{ "id": 2481941, "name": "WHITECO METROCOM DIVISION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF DOWNERS GROVE, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Whiteco Metrocom Division v. Village of Downers Grove", "decision_date": "1990-04-24", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201489\u20140612", "first_page": "174", "last_page": "185", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 174" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 2d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5300008 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/62/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3356573 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3102978 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/99/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5500825 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 993", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3589757 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "999" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0993-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3587543 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3174589 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5441257 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3630046 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152764 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ill. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2779648 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3229022 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5068413 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498986 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2658687 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2692707 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 750", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3496875 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5071091 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" }, { "page": "61-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3542774 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464-65" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "462" }, { "page": "463" }, { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "789 F.2d 571", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1574033 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" }, { "page": "575" }, { "page": "576" }, { "page": "576" }, { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/789/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 U.S.C. \u00a7131", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." }, { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 979, "char_count": 25382, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7086253952760614e-07, "percentile": 0.7020498106260249 }, "sha256": "305dc554b7e02fbe76f4ac766fa4a76898d8d3007347c71dd8ec24f6db2e263d", "simhash": "1:edae0d13694f7481", "word_count": 4145 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:08:36.740176+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WHITECO METROCOM DIVISION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF DOWNERS GROVE, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Whiteco Metrocom Division (Whiteco), seeks reversal of a judgment on the pleadings entered by the circuit court of Du Page County in its two-count complaint for declaratory judgment against the defendant, the Village of Downers Grove. On leased property at 1023 Butterfield Road in Downers Grove, Whiteco, which was engaged in the business of outdoor advertising, proposed to erect two double-faced outdoor advertising display signs, each to be located within 660 feet of U.S. Interstate 88 (1-88). Each of the sign faces was to be 60 feet wide and 20 feet high and have a total display area of 1,200 square feet. The bottom of the sign was to be 60 feet above grade, and the sign would be oriented so that it was viewable by eastbound and westbound vehicles on 1-88.\nAs proposed, the signs complied with certain relevant provisions of the Highway Advertising Control Act of 1971 (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121, pars. 504, 504.04, 506, 506.01). In particular, section 6.01 of the Act provides in pertinent part: \u201cNo sign may be erected which exceeds 1200 square feet in area, 30 feet in height and 60 feet in length.\u201d The Illinois Department of Transportation, the State agency charged with the administration of the Act, granted permits for the signs, but the Village of Downers Grove, a home rule unit, advised Whiteco that it would deny any application for signs which exceeded the sign face size and height limitations contained in article IX, section 5.3 \u2014 1(c) of its zoning ordinance. Section 5.3 \u2014 1(c) regulates signs in the B \u2014 3 zoning district in Downers Grove; the property on which the proposed signs were to be erected is located in a B \u2014 3 zoning district. Inter alia, \u201c[advertising signs not exceeding 20 feet in height and 200 square feet in area\u201d are permitted in the Downers Grove B \u2014 3 zoning district. Downers Grove, Ill., Zoning Ordinance art. IX, \u00a75.3 \u2014 1(c).