{ "id": 2467437, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN MOODY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Moody", "decision_date": "1990-05-22", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201487\u20141578", "first_page": "455", "last_page": "468", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "199 Ill. App. 3d 455" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "394 N.E.2d 624", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. App. 3d 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3276286 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/75/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 N.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3556746 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" }, { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 950", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. App. 3d 810", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3391435 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/53/0810-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 1087", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3532102 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 N.E.2d 1381", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5666891 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" }, { "page": "588" }, { "page": "586-87" }, { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 1183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5545304 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-41" }, { "page": "340-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3575147 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" }, { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 1176", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3529076 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.E.2d 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. App. 3d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2813975 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/44/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 U.S. 756", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 28110 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762-63" }, { "page": "628" }, { "page": "3107" }, { "page": "763" }, { "page": "629" }, { "page": "3107-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/483/0756-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 N.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2969453 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" }, { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126614 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 610", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6181032 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617-18" }, { "page": "97-98" }, { "page": "2244-45" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "422" }, { "page": "2245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 N.E.2d 1347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3569197 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" }, { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3384409 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 1129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3080004 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/1129-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 N.E.2d 1167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3604819 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 N.E.2d 1088", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 990", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3464297 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "999" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0990-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 891", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. App. 3d 1014", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2639770 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1019" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/42/1014-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 N.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 930", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2516445 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "939" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/16/0930-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 N.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5443749 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0203-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1260, "char_count": 28050, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0278705163644153e-07, "percentile": 0.5471950295171649 }, "sha256": "f430c97bb79c5c75a448c3eb6a585e5ee4ce9437e346fb004e87c4abcbd2f71f", "simhash": "1:f35c30d8fbcbf517", "word_count": 4728 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:10:12.040900+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN MOODY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant appeals from his conviction for murder, claiming that the circuit court erroneously: (1) admitted expert testimony at trial; (2) permitted the State to bolster witness testimony; and (3) allowed the State to impeach defendant with his post-arrest silence. Defendant also charges that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nBecause an issue is raised as to whether defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence adduced in this case must be set forth in some detail.\nOn August 29, 1985, defendant was arrested for the shooting of Ronald or Ronnie Lee (Lee) in Chicago, who died of his gunshot wounds at 12:47 p.m. that same day. A jury convicted defendant of murder, and he was sentenced to 25 years in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections.