{
  "id": 2466045,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAMUEL SIDES, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sides",
  "decision_date": "1990-06-21",
  "docket_number": "No. 4\u201489\u20140801",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAMUEL SIDES, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case presents the question of whether the State must establish the foundation required under Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1923), 293 E 1013, before the results of field-sobriety tests can be admitted into evidence. We hold that a Frye hearing is not required.\nDefendant, Samuel Sides, was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11-501) and sentenced to 12 months\u2019 probation. At trial, Officer Ronald Reysen testified that when he walked up to defendant\u2019s parked automobile, he found defendant therein had glassy eyes, unzipped trousers, an odor of alcohol on his breath, and an open can of beer between him and the console. The keys to the car were in the ignition.\nDefendant exhibited difficulty in getting out of the car and took 45 seconds to retrieve his driver\u2019s license from his wallet. Reysen requested that defendant perform field-sobriety tests, specifically the \u201cfinger-to-nose,\u201d \u201cwalk and turn,\u201d and \u201cone leg stand\u201d tests. Defendant touched his nose each of six times, but touched the tip of his nose, as he had been requested, only once. In addition, defendant was unable to complete the \u201cwalk and turn\u201d test and was able to perform the \u201cone leg stand\u201d for only 3 seconds, not 30, as requested. Reysen said that defendant\u2019s speech was slightly slurred.\nReysen further testified that he had attended a three-day course on field-sobriety tests at Illinois Central College approximately four to five years earlier. Both a written and a practical examination were given at the end of the training and Reysen passed both of them. Reysen testified he had been a police officer for 9V2 years and had charged approximately 50 people with DUI.\nPrior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to bar the State from introducing any evidence of the results of field-sobriety tests, as well as the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test that Reysen performed. As part of this motion, defendant argued that the field-sobriety test results are not admissible because they fail to meet the Frye reliability standards for scientific testing, as discussed in People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 225, 430 N.E.2d 1070 (a case in which the supreme court ruled that no polygraph results are admissible). The motion in limine was allowed with regard to the results of the HGN test, but denied with regard to the results of the field-sobriety tests.\nBefore this court, defendant renews the same argument:\n\u201cBecause the State failed to establish an adequate foundation to show that field sobriety tests are reliable indicators of past use of alcohol, the trial court erred by denying defense counsel\u2019s motion in limine ***.\nIn this case, Officer Reysen had no knowledge of the scientific theory underlying the field sobriety tests and admitted that he gave the tests only because \u2018those were the tests that we were taught to administer\u2019 when an individual was believed to have been consuming alcohol. *** The State obviously failed to establish any scientific basis for the field sobriety tests and failed to show that the scientific theory underlying those tests had won general acceptance in the scientific community.\u201d\nWe reject this characterization of the field-sobriety tests. In People v. Vega (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1000-01, 496 N.E.2d 501, 504-05, this court held that admission of the results of an HGN test was error because such evidence was beyond the general knowledge of the average individual and no expert testimony was offered to establish the necessary foundation. However, reversal was not required because of the strength of the other evidence offered. (Vega, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 1001, 496 N.E.2d at 505.) In so holding, we stated the following:\n\u201cEven though the admission of the evidence of the results of [the HGN] test was in error, we believe that there was sufficient other evidence to sustain the jury\u2019s verdict. The other tests, \u2018walk the line,\u2019 \u2018one leg stand,\u2019 and \u2018finger to nose,\u2019 are not so abstruse as to require a foundation other than the experience of the officer administering them.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Vega, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 1001, 496 N.E.2d at 505.)\nWe reaffirm in our holding today what we stated as dicta in Vega.\nThe jury in this case was given Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 23.05 (2d ed. Supp. 1989) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 2d), which defines when a person is under the influence of alcohol. That instruction, as given, reads as follows:\n\u201cA person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor when as a result of drinking any amount of intoxicating liquor his mental and/or physical faculties are so impaired as to reduce his ability to think and act with ordinary care.\u201d\nThe jury was also given IPI Criminal 2d No. 1.01 (2d ed. Supp. 1989), a portion of which reads as follows:\n\u201cYou should consider all the evidence in the light of your own observations and experience in life.\u201d\nIn assessing the defendant\u2019s mental and physical faculties at a time relevant to the charge that he was driving an automobile while under the influence of alcohol, it is entirely appropriate for the jury to consider the defendant\u2019s ability to perform the simple physical tasks which comprise the field-sobriety tests. The jury\u2019s inference that a defendant who had difficulty performing some of these tasks may have been similarly impaired in his ability to think and act -with ordinary care when in operation of an automobile is entirely justified and one which the law permits the jury to draw.\nCertainly in our modern society, a juror\u2019s common observations and experiences in life would include not only the driving of an automobile, but a familiarity with the degree of physical and mental acuity required to do so. No expert testimony is needed nor is a showing of scientific principles required before a jury can be permitted to conclude that a person who performs badly on the field-sobriety tests may have his mental or physical faculties \u201cso impaired as to reduce his ability to think and act with ordinary care.\u201d\nLast, defendant makes much of the fact that because Officer Reysen received some training on how to conduct the field-sobriety tests, the scientific basis underlying them must therefore be demonstrated. We disagree and find this argument to be a non sequitur.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGREEN and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daniel D. Yuhas and David Bergschneider, both of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, for appellant.",
      "John B. Huschen, State\u2019s Attorney, of Eureka (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Peter C. Drummond, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAMUEL SIDES, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201489\u20140801\nOpinion filed June 21, 1990.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and David Bergschneider, both of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJohn B. Huschen, State\u2019s Attorney, of Eureka (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Peter C. Drummond, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0203-01",
  "first_page_order": 231,
  "last_page_order": 235
}