{ "id": 2480698, "name": "EVA McDANIEL, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (The County of Cook, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "McDaniel v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1990-04-27", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201489\u20141425WC", "first_page": "981", "last_page": "995", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 981" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2898605 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3046711 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 1345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3114596 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0349-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1147, "char_count": 36820, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.087085966315723e-08, "percentile": 0.377615065588766 }, "sha256": "641bafdcc3aca1af406dbdbe08997f31922b152819c951581f41612d457f3081", "simhash": "1:8225a1a8452e2291", "word_count": 5970 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:08:36.740176+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EVA McDANIEL, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (The County of Cook, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LEWIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe claimant, Eva McDaniel, filed an application for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.) for an injury to her knee which she sustained during the course of her employment with the respondent, Oak Forest Hospital. (We note that there is no evidence presented in the record of the relationship of Oak Forest Hospital to the County of Cook; however, we presume that Oak Forest Hospital is a county hospital, and therefore, any reference to the \u201crespondent\u201d shall be understood to mean both Oak Forest Hospital and County of Cook.) At the hearing before the arbitrator, the claimant presented medical evidence of her knee injury and of her psychological condition. Ultimately, the arbitrator found that the claimant\u2019s knee injury arose out of and in the course of her employment, and awarded her temporary total disability (TTD) for 306/? weeks, her related medical expenses for her knee, and permanent partial disability (PPD) for a 10% loss of the use of her left leg. The arbitrator also held that the claimant had failed to prove there was a causal connection between her current mental condition and her work accident of December 24, 1980, and denied her benefits for her mental disability.\nOn appeal to the Industrial Commission (Commission), the Commission modified the arbitrator\u2019s decision by increasing the claimant\u2019s PPD from a 10% to 15% loss of the use of her left leg and by entering the specific dollar amount of the medical expenses that the claimant was entitled to receive for her left knee injury, but in all other respects, the Commission affirmed the arbitrator\u2019s decision. Subsequently, the circuit court of Cook County confirmed the Industrial Commission\u2019s decision, and the claimant appeals. On appeal, the sole issue raised by the claimant is whether the Industrial Commission\u2019s determination that the claimant failed to prove there was a causal connection between her psychological disability and her work-related accident was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nTwo hearings in which testimony was presented were held before the arbitrator. The first hearing was held on February 27, 1985, and the second hearing was conducted on April 24, 1985. At the first hearing, the claimant testified that she was employed in the dietary department of the respondent on December 24, 1980. Her duties consisted of fixing trays for patients, loading the trays onto a motorized cart, pushing the cart full of trays to the ward, distributing the food trays to the patients, and collecting the trays after the patients had eaten. The motorized cart used in these tasks carried approximately 30 trays of food.\nOn December 24, 1980, the claimant was operating her motorized cart when the cart hit her and pinned her left knee against the wall. This accident occurred at about 2:15 p.m., 15 minutes prior to the end of the claimant\u2019s work shift. The claimant reported her accident, but because her workday was nearing the end, she did not go to the respondent\u2019s Employee\u2019s Health Services until the following day. At that time, her knee was examined, and subsequently, the claimant\u2019s left leg was placed in a cast which came to mid-thigh. When her cast was removed, she received physical therapy for her knee.\nIn addition to her treatment from the respondent\u2019s services, the claimant also saw Dr. Haskell, whom the claimant described as a \u201cbone specialist.