{ "id": 2473337, "name": "GULF INTERSTATE GEOPHYSICAL/GULF INTERSTATE PIPING, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (John Davis, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Gulf Interstate Geophysical/Gulf Interstate Piping v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1990-04-27", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201489\u20140396WC", "first_page": "307", "last_page": "314", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "198 Ill. App. 3d 307" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 2d 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2533206 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/102/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 818", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3117051 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/0818-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3525267 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ind. Code \u00a722-3-2-15", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ind. Code", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "19_" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ind. Code \u00a722-3-4-4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ind. Code", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "19_" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "488 U.S. 261", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 U.S. 622", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 353763 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" }, { "page": "1144" }, { "page": "889" }, { "page": "628" }, { "page": "1144" }, { "page": "889" }, { "page": "630" }, { "page": "1145" }, { "page": "890" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/330/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 261", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787661 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" }, { "page": "773" }, { "page": "2661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 U.S. 430", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6142419 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/320/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ind. Code \u00a722-3-2-1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ind. Code", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq.", "parenthetical": "19_" }, { "page": "et seq.", "parenthetical": "19_" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 723, "char_count": 16688, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.071662824262825e-08, "percentile": 0.3749819004891791 }, "sha256": "3eb9ff564b8d90166e1452d487a0cf12bc590c7dd1addf1e5aac19f498d45f53", "simhash": "1:9ce8d926fde0840b", "word_count": 2670 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:49:28.995518+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GULF INTERSTATE GEOPHYSICAL/GULF INTERSTATE PIPING, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (John Davis, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOODWARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn January 31, 1982, claimant, John Davis, was working in Indiana for respondent, Gulf Interstate Piping and Construction Company, pursuant to an employment contract made in Illinois. While working on a pipeline in Washington, Indiana, claimant twisted a knee and sustained cartilage damage, which necessitated surgery. Pursuant to the Indiana Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act of 1929 (Ind. Code \u00a722\u20143\u20142\u20141 et seq. (19_)), claimant was paid 44 weeks of temporary total disability and all of his medical bills. By an agreement dated February 2, 1984, which was approved by the Industrial Board of Indiana on April 24, 1984, claimant and respondent entered into a settlement agreement which fixed the permanent partial disability lump-sum settlement figure at $2,670. This figure represented 35.6 weeks or a compromise of 15% and 20% of the leg, at the Indiana rate of $75 per week. The exact wording of the agreement was as follows:\n\u201cThis is the final PPI settlement agreement permanent disability settlement [sic]; based on a promise [sic] of 15% and 20% of the extremity, equals 35.6 weeks at $75 per week for a total settlement of $2,670.00.\u201d\nIn connection therewith, claimant executed a waiver, wherein he accepted the impairment rating of between 15% and 20% of the leg and waived his right to an impairment rating by any other physician.\nOn or about March 1, 1984, respondent\u2019s insurance carrier issued a check to claimant for $2,670. In a box of the payment document entitled \u201cPAYMENT OF CLAIM OR ACCOUNT AS FOLLOWS,\u201d the following information was typed in:\n\u201cfull and final PPI rating approved by Ind Board, clmt and attys; any and all[.]\u201d\nClaimant endorsed the check without reservation.\nOn November 26, 1984, claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim, pursuant to the Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.). He was seeking a supplemental award to that which he had received in Indiana. The application sought compensation for the same accident and same knee damage that had been the basis for the Indiana workers\u2019 compensation claim and settlement.