{ "id": 2473289, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRIS FROIO, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Froio", "decision_date": "1990-06-05", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201489\u20140371", "first_page": "116", "last_page": "123", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 Ill. App. 3d 116" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 896", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3639609 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "900" }, { "page": "901" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0896-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498634 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472031 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" }, { "page": "906" }, { "page": "1880" }, { "page": "27" }, { "page": "909" }, { "page": "1883" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2491123 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/196/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3514576 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" }, { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 U.S. 1032", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6203160 ], "weight": 27, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1048" }, { "page": "1219" }, { "page": "3480" }, { "page": "1049" }, { "page": "1219-20" }, { "page": "3481" }, { "page": "1035-36" }, { "page": "1210-11" }, { "page": "3473-74" }, { "page": "1050" }, { "page": "1220-21" }, { "page": "3481" }, { "page": "1052" }, { "page": "1221" }, { "page": "3482" }, { "page": "1051" }, { "page": "1221" }, { "page": "3482" }, { "page": "1050" }, { "page": "1220" }, { "page": "3481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/463/1032-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 701, "char_count": 15573, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1069473391656384e-07, "percentile": 0.5697793577926744 }, "sha256": "b7a896b0116a7e72e07649477c13fe0ba28daaf019340b38a60d20737f66e17b", "simhash": "1:a2e9a4180b5a94bd", "word_count": 2673 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:49:28.995518+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRIS FROIO, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Chris Froio, was charged in the circuit court of Kane County with the unlawful possession of (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 704(e)) and intent to deliver (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 705(e)) more than 500 grams of cannabis. The charges rose from the November 6, 1988, traffic stop which led to the discovery of the cannabis in the trunk of the defendant\u2019s automobile. The trial court granted the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, and the State now appeals.\nAt issue on appeal is the propriety of the trial court\u2019s findings that: (1) the search of the passenger compartment of the defendant\u2019s car was not justified to protect the safety of the police officers; and (2) the defendant did not consent to the search of the trunk of his car.\nThe following evidence was adduced at the hearing on the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence. We note that, although all parties testifying at the hearing indicated that the following events took place on the evening of November 7, 1989, the complaints and information filed in this cause indicate that the actual date of these occurrences was November 6, 1989. This discrepancy is immaterial here.\nOfficer Edward Roncone, a patrolman with the Village of Lindenhurst, testified that he was on patrol alone in his squad car on the night in question. While traveling west on Grand Avenue, Officer Ron-cone noticed a vehicle swerve from its lane and cross the center line. Officer Roncone decided to stop the vehicle because of this traffic violation, and he activated the mars lights on his squad car. As he was pulling the vehicle over to the side of the road, Officer Roncone flashed a spotlight through the car\u2019s rear window and noticed the driver reach down. After the two vehicles came to a stop, both the driver and Officer Roncone exited their automobiles and approached each other. Officer Roncone identified the defendant as the driver of the other automobile.\nOfficer Roncone testified that he and defendant stood near the rear end of the defendant\u2019s automobile. Officer Roncone asked to see the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license, and the defendant handed him a Lake County sheriff\u2019s citation. Officer Roncone then proceeded to walk past the defendant to the door of the defendant\u2019s automobile, which had been left open when the defendant exited the car. At this point, Officer Roncone observed a large knife wedged between the upper and lower driver\u2019s side seat cushions in the defendant\u2019s automobile, and he reached his arm into the vehicle and removed the knife. The officer testified that it was not illegal for the defendant to possess the knife. Officer Roncone then conducted a pat-down search of the defendant for any further weapons, but the defendant had none. Officer Roncone asked the defendant why he had the knife, and the defendant stated that he worked in a bad neighborhood in Chicago.\nAt this point, Officer Roy McNally, another Lindenhurst police officer who had been summoned by Officer Roncone, arrived at the scene. Officer Roncone asked Officer McNally to \u201ckeep an eye on\u201d the defendant while Roncone entered the vehicle to search for any further weapons. Officer Roncone stated that, after he entered the defendant\u2019s vehicle, he detected a strong odor of unburnt cannabis which he had not been able to smell when standing outside the car. The officer then \u201clooked down to where [the defendant] made the move on the initial action of the stop\u201d and found a plastic Tupperware container covered with a white lid. Officer Roncone opened the plastic container and detected a green, leafy residue and strong odor of unburnt cannabis. Officer Roncone found no other weapons in the automobile.