\u201d She first saw Dr. Haskell in February of 1981, and she continued to see Dr. Haskell once a month until July of 1981. Dr. Haskell diagnosed her condition as torn ligaments of the left knee and knee sprain. On May 1, 1981, Dr. Haskell hospitalized the claimant at Michael Reese Hospital for what the claimant termed a \u201cblood clot\u201d in her left leg. She was discharged on May 7, 1981. After her discharge, the claimant saw Dr. Haskell for the last time on July 7, 1981. At her last visit, Dr. Haskell told the claimant she would always have problems with her knee, but that further treatment was unnecessary.\nThe claimant testified that prior to her accident, the claimant was a \u201cbusy\u201d person, and in addition to her working, she bowled, kept house, and socialized. After her accident, she visited with her friends, watched television, and tried to do her housework. When the claimant was released from Michael Reese Hospital, her knee bothered her, she sometimes had trouble with her back, and she \u201cfelt anxious to go back to work.\u201d Additionally, she was unable to keep busy all day long, which made her feel irritable, tense and nervous, and sitting around made her feel depressed.\nSubsequently, on May 24, 1981, the claimant was admitted to Our Lady of Mercy Hospital for what the claimant termed was a \u201cnervous breakdown.\u201d During her stay at the hospital, the claimant was treated by Dr. Frieske. She was discharged from Our Lady of Mercy on June 22,1981.\nThe claimant further testified that she did not work after her accident of December 24, 1980, until she returned to her employment in the dietary department on August 29, 1981. Upon her return to work, she felt tired and weak, and she could not stand very long because her knee bothered her; however, she was feeling good psychologically. Wlien the claimant returned to work, her work duties had changed and she did \u201cassembly line\u201d work, wherein the claimant did different tasks from day to day. According to the claimant, her new work tasks required more of her physically than before since she had to stand and \u201cpush and pull things\u201d more often. She attempted to do the work, but the new work detail made her \u201cfeel bad\u201d because she could not keep up the pace.\nThe claimant worked from August 29, 1981, until April 17, 1982. During that time, the claimant found the work to be a strain physically on her, and made her feel nervous, and \u201clike I couldn\u2019t hold up during eight-hour pressure.\u201d Subsequently, on April 20, 1982, Dr. Frieske admitted the claimant to Southlake Mental Health Center (Southlake). Dr. Kim, Dr. Frieske\u2019s associate, who treated her while she was in the hospital, placed the claimant on medication at this time. The claimant was discharged on April 28, 1982.\nSubsequent to her hospitalization on April 20, 1982, the claimant had numerous other hospitalizations for her mental condition. The claimant testified that she was hospitalized on the following dates in the following hospitals for her psychological problems: September 25, 1982, to October 1, 1982, at Our Lady of Mercy Hospital; December 22, 1982, to January 1, 1983, at Our Lady of Mercy Hospital; March 3, 1983, to March 14, 1983, at Tinley Park Mental Health Center (Tinley Park); and on September 10, 1984, to September 27, 1984, at Christ Hospital. In addition to her hospitalizations, the claimant received outpatient treatment from Family Service and Mental Health Center of South Cook County (Family Services) commencing on June 10, 1983. When she was in Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, the claimant was treated by Dr. Frieske and Dr. Kim, but when she was treated as an out-patient with Family Services and was hospitalized at Christ Hospital, she was treated by Dr. Vivar. The claimant had continued her therapy with Family Services and was still being treated by Dr. Vivar. The claimant stated that since her hospitalization of April 20, 1982, she had not been released for work by a psychiatrist, and she remained on a leave of absence from her employment.\nThe claimant had worked for the respondent in the dietary department since 1967. Prior to her accident on December 24, 1980, the claimant had two other injuries to her lower back while at work, one on April 20, 1979, and one on March 22, 1980. The claimant filed workers\u2019 compensation claims and received compensation for these two previous accidents. After her back injuries, the claimant returned to the same work duties as before her injuries.\nAccording to the claimant, before her accident of December 24, 1980, she had never received treatment for a psychological problem. She admitted that the records of Our Lady of Mercy Hospital indicated that her mother suffered from mental illness. The claimant stated that she and her husband had not had any marital difficulties prior to her accident, but a couple of years after her accident of December 24, 1980, she and her husband separated. At the time of this hearing, she and her husband were reunited and had been back together for the past year and a half.