{
  "id": 2476183,
  "name": "COMMONWEALTH FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NORMAN E. DeWALT, Indiv. and d/b/a Bedroom Plaza, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Commonwealth Financial Corp. v. DeWalt",
  "decision_date": "1990-05-31",
  "docket_number": "No. 3\u201489\u20140770",
  "first_page": "559",
  "last_page": "561",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "198 Ill. App. 3d 559"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "106 R.I. 691",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "R.I.",
      "case_ids": [
        3040744
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ri/106/0691-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "ocr_confidence": 0.753,
    "pagerank": {
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    "sha256": "6926bf25727f3c4b879cf3f7deb7902c783b552e33785b3629f9e7349ba44597",
    "simhash": "1:0e2bccef280172d4",
    "word_count": 721
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:49:28.995518+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "COMMONWEALTH FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NORMAN E. DeWALT, Indiv. and d/b/a Bedroom Plaza, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE GORMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Commonwealth Financial Corporation, sued the defendant, Norman E. DeWalt, to recover $6,072 that DeWalt paid to Wright\u2019s Furniture Mills, Inc., for goods he purchased from Wright\u2019s Furniture. It was undisputed that Commonwealth had previously notified DeWalt that it had a security interest in Wright\u2019s Furniture\u2019s accounts receivable. The trial court granted Commonwealth\u2019s motion for summary judgment. DeWalt appeals.\nThe record reveals that Wright\u2019s Furniture and Commonwealth entered into a written security agreement wherein Commonwealth took an assignment of Wright\u2019s Furniture's accounts receivable as security for its indebtedness to Commonwealth. Thereafter, Commonwealth sent notice of the assignment to DeWalt in accordance with section 9\u2014318 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 26, par. 9\u2014318). After receiving notice, DeWalt made three collect on delivery (COD) purchases from Wright\u2019s Furniture for a total of $6,072. DeWalt paid Wright\u2019s Furniture for the goods.\nCommonwealth brought this action, alleging that DeWalt was obligated to make the COD payments to it, because DeWalt had received notice of the assignment of Wright\u2019s Furniture\u2019s accounts receivable. In response, DeWalt filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that a COD transaction does not create an \u201caccount\u201d under article 9 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 26, par. 9\u2014101 et seq.). In that regard, he argued that even though Commonwealth had a security interest in Wright\u2019s Furniture\u2019s accounts, it had no interest in the COD payments made to Wright\u2019s Furniture. Commonwealth filed a response and a counterpetition for summary judgment, arguing that COD payments constitute \u201caccounts\u201d within the meaning of section 9\u2014106 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 26, par. 9\u2014106).\nThe sole issue presented on appeal is whether the COD transactions involved here constituted \u201caccounts\u201d within the meaning of the Code, thus obligating DeWalt to make his payments to Commonwealth.\nSection 9\u2014106 of the Code defines an \u201caccount\u201d as \u201cany right to payment for goods sold *** whether or not it has been earned by performance.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 26, par. 9\u2014106.) The Code also provides that goods are sold when title passes from the seller to the buyer for a price. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 26, par. 2\u2014106(1).) Unless otherwise agreed, title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 26, par. 2\u2014401(2).\nDeWalt argues on appeal that tender of delivery did not precede payment. Therefore, he reasons, title did not pass and a sale did not occur until after payment. He concludes that since a sale did not occur until after payment, no \u201caccount\u201d was ever created.\nWe note that this appears to be a case of first impression in Illinois. However, having examined the Code, decisions in other jurisdictions, and treatises on this subject, we find DeWalt\u2019s reasoning faulty. In the instant case, title to the goods passed before payment. Thus, an \u201caccount\u201d was created, obligating DeWalt to make his payments to Commonwealth. This is so because in a COD transaction, title to goods passes immediately upon delivery to the carrier, even though the carrier retains possession on behalf of the seller. (3 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code \u00a72\u2014401:54, at 551 (3d ed. 1983).) Furthermore, even though the parties have expressly agreed that the goods will not be delivered until they are paid for, the transfer of title is not deferred until payment. (3 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code \u00a72\u2014401:54, at 551 (3d ed. 1983).) It does not matter whether payment is due immediately or in the future, the right to payment is still an \u201caccount.\u201d See Matthews v. Arctic Tire, Inc. (1970), 106 R.I. 691, 262 A.2d 831.\nAccordingly, we find that the trial court properly granted Commonwealth\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSCOTT and BARRY, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE GORMAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Thomas L. Perkins and David G. Mawn, both of Kavanagh, Scully, Sudow, White & Frederick, P.C., of Peoria, for appellant.",
      "Michael W. Heller, of Peoria, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "COMMONWEALTH FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NORMAN E. DeWALT, Indiv. and d/b/a Bedroom Plaza, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201489\u20140770\nOpinion filed May 31, 1990.\nThomas L. Perkins and David G. Mawn, both of Kavanagh, Scully, Sudow, White & Frederick, P.C., of Peoria, for appellant.\nMichael W. Heller, of Peoria, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0559-01",
  "first_page_order": 581,
  "last_page_order": 583
}