{ "id": 2468183, "name": "LEAZO L. HENDRIX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Hendrix v. Board of Education", "decision_date": "1990-04-27", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201488\u20142864", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "5", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "199 Ill. App. 3d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 965", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 1019", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3564821 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/1019-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 N.E.2d 340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 2d 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2470400 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/133/0703-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 529, "char_count": 10006, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.719567370958748e-08, "percentile": 0.29607015698598643 }, "sha256": "810d0d67580cfbc1add4b333a3f0f75fdd80fe9f0848075712ffc67868ce3eb4", "simhash": "1:7a5252db4f4e4401", "word_count": 1508 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:10:12.040900+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LEAZO L. HENDRIX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal follows dismissal (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014 615) of plaintiff\u2019s cause of action sounding in tort.\nWe affirm.\nThe record indicates plaintiff Leazo Hendrix was employed as a school clerk at Bethune Elementary School. On December 3, 1986, the Chicago Board of Education (Board) filed charges against plaintiff based, generally, on insubordination, unsatisfactory conduct, and unsatisfactory job performance. Ultimately, a hearing officer found the charges substantiated and plaintiff was dismissed from her employment.\nThe record indicates plaintiff did not seek timely administrative review of that action.\nOn December 16, 1988, plaintiff filed her original pro se complaint in the matter giving rise to this appeal. That complaint named, as defendants, Warren Franczyk, Helen Mardis, Audrey Ongman, and Manfred Byrd, Jr., all employees of the Board. The Board itself was not named as a defendant.\nOn March 20, 1987, the four named defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint.\nInstead of responding to the motion, on August 3, 1987, plaintiff filed a document labeled \u201cSecond Complaint in Brief,\u201d which we will refer to as plaintiff\u2019s first-amended complaint. That complaint, like plaintiff\u2019s original complaint, was labeled as sounding in \u201cdefamation-libel\u201d and named the same four Board members as defendants.\nDefendants were given leave to, and did, file a motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s first amended complaint. That motion was granted on February 22,1988, and plaintiff was given 28 days to amend her complaint.\nOn March 18, 1988, plaintiff filed a document labeled \u201cAmended,\u201d which we will refer to as plaintiff\u2019s second-amended complaint. That complaint named only Franczyk and the Board as defendants.\nOn April 5, 1988, plaintiff filed a document labeled \u201cAmended Cont\u2019d,\u201d which we will refer to as plaintiff\u2019s third-amended complaint. That complaint named, as defendants, Franczyk, the Board, and the Chicago Teachers Union (Union).\nThe Union successfully moved to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s third-amended complaint. However, the circuit court subsequently vacated its order and granted plaintiff leave to amend.\nOn June 27, 1988, the Board, on behalf of itself and Franczyk, moved to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s second-amended complaint.\nOn July 25, 1988, plaintiff filed another document labeled \u201cAmended Complaint,\u201d which we will refer to as plaintiff\u2019s fourth-amended complaint. Only the Board and Union were named as defendants in that complaint.\nOn July 20, 1988, plaintiff filed a document labeled \u201cAmended Complaint & Memorandum In Support of Response-Not to Dismiss.\u201d\nOn July 25,1988, the Union renewed its motion to dismiss.\nOn August 15, 1988, the circuit court dismissed all pending complaints.\nThis appeal followed.\nOpinion\nThe Code of Civil Procedure (Code) requires that all pleadings contain a plain and concise statement of the cause of action and a specific prayer for relief. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, pars. 2\u2014603(a), 2\u2014604.) The Code also provides that no pleading should be considered legally insufficient where it contains such information \u201cas reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014612.) Thus, pleadings should be construed liberally \u201cwith a view to doing substantial justice between the parties.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014603(c).) However, after carefully considering each of the documents filed by plaintiff in the instant matter, with particular consideration given to the fact that plaintiff had no legal training, we conclude that, even under a most liberal reading, all fail to satisfy the minimum required under the Code to state a recognizable cause of action.\nAlthough, generally, prior pleadings are superseded by amended pleadings (see Burdin v. Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 703, 269 N.E.2d 340), we consider, in turn, each of plaintiff\u2019s complaints. We note here that all of the complaints are handwritten. Although largely legible, much that is contained in the complaints is difficult to follow.\nPlaintiff\u2019s original complaint was labeled \u201cdefamation-libel.\u201d The complaint stated Franczyk had made \u201cfalse reports\u201d to police officers on May 12, 1988, concerning an incident which occurred at Bethune Elementary School. The complaint indicates plaintiff claimed she was struck by another teacher and that Franczyk told police officers \u201c \u2018some staff members said [plaintiff] offered to pay them to witness what occurred in office vault\u2019 (assault).