\nAt trial, Lieutenant Charles Mandel testified he received a call of \u201cshots fired\u201d while on patrol at 12:30 a.m. on August 29, 1985, drove to the 8600 block of Kingston and saw a man pointing southward in an alley. Handel proceeded down the alley to the rear of 8623 Essex, where he saw a man lying in a pool of blood, bleeding from the head and neck. The victim told him \u201cMoody shot me\u201d and that defendant drove away in an \u201capple red Pontiac.\u201d Handel saw a packet of white powder on the ground, near the victim\u2019s body. After calling for an ambulance, Handel left the scene to look for the perpetrator. Unsuccessful, he returned to the alley and noticed that police officers Ron Coleman and John Franklin had someone in the back seat of their squad car. Handel told neither officer that he knew the name of the offender, because the officers told Handel \u201cthey had an eyewitness to the incident\u201d who \u201chad all the information.\u201d Handel told no one at the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office of the victim\u2019s remarks until a year and one-half after the incident. He made no written report of the shooting; his job of watch commander was supervisory in nature, and he was not required to make written reports.\nOfficer Franklin averred he was in his squad car with Coleman at approximately 12:30 a.m. on August 29, 1985, when they received a radio call of \u201cshots fired\u201d and then of a \u201cman shot in the alley of 86th and Essex.\u201d Driving to the scene, the officers noticed a man on the corner of \u201c87th and South Chicago,\u201d jumping up and down, waiving and yelling for the car to stop. The man, whom Franklin identified as (Dalton) \u201cWoods,\u201d said, \u201cSomebody just killed my buddy,\u201d got into the squad car and directed the officers to where the victim lay in the alley, face up, with numerous wounds to the head and neck. The victim was not moving, and Franklin believed him to be dead. When they touched the victim, however, he raised his upper torso and attempted to stand. Franklin also saw a clear plastic bag of white powder near the victim\u2019s body.\nDetective Peter Dignan asserted he arrived at the scene at approximately 12:30 a.m. Franklin, Coleman and Woods were still in the alley. At approximately 2 a.m., he and his partner, Detective Buffo, were taken by Woods to defendant\u2019s apartment at 7620 South Shore Drive. Woods knocked on the door and identified himself to defendant as \u201cDog.\u201d The door swung open, and defendant came to the door pointing a gun at Dignan and Buffo. Dignan kicked in the door, grabbed defendant\u2019s gun, \u201ctook [defendant] down\u201d and disarmed him. Dignan and Buffo kicked and hit defendant as they struggled with him for control of the gun. Dignan described defendant\u2019s behavior as loud and combative, and that defendant appeared to be under the influence of narcotics. Dignan was unaware defendant lost a tooth during the scuffle. After he disarmed defendant, Dignan turned him over and handcuffed him, saying \u201cYou are under arrest for shooting Ronald Lee.\u201d Defendant then said \u201cOkay, okay, I did it.\u201d Dignan denied striking defendant with his own revolver when struggling with defendant.\nForensic pathologist Barry Lifschultz averred the autopsy he performed on August 30, 1985, revealed four gunshot wounds to Lee\u2019s body namely: a wound in his right chest; another at the right back of his neck, where the bullet entered and passed through the back of Lee\u2019s mouth; a third where the bullet \u201cperforated the skin of\u201d his right ear, went through the rear of the oral cavity and exited on the left side of Lee\u2019s face; and a final wound on the right side of Lee\u2019s face or neck, with an exit hole at the back of his neck. Lifschultz maintained that there was no damage to Lee\u2019s voice box or tongue, and that none of the wounds described made it physically impossible for him to speak.\nDeotrise Vance, defendant\u2019s second cousin, testified that she lived in defendant\u2019s apartment in August 1985 and was told by him that he intended to kill Lee because defendant was \u201ctired of Jackie being upset with\u201d Lee. Jackie Moody was defendant\u2019s cousin, the former girlfriend of Lee and the mother of Lee\u2019s child. Defendant told Vance he planned to \u201clure [Lee] down there\u201d with cocaine. On August 28, 1985, Vance was with defendant in his apartment and noticed he had a handgun and saw a clear plastic bag of white powder in a suitcase in defendant\u2019s closet. She also heard defendant make a telephone call from the apartment to Thelma Lee, Lee\u2019s mother, telling Thelma that he wanted to get in touch with Lee and that he had information \u201csomeone was out to get\u201d Lee. Defendant wanted to use Vance\u2019s car to drive to Lee\u2019s home, but Vance refused.\nVance next spoke to defendant by telephone several days after his arrest and he eventually admitted to her that he killed Lee. He threatened Vance that he would kill her if she told anyone that he murdered Lee and continued to call Vance collect, several times a day until December 1985, when she moved from the apartment. He continually threatened Vance and warned her he could have her killed even though he was in jail. She changed her telephone number once. Vance never discussed defendant\u2019s plans to murder Lee with anyone prior to the incident. She met with defendant\u2019s attorney in September 1985; paid him $150 for his services; told him she believed defendant killed Lee; did not tell him about defendant\u2019s threats; and did not inform him that she intended to testify for the State at trial. She spoke with two other defense attorneys in February 1987 and told them she would testify on the State\u2019s behalf.