\nThe claimant testified that she continued to feel nervous and that she was on medication. Dr. Vivar had prescribed lithium, Prolixin and Cogentin for her. The claimant stated that she does not have her strength back, either physically or mentally. Since April of 1982, the claimant has not been as active as she likes to be, which upsets her. With regard to her left knee, the claimant admitted that she does not use crutches, a cane or a brace for walking; she takes Tylenol for her pain; and she has not received any medical treatment for her knee injury since 1981. At her attorney\u2019s request, the claimant saw Dr. Garr\u00f3n in July 1984, and at the respondent\u2019s request, she saw Dr. Scuderi and Dr. Blackman at that time.\nThe claimant stated that she had graduated from high school. She further stated that since April 1982, she had looked for lighter work. Her efforts to seek other employment consisted of applying for a job as a transporter at Ingalls Hospital and as a security guard.\nThe claimant\u2019s husband, Darnell McDaniel, testified that he and the claimant had been married for 16 years. During their marriage, the claimant worked full time until her accident of December 24, 1980. Darnell described his wife as a very active person who always worked, kept house and was \u201con top of things.\u201d He stated she was a happy individual, and that the claimant had a strong constitution.\nAfter the claimant\u2019s injury of December 24, 1980, Darnell noted that the claimant was not as busy as she used to be. Additionally, the claimant\u2019s attitude also changed. When the claimant went back to work in August of 1981, the claimant did not sleep well, she would get up in the middle of the night, and she worried considerably. The claimant also complained about her legs and limped around the house.\nDarnell admitted that the claimant had started to change before her accident of December 24, 1980. The claimant had been off work for her back injuries prior to the accident in December, and it was then he first began to notice a difference in her. In Darnell\u2019s opinion, the claimant\u2019s mental outlook was influenced by how busy she was or was not.\nDarnell denied that he and the claimant had marital difficulties prior to December 24, 1980. However, he admitted that he and the claimant had separated in 1983 for approximately two years. He corroborated the claimant\u2019s testimony that they were now reunited.\nNo other testimony was presented at this hearing, but numerous medical records of the claimant were introduced into evidence. The medical records of Oak Forest Hospital indicated that the claimant was seen for her knee injury on December 26, 1980, and was found to have echymosis (essentially a bruise) of the left knee. On December 29, 1980, the claimant saw an orthopedist at Oak Forest Hospital, and a leg cast was applied. The X-ray examination done on the claimant\u2019s left knee at Oak Forest Hospital revealed that the claimant had no evidence of a fracture, a dislocation or a gross bone abnormality of her left knee. Ultimately, the claimant was diagnosed as having a partial tear of the lateral collateral ligament of her left knee.\nDr. Vittel\u2019s notes of April 27, 1981, from Oak Forest Hospital, indicated that the claimant had superficial thrombophlebitis (inflammation of the wall of a vein and the formation of clots) in her left leg, which was confirmed in Dr. Gaffud\u2019s consultation report. Subsequently, the claimant\u2019s medical records confirmed that she was admitted to Michael Reese Hospital by Dr. Haskell for treatment of the superficial thrombophlebitis on May 1, 1981, and was discharged from there on May 7, 1981. On June 21, 1981, the claimant was released to return to work orthopedically by Oak Forest Hospital, but the record indicated that she also needed clearance with regard to the thrombophlebitis. On July 27, 1981, the claimant was found to have full range of motion in her left knee, that she had no instability in standing, that she was able to squat well, and that she was able to return to work.\nThe medical records of the claimant\u2019s hospitalization at Our Lady of Mercy Hospital on May 24, 1981, were admitted. These records indicated that Dr. Frieske was her attending physician. The claimant\u2019s discharge summary gave her diagnosis as \u201c[a]cute agitated depression.\u201d The reason given for her admittance was that the claimant attempted to set fire to her home, whereupon her husband brought her to the hospital, and she was involuntarily committed. In the claimant\u2019s history and physical report it was stated that she was admitted \u201cbecause of bizarre and disorganized behavior over the past two weeks,\u201d and her behavior was described as fluctuating, i.e., \u201cvery severe disturbance interspersed with feeling fairly good.