{ "id": 2474912, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DWIGHT HANSEN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hansen", "decision_date": "1990-06-07", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201489\u20140817", "first_page": "160", "last_page": "167", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 Ill. App. 3d 160" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "461 N.E.2d 991", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3161103 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3626017 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 N.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2983269 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.E.2d 1082", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5641963 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 N.E.2d 816", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Ill. App. 3d 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2647465 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/185/0560-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 671, "char_count": 16292, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.702469334226362e-08, "percentile": 0.4073594638142996 }, "sha256": "efe25b97a3c03840afb59733a4b4af2e15e060381e3a2f019698a01440df51bf", "simhash": "1:0abb8f333f3f90d9", "word_count": 2674 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:49:28.995518+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DWIGHT HANSEN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SPITZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant appeals from a trial court order granting the expungement of his arrest records held by the sheriff\u2019s office, insofar as it denied the expungement of the records held by the circuit clerk\u2019s office relating to his arrest. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the expungement of the circuit clerk records. We agree and reverse.\nDefendant was indicted on October 13, 1983, by the grand jury of McLean County for the offense of delivery of a controlled substance in violation of section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1401(b)(2)). On January 4, 1984, defendant pleaded guilty to an included offense of possession of a controlled substance in violation of section 402 of the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1402.) The court sentenced defendant to 24 months\u2019 probation pursuant to section 410 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1410), and ordered him to pay a fine and court costs. Defendant successfully completed the term of probation and was discharged from probation on July 31,1986.\nOn August 19, 1988, defendant filed a petition for expungement of his arrest records pursuant to section 5 of \u201cAn Act in relation to criminal identification and investigation\u201d (Criminal Identification Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 206\u20145). Defendant\u2019s petition was a preprinted legal form which asked the court to \u201cexpunge his/her arrest records.\u201d After a hearing on August 26, 1988, the petition was denied. The court found that defendants who have successfully completed probation pursuant to section 410 of the Act were not eligible to have their records expunged pursuant to section 5 of the Criminal Identification Act.\nDefendant filed a motion for reconsideration on September 16, 1988, which stated that the court had denied defendant\u2019s request to expunge \u201carrest records and Circuit Court records.\u201d Defendant also included in his motion to reconsider a letter from a prospective employer who denied him employment because of the prior 1984 \u201cconviction.\u201d The court denied defendant\u2019s motion.\nDefendant appealed, and this court reversed the judgment and order of the circuit court below and remanded the cause for a new hearing. (People v. Hansen (1989), 185 Ill. App. 3d 560, 541 N.E.2d 816.) This court found that a person who has successfully completed probation pursuant to section 410 of the Act is eligible for expungement of criminal records pursuant to section 5 of the Criminal Identification Act.\nOn remand, the court ordered defendant\u2019s records held at the sheriff\u2019s office expunged. The court explained:\n\u201cIt does seem to me that people who have served their sentence, have done what\u2019s required to be done, ought not to be perpetually hampered by virtue of their prior records, their prior indiscretion, and perhaps terming it an indiscretion is putting it lightly, but it does appear to be out of character at least with his current mode of behavior, and to that extent it does seem that it does, that what is recorded in history is not a fair representation of the situation as it is today, and so for that reason I am going to grant the petition.\u201d\nThe court, however, refused to order the expungement of the circuit clerk\u2019s records. The court reasoned:\n\u201cBecause then you can\u2019t ever establish that it\u2019s been expunged. The expungement itself goes into the court record and then gets sealed up, and, and so there is no way of showing that it has been expunged.\u201d\nDefense counsel responded by asking the court for an order to seal the circuit clerk\u2019s file. A seal would ensure both that the file would not be destroyed, and that a court order would be required to observe the contents of the file. Defense counsel noted that defendant\u2019s prospective employer had gone into the circuit clerk\u2019s office, found defendant\u2019s record, and denied defendant employment because of the record. The court replied that defendant\u2019s file would reveal the ex-pungement order and explained:\n\u201cOtherwise, you run into all kind of trouble. The Circuit Clerk has to remove it from her indexes and has to remove it from, has to seal it up and place it in an envelope. Then you can\u2019t, you can\u2019t go and try and find it to show that it has been expunged, and so somebody, some police agency someplace said, well, we have this set of fingerprints or something, and, and there is no way of showing that it is expunged, and so then the Circuit Clerk had several of these things that were expunged, and it just causes a great deal of difficulty because you have to open each one of them and see if that\u2019s the one of the person who claims that his arrest record was expunged.