{ "id": 2489255, "name": "EARL HOPKINS, JR., Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (The City of Peoria, Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Hopkins v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1990-03-08", "docket_number": "No. 3-89-0240WC", "first_page": "347", "last_page": "352", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "196 Ill. App. 3d 347" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3111922 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5480756 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3467893 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2890857 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567377 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0052-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 544, "char_count": 11245, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3754070091193727e-07, "percentile": 0.6393714459800552 }, "sha256": "df5584ae8d5ae19b8c5d4fbb55e3142d2eed6cd7deb42e17e2be527bdf88cb77", "simhash": "1:8b656bbb3775e3b5", "word_count": 1852 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:37:27.698771+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EARL HOPKINS, JR., Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (The City of Peoria, Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOODWARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, City of Peoria (Peoria), appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County which set aside the Industrial Commission\u2019s (Commission\u2019s) decision to deny compensation to claimant, Earl Hopkins, Jr.\nThe matter was heard by an arbitrator on July 16 and August 5, 1986. The arbitrator found that claimant\u2019s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment and also determined that claimant\u2019s condition of ill-being was causally related to his injury. The arbitrator held that claimant was temporarily totally disabled for a period of 593/7 weeks. Further, the arbitrator found that claimant\u2019s condition had not reached permanency.\nOn December 1, 1986, the Commission, without hearing additional evidence, reversed the arbitrator\u2019s decision, finding that claimant failed to prove that on February 29, 1984, he sustained injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment.\nOn judicial review, the circuit court of Peoria County held that the Commission\u2019s decision to deny recovery by the claimant was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent thereupon filed a motion in the circuit court to reconsider its ruling or for a finding under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (107 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). This motion was denied, and the case was remanded to the Commission for a determination of the extent of claimant\u2019s temporary total disability. On remand, the Commission found that claimant was entitled to 593/? weeks of temporary total disability. The circuit court confirmed the Commission\u2019s decision, and this appeal followed.\nRespondent raises two issues, namely, claimant failed to prove that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment and that claimant\u2019s condition of ill-being is not causally related to his February 29,1984, accident.\nFirst, respondent argues that claimant\u2019s injury did not arise out of his employment. Regarding this issue, the following undisputed evidence was adduced at arbitration. Claimant was employed by Peoria as the court sergeant at the Peoria County courthouse. On February 29, 1984, claimant was training another police officer, Donald Swank, to take his place as court sergeant; claimant and Officer Swank were seated in the office provided for the court sergeant in the Peoria County courthouse. Officer Swank was seated in a swivel-style chair that claimant normally used. Claimant was seated in a nonswivel-type straight-back chair provided by his employer. Officer Swank asked claimant a question, and claimant turned in his chair to answer. As he turned, he felt a pop in his back. He complained of feeling a \u201cpopping\u201d in his back. Following the \u201cpopping,\u201d claimant experienced pain radiating down his right leg.\nShortly after the onset of back and leg pain, Officer Swank offered to perform a \u201cchiropractic manipulation\u201d on claimant\u2019s back. Said manipulation consisted of Officer Swank\u2019s squeezing and lifting claimant in the stairwell of the courthouse. Upon receiving this manipulation, claimant felt muscle spasms in his upper back; after the accident, claimant sought medical treatment from Dr. Paul Najers, who diagnosed lumbar-sacral strain, affecting claimant\u2019s back and right leg. Dr. Najers prescribed muscle relaxants and pain medication.\nClaimant also testified that he was wearing a gun and holster at the time of the incident but he did not recall if his gun caught on the arm of the chair in which he was seated. He was unsure whether this had occurred at the time of this incident. Claimant was accustomed to sitting in the swivel-type chair; the straight-back chair did not \u201cgive\u201d or turn as he had expected it to do.\nDr. Martin and Dr. White, the only medical witnesses, stated that the injury suffered by the claimant on the date in question could have occurred with any simple and normal activity. Claimant also had previous low back problems, beginning in 1966 with an auto accident and other work-related incidents.\nDr. White, the respondent\u2019s physician, who examined and treated claimant before and after the February 29, 1984, incident, testified as follows relative to the connection between claimant\u2019s injury and his employment.\n\u201cQ. With reference to degenerative disc disease, Dr., you did mention based on his prior history of back injuries that he is predisposed or would be predisposed to the sort of thing that happened to him on February 29,1984. Is that right?\nA. That\u2019s correct.\nQ. And as you understand it, that was simply turning in his chair which based on your experience can happen to people that have this kind of degenerative disc problem?\nA. That\u2019s correct.\nQ. And that sort of thing could have happened to him if he were sitting in his living room and turned to reach for the \u2018T.V. Guide\u2019?\nA. Could have happened anywhere at all.\nQ. Under any circumstances?\nA. That\u2019s correct.\nQ. OK. It just so happened that it happened while he was at his desk at the police station. It that correct?\nA. That\u2019s correct.