\u201d The claimant\u2019s history revealed that her mother had had psychiatric treatments, was on medication, and had been hospitalized for mental problems in the past. Dr. Frieske reported that the claimant had recently been drinking heavily.\nThe psychosocial history report of the claimant of June 8, 1981, prepared by Jesse Munoz, a social worker, stated that according to the claimant\u2019s husband, the claimant had always found it necessary to keep busy or she would become \u201chyper.\u201d The claimant\u2019s husband reported to Munoz that the claimant had not worked since her accident to her knee, and that the claimant had been on \u201cpain killers.\u201d The claimant\u2019s husband had noted that the claimant had been becoming gradually overactive, which immediately preceded the claimant\u2019s psychotic behavior. Munoz described the claimant, from the information he had received of her, as compulsive and obsessive, and he noted that she had difficulty tolerating inactivity. Munoz\u2019 report stated that in addition to the claimant\u2019s use of pain killers since January, she had also been drinking during this time.\nThe claimant was discharged from Our Lady of Mercy Hospital on June 22, 1981. On August 8, 1981, Dr. Frieske released the claimant for work as of August 10, 1981. The records also indicated that after her hospitalization for her mental problems the claimant was placed on the following medications: lithium, Navane, Cogentin and Benalyn expectorant.\nThe claimant\u2019s discharge summary of her hospitalization at Southlake revealed that the claimant had been hospitalized there from April 20, 1982, through May 4, 1982. The final diagnosis of the claimant\u2019s condition at that time was given as \u201cmajor affective disorder (depression).\u201d The claimant was admitted on the recommendation of Dr. Frieske, because she was nervous, tense and depressed. The records of this hospitalization stated that the claimant \u201cfelt unable to cope with her responsibilities, especially at work. Her mother has also been a problem[,] currently under psychiatric treatment, but doing fairly well.\u201d It was noted that the claimant had been on lithium and Navane in the past because of her high level of excitement. At the time of the claimant\u2019s discharge on May 4, 1982, Dr. Frieske completed a disability form for the claimant, where he indicated by checking a box on the form that the claimant\u2019s sickness arose out of the claimant\u2019s employment.\nA consultation report done on May 24, 1982, by Dr. Sherman Kaplitz, at Dr. Vittel\u2019s request, indicated that Dr. Kaplitz had contacted Dr. Frieske with regard to the disability form completed by Dr. Frieske on May 4, 1982. Dr. Kaplitz reported that Dr. Frieske did not recall stating that the claimant\u2019s depression was work related. Dr. Kaplitz went on to state that, at the present time, he did not find evidence that the claimant had a true major depression, but he felt that her depression was reactive, and that the claimant was reacting in this manner to avoid returning to work. He believed that the claimant would benefit by returning to work as soon as possible. An orthopedic progress note of this same date, submitted to Dr. Vittel, stated that the claimant\u2019s knee was not swollen and that she had full range of motion, and that the claimant was orthopedically able to return to work.\nAnother discharge summary disclosed that the claimant was again hospitalized at Our Lady of Mercy Hospital from July 8, 1982, through September 2, 1982. The diagnosis of her condition at this time was \u201cacute paranoid disorder.\u201d She was admitted to the hospital for \u201cviolent acting out, behaving strangely, and [because she] had been trying to burn her own house.\u201d The claimant was brought to the hospital by her husband, and at the time of her admittance, the claimant was belligerent and combative. This record also stated that the claimant\u2019s mother suffered from mental illness.\nThe claimant\u2019s next hospitalization was from September 25,1982, until October 1, 1982, at Our Lady of Mercy Hospital. The diagnosis of the claimant\u2019s condition given in the discharge summary of this hospitalization was \u201cacute paranoid disorder.\u201d The claimant was admitted on this occasion for depression, difficulty in sleeping, increasing agitation, wandering around at night, and paranoia against her husband. The report noted that the precipitating event for this hospitalization was that the claimant\u2019s husband recently filed for a divorce. It was also noted that the claimant had stopped taking her medication.\nThe claimant was again hospitalized at Our Lady of Mercy Hospital on December 22, 1982, and was discharged on January 1, 1983. The diagnosis of the claimant\u2019s condition in the discharge summary of this hospitalization was \u201cresidual schizophrenia with acute exacerbation.