{
  "id": 2481986,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL E. MINOR, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Minor",
  "decision_date": "1990-05-01",
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    "id": 8837,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:08:36.740176+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL E. MINOR, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn July 11, 1989, after a bench trial, defendant was convicted of driving while his driving privileges were suspended. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 303.) He appeals, arguing the trial court erred in admitting a signed document from the Secretary of State (Secretary) as evidence that defendant\u2019s driving privileges had been suspended.\nWe affirm.\nThe salient facts are taken from the common law record and a bystander\u2019s report. On October 24, 1988, Officer Price of the El Paso police department observed defendant and another individual driving vehicles on the wrong side of East Clay Street. Price followed the vehicles. Both turned into a mobile home park, where Price observed defendant exit one of the vehicles.\nDefendant testified that he had not been driving that day and had just left his mobile home when Officer Price arrived.\nThe State introduced a document from the Secretary which certified defendant\u2019s driving privileges had been suspended on April 9, 1988. The Secretary further certified the 1988 suspension was in effect on October 24, 1988, that the certification had been made after a review of the driving records, and all statutorily required notices had been given to defendant prior to any action. The document was dated and signed by the Secretary. The State seal had been affixed to the document. Although the document stated copies of defendant\u2019s driving record abstract and other pertinent documents were attached, no such attachments were appended to the certification. The court admitted the certification over objection and stated it was prima facie evidence of the matters contained within it.\nDefendant argues the document was inadmissible because it did not have attached to it a copy of the suspension order and an abstract of defendant\u2019s driving record. Second, defendant argues the certification was not admissible under the business-record exception to the hearsay rule because it was prepared for litigation.\nIn People v. Manikas (1969), 106 Ill. App. 2d 315, 246 N.E.2d 142, the court addressed the admissibility of the certificate from the Secretary. The court held the document was admissible as a business record because the Secretary was required to maintain such information and provide it upon request from governmental agencies. The Manikus court noted Manikus did not offer any evidence to rebut the information contained in the Secretary\u2019s certification. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction. Manikus, 106 Ill. App. 2d at 322-23, 246 N.E.2d at 147.\nUnder the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code), the Secretary is required to retain records of revocation and suspension. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 117(b).) The Secretary is authorized to prepare certified copies of the driving records, which are admissible in court. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 2 \u2014 108.) The Secretary may provide abstracts of a driver\u2019s record to the courts. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 2 \u2014 123(g).) Such an abstract is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 2 \u2014 123(g)(5).) An abstract is a summary of the larger record. Webster\u2019s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 47 (1986); Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 9 (5th ed. 1986).\nHere, the certification from the Secretary contained a brief summary of the salient portion of defendant\u2019s driving record, the date and fact of his suspension. We acknowledge this was not an abstract of the complete driving record; however, the statute does not state the abstract must be of the complete driving record. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 2 \u2014 123(g).) Thus, the certification was admissible and was prima facie evidence of the facts stated within it. The trial court did not err in admitting the certification of defendant\u2019s suspension.\nDefendant\u2019s argument that the document was not admissible under the business-records exception to the hearsay rule because it was prepared for litigation does not change this result. The prerequisite for admission of public records as an exception to the hearsay rule is that the record is made in the ordinary course of business and is authorized by statute, rule, or regulation, or required by the nature of the public office. (People v. Williams (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 658, 663, 493 N.E.2d 362, 366.) As a part of its ordinary business, the Secretary is required to prepare abstracts for the courts, public defenders, and other officials. Thus, the general exclusion of matters prepared for litigation would not apply.\nOnly two elements are necessary to establish the offense of driving while one's license is suspended: the fact of a suspension and the act of driving on the highways of the State. (See People v. Younge (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 305, 404 N.E.2d 415.) These elements were established in the instant case.\nFor the above reasons, we affirm the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nKNECHT, P.J., and SPITZ, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daniel D. Yuhas and Jeffrey D. Foust, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.",
      "John B. Huschen, State\u2019s Attorney, of Eureka (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL E. MINOR, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201489\u20140675\nOpinion filed May 1, 1990.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Jeffrey D. Foust, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJohn B. Huschen, State\u2019s Attorney, of Eureka (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0500-01",
  "first_page_order": 522,
  "last_page_order": 524
}