\u201d\nDefendant filed a timely notice of appeal.\nThe chief judge of the circuit court was of the belief that defendant should have his record expunged. However, the court refused to expunge the records held by the circuit clerk for two reasons: (1) the inconvenience the circuit clerk would suffer in expunging the record; and (2) the inability of police agencies to inquire about defendant\u2019s fingerprints and arrest record. We find neither concern valid and suggest a procedure to alleviate the court\u2019s concerns.\nSection 5 of the Criminal Identification Act strikes a balance between concern for effective record keeping and the right of privacy of individuals. (People v. Valentine (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 447, 365 N.E.2d 1082.) The trial court was concerned that the circuit clerk would suffer an inconvenience expunging defendant\u2019s records. The court noted the problem of proving a record had been expunged and the trouble the circuit clerk would incur attempting to find the expunged record, opening every sealed document in an attempt to find the one in question. This need not be the case, however, as a circuit clerk may easily keep track of the record and at the same time keep the record from the public. The clerk may seal the record, store it in a vault, delete the file from the county index, and list the contents in a separate index that would be available only to the court and the clerk. This procedure would strike the proper balance between effective record keeping and an individual\u2019s right to privacy.\nThe trial court was also concerned about the inconvenience the circuit clerk would incur in removing the expunged record from its indexes, placing it in an envelope and sealing it. This inconvenience, however, is greatly outweighed by the harm defendant suffers in having his \u201cexpunged\u201d record open to the public. We note that the circuit clerk performs a similar act with other records, including juvenile and adoption records. If the court\u2019s concern were valid, then no circuit court record would ever be expunged as it would be too much of an inconvenience. This would in effect render the statute and its protection of privacy meaningless, as the \u201cexpunged\u201d record would remain on file for the public to see.\nThe court\u2019s second concern was the ability of a police agency to inquire about defendant\u2019s arrest record or fingerprints. This concern is not valid, however, as Illinois law provides that the Illinois State Police shall serve as a \u201ccentral repository and custodian of criminal statistics.\u201d The State Police may maintain all records of any person admitted to section 410 probation who fulfills the terms and conditions of such probation, such as defendant. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 127, par. 55a(5).) Defendant\u2019s arrest record and fingerprints will be on file at State Police headquarters. See Hansen, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 564, 541 N.E.2d at 818.\nIn response, the State argues (1) this court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal; (2) defendant has already obtained the relief his original and only petition prayed for; (3) the records of the circuit clerk \u201crelating to such arrest\u201d and the \u201crecords of the Clerk of the Circuit Court\u201d are not an entire circuit clerk\u2019s file; and (4) the chief judge did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant\u2019s request for the circuit clerk\u2019s records to be expunged. We are not persuaded by these arguments.\nThe State first contends that this court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal because defendant's notice of appeal is defective. Defendant\u2019s notice of appeal states:\n\u201c5. Nature of Judgment or Order appealed from: Circuit Court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s petition to seal Circuit Court records of expunged conviction.\u201d\nThe State argues that while defendant refers to a \u201cpetition to seal circuit court records,\u201d no document bearing such name was ever filed. Instead, defendant\u2019s only petition was labeled \u201cPetition to Expunge AND NOTICE.\u201d The State also notes that defendant\u2019s notice of appeal seeks to seal an expunged \u201cconviction.\u201d The State argues that no conviction ever existed as defendant was sentenced to probation pursuant to section 410 of the Act \u201cwithout the entry of a judgment of conviction on 7/29/84.\u201d Thus, the State argues, there can be no appeal, or expungement of a conviction, when there was no conviction.\nThe State\u2019s argument fails for several reasons. During the hearing on remand, the court refused to grant defendant\u2019s request insofar as it sought to seal the records at the circuit clerk\u2019s office. It is from this denial that defendant appeals. The State further fails to note that section 410(f) of the Act states:\n\u201cA disposition of probation [under section 410] is considered to be a conviction for *** appeal ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1410(f).\nMoreover, a notice of appeal is to be liberally construed and appellate courts will have jurisdiction if the notice, when considered as a whole, fairly and adequately sets out the judgment complained of and the relief sought. (Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp. (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 427, 394 N.E.2d 380.) The State alleges no prejudice, and the alleged defect is one of form over substance and, as such, does not deprive this court of jurisdiction. People v. Ahlstrand (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 363, 447 N.E.2d 517.\nThe State\u2019s second contention is that defendant\u2019s appeal is moot, as he has already obtained the relief his original (and only) petition prayed for. Defendant\u2019s petition was a preprinted legal form which asked \u201cthe Court to expunge his/her arrest records.\u201d The State argues that the phrase, \u201carrest records,\u201d refers only to the records held by the McLean County sheriff\u2019s department because the circuit clerk\u2019s office is not an arresting agency. The State further argues that section 5 of the Criminal Identification Act makes a distinction between \u201crecord of arrest\u201d of the \u201cofficial records of the arresting authority\u201d and \u201crecords of the circuit court relating to such arrests\u201d in the \u201crecords of the clerk of the circuit court.