\nThelma Lee testified that the victim, her son, was living in her home on August 28, 1985, when defendant called there approximately five times, identifying himself by name. Defendant made one of the calls between 7 and 8 p.m. and informed Thelma someone had a \u201chit out on\u201d Ronnie. Thelma told Lee defendant had been calling for him. A few minutes after 11 p.m. on August 28, Lee was at home with Woods and a third person; Lee left soon after with Woods. She next saw Lee at the hospital on August 29.\nThomas Bachelder, an evidence technician with the Chicago police department, testified that he performed an atomic absorption gun residue test on defendant on August 29, which consisted of wiping both sides of defendant\u2019s hands with chemically treated cotton swabs, sealing the swabs in vials and delivering them to the crime lab\u2019s micro-analysis section. Bachelder stated that obtaining a positive residue test 30 hours after a person fired a handgun was improbable. The maximum amount of time after discharge of a gun the residue test could be expected to prove positive would be four to five hours.\nIn 1985 Jean Goliak was employed as a \u201ccriminalist\u201d in the police department\u2019s crime lab. She analyzed the swabs from the gun residue test and testified that the residue on defendant\u2019s hands indicated he discharged a firearm, was in close proximity of a firearm when it was discharged, or handled a firearm that had been discharged. The highest concentration of residue was on the back of defendant\u2019s right hand. Goliak contended that if a person fires a gun, the highest concentration of residue falls on the back of his firing hand; if he handles a gun only, the highest concentration is on the palm of the hand.\nDefendant\u2019s first attorney averred he met with Vance on September 16, 1985, and that she never told him she believed defendant killed Lee, but informed him she didn\u2019t think defendant was capable of such an act and believed defendant innocent.\nJackie Moody testified she was at the home of her sister, Debra Moody, on August 28, sometime between 10 p.m. and midnight, when defendant came to the residence and asked her, \u201cWhere\u2019s Dee Dee [Vance]?\u201d Jackie noticed defendant had a gun in his hand. She admitted failing to give the authorities this information until a week before the trial, but said she had never had an opportunity to meet with them until just before trial.\nDefendant, on his own behalf, insisted he never told Vance he intended to kill Lee and never threatened her. He was self-employed as a tailor, and about August 23, 1985, Woods came to his apartment to look at some suits. Woods told defendant there was \u201cbad blood\u201d between Woods and Lee and that Woods \u201cwas going to kill him about some things,\u201d including the fact Lee \u201cshot up\u201d the house of Woods\u2019 neighbor and shot at the neighbor\u2019s dog. Woods also said he and Lee had entered into a \u201ccocaine deal\u201d together and Lee \u201ctook the money and hadn\u2019t gave [sic] him any cocaine.\u201d\nDefendant again saw Woods at 10 p.m. on August 27, as defendant was walking down the street carrying a garment bag. Woods and another man drove up to him, stopped him, and asked to see any suits defendant had. After conversing about clothes, Woods asked defendant if he could take them someplace where they could buy cocaine. Defendant declined, and Woods\u2019 companion became \u201cagitated\u201d and appeared to reach for something. Defendant began to run away from them and heard three gunshots fired after him; Woods and the other man then got in their car and proceeded after defendant. Defendant pulled out his own gun and fired three or four shots back at the car, which then turned around and drove in the opposite direction. Defendant testified he spoke to Lee by telephone on the evening of August 28 and informed him of the incident with Woods and that Woods had threatened to kill Lee. Defendant also warned Thelma that threats were directed against her son, but not by whom.\nOn August 29, defendant averred, he was asleep in his apartment at midnight; at approximately 1:45 or 2 a.m. he heard a knock at his door and Woods\u2019 voice saying, \u201cThis is Dog.\u201d He cracked the door and saw a man pointing a gun at him, and slammed the door shut. Defendant had his own revolver in his hand because Woods had tried to \u201cgun [him] down\u201d the preceding evening and because defendant knew Woods \u201chas been in prison for murder.\u201d A voice on the other side of the door said, \u201cOpen the door. This is the police.\u201d Defendant complied after he put his own revolver down. When he opened the door, police entered his apartment and \u201cimmediately began to beat\u201d defendant \u201cto the ground.\u201d Defendant described the beating as \u201cpretty bad\u201d and maintained he lost a tooth when hit in the mouth with a pistol butt. One of the officers was Dignan. When the police stopped hitting defendant, they attempted to talk to him, but he replied only that he was a veteran and \u201cwanted to stand on my fifth amendment rights to see a lawyer.\u201d\nDefendant stated that he was thereafter taken to the police station and that he refused to answer any questions, though he did make certain statements, such as he was a Chuck Taub Indian and that he had been hit by a car. He couldn\u2019t recall telling authorities, however, that: the last time he heard about Lee was three weeks prior to the shooting when Lee allegedly kidnapped defendant\u2019s nephew; he visited his son on August 28 and returned home at about 7 p.m.; and he then left his apartment alone to walk on the lakefront for about an hour. Defendant further denied telling authorities that he had called Thelma Lee on August 28, telling her that members of defendant\u2019s family were \u201ctalking about killing [Lee].