{ "id": 2482082, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF DEBRA GRANGER, Petitioner-Appellant, and DONALD GRANGER, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Granger", "decision_date": "1990-04-17", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201489\u20140283", "first_page": "363", "last_page": "376", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 363" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "518 F.2d 972", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1122030 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "975" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/518/0972-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. App. 3d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2806610 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/38/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 F. Supp. 253", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3439143 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" }, { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/536/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 U.S. 554", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6216839 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" }, { "page": "492" }, { "page": "2632" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/491/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 N.E.2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" }, { "page": "432" }, { "page": "432" }, { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3622209 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" }, { "page": "634" }, { "page": "634" }, { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 N.E.2d 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 800", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3631758 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0800-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 792", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2506249 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/192/0792-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1053, "char_count": 27586, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2299048092502963e-07, "percentile": 0.6053918587531552 }, "sha256": "1d00b00a1768ec64a231d7daff9e7047ead381fd3100a6903eb8c64a1b3ecf10", "simhash": "1:91a60dbd9d130f64", "word_count": 4704 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:08:36.740176+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF DEBRA GRANGER, Petitioner-Appellant, and DONALD GRANGER, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARRISON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, Debra Granger, appeals from an order of the circuit court of St. Clair County which (1) vacated the judgment dissolving her marriage to respondent, Donald Granger, and ordered that a new trial be held \u201cas to all issues other than the dissolution of the bonds of matrimony,\u201d and (2) set aside a \u201cgag order\u201d it had entered in the case on her behalf. As grounds for her appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in setting aside the dissolution judgment and ordering a new trial because, in making its decision, the court improperly relied on evidence which was protected by the attorney-client privilege. Petitioner further argues that the circuit court was without the power or jurisdiction to modify or dissolve its \u201cgag order.\u201d For the reasons which follow, we find these arguments to be wholly without merit. We therefore affirm.\nThe record before us shows that on January 5, 1989, the circuit court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage between petitioner and respondent. Post-trial motions filed by the parties were denied on March 28, 1989. Respondent\u2019s attorney then set about reviewing the proceedings which had taken place in the case in order to determine if there was any basis for an appeal. Numerous hearings had apparently been held prior to entry of the judgment of dissolution, and some, if not all, of those hearings had been tape-recorded by the circuit court on the court\u2019s audio equipment. To expedite the process and to try to minimize the cost to her client, respondent\u2019s attorney began her review of the case by listening to these tapes. Chief Judge Stephen Kernan gave respondent\u2019s attorney authorization to listen to the tapes using the court\u2019s audio equipment.\nAmong the tapes which respondent\u2019s attorney reviewed was one of a hearing conducted on March 19, 1988. At the beginning of that hearing the judge in the case had directed that the tape-recording device in the courtroom be turned on, and there is no dispute that all of the parties to the hearing were aware that the proceeding was being recorded. During the course of the hearing, respondent called as a witness a man named Moody, who testified, inter alia, that petitioner had given the parties\u2019 infant child alcohol (a \u201cwine cooler\u201d) to drink and that Moody and petitioner had had sexual relations in the \u201cGame-lot Inn\u201d motel while the parties\u2019 child was on a bed next to them. This testimony apparently came as a surprise to petitioner\u2019s attorney, Paul M. Storment, Jr., who requested a five-minute recess so that he could consult with his client before conducting his cross-examination.