\u201d The claimant was hospitalized because of confusion, wandering away from home, trouble sleeping, and exposing herself to people by disrobing. The claimant left the hospital on an overnight pass and failed to return; therefore, she was discharged.\nThe medical records of Tinley Park disclosed that the claimant was admitted there on March 3, 1983, and was discharged on March 14, 1983. The claimant was diagnosed as having \u201c[sjchizophrenia, undifferentiated type, chronic.\u201d The discharge summary from Tinley Park stated that the claimant was currently separated from her husband. The claimant had been brought to Tinley Park by the Harvey police on a writ of detention because the claimant had been physically aggressive, hostile, and easily agitated. Additionally, she had been exhibiting bizarre behavior, wherein she had removed food from the refrigerator and had covered it with sheets, and she had walked around the house nude and had attempted to leave the house naked. It was noted that the claimant had not been taking her medication for the past three months.\nThe records of the claimant\u2019s outpatient treatment with Family Services, which commenced on June 10, 1983, revealed that the claimant\u2019s mother was also an aftercare patient. The records reported that the claimant had been stressed for the past year because of her unemployment. The claimant was found to be confused and evasive when she was questioned about her history of psychiatric hospitalizations, but she spoke often of her knee injury. The records noted that the claimant \u201cstate[d] symptoms [of her mental illness] began after knee injury but evasiveness suggests possibility of prior difficulty.\u201d The Family Services records indicated that the claimant stated that she \u201ccan\u2019t talk to mother who \u2018keeps things in,\u2019 \u201d and that the claimant\u2019s mother had atypical psychosis since 1977. It was stated in the records that the claimant was separated from her husband, that she had a son 16 years of age, and that the claimant said she was \u201cnot going back to no bad marriage.\u201d The records from Family Services indicated that the claimant had conflicts with her parents and her \u201cabusive\u201d husband. In her treatment at Family Services, the claimant was under the care of Dr. Vivar.\nThe notes of Family Services dated October 4, 1984, indicated that the claimant was now living with her husband, but that she was having problems with this. Additionally, it was noted that the claimant was also having difficulty with her son, who had been picked up for shoplifting; that she had her lawsuit for her work injury pending; and that she had conflicts with her husband, which was making her depressed.\nOn September 10, 1984, the claimant was again hospitalized at Christ Hospital under Dr. Vivar\u2019s care. The claimant was diagnosed as having a \u201c[schizophrenic disorder.\u201d The claimant\u2019s problems, upon her admission, were depression and thought process disorders including hallucinations, delusions, thought blocking, and confusion. The records of Christ Hospital revealed that the claimant was still separated from her husband, and that she had been separated from him for the past year and a half to two years. The claimant was discharged from Christ Hospital on September 27,1984.\nLastly, Dr. Garron\u2019s psychological evaluation report of the claimant of July 14, 1984, was admitted. Dr. Garron\u2019s report stated that in addition to his clinical interview with the claimant, he had also administered the following psychological tests to the claimant: Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised Form L; Thematic Apperception Test; and Rorschach Test. The results of the psychological testing did not presently indicate a schizophrenic, major affective, paranoid, anxiety, somatoform, or dysthymic disorder. However, he noted that the claimant had several characteristic traits of \u201cAtypical or Other Personality Disorders,\u201d specifically an Inadequate Personality Disorder. Dr. Garr\u00f3n stated that \u201c[i]n view of these specific characteristics, it is likely that any stress causing anxiety, or even unusual excitement, may result in personal disorganization.\u201d Dr. Garr\u00f3n thought it possible that the claimant\u2019s injury of December 24, 1980, or her extended period of time away from work, had contributed to her decompensation. This concluded the evidence presented at the February hearing before the arbitrator.