{ "id": 2466968, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOUG W. WOZNIAK, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wozniak", "decision_date": "1990-07-17", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201489\u20140054", "first_page": "1088", "last_page": "1092", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "199 Ill. App. 3d 1088" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 1055", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. App. 3d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3477363 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/173/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166862 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. App. 3d 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2475866 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/198/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 N.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3482446 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 N.E.2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 999", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3569263 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0999-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5676144 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3535015 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 N.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3553502 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/175/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 911", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3516589 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0911-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "547 N.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" }, { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2511739 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" }, { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/191/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "548 N.E.2d 1104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1107" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2505975 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/192/0520-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 583, "char_count": 10939, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.332018677214992e-07, "percentile": 0.629109457732864 }, "sha256": "5e3d17a5547a79354b5695c8431810264c06586cd0d1ba4dcf959ec974a30d18", "simhash": "1:9bbc009737d7e4b7", "word_count": 1797 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:10:12.040900+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOUG W. WOZNIAK, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Doug W. Wozniak was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014501(a)(2)). The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the result of defendant\u2019s breath test. The State appeals the suppression order.\nThe record shows that on October 9, 1988, defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and his license was summarily suspended. Defendant subsequently filed a petition to rescind (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014501.1), alleging that he had not been properly arrested.\nAt the hearing on the petition, Spring Valley police officer Thomas Sment testified that on October 9 he had investigated a traffic accident involving vehicles driven by defendant and Mrs. McNally. The officer asked for both drivers\u2019 licenses and issued a citation to Mrs. McNally for failure to yield. While talking with defendant, Sment noted that defendant had difficulty speaking and that he staggered and swayed as he walked. Sment also detected the odor of alcohol on defendant\u2019s breath. The officer had defendant perform some field sobriety tests, which defendant failed. Sment then told defendant to accompany him to the police station for a breath test. He did not tell defendant that he was under arrest at that time.\nOfficer Sment further stated that he had known defendant for four years and did not think it necessary to handcuff him. Defendant sat in the front seat of the squad car en route to the police station. There, the officer gave defendant the standard motorist\u2019s warning (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014501.1(c)) and administered the breath test. Defendant registered a .20 breath-alcohol content. Then, defendant lost his balance and disturbed the breathalyzer keyboard. Consequently, a second test was administered in which defendant registered a .19 breath-alcohol content. At that point the officer issued defendant a citation for driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant\u2019s license was not returned to him that evening.\nDefendant testified that he had been drinking beer that evening. He claimed, however, that he satisfactorily performed the field sobriety tests. He also denied that he staggered or swayed as he walked. Defendant agreed that he was not handcuffed, but stated that he rode in the back seat of the police car to the station.\nThe trial court found that defendant had not been arrested prior to the breath test. Accordingly, the court rescinded the statutory summary suspension.\nDefendant subsequently filed a motion to suppress the breath-test result in the DUI prosecution, again arguing that he had not been properly arrested prior to the breath test. The parties rested on the evidence presented at the summary suspension hearing. The trial court suppressed the breath-test result on the ground that defendant had not been arrested prior to the test.\nIn this appeal, the State argues only that the trial court erred in suppressing the breath-test result in the DUI prosecution. The State acknowledges that the statutory summary suspension provisions are triggered by an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014501.1(a)). There is no language, however, in that section or in section 11\u2014501 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014501)\u2014the section defining the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol \u2014 stating that an arrest must precede a breath test in order for the result to be admissible in a DUI prosecution. The State concludes that as long as the test is supported by probable cause to believe that the motorist was driving under the influence of alcohol, the result is admissible in a DUI prosecution regardless of whether defendant was under arrest at the time the test was administered.\nThe initial question to be resolved is a question of law, i.e., whether sections 11\u2014501 and 11\u2014501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 11\u2014501, 11\u2014501.1) are so interrelated as to require suppression of evidence in a DUI prosecution solely because such evidence was statutorily invalidated for purposes of the summary suspension proceedings.