\nDuring the recess, Storment and his client remained in the courtroom. Although the judge stepped outside, the tape-recording device was not turned off. Distracted by the damaging testimony which had been presented by Moody, Mr. Storment seems to have lost sight of the fact that he and his client were seated next to a live microphone, and he proceeded to have the following discussion with petitioner, all of which was recorded by the court\u2019s audio equipment.\n\u201cMR. STORMENT: This guy, is he broken hearted because you flushed him? Did you flush this guy down the drain?\nMS. GRANGER: (Inaudible.)\nMR. STORMENT: You\u2019re not friends?\nMS. GRANGER: No.\nMR. STORMENT: Cut your God-damn ass off before he really hurts you bad.\nMS. GRANGER: Yeah, I know.\nMR. STORMENT: Okay. Now, you\u2019re going to have to say that \u2014 who did you meet, the last guy you meet \u2014 the last guy you meet?\nMS. GRANGER: Darnell.\nMR. STORMENT: Darnell. Did he have desires for you? Did you cut his (inaudible) off?\nMS. GRANGER: Yes, that\u2019s him. I stopped seeing him when I got married.\nMR. STORMENT: Okay.\nMS. GRANGER: And, the only reason I was seeing him was because I filed for my divorce.\nMR. STORMENT: Did he know you were separated?\nMS. GRANGER: Yeah.\nMR. STORMENT: What about this business about the booze though? What about the business about the Camelot Inn? Did that happen?\nMS. GRANGER: Yeah, it happened.\nMR. STORMENT: God-damn. What were you thinking about?\nMS. GRANGER: She was only three months \u2014 I mean 18 months. I couldn\u2019t leave him. I don\u2019t know. I don\u2019t know.\nMR. STORMENT: You better deny it. Eighteen months old, Jesus.\nMS. GRANGER: Well, she wasn\u2019t even 18 months in \u201986. She was a little bitty baby. She was still in diapers. She was born in \u201885, in \u201884, December of '84. In \u201885, she was about a year, but I was not seeing him in \u201886 because right after the Court date, right after my court date, me and Darnell still were talking, and I did see him then.\nMR. STORMENT: So, that didn\u2019t happen in October of \u201886?\nMS. GRANGER: No, it wouldn\u2019t have been October.\nMR. STORMENT: You better deny this, buddy. You better deny it. What about the liquor situation? You told me you didn\u2019t even drink.\nMS. GRANGER: I drink socially.\nMR. STORMENT: That\u2019s drinking.\nMS. GRANGER: This was the first time I drank socially.\nMR. STORMENT: But, anyway, what about this liquor with Morgan?\nMS. GRANGER: I let her taste it, but I mean, no, I wouldn\u2019t feed it to her.\nMR. STORMENT: You let her taste it? What about this? What is the reason for that? Was he jealous or were you jealous or what happened? What happened in \u201979?\nMS. GRANGER: Well, we never did really get along very well, and then one night I told him that I wanted us to just be friends, and he got violent, and he tore off my clothes.\nMR. STORMENT: That\u2019s in \u201879?\nMS. GRANGER: Yeah, around that time. I was laying in the bed. I called my mother because I asked him to go home, and he wouldn\u2019t go home. So, I called my mother, and they came over.\nMR. STORMENT: What did he look like, he had been drinking? He smelled like booze?\nMS. GRANGER: I don\u2019t know. He drinks.\nMR. STORMENT: But, this was a business on the fact that you didn\u2019t want to be \u2014 you didn\u2019t want to go out with him anymore, right?\nMS. GRANGER: Right. And, then this pure aggravation, that was just the way I release my frustration, but I never attacked anybody.\nMR. STORMENT: Why did you scream and holler at him for?\nMS. GRANGER: I didn\u2019t scream and holler at him. I would basically just go in another room, just go in to release your frustrations. I\u2019d go in the bathroom, ahh, just like that and come back out. I\u2019m serious. I usually roll down the window. I\u2019m not a violent person. I\u2019m really not, but I mean, I\u2019m on the bottle when I\u2019m attacked.\nMR. STORMENT: This is damning. This is damning, damning. I don\u2019t know what you\u2019re going to do with that, but you\u2019re going to have to do something with that. You\u2019re going to have to do something with that because that\u2019s going to cost you, man. It could cost you custody right there.\nMS. GRANGER: I guess. I don\u2019t know.\nMR. STORMENT: That could cost you the custody of your child right there. I mean, that\u2019s terrible. That\u2019s terrible. So, you better do something with that. Maybe the Judge won\u2019t believe that. You\u2019re awful classy.\nMS. GRANGER: What can I do? I mean I was seeing him, and I was separated from him.\nMR. STORMENT: Yeah, but I think the thing that hurts you is taking the kid in the room and screwing with the kid in the room. He said that you two had sex in the bed next to your kid, your little kid that was in the other bed. You\u2019re going to have to do something with that.\nMS. GRANGER: What can I do with it? (Inaudible.)\nMR. STORMENT: I don\u2019t know. That\u2019s up to you. It could be your word against his. It\u2019s up to you.\nMS. GRANGER: Are you saying if I deny it then\u2014\nMR. STORMENT: If you said it didn\u2019t happen, it didn\u2019t happen.