\nAt the second hearing before the arbitrator on April 24, 1985, the testimony of two psychiatrists was presented. The claimant\u2019s psychiatrist, Dr. Marvin Ziporyn, testified that he had reviewed the claimant\u2019s testimony at the previous hearing before the arbitrator, and the claimant\u2019s attorney\u2019s abstract of the claimant\u2019s various hospitalizations following her accident of December 24, 1980. Additionally, he had reviewed Dr. Garr\u00f3n\u2019s, Dr. Blackman\u2019s and Dr. Scuderi\u2019s reports. However, Dr. Ziporyn had not interviewed the claimant. Based upon the information he reviewed, it was Dr. Ziporyn\u2019s opinion that the claimant\u2019s mental condition was either caused or aggravated by her work-related accident of December 24, 1980. The doctor placed importance upon the timing of the claimant\u2019s first mental hospitalization and stated that there seldom was an immediate cause and effect in a situation such as the claimant\u2019s. He believed that the claimant\u2019s two prior back injuries were of crucial importance, as the first trauma \u201cprepares the soil,\u201d and after the second and third trauma, a patient\u2019s ability to cope is broken down and the symptoms of mental illness occur.\nDr. Ziporyn explained the reason for the variability of the different diagnoses of the claimant\u2019s condition. According to the doctor, these diagnoses were technical questions of labelling, and that depression and paranoia were two sides to the same coin. The different terms used to describe the claimant\u2019s condition were just different ways of looking at the same issue. He stated that the claimant basically went into a state of psychosis, which is a departure from reality.\nThe doctor further explained that psychosis can have \u201ckey-like scopic variables of presentation.\u201d Dr. Ziporyn stated that initially, a situation is inaugurated by anxiety, which at some point becomes overwhelming and the person decompensates or disintegrates. The doctor found that in the claimant\u2019s case, she was angry in response to her feelings of vulnerability.\nDr. Ziporyn interpreted the claimant\u2019s husband\u2019s testimony of the claimant\u2019s hyperactivity as a description of her basic personality structure, which was \u201can anxious individual and consequently hypersensitive to any stress that would cause an exacerbation of her anxiety.\u201d He stated that one of the claimant\u2019s basic stress elements was still present, i.e., the atrophy of her knee, and that her knee will always represent a stress element to her. Dr. Ziporyn testified that any stress, any situation which makes the claimant feel inadequate physically or mentally, could precipitate another acute exacerbation of her condition.\nDr. Ziporyn differed with Dr. Garr\u00f3n\u2019s opinion that the claimant\u2019s mental condition was caused by the time of unemployment after her injury; however, he agreed with Dr. Garr\u00f3n in that the claimant\u2019s condition was caused by the claimant\u2019s accident. Dr. Ziporyn was of the opinion that the claimant\u2019s subsequent mental breakdowns were also related to her work accident of December 24, 1980. His reasoning was that because the claimant had reached the point of decompensation, she would always be prone to breakdowns under any kind of stress, particularly work-related stress.\nOn cross-examination, Dr. Ziporyn stated that the severity of the claimant\u2019s injury was not an issue with regard to her mental condition, and that any kind of trauma (physical) may be sufficient to trigger her condition. Dr. Ziporyn admitted it was possible that if the claimant had a stressful situation at home, that could create the onset of her problem, but he felt that to be highly unlikely. According to Dr. Ziporyn, the real issue, outside of the causation element of the claimant\u2019s mental problems, was her feelings of inadequacy and vulnerability.\nDr. Benjamin Blackman, a psychiatrist for 30 years, testified on behalf of the respondent. He testified that he had reviewed the medical records of the claimant from Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, Dr. Haskell\u2019s records, Oak Forest Hospital\u2019s records, and the records of Family Services, and that he had interviewed the claimant. He admitted that he had not reviewed the records of Southlake, Tinley Park, or Christ Hospital. Likewise, he had not seen Dr. Scuderi\u2019s or Dr. Garron\u2019s reports. Dr. Blackman gave as his opinion that the claimant\u2019s mental condition was not caused by her work-related accident involving her left knee, but that the underlying basis for her psychological disorder was her personal problems. The personal problems of the claimant to which he referred were the claimant\u2019s bad marriage and her conflicts with her husband, her son, and her parents. During his interview with the claimant, she would \u201cglaze\u201d over these difficulties.