\nBefore an arbitrator, respondent sought to dismiss claimant\u2019s application for want of jurisdiction, arguing that the Indiana settlement precluded claimant from pursuing a worker\u2019s compensation claim in Illinois. The arbitrator held that the Indiana settlement \u201cand the acceptance of payment of that settlement \u2018in full\u2019 constitutes an \u2018accord and satisfaction\u2019 and an \u2018estoppel\u2019 requiring the dismissal of the application for adjust [sic] of claim filed here in Illinois.\u201d\nIn reversing the arbitrator's decision, the Industrial Commission (Commission) found that neither the settlement agreement, the waiver, nor the endorsed check contained any statement that the agreement was in settlement of claims in jurisdictions other than Indiana, or a waiver of rights in other jurisdictions. It further found that an Indiana settlement agreement which neither states that it is made in settlement of claims in all jurisdictions nor waives the right to pursue remedies in other jurisdictions did not prevent claimant from pursuing his claim in Illinois. The circuit court of Franklin County confirmed the Commission\u2019s decision, and this appeal followed.\nRespondent initially maintains that Illinois jurisdiction is barred by res judicata under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. IV, \u00a71), which reads:\n\u201cFull Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.\u201d\nCiting Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt (1943), 320 U.S. 430, 88 L. Ed. 149, 64 S. Ct. 208, respondent contends that a final resolution of a worker\u2019s compensation claim is res judicata, and a worker\u2019s compensation claim for the same injury cannot be asserted again in another State.\nThree United States Supreme Court cases deal specifically with this issue, namely, Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. (1980), 448 U.S. 261, 65 L. Ed. 2d 757, 100 S. Ct. 2647, Industrial Comm\u2019n v. McCartin (1947), 330 U.S. 622, 91 L. Ed. 1140, 67 S. Ct. 886, and Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt (1943), 320 U.S. 430, 88 L. Ed. 149, 64 S. Ct. 208.\nIn Magnolia Petroleum, an oil field worker was employed in Louisiana and, in the course of his employment, was sent by his employer to work in Texas, where he was injured on the job. He sought and received a workmen\u2019s compensation award in Texas, and subsequently, he filed a workmen\u2019s compensation claim in Louisiana. The Court found that the Texas compensation award was made explicitly in lieu of any other recovery for the employee\u2019s injury, preventing any recovery under the laws of another State. In a 5 to 4 decision,,the Magnolia Court held that the full faith and credit clause (U.S. Const., art. IV, \u00a71) precluded an employee, who had received a workmen\u2019s compensation award for injuries received in one State, from seeking supplementary compensation in another State where he had been hired.\nIn McCartin, a bricklayer entered into an employment contract in Illinois and worked in Wisconsin, where he suffered a job-related eye injury and filed a workmen\u2019s compensation claim with the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin. Subsequently, he filed a claim with the Illinois Industrial Commission. The worker settled his Illinois claim. The settlement agreement stated, in part, \u201cThis settlement does not affect any rights that applicant may have under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act of the State of Wisconsin.\u201d (McCartin, 330 U.S. at 629, 91 L. Ed. at 1144, 67 S. Ct. at 889.) This clause was put in the agreement at the behest of claimant, who had been informed by Wisconsin\u2019s Industrial Commission that he was eligible for a supplemental award in Wisconsin after recovering in Illinois. The Wisconsin Industrial Commission ordered a supplemental award to the claimant.\nThe McCartin Court found nothing in the relevant Illinois statute that was designed to preclude any recovery by proceedings brought in another State for injuries arising under Illinois employment.\nThe Court then stated:\n\u201cAnd in light of the rule that workmen\u2019s compensation laws are to be liberally construed in furtherance of the purpose for which they were enacted, [citation], we should not readily interpret such a statute so as to cut off an employee\u2019s right to sue under other legislation passed for his benefit. Only some unmistakable language by a state legislature or judiciary would warrant our accepting such a construction. Especially is this true where the rights affected are those arising under legislation of another state and where the full faith and credit provision of the United States Constitution is brought into play.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 330 U.S. at 628, 91 L. Ed. at 1144, 67 S. Ct. at 889.\nThe Court then found another basis for its decision, namely, that the language of the settlement agreement noted above stated that the agreement did not affect any rights claimant may have under the Wisconsin Compensation Act.