\nMS. GRANGER: I remember it happening in \u201886. It seemed to me she was in diapers. She was little. I\u2019ve left him so many different times, except the first time I filed was in \u201885, right?\nMR. STORMENT: Yeah, but think of your judgment like that, screwing some guy in a motel with your daughter in the other bed next to you. She recognized her mother, didn\u2019t she?\nMS. GRANGER: Well, she was little bitty. We\u2019re talking about little. We\u2019re talking about pampers.\nMR. STORMENT: Well, what are you going to say about that? Are you going to deny that or not?\nMS. GRANGER: I don\u2019t know.\nMR. STORMENT: Hum?\nMS. GRANGER: I don\u2019t know.\nMR. STORMENT: Well, it\u2019s up to you. It\u2019s up to you. You\u2019re telling the truth when you say it didn\u2019t happen in \u201886. Okay.\nMS. GRANGER: I don\u2019t remember it happening in \u201986, no.\nMR. STORMENT: This guy crucified you.\nMS. GRANGER: I know.\u201d\nFollowing this exchange, court reconvened and Mr. Storment called petitioner as a witness. His examination of her included the following series of questions and answers:\n\u201cMR. STORMENT: Okay. Now, in 1986, why \u2014 what would possess [Moody] to tell that you went to a motel with him, with your daughter?\nMS. GRANGER: I don\u2019t know.\nMR. STORMENT: Did you think he was your friend?\nMS. GRANGER: Yes.\nMR. STORMENT: What was the situation with him when you met Darnell when you were separated? Were you going out with Moody?\nMS. GRANGER: No, I wasn\u2019t.\nMR. STORMENT: You dumped him for Darnell?\nMS. GRANGER: No, I wasn\u2019t dating anyone.\nMR. STORMENT: You weren\u2019t dating anyone?\nMS. GRANGER: No.\nMR. STORMENT: Do you ever \u2014 under oath now, do you ever remember going to a motel with your daughter with Mr. Moody?\nMS. GRANGER: No.\nMR. STORMENT: That\u2019s a lie, isn\u2019t it?\nMS. GRANGER: Yes.\nMR. STORMENT: What would possess him to tell that?\nMS. GRANGER: I don\u2019t know. Mr. Moody did call me at work hollering and screaming at me. He told me that I had told Donald \u2014 .\nMR. STORMENT: Give us a time. When did Mr. Moody holler and scream?\nMS. GRANGER: I would say it must have been the early part of this year. I would say maybe March, sometime in March he called me at work, and he told me that Mr. Granger had gotten in contact with him and he had talked with him, and I had told him all these things, and he was just constantly \u2014 he was just basically hollering and screaming at me, and I didn\u2019t really know what he was talking about. And, in terms of me giving any information to Mr. Granger about Mr. Moody, I did tell him at one time that I had dated Mr. Moody, and that, that was the first time that I had ever received a black eye because Mr. Moody did hit me in my eye, and that was the first and only time that I had a black eye.\nMR. STORMENT: Okay. Now, how old would your daughter have been in 1986? All this seemed to have happened according to Mr. Moody in October of \u201886, the Seagrams Cooler and the Camelot Inn.\nMS. GRANGER: She would have been \u2014 in October she would have been almost two. She would have been \u2014 .\nMR. STORMENT: Terrible two\u2019s?\nMS. GRANGER: She was almost two, yeah.\nMR. STORMENT: Walking and talking and running around, is that correct?\nMS. GRANGER: She was walking a little, yeah. She wasn\u2019t talking that much.\nMR. STORMENT: Have you ever been in a Camelot Inn?\nMS. GRANGER: Yes, sir, I have.\nMR. STORMENT: When were you in a Camelot Inn?\nMS. GRANGER: I\u2019ve been there with Mr. Granger.\nMR. STORMENT: So, that\u2019s when you were in a Camelot Inn was with Mr. Granger?\nMS. GRANGER: Yes, Mr. Granger and I went to the Camelot Inn.\u201d\nPetitioner was then cross-examined by respondent\u2019s trial attorney, Timothy Stubblefield, during which the following exchange took place:\n\u201cMR. STUBBLEFIELD: And, you were saying that this relationship [with Moody] just ended at your marriage?\nMS. GRANGER: I did.\nMR. STUBBLEFIELD; Okay. And, everything that [Moody] is saying after that about any sort of relationship is totally fabricated?\nMS. GRANGER: I wouldn\u2019t say fabricated, no. We did talk.\nMR. STUBBLEFIELD: You did go out?\nMS. GRANGER: After my separation from Mr. Granger when I filed for my divorce.\nMR. STUBBLEFIELD: But, you did go out?\nMS. GRANGER: We went riding. We went shopping.\nMR. STUBBLEFIELD: This was all platonic?\nMS. GRANGER: Yes.\nMR. STUBBLEFIELD: So, everything [Moody] said today was just fabricated \u2014 .\nMR. STORMENT: Objection, some of it wasn\u2019t fabricated. The motel incident she said was fabricated.\nMR. STUBBLEFIELD: Everything relating to a sexual nature after 1984 was fabricated, correct?\nMS. GRANGER: Yes.\u201d\nOnce respondent\u2019s attorney heard this tape, she realized that petitioner had committed perjury and that she had done so at the urging of her attorney. Based upon the contents of the tape, which respondent\u2019s attorney had transcribed, respondent filed a motion in the circuit court requesting, inter alia, that a new trial be conducted on the issues of child custody and property division between the parties. Although this motion did not specify that a new trial was being sought pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1401), respondent\u2019s attorney subsequently indicated to the circuit court that that statute was the basis for her request for a new trial, and there is no dispute that respondent\u2019s motion was proper under that statute.