\nAt issue is whether the advertising sign size limitation imposed by the Downers Grove zoning ordinance is an invalid preemption of the maximum sign size permitted under the Act.\nWhiteco acknowledges that in zoned commercial and industrial areas municipalities are permitted under section 7 of the Act to adopt regulations with respect to the size of signs other than as set forth in section 6.01 of the Act if such regulations are \u201cconsistent with the intent of [the] Act and with customary use.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121, par. 507.) \u201cCustomary use,\u201d Whiteco contends, refers to the customary use of advertising signs in the State of Illinois by the outdoor advertising industry in its exercise of the rights established by the Act and does not refer, as Downers Grove contends, to \u201cthe customary use of land based on its designation, restrictions on usage, and surrounding uses in a particular community as delineated and described in a local municipal zoning ordinance.\u201d\nWhiteco relies on the language of section 1 of the Act and the legislative histories of the Act and of the Federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965 (23 U.S.C. \u00a7131 et seq. (1970)) in support of its interpretation of the term \u201ccustomary use.\u201d It concludes on the basis of those authorities that Downers Grove\u2019s restriction of the size of signs in the B \u2014 3 zoning district to 20 feet in height and 200 square feet in area is not consistent with \u201ccustomary use\u201d since regulatory standards consistent with such \u201ccustomary use\u201d are specified in section 1 as those \u201cset forth in section 6 of [the] Act.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121, par. 501.) Thus, Whiteco argues, Downers Grove\u2019s more severe sign size restriction is inconsistent with \u201ccustomary use.\u201d\nThe Illinois Highway Advertising Control Act of 1971 was adopted by the Illinois legislature pursuant to the Federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965. (23 U.S.C. \u00a7131 et seq. (1970).) In order for States to preserve Federal funding for State highways, the Highway Beautification Act required them to enact legislation regulating outdoor advertising signs. The Illinois Highway Advertising Control Act, in part, regulates the size, lighting and spacing of outdoor advertising signs. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121, pars. 506, 506.01, 506.02, 506.03.\nSection 1 of the Act provides in full as follows:\n\u201cThe General Assembly finds and declares that the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising signs, displays, and devices in areas adjacent to Interstate highways and primary highways should be regulated in order to protect the public investment in such highways, to promote the recreational value of public travel, to preserve natural beauty and to promote the reasonable, orderly and effective display of such signs, displays and devices.\nThe General Assembly further finds and declares that outdoor advertising is a legitimate, commercial use of private property adjacent to roads and highways; that outdoor advertising is an integral part of the business and marketing function, and an established segment of the national economy which serves to promote and protect private investments in commerce and industry and should be allowed to operate in business areas; and that the regulatory standards set forth in Section 6 of this Act are consistent with customary use in this State and will properly and adequately carry out each and all of the purposes of this Act, more severe restrictions being inconsistent with customary use and ineffective to accomplish the purposes of this Act.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121, par. 501.\nSection 7 of the Act provides, however, that:\n\u201cIn zoned commercial and industrial areas, whenever a State, county or municipal zoning authority has adopted laws or ordinances, which include regulations with respect to the size, lighting and spacing of signs, which regulations are consistent with the intent of this Act and with customary use, then from and after the effective date of such regulations, and so long as they shall continue in effect, the provisions of Section 6 shall not apply to the erection of signs in such areas.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121, par. 507.\nSeveral cases have addressed the seeming inconsistency of municipal zoning regulations permitting less generous square footage of advertising signs pursuant to the provisions of section 7 of the Act in light of the language of section 1 of the Act that \u201cmore severe restrictions\u201d than section 6 regulatory standards are \u201cinconsistent with customary use.