{
  "id": 2490807,
  "name": "EDWARD R. JORDAN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. MICHAEL A. GLAUB et al., Respondents-Appellants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Jordan v. Glaub",
  "decision_date": "1990-03-30",
  "docket_number": "No. 1-90-0342",
  "first_page": "736",
  "last_page": "742",
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    {
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      "cite": "196 Ill. App. 3d 736"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
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      "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 58",
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      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
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      "cite": "522 N.E.2d 908",
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      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1988,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "909"
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    {
      "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 501",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
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        3514317
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      "year": 1988,
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        {
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  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 539,
    "char_count": 13442,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.759,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08,
      "percentile": 0.08137231166759143
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:37:27.698771+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "EDWARD R. JORDAN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. MICHAEL A. GLAUB et al., Respondents-Appellants."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE SCARIANO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent appeals from an order of the circuit court which reversed a decision of the Cook County Officers Electoral Board sustaining respondent\u2019s objections to the nominating papers of petitioner as a candidate for judge of the circuit court of Cook County in the March 20, 1990, primary election.\nPetitioner is seeking to place his name on the ballot for the March 20, 1990, primary election to fill the vacancy in the office of resident circuit judge created by the resignation of the Honorable Dean Trafelet, who had been elected from the suburban portion of the Cook County judicial circuit. Respondent maintains that petitioner\u2019s nominating petitions for this position are legally insufficient, because some of the signers and circulators of the petitions reside inside the City of Chicago and not in its Cook County suburbs. We affirm.\nTo be placed on the primary election ballot, prospective judicial candidates must collect the signatures of at least 500 qualified voters. Petitioner collected the signatures of 506 voters, of which approximately 116 reside within the corporate limits of Chicago and the balance in the suburban portion of the Cook County judicial circuit. Thirty signatures were obtained on a petition circulated by a resident of Chicago.\nRespondent filed a timely objection to petitioner\u2019s nominating papers with the Cook County Officers Electoral Board (Board), alleging that the signatures were insufficient. The Board found the papers invalid and ordered petitioner\u2019s name to be omitted from the ballot. Petitioner appealed to the circuit court of Cook County, which reversed the Board\u2019s decision and made the following findings: (1) Cook County comprises one judicial circuit; (2) the statute controlling this dispute is section 7 \u2014 10(h) of the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 46, par. 7\u201410(h)), as written before the enactment of Public Act 86 \u2014 786; and (3) Kozel v. State Board of Elections (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 501, 522 N.E.2d 908, vacated and appeal dismissed on procedural grounds (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 58, 533 N.E.2d 796, although lacking precedential value, is persuasive authority.\nRespondent filed a timely notice of appeal to this court on January 22, 1990, and on February 13, 1990, we granted his motion to place his appeal on an accelerated docket. On March 13, 1990, we heard and decided this case from the bench and entered an appropriate order citing that our opinion would follow.\nArticle VI of the Illinois Constitution provides in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201c\u00a72. JUDICIAL DISTRICTS\n*** The First Judicial District consists of Cook County. ***\n* * *\n\u00a77. JUDICIAL CIRCUITS\n(a) The State shall be divided into Judicial Circuits consisting of one or more counties. The First Judicial District shall constitute a Judicial Circuit. * * * The General Assembly by law may provide for the division of a circuit for the purpose of selection of Circuit Judges and for the selection of Circuit Judges from the circuit at large.\n(b) *** In the First Judicial District, unless otherwise provided by law, Cook County, Chicago, and the area outside Chicago shall be separate units for the selection of Circuit Judges ***.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7\u00a72, 7.\nSection 1 of \u201cAn Act relating to the circuit courts\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 72.1) states that \u201c[t]he county of Cook shall be one judicial circuit.