 505 (113 Ill. 2d R. 505) applies in this case. Supreme Court Rule 505 provides in relevant part:\n\u201cIf the accused demands a trial by jury, the trial shall be scheduled within 120 days of arrest. *** Any State agency or any unit of local government desiring to be exempt from the re quirements of this Rule 505 may apply to the Conference of Chief Circuit Judqes for an exemption.\" (Emphasis added.) (113 Ill. 2d R. 505.)\nThe State has claimed an exemption in this case. We take judicial notice of the fact that there was such an exemption in effect in Du Page County at the time of the alleged traffic offenses in this case. See People v. Monaco (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 278, 281.\nWe next turn to the only issue before us: that is, did defendant\u2019s request for a jury trial constitute a demand for a speedy trial? The Circuit Court of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit had a rule in effect-that concerned defendant\u2019s demand for speedy trial. The rule provided, in pertinent part:\n\u201c30.06 DEFENDANT\u2019S DEMAND FOR SPEEDY TRIAL\n(a) All demands for trial, pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure [Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38 par. 103\u20145(b)], shall be made in the following manner:\n(i) In writing with proper caption and case number signed and dated by the defendant or his attorney and,\n(ii) A copy of said demand shall be served on the State\u2019s Attorney in any manner permitted by Supreme Court Rule No. 11 and 12 and,(iii) A copy of said demand shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court with proof of service on the State\u2019s Attorney.\n(b) The requirements of this rule are mandatory and a demand for trial that does not comply with the foregoing shall not be recognized unless the Court finds that the State had actual notice of defendant\u2019s trial demand and that the interests of justice require recognition of such demand.\u201d (18th Jud. Cir. R. 30.06 (1987).)\nSection 103\u20145(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 103\u20145(b)) provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201c(b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant ***.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 103-5(b).)\nDefendant did not make a written or oral demand for a speedy trial. However, defendant did demand a jury trial at his hearing on November 22, 1988.\nThe effect of defendant\u2019s jury demand was also governed by a local rule. Rule 35.02(c) provided:\n\u201cA jury demand shall not operate as a demand for speedy trial, for purposes of Section 103 \u2014 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38, par. 103\u20145]; any demand for a speedy trial must be made specifically, in accordance with Rule 30.06.\u201d (18th Jud. Cir. R. 35.02(c) (1987).)\nThus, under the local rules, a jury demand could not operate as a demand for speedy trial unless Rule 30.06 was complied with. The trial court found that Rule 30.06(b) applied in this case, stating, \u201cI think that you [the State] were on actual notice that a demand for jury trial was made.\u201d After hearing argument, the trial court found that the State had actual knowledge of the demand and stated, \u201cI\u2019m going to hang my hat on this B section.\u201d The case was then dismissed for violation of the speedy-trial provision.\nThe circuit court rules involved in this case are explicit. The rules mandate that a jury demand will not operate as a speedy-trial demand and that any demand for a speedy trial be written with a copy served on the State\u2019s Attorney. Rule 30.06, however, does provide for an exception in paragraph (b) if \u201cthe Court finds that the State had actual notice of defendant\u2019s trial demand and that the interests of justice require recognition of such demand.\u201d Defendant did not make an oral or written demand for a speedy trial, and we can find nothing in the record to support the court\u2019s finding that the State had actual notice of any such demand. In addition, the trial court ignored the second requirement for the exception in section 30.06(b), which states \u201cand the interests of justice require recognition of such demand.\u201d 18th Jud. Cir. R. 30.06(b) (1987).\nWe have already noted that Supreme Court Rule 505 (113 Ill. 2d R. 505) does not apply in this case because of the applicable exemption for Du Page County. As such, there is no basis in the record to convert defendant\u2019s jury demand into a speedy-trial demand.\nFinding no basis in the record to determine that the State had actual notice of any speedy-trial demand and lacking the required finding of the \u201cinterests of justice,\u201d the order of the circuit court of Du Page County is reversed and the cause is remanded for trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcLAREN and GEIGER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE INGLIS"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Barbara A. Preiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.",
      "Donald J. Ramsell, of Ramsell & Associates, of Schaumburg, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VINCENT M. MADSEN, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201489\u20140735\nOpinion filed April 11, 1990.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Barbara A. Preiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nDonald J. Ramsell, of Ramsell & Associates, of Schaumburg, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0220-01",
  "first_page_order": 242,
  "last_page_order": 246
}