\u201d (National Advertising Co. v. City of Rolling Meadows (7th Cir. 1986), 789 F.2d 571, 575; Dingeman Advertising, Inc. v. Village of Mt. Zion (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 461; National Advertising Co. v. Village of Downers Grove (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 58.) Sections 1 and 7 of the Act have variously been described as having been born of either the compromise (Rolling Meadows, 789 F. 2d 571, 575) or conflict (Dingeman, 157 Ill. App. 3d 461; Downers Grove, 166 Ill. App. 3d 58) between the State \u2014 concerned with preserving its Federal highway funds; the advertising industry \u2014 concerned with effective highway advertising; and local zoning entities \u2014 concerned with highway aesthetics and safety. (Rolling Meadows, 789 F.2d at 576; Dingeman, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 464-65; Downers Grove, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 62.) As stated in Dingeman,\n\u201cThe main purpose of the Act was to obtain Federal funds and that entailed maximum limitation on advertising signs. The protection for the advertising industry indicated by section 1 was an offshoot of the legislation. Section 7 was a protection for municipalities desiring additional limitations.\u201d Dingeman, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 464.\nIn National Advertising Co. v. City of Rolling Meadows, the court of appeals invalidated section 9.1 of Rolling Meadows\u2019 zoning ordinance limiting the size of signs to 200 square feet inasmuch as it was \u201cmore restrictive than [section 6.01 of the Act] and so *** not consistent with \u2018customary use\u2019 within the meaning of [sections 1 and 7].\u201d (Rolling Meadows, 789 F.2d at 576.) The court there was of the opinion that Rolling Meadows, as a home rule municipality, may restrict the total height of a sign and its support structures since section 6 of the Act does not specify those matters, but that it could not restrict the size of the visible face of the sign to less than 1,200 square feet since section 6 of the Act does regulate square footage. The court observed that, \u201c[wjhen the state expressly establishes a coordinated plan, \u00a76(i) of the state constitution requires home-rule municipalities to go along.\u201d (789 F.2d at 576; Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, \u00a76(i).) In other words, the court found the more restrictive Rolling Meadows sign size regulation was \u201cpreempted\u201d by section I of the Act, which stated that the sign size which was \u201cconsistent with customary use in this State\u201d was the regulatory standard set forth in section 6 of the Act, i.e., 1,200 square feet.\nThe preemption found in National Advertising Co. v. City of Rolling Meadows was rejected after careful analysis in Dingeman Advertising, Inc. v. Village of Mt. Zion, however, and Dingeman\u2019s lead was followed in this court\u2019s subsequent decision in National Advertising Co. v. Village of Downers Grove. (Dingeman, 157 Ill. App. 3d 461; Downers Grove, 166 Ill. App. 3d 58.) At issue in Dingeman was the validity of Mt. Zion\u2019s zoning ordinance prohibiting all signs larger than 150 square feet in area. The plaintiff, Dingeman Advertising, Inc., sought approval of a two-sided, off-premises advertising sign, each side of which measured 300 square feet. Mt. Zion denied Dingeman\u2019s application, and in Dingeman\u2019s subsequent suit for declaratory judgment, the trial court found Mt. Zion\u2019s ordinance invalid as being in conflict with the Act.\nThe precise issue considered on appeal in Dingeman was: \u201cDoes the Highway Advertising Control Act (the Act) preempt all municipal zoning controls and establish, as a minimum advertisement requirement for all commercial areas adjoining Federal-aid primary highways, the same maximum limitation set forth in the Act?\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Dingeman, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 462.) Dingeman argued the second paragraph of section 1 of the Act had the effect of making the maximum limitations of the section 6 series the minimum limitations available to municipalities for commercial and industrial-zoned areas. Mt. Zion contended section 7 of the Act has effect only if municipalities are allowed to make more restrictive provisions than those set forth in the section 6 series.\nDingeman\u2019s contention was rejected, and the trial court\u2019s finding of invalidity of the Mt. Zion sign size limitation ordinance was reversed. The court observed that, \u201c[i]f \u2018customary use\u2019 is, in fact, the upper limits provided by section 6, then section 7 is a nullity.\u201d (Dingeman, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 463.) Recognizing that statutes should not be construed, if possible, as containing a superfluous provision, the court concluded that insofar as sections 1 and 7 conflicted, section 7 controls, and it upheld Mt. Zion\u2019s right to regulate the size, lighting, and spacing of advertising signs \u201cconsistent with customary use.\u201d Dingeman, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 465.