\u201d Defendant contended he did not fire a gun earlier on the day of his arrest.\nOn cross-examination, defendant first said that he did not wash his hands in the period between his shoot-out with Woods on August 27 and his submission to the gun residue test on August 29. He then testified, \u201cI didn\u2019t say that I didn\u2019t wash my hands. I didn\u2019t do a lot of washing with my hands.\u201d Finally, this exchange occurred: \u201c[Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Quinn]: The question is, did you wash your hands? Defendant: I can\u2019t recall.\u201d Defendant never told police about his earlier confrontation with Woods because he knew he had violated the law by having a gun on his person and for firing it within city limits.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Wayne Jakalski said he interviewed defendant on August 29 and August 30, at which time defendant contended he: hadn\u2019t seen Lee for three weeks; knew \u201cthere was something involving a kidnapping of his nephew\u201d; talked to Thelma Lee five times on August 28; arrived home before dusk on August 28 and went for a walk along the lakefront for an hour.\nThe court sentenced defendant and denied his post-trial motion. He appeals.\nI\nDefendant first assigns error to the admission of evidence technician Bachelder\u2019s testimony as an expert, which he claims lacked sufficient foundation. Defendant insists the court improperly overruled defense counsel\u2019s objection where the State failed to establish Bachelder\u2019s qualifications to analyze gunshot residue results, as opposed to merely administer the process.\nThe State bears the burden of demonstrating that, because of skill, training or experience, an individual is better able to form a more accurate opinion as to matters under consideration than the ordinary person. (People v. Park (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 203, 209, 380 N.E.2d 795; People v. Pruitt (1974), 16 Ill. App. 3d 930, 939, 307 N.E.2d 142.) Only if the resulting error is clear and prejudicial will this court usurp the circuit court\u2019s broad discretion to accept an expert as qualified. People v. Aliwoli (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1019, 356 N.E.2d 891.\nBachelder described his training in the administration of gunshot residue tests as: an eight-hour session taught by the Chicago police department chemistry and microanalysis sections; and the \u201cpractical application\u201d of conducting the test 200 to 300 times since 1984. He has testified approximately 75 times and in each case was certified an expert in administering the test. He stated he does not analyze the residue on the swabs delivered to the crime lab and learns the results of the tests by asking those who performed them or if someone else tells him.\nThe evidence above stated recalls People v. Owens (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 990, 999, 508 N.E.2d 1088, where the court found the admission of a crime technician\u2019s testimony regarding \u201cblood spatters\u201d at the crime scene improper: \u201c[T]he State did not establish Knight\u2019s qualifications as a blood-spatter analyst. The State did not produce any evidence of *** Knight\u2019s training or experience in the field of blood-spatter analysis.\u201d (See also People v. Perry (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 272, 275, 498 N.E.2d 1167; People v. Adams (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 1129, 1134, 430 N.E.2d 267.) Bachelder here emphasized his experience was limited solely to administration of the test and that he learned of test results only through those who actually analyzed the swabs. The court therefore erred in certifying Bachelder qualified to render an opinion concerning residue test analysis.\nAny error spawned by Bachelder\u2019s statement that a positive test result could not be achieved 30 hours after discharge of a weapon, however, was harmless. Defendant\u2019s equivocation on the question of when he last washed his hands prior to arrest decreased the impact of Bachelder\u2019s conclusion to such a degree that it could not fairly be deemed prejudicial.\nOther statements going to the time lapse between discharge of a weapon and the performance of the gun residue test, moreover, were acceptable. Bachelder maintained that, from his own personal observation, tests administered more than five hours from the discharge of the weapon were more likely to yield negative results than tests performed within a shorter period of time. Such a conclusion, based on information volunteered to him by individuals analyzing the swabs, was adequately grounded in personal experience to constitute an admissible professional opinion. (People v. Wade (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 721, 728, 366 N.E.2d 528.) The information was properly submitted to the jury for whatever weight they may have chosen to give it.\nII\nDefendant next contends the court erred in allowing the State to impeach his exculpatory trial testimony with evidence of his post-arrest silence and argue the fact of this silence as evidence of his guilt.\nThe State responds that defendant waived this issue by neglecting to object at trial or by post-trial motion to the introduction of the evidence. (See People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) Defendant here unsuccessfully moved in limine to bar his impeachment with matters he failed to tell police, which may explain counsel\u2019s neglect to voice objections when the evidence was introduced at trial; nevertheless, defendant failed to object with specificity in his post-trial motion, ordinarily barring appellate review. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 187; People v. Smith (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 21, 27, 486 N.E.2d 1347.