\nThe Court further stated:\n\u201cBut when the reservation in this award is read against the background of the Illinois Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act, it becomes clear that the reservation spells out what we believe to be implicit in that Act \u2014 namely, that an Illinois workmen\u2019s compensation award of the type here involved does not foreclose an additional award under the laws of another state. And in the setting of this case, that fact is of decisive significance.\u201d 330 U.S. at 630, 91 L. Ed. at 1145, 67 S. Ct. at 890.\nIn a unanimous decision, the Court concluded that because the Illinois award was final solely as to rights under Illinois law, Wisconsin could under the full faith and credit clause grant a supplemental award to claimant under its own laws.\nIn Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. (1980), 488 U.S. 261, 65 L. Ed. 2d 757, 100 S. Ct. 2647, the claimant was a resident of the District of Columbia, who was hired in same, but suffered a job-related injury in Virginia. Claimant received compensation under Virginia Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act. On appeal, the employer argued that the Virginia award excluded all other recovery for the injury and that the full faith and credit clause precluded a supplemental award for said injury under the District of Columbia Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act.\nThe Thomas Court, a plurality of four justices, reexamined the full faith and credit clause as it related to supplemental workers\u2019 compensation awards. The Court found that the rule in McCartin, which authorized a State to draft or construe its workers\u2019 compensation statute so as to preclude a compensation award in another State, represented an unwarranted delegation to the States of the Supreme Court\u2019s responsibility to be the final arbitrator of full faith and credit decisions. The \u201cunmistakable language\u201d test of McCartin, thus, was an unacceptable basis upon which to distinguish McCartin from Magnolia.\nThe Thomas plurality noted both that State cases overwhelmingly followed McCartin, applying the unmistakable language test to permit supplemental awards, and that the States had placed little reliance upon the Magnolia case.\nStare decisis concerns aside, the Thomas plurality sought to freshly examine the full faith and credit clause as it applied to supplemental workers\u2019 compensation awards. First, it found that the employer and its insurer had to measure their potential liability under the laws of either the District of Columbia or Virginia, as claimant could seek compensation in either State. It followed then that a State\u2019s interest in limiting the potential liability of businesses within the State was not controlling. Moreover, the State\u2019s interest in providing adequate compensation to injured workers would be served by successive awards.\nThe Court then found that the Virginia Industrial Commission, while responsible for establishing a claimant\u2019s rights under Virginia laws, could not determine his rights regarding compensation in the District of Columbia. Full faith and credit must, of course, be given to the Virginia award as far as it went, but said determination could not preclude claimant\u2019s rights to a supplemental award in the District of Columbia. There could be no objection to a fresh adjudication of those rights in the District of Columbia.\nFurther, whether or not claimant initially sought compensation from the less generous jurisdiction, the vindication of the State\u2019s interest in placing a ceiling on employer\u2019s liability would inevitably impinge upon the substantial interests of the second jurisdiction in the welfare of the injured workers.\nIn conclusion, the Thomas plurality held that a State has no legitimate interest in precluding another State from granting a supplemental compensation award, when the second State would have had the power to apply its workers\u2019 compensation law in the first place.\nThree justices concurred with the plurality\u2019s decision, concluding that the Virginia Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act lacks the unmistakable language which McCartin requires to prevent a supplemental award. Two justices dissented, arguing that Magnolia should be followed to determine the issue.\nIn effect, Thomas did not overrule either Magnolia or McCartin, the result of which is that we are still left with the McCartin\u2019s \u201cunmistakable language\u201d rule.\nThe respondent points to the following language found in the Indiana Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Ind. Code \u00a722\u20143\u20142\u20141 et seq. (19_)), as evidence of Indiana\u2019s intention of precluding supplemental awards.\n\u201cIf *** the employer and the injured employee *** reach an agreement in regard to compensation under IC 22\u20143\u20142 through IC 22\u20143\u20146, a memorandum of the agreement in the form prescribed by the [workers\u2019 compensation] board shall be filed with the board ***. If approved by the board, thereupon the memorandum shall for all purposes be enforceable by court decree as specified in section 9 of this chapter.\u201d (Ind. Code \u00a722-3-4-4 (19_).)