\nOfficer Roncone stated that he asked the defendant if he would object to opening the trunk of the automobile so the officers could look inside. According to Officer Roncone, the defendant stated that, although he had no objection, he did not have the key to the trunk. The officer asked the defendant if a key which was sitting on the front seat of the car was the key to the trunk, and the defendant said that it was. When asked again whether he would object to opening the trunk, the defendant did not object. The defendant then took the key and opened the trunk of the car. The officers present saw in the trunk a bag of cannabis in the spare tire. The defendant was placed under arrest at this time.\nOfficer McNally also testified on behalf of the State. Officer McNally substantially corroborated Officer Roncone\u2019s version of events and indicated that the defendant had no objection to opening the trunk.\nTestifying in support of the motion to suppress evidence, the defendant stated that he was told to open the trunk and that he did not feel he could refuse.\nDuring argument on the motion, the State suggested that the police officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s automobile was justified per the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Michigan v. Long (1983), 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 103 S. Ct. 3469. The trial court, stating that Long was factually distinguishable from the case at bar, disagreed. The court stated:\n\u201cIn this case it seems to me we have a simple traffic violation. I mean the only reason that the officer said that he went back into the car was to search for weapons for his own safety and, quite frankly, I don\u2019t understand that. I think he had the right to give him a ticket and take him into custody if he couldn\u2019t post bail, or let him go. I don\u2019t think he had a right to go in the car the second time and I will grant the motion to suppress.\u201d\nThe trial court also found that the defendant did not voluntarily consent to the search of the trunk of the automobile. The State filed a certificate of impairment and now appeals from the order of suppression pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 640(a)(1) (107 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)).\nThe stop and search of the defendant\u2019s automobile in the instant case involved five distinct components: (1) the initial stop for the traffic violation; (2) the removal of the knife which was spotted on the driver\u2019s seat; (3) the pat-down search of the defendant; (4) the search of the passenger compartment for weapons; and (5) the search of the trunk. The propriety of the first three components is not at issue. However, the State contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that the weapons search was not justified and that the defendant did not consent to the search of the trunk.\nWe note that, in reviewing the trial court\u2019s ruling on the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence, the court\u2019s findings normally will not be disturbed on review unless they are manifestly erroneous. (Village of Gurnee v. Gross (1988), 174 Ill. App. 3d 66, 69.) However, where neither the facts nor the credibility of the witnesses is in dispute, the question is a legal one subject to de novo consideration on review. People v. Graves (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 273, 276.\nIn Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may make a valid investigatory stop, absent probable cause for an arrest, provided that the officer\u2019s decision is based on specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences therefrom which warrant the investigative intrusion. Where the officer making a Terry stop reasonably believes, again based on specific, articulable facts, that his safety or the safety of others is in danger, the officer may also conduct a limited search of an individual to search for weapons. (Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909, 88 S. Ct. at 1883.) The protective search may extend beyond the individual\u2019s person to the area within his immediate control from which he might gain access to a weapon. (Michigan v. Long (1983), 463 U.S. 1032, 1048, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1219, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480.) It is permissible for an officer making a Terry stop to search the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, so long as the officer possesses a reasonable belief, based on specific, articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences therefrom, warrant the belief that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1219-20, 103 S. Ct. at 3481.\nIn the instant case, the trial court concluded that Officer Roncone failed to demonstrate a sufficient basis for his belief that the weapons search of the defendant\u2019s passenger compartment was necessary to protect the officers\u2019 safety. Since neither the facts nor the credibility of the witnesses is at issue in this portion of our inquiry, however, we may make a de novo determination of whether the circumstances of this case presented the police officers with sufficiently specific and articulable facts to support their decision to search the passenger compartment. (Graves, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 276.) We believe that the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Michigan v. Long requires us to conclude that the officers were justified in conducting a search of the passenger compartment of the defendant\u2019s automobile to search for weapons.