\u201d Exercising its constitutional authority to divide the judicial circuits into political units for the selection of circuit judges, in 1978 the Illinois legislature provided that a vacancy in the office of a resident circuit judge, as defined in section 1.1 of \u201cAn Act relating to vacancies in the office of judge\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 72.41\u20141) (hereinafter Judicial Vacancies Act), shall be filled in the following manner:\n\u201c(4) The County of Cook shall have 83 resident judges. Twenty-seven of those resident judges shall be elected from the unit comprised of the territory of the Circuit Court of Cook County outside the corporate limits of Chicago and 56 resident judges shall be elected from the unit within the corporate limits of Chicago. A vacancy in the office of resident judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County shall be filled from the unit in which it occurs.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 72.42(4).)\nFurthermore, \u201c[w]hen a vacancy in the office of resident circuit judge is filled by election, the election shall be for the appropriate county or unit, and not for the entire circuit.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 72.42-1.\nIn 1989, the legislature mandated the division of the Cook County judicial circuit into 15 subcircuits, which the \u201cGeneral Assembly shall create *** by law on or before July 1, 1991, using population data as determined by the 1990 Federal census.\u201d (Pub. Act 86 \u2014 786, \u00a72, eff. Sept. 6, 1989 (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, by adding par. 72.2e).) Preserving the old city/suburban division for the interim period, the legislature stated further that \u201c[a] vacancy in the office of resident judge of the Circuit of Cook County occurring before the date the subcircuits are created by law *** shall be filled from the unit within Chicago or the unit outside Chicago, as the case may be, in which the vacancy occurs.\u201d Pub. Act 86 \u2014 786, \u00a73 (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 72.42).\nIn the present case, because the Honorable Dean Trafelet was a resident circuit judge elected from the suburban unit of the Cook County judicial circuit, his successor must be elected- by qualified voters residing in that same unit.\nAs noted above, respondent's crucial contention on appeal is that the circulators and signers of the nominating petitions of a prospective candidate for this suburban judicial vacancy must also reside in that portion of Cook County which lies outside the corporate limits of Chicago. The Illinois General Assembly recently divided Cook County into smaller election units for the purpose of selecting judges for the courts of that circuit and district. (See Pub. Act 86 \u2014 786 (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, pars. 25, 72.2, 72.42, 160.2; ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10; and adding ch. 37, par. 72.2e).) However, until the new \u201csubcircuits\u201d are created, the statute governing judicial nominating petitions (Pub. Act 86 \u2014 786, \u00a75 (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 46, par. 7\u201410(h)) (the Election Code)) clearly and unambiguously provides that the entire Cook County judicial circuit is fair territory for collecting signatures for all types of judicial vacancies occurring within the circuit.\nThe newly amended section 7 \u2014 10 of the Election Code provides as follows:\n\u201c[A] petition [for nomination] shall be signed by qualified primary electors residing in the political division for which the nomination is sought ***. *** At the bottom of each sheet of such petition shall be added a statement signed by a registered voter of the political division for which the candidate is seeking a nomination ***. * * *\n* * *\nSuch petitions for nominations shall be signed:\n* * *\n(h) If for a candidate for judicial office, by at least 500 qualified primary electors of his or her judicial district, subdistrict, circuit, or subcircuit, as the case may be.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Pub. Act 86\u2014786, \u00a75 (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 46, par. 7\u201410).\nThe only change in the amended version of section 7 \u2014 10 is the addition of the words \u201csubdistrict\u201d and \u201csubcircuit\u201d in subsection (h) thereof. Respondent attaches undue significance to these terms, arguing that \u201csubcircuit\u201d refers to the old division of the Cook County judicial circuit into city and suburban political units. Such an interpretation is clearly unwarranted in view of the legislative mandate to divide Cook County into five \u201csubdistricts\u201d for appellate court elections and 15 \u201csubcircuits\u201d for circuit court elections after the 1990 census. (See Pub. Act 86 \u2014 786, \u00a7\u00a71, 2.) Although for the purposes of this appeal the result would be the same whether we applied the old or the amended version of subsection 7 \u2014 10(h), the amended version took effect on September 6, 1989 (Pub. Act 86 \u2014 786, \u00a76), before the circulation period for nomination petitions began (see Pub. Act 86\u2014 786, \u00a75 (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 12(1)); therefore, contrary to the finding of the circuit court, the amended version controls this case.