{ "id": 2483972, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD H. RAUH, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rauh", "decision_date": "1990-05-10", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201489\u20140366", "first_page": "692", "last_page": "693", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 692" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130415 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 1029", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069839 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 943", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "948" }, { "page": "948" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542514 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" }, { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0362-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 262, "char_count": 3393, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.061447019797991e-08, "percentile": 0.31815059488024205 }, "sha256": "94e119f769aef8eeab0b670a6792ad6ecf018328a82aeacef9c3383a69db06de", "simhash": "1:2b0f85d56a2f3b1a", "word_count": 570 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:08:36.740176+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD H. RAUH, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Richard H. Rauh, was charged with contributing to the delinquency of a child (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 23, par. 2361a) by causing the child to stay out past her curfew. Prior to trial, he moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that the penalty for the offense was unconstitutionally disproportionate to the penalty for curfew violation. The trial court denied the motion. Following a bench trial, the court found the defendant guilty and imposed a $100 fine.\nOn appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. In support of his argument, he notes that the maximum penalty for a curfew violation is a $100 fine (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 23, par. 2371), while contributing to the delinquency of a child may be punished by 364 days\u2019 imprisonment and a $1,000 fine (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 23, par. 2361a; ch. 38, pars. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143(b), 1005 \u2014 8\u20143(a)(1), 1005 \u2014 9\u20141(a)(2)). He also argues that the instant offense is comparable to solicitation, which limits the penalty for that offense (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 8 \u2014 1(b)).\nThe State first argues that the defendant lacks standing to raise this issue, because he did not receive a sentence that exceeded the maximum penalty for a curfew violation. The supreme court has stated, however, that a defendant has standing to contest a disproportionate penalty if he was exposed to it, regardless of whether he actually received it. (People v. Upton (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 362, 500 N.E.2d 943.) Since the instant defendant could have received the maximum penalty for the offense, he has standing to raise the issue.\nRegarding the disproportionality issue, we note that the legislature has wide discretion in establishing criminal penalties. (Upton, 114 Ill. 2d at 373, 500 N.E.2d at 948.) This power, however, is subject to the limitation that a person\u2019s liberty may not be deprived without due process of law. (People v. Bradley (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 410, 403 N.E.2d 1029.) A penalty does not violate due process so long as it is reasonably designed to remedy the evils the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, safety, and welfare. (Upton, 114 Ill. 2d at 373, 500 N.E.2d at 948.) Moreover, the party challenging a statute\u2019s constitutionality has the burden of proving the violation. People v. Bales (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 182, 483 N.E.2d 517.\nUnder Illinois law, children are commonly afforded special protection because their age renders them more likely to be victims of crime. (See generally Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 11 \u2014 6 through 11 \u2014 22.) For the same reason, the legislature could have reasonably imposed a greater penalty for contributing to a child\u2019s delinquency than for the delinquent\u2019s offense. We find that the defendant has failed to meet his burden of proving that the difference in the penalties violated due process.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Bureau County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHEIPLE, P.J., and STOUDER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BARRY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas A. Tonozzi, of Spring Valley, for appellant.", "Marc Bernabei, State\u2019s Attorney, of Princeton (Gary F. Gnidovec, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD H. RAUH, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201489\u20140366\nOpinion filed May 10, 1990.\nThomas A. Tonozzi, of Spring Valley, for appellant.\nMarc Bernabei, State\u2019s Attorney, of Princeton (Gary F. Gnidovec, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0692-01", "first_page_order": 714, "last_page_order": 715 }