\nSection 22\u20143\u20142\u201415 reads in relevant part:\n\u201cNo contract, agreement, written or implied, no rule, *** or other device shall, in any manner, operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by [IC 22\u20143\u2014]2 through [IC 22\u20143\u2014]6 ***. (a) However, nothing in [IC 22 \u2014 3\u2014]2 through [IC 22 \u2014 3\u2014]6 *** shall be construed as preventing the parties to claims *** under chapters [IC 22\u20143\u2014]2 through [IC 22\u20143\u2014]6 *** from entering into voluntary agreements in settlement thereof, but no agreement *** of settlement or compromise *** shall *** be valid until approved by a member of the board.\u201d Ind. Code \u00a722\u20143\u20142\u201415 (19_).\nWe find nothing in said statutes resembling the \u201cunmistakable language\u201d required by McCartin. Nothing in the Indiana Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act states matter of factly that the agreement of settlement or compromise reached under Indiana law precludes a claimant\u2019s supplemental award in another State wherein the injured worker has a legitimate claim. Without such language, the full faith and credit clause does not bar a supplemental recovery under Illinois law.\nMoreover, the actual language of the settlement agreement and the check for the lump-sum payment gave no indication that the parties intended the settlement to preclude claimant from applying for compensation in any other jurisdiction. On its face, the Indiana settlement merely forecloses claimant from seeking further recovery under Indiana law.\nContrary to respondent\u2019s assertion, we do not find Long-Airdox Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 334, to control here. In Long-Airdox Co., claimant, a Missouri resident, was hired by respondent, a West Virginia company. On his first day of work, claimant was seriously injured on a job-related trip in Illinois. He signed an application for compensation of benefits under West Virginia law and received medical expenses and temporary total disability benefits. Claimant later filed application for adjustment of claim under Illinois law. At the time of the filing of the Illinois claim, the status of the West Virginia claim was unclear. No final disposition of the West Virginia claim was reflected in the Long-Airdox Co. record. Consequently, it did not reach the issue of whether the claimant\u2019s Illinois application for compensation was specifically barred by res judicata.\nNext, respondent argues that, under the principal of accord and satisfaction, the Indiana settlement, agreed to by the parties, constitutes full and final payment in Indiana or any other State for claimant\u2019s injuries.\nThe cases cited by respondent, Quaintance Associates, Inc. v. PLM, Inc. (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 818, and Koretz v. All American Life & Casualty Co. (1968), 102 Ill. App. 2d 197, are not on point; both deal with contract disputes, not workers\u2019 compensation claims.\nThe Indiana settlement will be credited against any supplemental award that claimant, who is avowedly not seeking double recovery, will receive in Illinois. Indeed, the Thomas Court stated, \u201cA supplemental award gives full effect to the facts determined by the first award and also allows full credit for payments pursuant to the earlier award. There is neither inconsistency nor double recovery.\u201d Thomas, 448 U.S. at 281, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 773, 100 S. Ct. at 2661.\nFurther, accord and satisfaction applies to agreements which constitute full and final payment as to all jurisdictions. In the instant case, neither the Indiana settlement agreement nor the endorsed check, both cited above, contains any indication that the settlement was made in regard to all claims in all States. As the court below determined, the language on the check is subject to interpretation as to whether or not the parties intended it to be full and final for all claims in Indiana or full and final for all claims in any other States. Thus, the Commission did not err in finding that claimant could pursue a supplemental award for his injury.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court confirming the Commission\u2019s decision is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY, P.J., and McNAMARA, McCULLOUGH, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOODWARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stevenson, Rusin & Friedman, Ltd., of Chicago (Douglas F. Stevenson, of counsel), for appellant.", "Nancy K. Hall, of Nancy K. Hall, Ltd., of Mt. Vernon, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GULF INTERSTATE GEOPHYSICAL/GULF INTERSTATE PIPING, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (John Davis, Appellee).\nFifth District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 5\u201489\u20140396WC\nOpinion filed April 27, 1990.\nRehearing denied July 9, 1990.\nStevenson, Rusin & Friedman, Ltd., of Chicago (Douglas F. Stevenson, of counsel), for appellant.\nNancy K. Hall, of Nancy K. Hall, Ltd., of Mt. Vernon, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0307-01", "first_page_order": 329, "last_page_order": 336 }