\nThe circuit court relied on the reasoning of Kozel v. State Board of Elections (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 501, 522 N.E.2d 908, vacated and appeal dismissed on procedural grounds (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 58, 533 N.E.2d 796, wherein the Fourth District Appellate Court ruled that subsection 7 \u2014 10(h) of the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10(h)) was unambiguous and allowed a prospective candidate for La Salle County resident judgeship to collect signatures for his nomination from the entire judicial circuit embracing three counties. The court reasoned that by permitting circuit-wide circulation the statute \u201callows less populated counties to have multiple candidates in primaries where the 500-signature requirement would otherwise preclude it, or to have a candidate at all in counties where one or the other of the parties is predominant.\u201d (168 Ill. App. 3d at 503, 522 N.E.2d at 909.) Although both aspects of this rationale lose their force in a judicial circuit as densely populated as Cook County, the court\u2019s reasoning does not strip subsection 7 \u2014 10(h) of its plain meaning. Indeed, as the supreme court stated in Kozel, \u201cwith respect to circuit court judgeships, the statute makes no distinction between candidates for resident positions, who run only within their county, and candidates for at-large positions, who must run throughout their circuit.\u201d (126 Ill. 2d at 62, 533 N.E.2d at 798.) Similarly, the statute makes no distinction between the Cook County judicial circuit and other circuits; accordingly, we agree with the circuit court that the appellate opinion in Kozel is persuasive in the present case.\nRespondent also maintains that the term \u201cpolitical division\u201d as it is used in section 7 \u2014 10 with respect to the residency requirements for signers and circulators of nominating petitions refers to the city and suburban election units of Cook County. A thorough reading of the section, however, makes it clear that \u201cpolitical division\u201d is a general term which embraces all of the various types of specifically identified electoral enclaves enumerated in subsections 7 \u2014 10(a) through 7 \u2014 10(k), such as congressional districts, county board districts, municipalities, townships, wards, sanitary districts, precincts, counties, etc. (See Pub. Act 86 \u2014 786, \u00a75.) Thus, when subsection 7\u2014 10(h), which governs all judicial elections, requires the signatures of \u201cat least 500 qualified primary electors of his or her judicial *** circuit,\u201d it means just that. (Emphasis added.) (Pub. Act 86 \u2014 786, \u00a75 (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10(h)).) Moreover, if the legislature had meant to refer to the city and suburban election units in subsection 7 \u2014 10(h), it would have used the term \u201cunit\u201d as it did in sections 72.41 \u2014 1, 72.42 \u2014 1, and amended section 72.42 of the Judicial Vacancies Act. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, pars. 72.41 \u2014 1, 72.42 \u2014 1; Pub. Act 86 \u2014 786, \u00a73 (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 72.42).) Although section 7 \u2014 10 is part of the Election Code, both that section and section 72.42 of the Judicial Vacancies Act were amended together with Public Act 86 \u2014 786.\nRespondent finally contends that the circulators of petitioner\u2019s judicial nominating petitions must also be residents of the suburban portion of the Cook County judicial district. As noted above, 30 of petitioner\u2019s 506 nominating signatures were obtained by a resident of the City of Chicago. As we read section 7 \u2014 10, the residency qualifications of both signers and circulators are substantially the same: signers must be \u201cqualified primary electors residing in the political division for which the nomination is sought,\u201d and circulators must be \u201cregistered voter[s] of the political division for which the candidate is seeking nomination.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Pub. Act 86 \u2014 786, \u00a75 (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 46, par. 7 \u2014 10).) We determined above that the relevant political division for signers of judicial nominating petitions is the appropriate judicial \u201ccircuit.\u201d Although the statute does not specifically identify the corresponding electoral enclave for circulators, since the general term \u201cpolitical division\u201d is used in the statute for both signers and circulators, we hold that the relevant political division with respect to petition circulators is also the appropriate judicial \u201ccircuit;\u201d accordingly, we find that petition circulators for candidates for resident judgeships in the Cook County judicial circuit may reside anywhere within the circuit.\nFor all of the above reasons, we hold that petitioner\u2019s nomination papers are legally sufficient and affirm the order of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nDiVITO, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE SCARIANO"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Paul Stralka and James R. Stopka, both of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Edward R. Jordan, of Wheeling, appellee pro se."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "EDWARD R. JORDAN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. MICHAEL A. GLAUB et al., Respondents-Appellants.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201490\u20140342\nOpinion filed March 30, 1990.\nPaul Stralka and James R. Stopka, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nEdward R. Jordan, of Wheeling, appellee pro se."
  },
  "file_name": "0736-01",
  "first_page_order": 758,
  "last_page_order": 764
}