\nIn another context, that question was recently answered in the negative by the Second District of the Illinois Appellate Court (People v. Giere (2d Dist. 1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 520, 548 N.E.2d 1104, appeal denied (1990), 131 Ill. 2d 562) and in the affirmative by this district (People v. Monckton (3d Dist. 1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 106, 547 N.E.2d 673, appeal denied (1990), 131 Ill. 2d 564). At issue in Monckton and Giere was whether a breath test taken without defendant\u2019s voluntary consent as required for purposes of the summary suspension provision tainted the test result for purposes of a subsequent DUI prosecution. In Monckton this court rejected its own precedent in People v. Eaves (3d Dist. 1988), 174 Ill. App. 3d 911, 529 N.E.2d 277, ruling that \u201c[ajdmission of the result in either the summary suspension hearing or the DUI trial would defeat the legislature\u2019s objective of allowing a defendant to make a knowing and voluntary decision regarding the test.\u201d Monckton, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 109, 547 N.E.2d at 674.\nBy contrast, in Giere, the court, relying on precedent in People v. Brawn (2d Dist. 1988), 175 Ill. App. 3d 725, 530 N.E.2d 71, Village of Algonquin v. Ford (2d Dist. 1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 19, 495 N.E.2d 595, and Eaves, stated, \u201cThere is nothing *** in either section 11\u2014501 or section 11\u2014501.1 that requires consent before a blood test may be taken in a DUI or reckless homicide prosecution.\u201d (Giere, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 524-25, 548 N.E.2d at 1107.) To the extent that Giere was convicted only of reckless homicide (the DUI charge having been dismissed prior to trial), the court\u2019s statement relative to DUI is obiter dictum. Nonetheless, the rationales of the two decisions cannot be reconciled. Giere rejects the precedents of People v. Frazier (4th Dist. 1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 563, 463 N.E.2d 165, and People v. Romano (2nd Dist. 1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 999, 487 N.E.2d 785, decided under a prior version of section 11\u2014501.1(c), which had held that consent under the statute then in effect was required before blood tests could be administered.\nIn Monckton, Frazier and Romano were relied upon as support for the court\u2019s statement that \u201c[t]he Code reflects the legislature\u2019s desire to prohibit involuntary blood and breath tests and to allow a driver to make a knowing withdrawal of his implied consent, so long as he is willing to bear the penalty.\u201d (Monckton, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 109, 547 N.E.2d at 674.) Monckton fails, however, to consider statutory amendments subsequent to Frazier and Romano and makes no reference to either Ford or Brown. Although Monckton derives its finding of legislative intent from section 11\u2014501.1(c), it does not purport to engraft that provision onto section 11\u2014501.\nGiven the substantive differences between civil implied consent proceedings and a criminal DUI prosecution (see People v. Golden (5th Dist. 1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 150, 453 N.E.2d 15), any further extent of the civil protections would, we believe, only confuse already muddy waters. Suffice to say, we find no expression of legislative intent to extend the predicate arrest provision of the summary suspension statute to DUI prosecutions. We hold that for purposes of DUI prosecutions, admissibility of blood-alcohol test results is subject to fourth amendment constraints and those specific provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code relating, to the administration of such tests (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 11\u2014501.2 through 11\u2014501.4).\nMoreover, even were we to extend the protections of the summary suspension statute to DUI prosecutions, we would find the court\u2019s conclusion in this case that defendant had not been timely arrested contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. From the record on appeal, it is clear that the trial court placed undue emphasis upon the arresting officer\u2019s failure to tell defendant that he was under arrest. The court\u2019s analysis is thus flawed because it focuses upon the officer\u2019s conduct instead of on the arrestee\u2019s reasonable perception of his situation.\nAs this court recently stated in People v. Jones (1990), 198 Ill. App. 3d 572, 575, \u201cthe standard for determining if and when an arrest has occurred is whether a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have concluded that he was not free to leave considering the surrounding circumstances. (People v. Wright (1985), 111 Ill. 2d 128, 490 N.E.2d 640.) Such circumstances include the continuing possession of the individual\u2019s driver\u2019s license by a police officer, the placing of an individual in a squad car, and the duration of the individual\u2019s detention. (People v. Goodman (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 559, 527 N.E.2d 1055.)\u201d\nIn Jones, as here, defendant\u2019s appearance and conduct at the scene of his encounter with the police officer gave the officer probable cause to believe defendant was under the influence of alcohol. At the officer\u2019s request, defendant relinquished his license, performed field sobriety tests, and was invited to accompany the officer in a squad car to the police station for further testing. Even accepting as credible defendant\u2019s version of the events preceding his breathalyzer tests, a reasonable person under these circumstances would have believed he was not free to leave despite the fact that the officer did not issue a citation for DUI until after administering the breathalyzer test. In sum, we find that defendant was \u201carrested\u201d for purposes of the DUI prosecution before he arrived at the police station.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Bureau County is reversed.\nReversed and cause remanded.\nSCOTT, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BARRY" }, { "text": "JUSTICE STOUDER,\nspecially concurring:\nI agree with the result reached by the majority in this case but I do not agree with all of the findings or conclusions of the majority.\nIn particular I agree with the majority the defendant was under arrest before the blood-alcohol test was administered. Having so decided, the issue discussed at length in the majority opinion concerning the consequences of administering a test if the defendant was under arrest is obiter dictum, unnecessary to the opinion. In the interest of judicial restraint I see no special reason for considering an issue unnecessary to the resolution of the case in the circumstances presented by this appeal. I do not join with the majority in the reasoning or resolution of this issue.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE STOUDER," } ], "attorneys": [ "Marc Bernabei, State\u2019s Attorney, of Princeton (John X. Breslin, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Douglas B. Olivero, of Peru, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOUG W. WOZNIAK, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201489\u20140054\nOpinion filed July 17, 1990.\nSTOUDER, J., specially concurring.\nMarc Bernabei, State\u2019s Attorney, of Princeton (John X. Breslin, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nDouglas B. Olivero, of Peru, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1088-01", "first_page_order": 1116, "last_page_order": 1120 }