{
  "id": 2483292,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GREGORY ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rogers",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GREGORY ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Gregory Rogers, was certified as a habitual child sex offender pursuant to the Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 221 et seq.). The certification was based on the defendant\u2019s convictions of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 14(a)(2)) in 1987 and contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 5) in 1984. The defendant now appeals from the certification order and raises four contentions of error: (1) the Act is unconstitutional because it constitutes a cruel, unusual and disproportionate punishment; (2) the Act unconstitutionally violates the defendant\u2019s due process and equal protection rights; (3) the order of certification was untimely; and (4) the offense of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child cannot serve as the basis for certification under the Act. Because the State correctly has confessed error with regard to the fourth issue, we reverse the order certifying the defendant as a habitual child sex offender.\nThe defendant\u2019s 1984 conviction of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child was based on an information alleging that he performed an act of sexual intercourse with a 15-year-old girl when he was 17 years old. The conviction was entered as a result of a negotiated plea agreement. The defendant was sentenced to five months\u2019 periodic imprisonment and one year\u2019s probation. People v. Rogers (Cir. Ct. Winnebago Co.), No. 84 \u2014 CF\u2014455.\nAgain pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual assault in 1987. The conviction stemmed from the defendant\u2019s forcible act of intercourse with a 16-year-old girl which caused the victim bodily harm. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eight years\u2019 imprisonment. People v. Rogers (Cir. Ct. Winnebago Co.), No. 86 \u2014 CF\u20141498.\nSubsequently, on June 17, 1988, the trial court granted the State\u2019s petition to certify the defendant as a habitual child sex offender pursuant to the Act. The trial court found that the defendant\u2019s conviction of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child was a sex offense under the Act and that the conviction of aggravated criminal sexual assault constituted a subsequent sex offense. The defendant now appeals from the order certifying him as a habitual child sex offender.\nAlthough the defendant raises four arguments on appeal, the State has filed with this court a confession of error pertaining to the defendant\u2019s fourth argument which makes it unnecessary for us to address the other three. The State concedes that the offense of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor cannot serve as the basis for certification as a habitual child sex offender under the Act. This issue was not raised by the defendant before the trial court; normally, this omission would waive appellate review of the question. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186-87.) This issue may still be reviewed under the doctrine of plain error, however, if the evidence at trial was closely balanced or the accused was denied a fair trial. (People v. Sommerville (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 161, 171.) We believe that review under the plain-error doctrine is appropriate here because, as the State concedes, the certification order was based on an offense which is not a proper predicate for certification under the Act.\nThe Act requires any person certified as a habitual child sex offender to register with the police chief or sheriff in the municipality or county in which he resides. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 223.) A habitual child sex offender is defined as \u201cany person who, after July 1, 1986, is convicted a second or subsequent time for any of the sex offenses or attempts to commit any of the sex offenses set forth in\u201d the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 222(A).) The Act states:\n\u201c(B) As used in this Section, \u2018sex offense\u2019 means:\n(1) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Crimi- ' nal Code of 1961, as amended, when the victim is under 18 years of age:\n12 \u2014 13 (criminal sexual assault),\n12 \u2014 14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault),\n12 \u2014 15 (criminal sexual abuse),\n12 \u2014 16 (aggravated criminal sexual abuse when the offense is a felony).\n(2) A violation of any former law of this State substantially equivalent to any offense listed in subsection (B)(1) of this Section.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 222(B).\nThe State\u2019s confession of error relates to the phrase \u201cwhen the offense is a felony,\u201d which appears to modify the offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse in the portion of the Act quoted above. The State concedes that this phrase was actually intended to modify the offense of criminal sexual abuse, not aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Thus, both the State and the defendant contend that a conviction of criminal sexual abuse, or a \u201csubstantially equivalent\u201d statutory predecessor to criminal sexual abuse, is not a \u201csex offense\u201d under the statute unless it is a felony.\nWe agree with this interpretation of the Act\u2019s definition of a sex offense. We note that aggravated criminal sexual abuse is always a felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 16(e).) Thus, the phrase \u201cwhen the offense is a felony\u201d is redundant to the offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Statutes should, if possible, be construed so that no term is rendered superfluous. (Niven v. Siqueira (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 357, 365.) The defendant contends, and the State concedes, that the legislature actually intended the phrase \u201cwhen the offense is a felony\u201d to modify the offense of criminal sexual abuse and not aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Criminal sexual abuse is, in fact, the only one of the four offenses which can be either a misdemeanor or a felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 15(d)); the other three offenses are always felonies (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 12\u2014 13(b), 12 \u2014 14(c), 12 \u2014 16(e)).\nFurthermore, it is appropriate here to examine the debates on the floor of the General Assembly to ascertain the legislative intent underlying the Act. (Morel v. Coronet Insurance Co. (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 18, 24.) During the Senate debate on the Act, Senator Karpiel stated that the Act\u2019s definition of a habitual child sex offender includes \u201conly those persons who have a second felony conviction after July 1, 1986, for certain felony sex offenses.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (84th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 25, 1986, at 210.) The following colloquy between Representatives Cullerton and Parke also demonstrates the clear intent of the House of Representatives that the definition of sex offenses was meant to include felonies only:\n\u201cCullerton: '*** [I]n another part of the Bill you are limiting this to felonies...\u2019\nParke: \u2018That is correct.\u2019\nCullerton: '... wouldn\u2019t this whole Section here contemplate a misdemeanor, someone being fined by a misdemeanor?\u2019\nParke: T don\u2019t believe it does. That\u2019s one of the reasons why we had an Amendment to redefine what was [sic] the sexual offenses.\u2019\nCullerton: '*** I want to make clear that this does not apply to misdemeanants.\u2019\nParke: \u2018Well, I will tell you our intent, this is only to apply to the defined felony convictions and that there\u2019s no... we\u2019ve alleviated any thought of a misdemeanor being involved here.\u2019 \u201d 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 20, 1986, at 62.\nWe conclude, therefore, that the Act\u2019s definition of a sex offense includes criminal sexual abuse only where that offense is a felony. We wish to draw the legislature\u2019s attention to the need to clarify the Act\u2019s definition of a sex offense so that unnecessary litigation might be avoided.\nIn the instant cause, the defendant\u2019s certification as a habitual child sex offender rested in part on his 1984 conviction of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child, an offense which is no longer included in the Criminal Code of 1961. Although contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child is \u201csubstantially equivalent\u201d to the offense of criminal sexual abuse, it is a misdemeanor only (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 5(c)) and cannot serve as a basis for certification under the Act. Therefore, the order of the circuit court certifying the defendant as a habitual child sex offender must be reversed. This conclusion resolves the appeal and makes it unnecessary for us to consider any of the three additional arguments raised by the defendant. A reviewing court will not consider questions or contentions which are not essential to the determination of the case before it. Unger v. Nunda Township Rural Fire Protection District (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 758, 764.\nThe order of the circuit court of Winnebago County is reversed.\nReversed.\nGEIGER and INGLIS, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "G. Joseph Weller and Thomas A. Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office of Elgin, for appellant.",
      "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers and Cynthia N. Schneider, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GREGORY ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201488\u20140602\nOpinion filed May 16, 1990.\nG. Joseph Weller and Thomas A. Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office of Elgin, for appellant.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (William L. Browers and Cynthia N. Schneider, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0722-01",
  "first_page_order": 744,
  "last_page_order": 748
}