\nDr. Blackman stated that ordinarily a soft tissue injury, such as the claimant\u2019s, does not trigger psychological disorders. The doctor believed that the claimant\u2019s mental problems predated her injury of December 24, 1980. The basis for his opinion was the claimant\u2019s condition upon her first admission to Our Lady of Mercy Hospital and the chronic nature of her mental decompensation. Additionally, the information contained in the records he had, plus his knowledge of the course of mental decompensation, gave support to his opinion that the claimant was emotionally disturbed long before December of 1980. It was his opinion that the claimant\u2019s injury occurred while she had the schizophrenia, that the schizophrenia was in \u201cnascent form,\u201d and that the claimant\u2019s injury was not known to produce schizophrenia. The doctor stated that it was possible that the claimant\u2019s injury and the activity brought on by the injury could have aggravated her deep-seated condition; however, he also noted that her domestic problems and parental problems existed at that time as well. Dr. Blackman further stated that if the claimant had a good home life and was well-adjusted, her inactivity of over five months after her injury would have had no adverse effect on the claimant.\nA third hearing, at which neither the claimant nor the attorneys were present, was conducted by the arbitrator on May 31, 1985. At that time, the arbitrator admitted into evidence two letters from Dr. Blackman, one dated August 30, 1984, and the other dated September 28, 1984; the results of the claimant\u2019s Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI); and a letter from Dr. Scuderi dated July 25, 1984, on behalf of the respondent.\nDr. Blackman\u2019s letter of August 30, 1984, stated that he had seen the claimant on July 25, 1984, at which time the claimant took an MMPI. Dr. Blackman indicated in his letter that he had determined, from the records he reviewed, that the claimant had a \u201c[sjchizoaffective disorder,\u201d that she had a bad marriage, and that she had conflicts with her parents as well as her husband. The letter revealed that the doctor found the claimant\u2019s descriptions of her knee injury to be very vague, and her description of her mental illness unsatisfactory. The doctor found the claimant\u2019s statements were sometimes inconsistent in that the claimant had reported to the doctor that she and her husband got along well, but then the claimant had told him that her relationship with her husband could be better. She also told the doctor that she got along fine with her parents; however, the claimant\u2019s records indicated she had conflicts with them.\nDr. Blackman\u2019s letter of September 28, 1984, simply stated that his initial impression of the claimant, that she suffered a severe mental impairment which was far advanced and deep-seated, was confirmed by the claimant\u2019s medical records. His conclusions as to the claimant\u2019s mental condition were also confirmed by his interview with the claimant.\nThe results of the MMPI, which was given to the claimant by Dr. Blackman, were as follows:\n\u201cThe client has responded to the MMPI items in an exaggerated manner, endorsing a wide variety of inconsistent symptoms and attitudes. These results may stem from a number of factors that include random responding; falsely claiming psychological problems; low reading level; a \u2018plea for help\u2019; or a confused state. The resulting MMPI profile is not a valid indication of the individual\u2019s personality and symptoms.\u201d\nDr. Scuderi\u2019s letter of July 25, 1984, stated that he examined the claimant on that date, at which time the claimant complained of occasional pain and swelling in her left knee, and that her knee bothered her when the weather changed or when she stood or walked for long periods of time. Dr. Scuderi\u2019s physical examination of the claimant revealed that she had maximum discomfort over the medial femoral condyle of her left knee; that she had a slight amount of creaking on forced flexion and extension of her knee; that the claimant had a little difficulty with complete extension of her knee; that there was a small amount of swelling present; that there was a slight atrophy of her left knee; and that the claimant walked with a rather careful gait and a slight limp on her left leg. Dr. Scuderi\u2019s diagnosis of the claimant\u2019s knee was that she had a soft tissue injury to the medial femoral condyle from which she had made a good recovery. Dr. Scuderi found there was no need for further treatment of the claimant\u2019s knee and stated that she was able to return to some form of work.\nAt the review hearing before the Commission, the claimant testified that she had attempted to return to her employment with the respondent. However, Dr. Vivar, her treating psychiatrist, had talked with the claimant\u2019s supervisors, and Dr. Vivar was told by her supervisors that the claimant could not return to work in the dietary department as the work would be too much strain on the claimant. The claimant\u2019s supervisors referred the claimant to personnel, who in turn referred her to human relations. The claimant was told by the woman in human relations that the respondent had not yet found work for her, but that there might be a possibility of employment. The claimant stated that she had also sought work at the Harvey police department, but that she was told they were not hiring.