\nThis court agreed with the reasoning and conclusion of Dingeman in National Advertising Co. v. Village of Downers Grove, which concerned the same section of the Downers Grove zoning ordinance which is at issue here, section 5.3 \u2014 1(c) of article IX. The trial court found in each of the consolidated cases before it that the Act preempted local regulations which were inconsistent with it.\nOn appeal before this court, there was no dispute between the parties that the Village\u2019s sign ordinance imposed substantially stricter limitations on the size and location of outdoor advertising signs than those imposed by the Illinois General Assembly under section 6 of the Act. Adhering to the reasoning and conclusion of Dingeman in affording control to section 7 over section 1 of the Act, this court also observed that the enactment of more restrictive local advertising sign regulations by a municipality would not jeopardize the continued receipt of Federal highway funds which was the legislature\u2019s impetus in adopting the Act. 166 Ill. App. 3d at 61-62.\nWhiteco contends, however, that neither Dingeman nor National Advertising Co. v. Village of Downers Grove recognized a right in municipalities to regulate State highway advertising sign standards using a purely local standard of customary use of land based on its designation as contended by Downers Grove. Rather, municipalities may only regulate sign sizes subject to the Act\u2019s imposed standard of \u201ccustomary use\u201d which, Whiteco argues, refers to the statewide sign industry usage declared in section 1 of the Act, which, in turn, refers to the section 6 sign area size of 1,200 square feet. Whiteco contends the trial court\u2019s judgment in the instant cause deprived the sign industry of the legitimate rights and considerations which the Act intended to preserve for it in Illinois and deprived it of any meaningful remedy to enforce those rights by rendering superfluous the \u201ccustomary use\u201d language in sections 1 and 7 of the Act.\nThe trial court\u2019s judgment has not deprived the sign industry of any legitimate rights and considerations provided by the Act. The construction of a statute is a question of law (In re Estate of Pirie (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 750), and the statute may be construed by this court independently of the trial court\u2019s judgment (People ex rel. Edgar v. Curley (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 37). A court\u2019s function in interpreting statutory provisions is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent underlying the statute. The court must look at the statute as a whole, taking into consideration its nature, its purposes and the evil the statute was intended to remedy. (Rodgers v. Department of Employment Security (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 194, 198.) Each word, clause, or sentence of a statute must not be rendered superfluous but must, if possible, be given some reasonable meaning. (Peoria Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 616.) Absent contrary legislative intent, the same, or substantially the same, words appearing in different parts of the same statute will be given consistent interpretation. (People v. Yarbrough (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 782.) Where intent can be ascertained from the statutory language itself, it must be given effect without resorting to extrinsic aids for construction. People v. Bryant (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 448.\nNotwithstanding Whiteco\u2019s thorough, hard-pressed argument setting forth the State and Federal legislative histories of the Act and the Highway Beautification Act in support of its position that \u201ccustomary use\u201d in section 7 refers to statewide sign industry usage and not local land use, we believe resort to extrinsic aids in interpretation of the Act is unnecessary. Accepting, for purposes of discussion, that the term \u201ccustomary use\u201d in section 7 should be afforded a meaning consistent with the term \u201ccustomary use in this state\u201d as used in section 1, section 7 nonetheless permits zoning authorities to preempt the provisions of the section 6 series (regulating sign size, lighting, and spacing) in zoned commercial and industrial areas if such preemptive regulations \u201care consistent with the intent of [the] Act and with customary use.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121, par. 507.) Again, assuming \u201ccustomary use\u201d to mean \u201ccustomary use in this state\u201d as provided in section 1 of the Act and as urged by Whiteco, section 1 declares that: \u201c[T]he regulatory standards set forth in section 6 *** are consistent with customary use in this state and will properly and adequately carry out each and all of the purposes of this Act, more severe restrictions being inconsistent with customary use and ineffective to accomplish the purposes of this Act.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 121, par. 501.