\nPetitioner responded immediately by filing what her attorney denominated as a \u201cPetition for Temporary Restraining Order, Injunction and Gag Order.\u201d As grounds for that motion, petitioner claimed that the portion of the court\u2019s tape recording of the March 19, 1988, hearing which included her conversation with her attorney during the recess was obtained in violation of section 14 \u2014 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 14 \u2014 2), which prohibits eavesdropping, and that the contents of the conversation she had with her attorney should be protected from disclosure based on attorney-client privilege. She therefore requested that the circuit court enter an order (1) \u201cprohibiting further publication and use of\u201d the conversation between petitioner and her attorney which was recorded during the recess at the 1988 hearing, (2) enjoining respondent from \u201cusing any conversations between Donald Granger [sic] and her attorney\u201d as a basis for any motion to change custody, and (3) \u201cprohibiting Donald Granger from further publishing any knowledge he has in regard to conversations which may have occurred between Debra Granger and her attorney.\u201d\nA hearing on the foregoing motions was conducted on April 20, 1989. At that hearing, testimony was adduced from the attorneys for both petitioner and respondent regarding the tape recording made of the 1988 hearing. Respondent\u2019s attorney, Roza Gossage, explained how she had come to listen to the recording and how it had been transcribed. The transcript was then placed into evidence and was reviewed by the judge in the course of the hearing.\nAfter reviewing the transcript and hearing the testimony and arguments by counsel, the circuit court indicated that it would take the matter under advisement. Pending further order of the court, however, the court verbally instructed respondent\u2019s attorney \u201cnot to tell anybody about what is in this [transcript].\u201d She ordered respondent, himself, not to disseminate \u201cit to anybody * * * and not to. discuss this issue with anyone outside of [his attorney].\u201d The court instructed counsel to surrender all copies of the transcript, which were placed under seal; she ordered that the \u201ctranscript that we had today made [sic] which is April 20, 1989, will be under seal of court until further order of court\u201d; and she ordered the court reporter not to discuss the matter \u201cwith anyone outside of the normal course of her duties as official stenographer of the court.\u201d The court granted this interim relief in order to preserve the status quo so that she could study the law more carefully before making a final decision.\nThat decision came the following day, April 21, 1989, when the court entered a written order in which it found\n\u201cthat the information contained in the transcription of March 19, 1988, which has been filed with the court on April 20, 1989[,] cast[s] serious doubt about the truthfulness of the testimony of Debra Granger and the fundamental fairness of *** all [of] the proceedings before the Court in this matter; further, the information raises serious doubt about whether either party received a full and fair hearing.\u201d\nBased on this finding, the court set aside the judgment of dissolution entered on January 5, 1989, as to all issues \u201cother than the dissolution of the bonds of matrimony,\u201d and ordered that the parties receive \u201ca new trial on the merits of this cause.\u201d The court further set aside that portion of the interim order it had entered the previous day which prohibited discussion of the contents of the transcription of the 1988 hearing. At the same time, the court reaffirmed that the transcription of the 1988 hearing should remain under, seal of the court, but it held that \u201cany party desiring a copy of said transcription to fulfill their ethical obligations under the Disciplinary Rules may petition the Court for a copy of said transcription.\u201d From this order petitioner now appeals.\nOn this appeal, petitioner argues: (1) that the circuit court\u2019s order should be reversed insofar as it set aside the oral \u201cgag order\u201d announced by the court on April 20, 1989, barring discussion of the contents of the 1988 trial transcript and (2) that the circuit court erred in granting respondent a new trial. Both of these issues are properly before this court. Under Illinois law, \u201cgag orders\u201d which restrain the parties and their attorneys from making extrajudicial comments about a pending civil matter are construed as injunctions. (Cummings v. Beaton & Associates, Inc. (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 792, 796, 549 N.E.2d 634, 637.) The portion of the April 21 order which set aside the \u201cgag order\u201d is therefore appealable pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (107 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)), which authorizes interlocutory appeals as of right from orders \u201cgranting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction.\u201d\nThe circuit court\u2019s order granting respondent a new trial is likewise properly before us. Although orders granting new trials are generally not appealable unless leave to appeal has been granted by this court (107 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(l)(i)), respondent\u2019s request for a new trial was made in the context of a petition under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014 1401). Orders granting relief prayed in a petition under that statute are appealable pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3) (107 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(3)).\nIn support of her argument that the circuit court committed reversible error when, on April 21, 1989, it dissolved the \u201cgag order\u201d it had entered on the previous day, petitioner contends that once the circuit court entered the \u201cgag order,\u201d it was powerless to alter that order in any fashion, absent a change in the conditions which prompted the order\u2019s issuance. This position is completely untenable. Petitioner bases her argument on Bundy v. Church League (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 800, 466 N.E.2d 681, but that case is inapposite. Bundy involved a situation where the circuit court attempted to sua sponte dissolve an injunction months after the injunctive order had become final. In the case before us, by contrast, the April 20, 1989, \u201cgag order\u201d had not yet become final when it was modified by the court\u2019s written order on April 21,1989.\nThe April 20, 1989, order was strictly provisional in nature, and its sole purpose was to maintain the status quo until the trial judge had an opportunity to consider the case more thoroughly. This is clearly evident from even a cursory review of the transcript of the April 20, 1989, hearing, and for petitioner\u2019s attorney to suggest that the oral ruling made by the circuit court on April 20, 1989, was intended to be final in any sense strains the bounds of zealous advocacy. Because the April 20, 1989, order was not final and was not intended to be final, no possible basis exists for holding that the circuit judge acted improperly or exceeded her authority when she modified that oral ruling the following day.\nThe second argument raised by petitioner on this appeal, that the circuit court erred in granting respondent a new trial, must likewise fail. Petitioner bases her argument before this court solely on the proposition that the evidence upon which the circuit court relied in ordering a new trial, the transcript of the 1988 hearing, contained statements and conversations which should have been protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.\nAlthough the circuit court did not make an express written finding regarding petitioner\u2019s claim of attorney-client privilege, the issue was squarely presented to the circuit court, which evidently concluded, following an in camera review of the transcript of the tape of the 1988 hearing, that the privilege was inapplicable. As a preliminary matter, petitioner claims that such an in camera review was improper and that the circuit court had no right to read the transcript itself in determining whether the attorney-client privilege applied. We note that in camera inspections have been recognized as an appropriate mechanism for evaluating whether a communication between an attorney and his client is protected by the attorney-client privilege. (Radiac Abrasives, Inc. v. Diamond Technology, Inc. (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 628, 636, 532 N.E.2d 428, 433; United States v. Zolin (1989), 491 U.S. 554, 574, 105 L. Ed. 2d 469, 492, 109 S. Ct. 2619, 2632 (applying Federal common law).) Whether the use of such a procedure was proper here, however, need not be reached.\nThis is so because during the hearing before the circuit court, petitioner made no objection of any kind when the judge indicated that she would consider the contents of the transcript of the tape recording in ruling on the parties\u2019 respective motions. Although petitioner\u2019s attorney did indicate to the judge that he did not believe that it was necessary for her to read the transcript in ruling on the question of privilege, he voiced no complaint when the judge indicated that she was, in fact, going to read the transcript. Petitioner did not even challenge the propriety of the circuit court\u2019s in camera inspection of the transcript in either the main brief or reply brief which she filed in this appeal. The first time that the issue was raised at all by petitioner was at oral argument before this court. Under these circumstances, the issue must be deemed to have been waived. (113 Ill. 2d R 341(e)(7).) We turn then to the question of whether the circuit court properly concluded that the attorney-client privilege did not apply here.\nThe attorney-client privilege exists in order that a client may consult freely with counsel without fear of compelled disclosure of information communicated by him to the attorney whom he has employed or seeks to employ. (Radiac Abrasives, Inc. v. Diamond Technology, Inc. (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 628, 634, 532 N.E.2d 428, 432.) The privilege applies not only to the communications of a client to his attorney, but also to the advice of an attorney to his client. (United States v. King (C.D. Cal. 1982), 536 F. Supp. 253, 261.) The attorney-client privilege does, however, have important limitations.