\u201d The complaint alleged Franczyk forwarded the reports to the Board with other documents \u201cin request for a conference which was actually a \u2018hearing,\u2019 \u201d and thereby did harm to plaintiff\u2019s character. The complaint stated Mardis submitted a memo containing untruths to plaintiff\u2019s personnel file, causing more harm to plaintiff\u2019s character, Ongman accepted such documents, and Byrd also participated in the defamation. The complaint contains no specific prayer for relief.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint is defective for several reasons. No specific allegations are directed at defendants Mardis, Ongman, and Byrd concerning defamation of plaintiff as required in Hlinois. (See American International Hospital v. Chicago Tribune Co. (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 483 N.E.2d 965.) As to Franczyk\u2019s alleged statement, that allegation, without more, cannot be considered libelous per se as being so obviously and naturally harmful as to have harmed plaintiff\u2019s reputation. (See American International Hospital (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 483 N.E.2d 965.) No actual harm is alleged. Nor did the complaint allege special damages to support a cause of action for libel per quod. See American International Hospital, 136 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 483 N.E.2d 965.\nPlaintiff\u2019s amended complaint apparently pertains to the same statement recorded in plaintiff\u2019s original complaint. As against Mardis, plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint stated \u201cMardis signed memo to file (my personal file) 2 pages of confession of truth of verbal concealing.\u201d Further, \u201cthe memo to file also consisted of untrue/hearsay, and placing me under police threat.\u201d As to Ongman, plaintiff alleged Ongman \u201cconfirmed by telephone decisions(s) on untrue-hearsay information submitted to her\u201d by Franczyk and, further, \u201csubmitted untrue information to agencies three letters of termination under oath.\u201d As to Byrd, the complaint alleged he received the \u201cuntrue/hearsay\u201d information and sent \u201cuntrue information through school system.\u201d Plaintiff also alleged Byrd contributed to the defamation of plaintiff\u2019s character \u201cby letting Mrs. Ongman sit as police, judge and jury of [plaintiff\u2019s] case.\u201d The complaint contains no prayer for relief.\nAlthough plaintiff did not attach exhibits to the first-amended complaint, the record contains a copy of that complaint to which exhibits were attached. Even considering those exhibits in conjunction with the allegations above, we cannot conclude plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint states a recognizable cause of action. Two of the eight pages of exhibits consist of a memo, written by Mardis, apparently intended for plaintiff\u2019s personnel file. The memo consists of a recitation of events leading up to plaintiff\u2019s \u201cunsatisfactory rating.\u201d The other six pages of exhibits consist of, apparently, excerpts from the hearing on plaintiff\u2019s dismissal. That material does not in any way aid in the understanding of the allegations of the complaint.\nPlaintiff\u2019s second-amended complaint contains no indication that it was based on a theory of defamation. Instead, the complaint states Franczyk \u201cdeceitfully]\u201d rated plaintiff \u201cunsatisfactory\u201d and refused plaintiff\u2019s \u201crequest for a witness to discuss unsatisfactory rating.\u201d The complaint also alleged plaintiff was not informed that the \u201cconference\u201d which was scheduled for September 4, 1986, was actually a hearing. Further, plaintiff alleged she was told to \u201cattend or be e[s]corted out the building.\u201d The complaint contains a prayer for \u201cthree million dollars.\u201d\nOther than indicating \u201cdeceit,\u201d the second-amended complaint simply fails to set out any element of a recognizable cause of action.\nPlaintiff\u2019s third-amended complaint charged the Union, in conspiracy with the Board, combined to \u201coust\u201d plaintiff from her job. The complaint does not, otherwise, in any fashion, set out any allegedly wrongful conduct. The complaint contains no prayer for relief.\nPlaintiff\u2019s fourth-amended complaint refers to funds being withheld from plaintiff. Specifically, the final paragraph in the complaint contains a prayer for relief which refers to a \u201c$14.60 deduction from [plaintiff\u2019s] check that [plaintiff] never had a choice about.\u201d Plaintiff sought return of \u201call monies deducted.\u201d The complaint does not otherwise contain a statement as to why funds were withheld from plaintiff or why that withholding was improper.\nThe last document filed by plaintiff, the \u201cAmended Complaint & Memorandum in Support of Response-Not to Dismiss,\u201d is also labeled as sounding in \u201cdefamation-libel\u201d but does not contain allegations different than those noted above. The document does not contain a prayer for relief.\nBecause none of plaintiff\u2019s complaints contains a clear statement of any cause of action, we cannot conclude the circuit court improperly dismissed plaintiff\u2019s complaints.\nAffirmed.\nMURRAY and GORDON, JJ., concur.\nJustice R. Eugene Pincham participated in this case prior to his resignation. Since that time, Justice Joseph Gordon was designated the third member of the panel and has read the record and briefs and has listened to the oral argument tapes.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LORENZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "Leazo L. Hendrix, of Chicago, appellant pro se.", "Robert S. Bates, Jr., of Jacobs, Burns, Sugarman & Orlove, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LEAZO L. HENDRIX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201488\u20142864\nOpinion filed April 27, 1990.\nRehearing denied July 12, 1990.\nLeazo L. Hendrix, of Chicago, appellant pro se.\nRobert S. Bates, Jr., of Jacobs, Burns, Sugarman & Orlove, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 23, "last_page_order": 27 }