\nThe facts in Long are strikingly similar to those in the case at bar. Long, the defendant, was the driver of the automobile which swerved into a ditch. The police officers arriving at the scene met Long, who had exited his automobile and left its driver\u2019s side door open, at the rear of his car. Long was uncooperative with the police and soon began to walk back toward his car. At this point, the police officers noticed a knife in Long\u2019s automobile, so they frisked him and searched those areas of his car\u2019s passenger compartment which would be within his immediate control and in which a weapon could be hidden. The search produced a pouch which contained marijuana. (Long, 463 U.S. at 1035-36, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1210-11, 103 S. Ct. at 3473-74.) The Supreme Court held that the police officers were in possession of specific, articulable facts which would justify a belief that Long was dangerous and that a limited search of the automobile was necessary to protect the officers\u2019 safety. (Long, 463 U.S. at 1050, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1220-21, 103 S. Ct. at 3481.) Because these facts virtually mirror those in the instant case, we believe it is clear that the officers here were also possessed of specific, articulable facts which justified their belief that the defendant was potentially dangerous and that a limited search of the driver\u2019s area of the automobile was necessary to protect the officers\u2019 safety.\nThe trial court felt that Long was not controlling because of a number of dissimilarities between it and the instant case. The court noted that the defendant in Long was not cooperative with the police and was headed back toward his automobile when the officers decided to search his car. We do not find these differences to be significant. Just as was the case in Long, the police officer here saw a dangerous weapon on the seat of the defendant\u2019s automobile. Even if the defendant here was more cooperative than the defendant in Long, it is difficult to imagine a more specific and articulable basis for concluding that an individual may be dangerous than the open presence of a dangerous weapon in his automobile. Again, here, as in Long, the fact that it was legal to possess the knife does not detract from the officer\u2019s reasonable conclusion that the knife\u2019s owner was potentially dangerous. (See Long, 463 U.S. at 1052 n.16, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1222 n.16, 103 S. Ct. at 3482 n.16.) In addition, here, unlike in Long, the officer saw the driver of the car reach down as the car was being pulled over; this kind of furtive gesture is a factor which supports the inference that there might have been other weapons in the car. See People v. Poole (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 7, 14.\nMoreover, it is not particularly relevant whether the investigatory search for weapons is conducted before or after the driver begins to return to the car. Under circumstances such as those in the case at bar, \u201cif the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to any weapons inside.\u201d (Long, 463 U.S. at 1052, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1221, 103 S. Ct. at 3482.) \u201cTherefore, the balancing required by Terry clearly weighs in favor of allowing the police to conduct an area search of the passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as long as they possess an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous.\u201d Long, 463 U.S. at 1051, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1221, 103 S. Ct. at 3482.\nAccordingly, we believe that the search of the vehicle\u2019s passenger compartment was reasonable under these circumstances. Since the search of the passenger compartment was valid, it would not be proper to suppress any contraband discovered during the search. (Long, 463 U.S. at 1050, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1220, 103 S. Ct. at 3481.) Thus, it was improper for the trial court to suppress the plastic Tupperware bowl which contained cannabis residue.\nThe further search of the trunk, however, presents an entirely different question. The defendant was not arrested until after the trunk was opened, and the State concedes that the search of the trunk is not justified as an inventory search (see, e.g., People v. Moffitt (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 106, 113). Instead, the State contends that the defendant consented to the search of the trunk. Unlike our prior inquiry, the testimony presented to the trial court on this point is in conflict. The facts are not, then, undisputed, and the trial court\u2019s ruling rests in part on its assessment of the witnessess\u2019 credibility. Therefore, the trial court\u2019s finding that the defendant did not consent to the search of the trunk will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous. Graves, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 276; Gross, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 69.\nConsent to a search must be given voluntarily. Whether consent is voluntarily given must be determined from the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Branham (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 896, 900.) Consent is not voluntary if it is solely the product of acquiescence or submission to an assertion of lawful police authority. (Branham, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 901.) Here, the trial court was entitled to credit the defendant\u2019s testimony that the officers directed him to open the trunk and that he felt compelled to do so. We cannot say that the trial court\u2019s finding that the defendant did not voluntarily consent to the search of the trunk was manifestly erroneous. Therefore, the trial court properly suppressed the evidence which was found in the trunk.\nThe portion of the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County suppressing the evidence found in the search of the passenger compartment of the defendant\u2019s vehicle is reversed; the portion of the order suppressing the evidence found in the trunk of the car is affirmed.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part.\nUNVERZAGT, P.J., and DUNN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Fred L. Foreman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Peter A. Speranza, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "G. Joseph Weller and Sherry R. Engelstad, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRIS FROIO, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201489\u20140371\nOpinion filed June 5, 1990.\nFred L. Foreman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Peter A. Speranza, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nG. Joseph Weller and Sherry R. Engelstad, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0116-01", "first_page_order": 138, "last_page_order": 145 }