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 206\u20145.) Because the court\u2019s October 11, 1989, order directed the McLean County sheriff\u2019s department to expunge defendant\u2019s arrest record, the State argues that defendant has already received the relief he originally sought.\nWe disagree and find defendant\u2019s petition seeking to expunge his \u201carrest records\u201d included the records held by the McLean County sheriff\u2019s department as well as the records relating to such arrests in the circuit clerk\u2019s office. Defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider asked the court to reconsider its order denying his original petition to expunge \u201chis arrest records and Circuit Court Records.\u201d During the hearing on remand, defense counsel specifically asked the court to expunge both the sheriff\u2019s records and the circuit clerk\u2019s records. Moreover, the trial court apparently was never under the belief that defendant\u2019s petition asked only for the expungement of the sheriff\u2019s records, as the court entertained both requests.\nThe State\u2019s third argument is that section 5 of the Criminal Identification Act does not specifically define what \u201ccircuit clerk records relating to an arrest\u201d are. The State contends there is no authority to assert that the entire circuit clerk\u2019s record, including pleadings, docket sheet, and orders, must be expunged. These records have potential reasons to be preserved, the State insists, especially here, where defendant had agreed to testify against a codefendant and a codefendant needed defendant\u2019s record in his appeal concerning the issue of whether he received a disparate sentence as compared to defendant.\nThe intent of the legislature can best be determined by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. (People v. Pettit (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 309, 461 N.E.2d 991.) Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201cexpunge\u201d as \u201c[t]o destroy; blot out; obliterate; erase; efface designedly; strike out wholly. The act of physically destroying information-including criminal records \u2014 in files, computers, or other depositories.\u201d (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 522 (5th ed. 1979).) \u201cExpungement of record\u201d is defined as \u201cProcess by which record of criminal conviction is destroyed or sealed after expiration of time.\u201d (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 522 (5th ed. 1979).) Because the legislature did not specify that only certain portions of the circuit clerk\u2019s records relating to an arrest may be expunged, and because the purpose of expungement is to erase any record of a conviction, the entire record, including the entire circuit clerk\u2019s record, may be expunged. We note, however, that the procedure suggested above for expunging records would alleviate the concerns the State has concerning the availability of the record for future use.\nThe State\u2019s final argument is that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s request for the expungement of the circuit clerk\u2019s records. The State first argues that defendant was originally indicted for a Class 1 felony, the delivery of between 10 and 30 grams of cocaine. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1401(b)(2).) Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of less than 10 grams of cocaine, a Class 4 felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1402(b).) The State argues that today, the possession charge (of 13 grams of cocaine) would be a Class 1 felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1401(b)(2).) The State further argues that at the time of the offense, defendant was almost 30 years old, was the manager of a restaurant, and had solicited another to sell cocaine for a profit. Thus, this is not a case where a naive young adult only possessed cocaine.\nThe State\u2019s argument would have merit if the court denied defendant\u2019s request for expungement altogether. However, the court believed that defendant qualified to have his record expunged, stating that defendant\u2019s \u201cindiscretion\u201d appeared to be out of character with his current mode of behavior. The court also believed that defendant\u2019s record should not hamper his future. The court simply did not want to expunge the circuit clerk\u2019s records because of the inconvenience to the clerk and because of the mistaken belief that there would be no permanent record of defendant\u2019s arrest and fingerprints on file.\nThe State also argues that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion because the judge believed the circuit clerk\u2019s file may have future value, protecting not only the instant defendant, but others as well. These others include codefendants, or those not yet charged but under investigation. However, if the circuit clerk simply removes the file, seals it, and keeps a separate index to the expunged records, there should be no problem locating the record if it is needed in the future.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed insofar as it ordered expungement of the arrest record held by the sheriff\u2019s office, but reversed with directions to expunge the records relating to defendant\u2019s arrest held by the circuit clerk\u2019s office.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.\nKNECHT, P.J., and STEIGMANN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SPITZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "George F. Taseff, of Jennings, Novick, Ensign & Ostling, of Blooming-ton, for appellant.", "Charles G. Reynard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and James Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DWIGHT HANSEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201489\u20140817\nOpinion filed June 7, 1990.\nGeorge F. Taseff, of Jennings, Novick, Ensign & Ostling, of Blooming-ton, for appellant.\nCharles G. Reynard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and James Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0160-01", "first_page_order": 182, "last_page_order": 189 }