\nThe use of an arrestee\u2019s silence to impeach a subsequent explanation has been held \u201cfundamentally unfair,\u201d given the \u201cinsolubly ambiguous\u201d message broadcast by one exercising his right not to speak. (Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610, 617-18, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 97-98, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2244-45.) Review of such questions otherwise waived is mandated where, as here, defects in the proceedings below impinge upon \u201csubstantial rights.\u201d People v. Walker (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 484, 497, 488 N.E.2d 529; see also People v. Monaghan (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 322, 326, 352 N.E.2d 295.\nDue process precludes a prosecutor from impeaching defendant\u2019s exculpatory testimony, offered for the first time at trial, by cross-examining defendant regarding his failure to inform police of his explanation after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest. Greer v. Miller (1987), 483 U.S. 756, 762-63, 97 L. Ed. 2d 618, 628, 107 S. Ct. 3102, 3107; Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 619, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 422, 96 S. Ct. at 2245; People v. Robinson (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 447, 449, 358 N.E.2d 43; People v. Monaghan, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 326.\nDefendant\u2019s uncontradicted testimony in the case sub judice established that he asserted his right to an attorney immediately after police officers subdued him at his apartment on August 29. He additionally raised for the first time at trial the alleged threats made by Woods against Lee\u2019s life and the fact of his confrontation with Woods on August 27, 1985.\nOn cross-examination, the State probed defendant\u2019s failure to explain these events to authorities in August 1985, including whether he ever reported to the police that: Dalton Woods had told him that he wanted to kill Ronald Lee; Woods wanted to shoot Ronald Lee over a shooting of a neighbor\u2019s dog; Woods wanted to kill Ronny Lee over a cocaine deal; and Woods had tried to kill him earlier on the 27th of August 1985. He was asked whether the first time he ever told anybody that: he was shot at by Woods and his partner on the 27th of August was at trial; and Woods had threatened to kill Ronny Lee was at trial. He was further questioned whether: he ever reported the shoot-out he had near 74th and Coles, when he shot four shots, and Woods and his partner shot three shots at him; and he ever reported the shoot-out when Woods was there in his apartment accusing him of murdering Ronny Lee.\nIn closing and rebuttal argument, the State argued the significance of defendant\u2019s post-trial silence to the jury, stating if they were victims of armed robbery and someone was shooting at them, so that they were victims of attempted murder, or aggravated battery, they certainly would call the police; that after they were charged with a murder they were going to say something to the police about the fact \u201cthis guy been over bothering [them], nearly stuck [them] up, and nearly killed [them] out on the street two days earlier.\u201d\nThe State may impeach exculpatory statements inconsistent with remarks made by defendant before trial. (People v. Chriswell (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 458, 466, 478 N.E.2d 1176.) Here, however, defendant consistently refused to answer the authorities\u2019 questions before trial. The State thereby possessed no statements \u201cmanifestly inconsistent\u201d with defendant\u2019s trial testimony which could properly be used for impeachment purposes. People v. Nolan (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 260, 268, 504 N.E.2d 205.\nThis was not harmless error. The State inflicted serious damage on defendant\u2019s credibility and undermined his alibi, factors critical to his defense. (People v. Nolan, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 268.) The court never instructed the jury to disregard evidence of defendant\u2019s silence following his arrest. (See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. at 763, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 629, 107 S. Ct. at 3107-08.) This was substantial error which requires reversal.\nIll\nDefendant also urges error in the State\u2019s efforts to bolster Deotrise Vance\u2019s testimony with evidence of her prior consistent statements.\nTestimony regarding a prior consistent statement is inadmissible, except when used to refute an express or implied charge of recent fabrication (People v. Shum (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 317, 340-41, 512 N.E.2d 1183; People v. Olesch (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 577, 587, 492 N.E.2d 1381) or of a motivation to testify falsely (People v. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 340-41).\nOn cross-examination, Vance admitted she never told defendant\u2019s lawyer of the threats defendant directed against her, and first told the authorities in 1987 of her knowledge of defendant\u2019s intention to kill Lee. She did not inform Thelma Lee of defendant\u2019s plans, although she had known Lee\u2019s mother for several years.