\nThe regulatory standard for sign size established by section 6 of the Act which, by virtue of section 1, is expressly declared to be consistent with customary use in this State, is a maximum of 1,200 square feet in area. Section 6 clearly permits the erection of signs less than 1,200 square feet in area. Consequently, if signs not exceeding 1,200 square feet in area are consistent with customary use as declared in section 1, then the only sign size regulation which would be inconsistent with customary use would be one that allows erection of a sign with an area of more than 1,200 square feet.\nThe only way to achieve consistency between the apparent blanket prohibition of section 1 against \u201cmore severe restrictions\u201d and the preemptive capabilities granted zoning authorities in section 7 is to construe section 1 as a declaration that \u201cmore severe restrictions [on a statewide basis would be] inconsistent with customary use and ineffective to accomplish the purposes of this Act.\u201d Construed thusly, the statute assures that outdoor advertising signs in business areas adjacent to interstate highways and primary highways in the State of Illinois shall be allowed and may be as large in area as 1,200 square feet except insofar as they may be located in zoned business and industrial areas and are otherwise regulated not in excess of the maximum size limitation of1,200 square feet.\nWhiteco asserts that the court\u2019s finding of validity of the Downers Grove zoning ordinance preempting the 1,200 square foot maximum sign size set forth in the Act \u201cdeprives the sign industry of any meaningful remedy to enforce the rights recognized in sections 1 and 7 of the Act\u201d in that municipal sign ordinances would \u201cneed only pass constitutional muster under traditional zoning law\u201d (i.e., LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 40). That zoning law test, it argues, would not include a consideration of statewide customary sign industry usage and practices. The Village argues in response that Whiteco\u2019s fear that customary sign industry usage on a statewide basis could not be considered under LaSalle is incorrect and cites Cosmopolitan National Bank v. County of Cook (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 302, as an example of a case where the regional and statewide need for landfills was considered in reviewing the denial of a landfill zoning request.\nIn section 1(D) of its reply brief, Whiteco takes exception to Downers Grove\u2019s position on this issue and its supporting authority, arguing that it amounts to a withholding from this court of Downers Grove\u2019s \u201ctrue position\u201d on the test applicable to sign regulation ordinances. In support of its argument in this regard, it points to a trial court brief which Downers Grove filed in National Advertising Co. v. Village of Downers Grove, case No. 88\u2014MR\u2014527. Whiteco characterizes Downers Grove\u2019s true position to be that \u201cabsent the Act, local communities are not required to recognize sign industry usage in any respect\u201d since it is the reasonableness of sign regulation ordinances which is the proper test of validity and not the test used in La Salle. Whiteco\u2019s reply brief then appends as exhibit \u201cT\u201d a copy of Downers Grove\u2019s so-called brief which, in actuality, was Downers Grove\u2019s reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment in that cause.\nIn a motion taken with this case, Downers Grove moves to strike Whiteco\u2019s reply brief, and Whiteco has filed its objections thereto. Downers Grove argues Whiteco\u2019s reply brief should be stricken in that it does not limit itself to matters of reply, injects entirely new matter into the case and improperly attempts to supplement the record without leave of court, all in violation of Supreme Court Rule 341. (113 Ill. 2d R. 341(g).) Whiteco counters that its section 1(D) argument and appendix T are properly responsive to arguments made by Downers Grove in its answer brief and are not violative of Supreme Court Rule 341. Alternatively, it argues that striking only that portion of the reply brief and appendix which is deemed to be improper rather than its entire brief would adequately protect Downers Grove\u2019s interests without greatly prejudicing Whiteco.\nDowners Grove\u2019s answer brief in the instant cause appears to suggest that the traditional zoning test used in La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 40, would allow consideration of statewide industry practice in analyzing the validity of the sign ordinance. The inherent implication that the La Salle test is the one which would be used to test the validity of a sign ordinance is not well taken, but we do not believe Downers Grove\u2019s argument in answer to Whiteco\u2019s contention can be construed to be an intentional misrepresentation of the law or Downers Grove\u2019s position to this court. It has been pointed out that the factors to be considered under the traditional La Salle zoning test focus only on the validity of a zoning classification as applied to a particular piece of property. In contrast, a sign regulation ordinance is applicable to all signs within a zoning district thus distinguishing it in its scope and application. Therefore, it is tested strictly on the basis of whether it is reasonable, that is, whether it is rationally related to the public health, safety or welfare. Village of Skokie v. Walton on Dempster, Inc. (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 299, 302-03; see also Krych v. Village of Burr Ridge (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 461, 464-66; City of Champaign v. Kroger Co. (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 498, 503-10.