\nThe privilege does not attach where the communications between a client and her lawyer are in furtherance of a crime or fraud. (Radiac Abrasives, Inc. v. Diamond Technology, Inc. (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 628, 634, 532 N.E.2d 428, 432.) Accordingly, the privilege cannot be invoked to bar disclosure of communications in which a client seeks legal assistance to obtain illegal ends. (177 Ill. App. 3d at 634, 532 N.E.2d at 432.) Correspondingly, the privilege cannot be invoked to exclude evidence of an attorney\u2019s advice to his client where that advice is given in furtherance of illegal or fraudulent conduct. (United States v. King (C.D. Cal. 1982), 536 F. Supp. 253, 261.) As one leading authority has explained:\n\u201cSince the policy of the privilege is that of promoting the administration of justice, it would be a perversion of the privilege to extend it to the client who seeks advice to aid him in carrying out an illegal or fraudulent scheme. Advice given for those purposes would not be a professional service but participation in a conspiracy.\u201d (E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence \u00a795, at 199 (2d ed. 1972), quoted in People v. Wurbs (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 360, 364, 347 N.E.2d 879, 893.)\nUnder this rule, known as the \u201ccrime-fraud exception,\u201d conversations in which an attorney recommends to his client that the client commit perjury are not entitled to protection by the attorney-client privilege. (See United States v. Gordon-Nikkar (5th Cir. 1975), 518 F.2d 972, 975.) That is precisely the situation we have before us in this case.\nPetitioner\u2019s attorney has attempted to avoid this conclusion by characterizing the disputed statements and conversations here simply as a legitimate effort on his part to determine the facts from his client and to formulate a strategy to counter obviously damning testimony from an unexpected, adverse witness. We cannot accept this view. The statements and conversations captured on the tape recording made of the 1988 hearing have been set out in detail in this opinion. The clear import of those conversations and statements is that petitioner\u2019s attorney urged his client to commit perjury in order to save any chance she might have of obtaining an award of custody of the parties\u2019 child. There was nothing subtle or ambiguous about his approach. Indeed, we cannot recall a more blatant disregard for the provisions of Rule 7 \u2014 102 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that in his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not \u201cparticipate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or when it is obvious that the evidence is false\u201d (107 Ill. 2d R. 7 \u2014 102(a)(6)) or \u201ccounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent\u201d (107 Ill. 2d R. 7 \u2014 102(a)(7)).\nCounsel\u2019s violation of the canons of ethics is for other authorities to pursue. We note, however, that in advising his client to lie, petitioner\u2019s attorney did more than breach his ethical obligations. He appears to have committed a criminal offense, attempt to suborn perjury. (See Ill. Rev. Stat, 1987, ch. 38, pars. 8 \u2014 4 (attempt), 32 \u2014 3 (subornation of perjury).) Had petitioner opposed her attorney\u2019s advice, this case would probably not be before us now. But she did not. On direct examination by her attorney and on cross-examination by respondent\u2019s counsel, petitioner willingly followed her attorney\u2019s recommendation. Without reservation and without hesitation, she clearly and unambiguously lied under oath, just as her attorney had suggested that she do during the conversation she had with him at the recess called by the circuit court following Moody\u2019s testimony. No possible claim could be made that petitioner did not know or should not have known that this course of conduct was unlawful. Accordingly, we must conclude that the statements and communications between petitioner and her attorney which were recorded on the tape of the 1988 hearing are not protected by any claim of attorney-client privilege. The circuit court therefore did not err when it considered the transcript of the tape in granting respondent\u2019s motion for a new trial.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the April 21, 1989, order of the circuit court of St. Clair County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWELCH and HOWERTON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARRISON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Storment & Read, of Belleville, for appellant.", "Roza Gossage, of Belleville, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF DEBRA GRANGER, Petitioner-Appellant, and DONALD GRANGER, Respondent-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201489\u20140283\nOpinion filed April 17, 1990.\nRehearing denied May 15, 1990.\nStorment & Read, of Belleville, for appellant.\nRoza Gossage, of Belleville, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0363-01", "first_page_order": 385, "last_page_order": 398 }