\nOn redirect examination, she was asked a series of questions which had the clear effect of bolstering her testimony on direct examination. The State correctly observes that these questions could be inferred as rebutting recent fabrications or an inference of a motivation to testify falsely. Defense counsel objected to all but the first question and was sustained on each objection. The court instructed the jury at the close of the case to ignore evidence upon which objections were sustained. The mere occurrence of improper remarks alone does not mandate reversal. (People v. Whitfield (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 433, 440, 488 N.E.2d 1087.) Timely objection by defense counsel and an appropriate admonition by the court will prevent error, or in the event error occurs, render it harmless, even when the alleged error occurs more than once. (People v. Olesch, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 588; People v. Taylor (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 810, 817-18, 368 N.E.2d 950; see also People v. Rowe (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 322, 328, 450 N.E.2d 804.) The challenged remarks do not merit reversal as material factors in defendant\u2019s conviction, or in prompting a judgment different from that which would have resulted absent the alleged impropriety. (People v. Olesch, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 586-87.) No error occurred below from the State\u2019s attempted use of Vance\u2019s prior consistent statements.\nIV\nDefendant\u2019s last contention attacks the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, insisting that the State failed to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\nReversal is permissible only where the evidence is so palpably contrary to the finding of guilt, or so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory that it raises reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt. (People v. Olesch, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 584.) The fact of defendant\u2019s conviction requires this court to view all evidence in a light most favorable to the State. People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267.\nEvidence adduced in the instant case demonstrated an identification by the victim of the individual who shot him, and defendant\u2019s statement \u201cOkay, okay, I did it,\u201d upon his arrest for shooting Lee. Vance testified that defendant told her weeks before the shooting that he intended to kill Lee and the means by which he intended to do it, all of which was corroborated by the presence of a bag of white powder next to the victim\u2019s body at the crime scene and the fact his death occurred by shooting.\nDefendant\u2019s alibi defense and credibility were substantially impeached by the following evidence: Jackie Moody\u2019s testimony placing him outside of his apartment and with a revolver in his hand sometime between 10 p.m. and midnight on August 28; Thelma Lee\u2019s testimony that she received five telephone calls on August 28, informing her that a \u201chit\u201d was out on her son; Vance\u2019s statement that she heard defendant phone the Lee residence that day, telling Thelma Lee her son\u2019s life was in danger; and Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Jakalski\u2019s averments regarding defendant\u2019s whereabouts on August 28. Forensic evidence introduced at trial established that the gun residue found on defendant\u2019s right hand was consistent with someone who had discharged a firearm. Defendant\u2019s statement that he couldn\u2019t \u201crecall\u201d whether he washed his hands on the day of his arrest and expert testimony that positive results on the residue test were unlikely more than five hours after discharge of a firearm undermined defendant\u2019s contention that the residue on his hand was from the alleged shootout with Woods on August 27.\nCiting People v. Thomas (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 491, 493, 394 N.E.2d 624, defendant argues that the \u201c[o]missions, discrepancies, and improbabilities\u201d in the police officers\u2019 and Vance\u2019s testimony rendered their statements incredible. It is the jury\u2019s province, however, to weigh the evidence presented, judge the credibility of the witnesses and determine facts. People v. Rowe, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 325.\nThe alleged weaknesses in the witnesses\u2019 testimony in the instant case were neither as material nor as fatal to the State\u2019s case as defendant argues. Mandel conceded he failed to record Lee\u2019s dying declaration and to inform Coleman and Franklin of the statement, yet he also stated his duties did not include making written reports and that the other officers had an eyewitness in custody who provided them with the information they needed. Franklin concurred that his written report described Lee as \u201cunconscious\u201d at the scene, but his assertions at trial that Lee lay perfectly still with his eyes closed until Franklin touched him are not clearly contradictory. Franklin also reminded the jury that reports are merely summaries of the events in question. Although Vance\u2019s statement that she informed the defense attorney in 1985 of her belief that defendant murdered Lee was contradicted, defendant offered no evidence other than his own testimony to rebut Vance\u2019s assertions that defendant threatened to kill her if she revealed his guilt to anyone.\nThe evidence cannot be portrayed as so palpably contrary to the finding of guilt as to justify, alone, a reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction.\nThe error committed by the State in introducing the fact of defendant's post-arrest silence denied defendant a fair trial and requires reversal and remandment of the conviction entered below for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nBILANDIC, P.J., and EGAN. J., concur.\nJustice Egan participated in the decision of this case prior to becoming a member of the sixth division of the appellate court.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARTMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN MOODY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201487\u20141578\nOpinion filed May 22, 1990.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, for the People." }, "file_name": "0455-01", "first_page_order": 483, "last_page_order": 496 }