\nIn countering Downers Grove\u2019s suggestion that statewide sign industry usage could be considered even under the La Salle test, White-co is forced in its reply brief to acknowledge that La Salle is not the proper test, but, rather, that the reasonableness test applies. Whiteco doggedly adheres to its \u201clack of remedy\u201d argument, however, by weakly concluding that none of the reasonableness cases arose under the Act and, thus, absent the protection afforded the sign industry by the Act, \u201cthe only test for a sign ordinance is \u2018reasonableness,\u2019 nothing more.\u201d As Downers Grove points out, Whiteco has not contended in this cause that its maximum sign size is unreasonable, nor, in fact, does Whiteco argue here that the reasonableness test could not include consideration of statewide sign industry advertising practices. Its lack-of-remedy argument seriously deflated, Whiteco proceeds to attack Downers Grove, charging it has concealed its \u201ctrue position\u201d discussed above.\nThat portion of section 1(D) of Whiteco\u2019s reply brief which unfairly charges Downers Grove with misrepresenting its true position to this court is stricken. Although appendix T ordinarily also should be stricken as concerning a matter de hors the record, Downers Grove\u2019s motion to strike relies itself on appendix T in arguing the reply brief should be stricken, thus rendering its presence in the record essential to this court\u2019s determination of the motion. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to strike it in this instance.\nIt is well established that a motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the facts well pleaded by the opposite party and seeks judgment on the questions of law raised by the pleadings. (Vermeil v. Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 556, 563.) Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only if the pleadings do not raise genuine issues of material fact. (Allcare, Inc. v. Bork (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 993, 999.) The grant or denial of declaratory relief is discretionary with the court (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 701; Clyde Savings & Loan Association v. May Department Stores (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 189); the trial court\u2019s exercise of this discretion is not afforded the same deference as its exercise of discretion in other contexts which may require factual determinations such as the credibility of the witnesses (Chicago & Eastern Illinois R.R. Co. v. Reserve Insurance Co. (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 433, 436). When no question of fact is presented, entry of judgment on the pleadings in a declaratory judgment action is proper. Lane v. Bauscher (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 621; Commercial Mortgage & Finance Co. v. City of Rockford (1965), 62 Ill. App. 2d 160.\nFor the reasons above, we conclude the court did not err in granting Downers Grove\u2019s motion for judgment on the pleadings where the only question presented was one of law and that the plaintiff was not entitled to judgment based upon the plaintiff\u2019s allegation that customary usage, as an industry standard, preempts and invalidates Downers Grove\u2019s zoning ordinance because the ordinance is inconsistent with customary usage and is ipso facto invalid.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed. Downers Grove\u2019s motion to strike Whiteco\u2019s reply brief is granted in part.\nMotion to strike granted in part; judgment affirmed.\nDUNN and McLAREN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Douglas R. Prochnow, Lawrence D. Mishkin, and E. Regan Daniels, all of Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Chicago (James R. Morrin, of counsel), for appellant.", "Rosenthal, Murphey, Coblentz & Janega, of Chicago, and Barbara J. Gosselar, of Kubiesa & Power, Ltd., of Westmont (Jon B. Murphey, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WHITECO METROCOM DIVISION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF DOWNERS GROVE, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201489\u20140612\nOpinion filed April 24, 1990.\nDouglas R. Prochnow, Lawrence D. Mishkin, and E. Regan Daniels, all of Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Chicago (James R. Morrin, of counsel), for appellant.\nRosenthal, Murphey, Coblentz & Janega, of Chicago, and Barbara J. Gosselar, of Kubiesa & Power, Ltd., of Westmont (Jon B. Murphey, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0174-01", "first_page_order": 196, "last_page_order": 207 }