\u201d\nThe issue on this appeal is whether the decision of the Industrial Commission, December 1, 1986, denying the claimant compensation is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 52, our supreme court explicated the law regarding whether the injury arose out of the employment as follows:\n\u201cFor an injury to \u2018arise out of\u2019 the employment its origin must be in some risk connected with, or incidental to, the employment so as to create a causal connection between the employment and the accidental injury. [Citations.] Typically, an injury arises out of one\u2019s employment if, at the time of the occurrence, the employee was performing acts he was instructed to perform by his employer, acts which he had a common law or statutory duty to perform, or acts which the employee might reasonably be expected to perform incident to his assigned duties. [Citation.] A risk is incidental to the employment where it belongs to or is connected with what an employee has to do in fulfilling his duties. [Citations.]\nIf an employee is exposed to a risk common to the general public to a greater degree than other persons, the accidental injury is also said to arise out of his employment. [Citations.] However, if the injury results from a hazard to which the employee would have been equally exposed apart from the employment, or a risk personal to the employee, it is not compensable. [Citations.]\u201d Caterpillar, 129 Ill. 2d at 58-59.\nIn Board of Trustees v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 207, the claimant, who was a teaching assistant, was preparing materials for class as required by his job, turned in his chair upon hearing a noise, and he then heard his back \u201cpop,\u201d and thereafter, his problem was diagnosed as a ruptured disc. The Industrial Commission made an award which the circuit court set aside, and then the supreme court affirmed the denial of the award to the claimant. The court stated as follows:\n\u201c[TJhere must be a showing that an injury, to be considered compensable, was due to a cause connected with the employment or incidental to it. There is no evidence here of a causal connection between the appellant\u2019s employment and the injury. The appellant simply turned in his chair and suffered the injury. There was no suggestion that the chair was defective or unusual in any way. The medical evidence was that because of its degenerated condition any simple and normal activity would have caused the appellant\u2019s disc to rupture. The injury was not caused by a risk incidental to the employment.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Board of Trustees, 44 Ill. 2d at 214-15.)\nIn Board of Trustees v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, the Industrial Commission\u2019s finding was set aside for the reason that the finding in claimant\u2019s favor was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nInterlake, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 704, is cited to support claimant\u2019s position in this case; however, there the medical evidence clearly related to claimant\u2019s back difficulties due to prior work-incurred injuries. Here, the Industrial Commission made no such finding, and based on Dr. White\u2019s testimony as set forth above, the decision of the Industrial Commission has ample evidentiary support.\nClaimant here seeks to distinguish Board of Trustees on the basis of certain facts that cast doubt on the credibility of the claimant in that case as the basis of the supreme court decision. On the other hand, as previously noted, there is evidentiary support for the Industrial Commission\u2019s decision in this case; therefore, it is not for this court to pass on the credibility of the witnesses.\nIn Greater Peoria Mass Transit District v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 38, the claimant leaned over to pick up a document from the floor and lost her balance and, in falling, struck her shoulder, which was dislocated. The medical evidence showed that she had an existing shoulder problem before the occurrence in question. The supreme court denied recovery of compensation, holding that her injury was a result of a normal activity and not a risk incidental to her employment.\nIn Branch v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 268, the claimant told his doctor that while he was taking his coat off after arriving at work, he suddenly felt a hot poker in his back. The Industrial Commission found that the claimant had not proved a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, and the decision of the Industrial Commission was affirmed by the circuit court and the supreme court. The supreme court held that in order for there to be a compensable injury, there must be a showing that the injury is connected to the employment and that more is required than the fact that the incident occurred at the employee\u2019s workplace.\nThis case is very similar to Board of Trustees v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 207. Here, claimant \u201csimply turned in his chair and suffered injury. There was no suggestion that the chair was defective or unusual in any way.\u201d There is no definite proof that claimant\u2019s gun and holster caught on the chair as he turned. More is required than the fact that an accident occurred at claimant\u2019s workplace. Here, the injury resulted from a hazard personal to the claimant and, therefore, did not arise out of claimant\u2019s employment. There is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the Industrial Commission denying the claim.\nIt is unnecessary for us to consider the issue of causal connection in view of our holding that the injury did not arise out of claimant\u2019s employment. Accordingly, we hold that the decision of the Industrial Commission, December 1, 1986, is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the judgment of the circuit court is reversed.\nReversed.\nBARRY, P.J., and McNAMARA, McCULLOUGH, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOODWARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Brian P. Mack and Robert H. Jennetten, both of Quinn, Johnston, Henderson & Pretorius, of Peoria, for appellant.", "Lindsay W. Wright, of Strodel, Kingery & Durree, Associated, of Peoria, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EARL HOPKINS, JR., Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (The City of Peoria, Appellant).\nThird District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 3\u201489\u20140240WC\nOpinion filed March 8, 1990.\nBrian P. Mack and Robert H. Jennetten, both of Quinn, Johnston, Henderson & Pretorius, of Peoria, for appellant.\nLindsay W. Wright, of Strodel, Kingery & Durree, Associated, of Peoria, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0347-01", "first_page_order": 369, "last_page_order": 374 }