\nThe claimant testified that she is currently on the following medications: lithium, Prolixin and Cogentin. These medications were prescribed by Dr. Vivar, from whom she still received treatment for her psychiatric problems.\nAs we noted previously, the sole issue raised by the claimant on appeal is whether the Commission\u2019s determination that her failure to prove her psychological disability was causally connected to her work accident of December 24, 1980, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The claimant contends that the medical evidence of Dr. Ziporyn that the claimant\u2019s mental problems were caused or aggravated by her work-related injury to her knee was unrefuted; therefore, the Commission\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.\nIt is well established that the claimant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the elements of his claim, including a showing of causal connection between an employee\u2019s disability and his work-related injury; and that it is the province of the Industrial Commission to decide factual questions, to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and to resolve conflicts in the medical evidence. (Horath v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 349, 449 N.E.2d 1345; Vestal v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 469, 419 N.E.2d 897; International Harvester Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 238, 263 N.E.2d 49.) The Commission\u2019s findings on medical causation will not be disturbed on review unless it is determined that the Commission\u2019s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Horath, 96 Ill. 2d 349, 449 N.E.2d 1345; International Harvester Co., 46 Ill. 2d 238, 263 N.E.2d 49.) In this case, Dr. Ziporyn testified that the claimant\u2019s knee injury had caused her mental disability, while Dr. Blackman testified that a soft tissue injury, such as the claimant suffered here, was not known to cause such psychological disability. Clearly, the testimony of the two psychiatrists on whether the claimant\u2019s knee injury had caused her mental disability was conflicting. The arbitrator, in her decision, accepted the testimony of Dr. Blackman and determined that the claimant\u2019s mental disability was not causally connected to her work accident. Likewise, the Commission, in its determination, held that the evidence was conflicting, adopted the arbitrator\u2019s findings wherein the arbitrator accepted Dr. Blackman\u2019s testimony and rejected Dr. Ziporyn\u2019s testimony on medical causation, and affirmed the arbitrator\u2019s decision. As we noted previously, the determination of medical causation and resolving conflicting medical evidence are the province of the Commission, and we conclude that the Commission\u2019s decision in this case was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nWe also note that the claimant raised a brief alternative argument that, at the least, the claimant\u2019s work-related accident of December 24, 1980, aggravated her preexisting condition. The only evidence presented at her hearings by the claimant in this regard was a brief statement by Dr. Ziporyn that her injury either caused or aggravated her mental disability. The remainder of Dr. Ziporyn\u2019s testimony was concerned with the aspect that the claimant\u2019s injury caused her disability. Dr. Ziporyn gave no basis for an opinion that the claimant\u2019s psychological condition was aggravated by her knee injury. The claimant had the burden of proving her claim by a preponderance of the evidence, and we do not find that the claimant met her burden of proving that her accident aggravated her preexisting mental condition. Vestal, 84 Ill. 2d 469, 419 N.E.2d 897.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County, confirming the Industrial Commission\u2019s decision, is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY, P.J., and McNAMARA, WOODWARD, and McCullough, jj., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LEWIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Wittenberg & Dougherty, Ltd., of Chicago (David M. Wittenberg, of counsel), for appellant.", "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry, Myra J. Brown, and LaBrenda E. White, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EVA McDANIEL, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (The County of Cook, Appellee).\nFirst District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20141425WC\nOpinion filed April 27, 1990.\nRehearing denied June 6, 1990.\nWittenberg & Dougherty, Ltd., of Chicago (David M. Wittenberg, of counsel), for appellant.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Joan S. Cherry, Myra J. Brown, and LaBrenda E. White, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0981-01", "first_page_order": 1003, "last_page_order": 1017 }