{ "id": 5343896, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Herbert Catlett, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Catlett", "decision_date": "1974-06-07", "docket_number": "No. 58499", "first_page": "832", "last_page": "836", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "20 Ill. App. 3d 832" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "3 Ill.App.3d 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2836685 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Ill.App.3d 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5314201 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/1/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ill.App.3d 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2470860 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/6/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 U.S. 263", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168184 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168076 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ill.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2907985 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 U.S. 377", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6170914 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/390/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill.2d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2848428 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 U.S. 293", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168284 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0293-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 557, "char_count": 9699, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.594203391136844e-08, "percentile": 0.48964032265973806 }, "sha256": "cc572e9eae701312a3f31396efcb825179a39142f2ad008f31c15d7f2a94c424", "simhash": "1:8d7916aa630e5cbb", "word_count": 1596 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:58:20.277928+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Herbert Catlett, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE BARRETT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal arises from a bench trial judgment in which defendant-appellant was convicted for armed robbery and sentenced to the Illinois State Penitentiary for a period of not less than 7 and not more than 7 years and 1 day. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nThe appeal raises four issues: (1) Whether pre-trial identification procedures were unduly suggestive; (2) Whether the failure to specifically name the dangerous weapon used to perpetrate the alleged crime rendered the indictment fatally defective; (3) Whether the sentence imposed was improper and contrary to the principles of indeterminate sentencing; (4) Whether defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nOn the evening of October 27, 1971, Giulio Piunti and Jeffrey Denis Means were working at Romano\u2019s Liquors in Chicago. Piunti was the manager of the store and Means was his assistant.\nAt approximately 9 P.M. two black males entered the store. One of these men was the defendant. The two men were soon joined by another black male. Piunti testified that his attention was drawn to the three men because they were \u201ccongregating from one section of the store to another.\u201d It was also brought out in testimony that the entire store was lighted by various 8-foot fluorescent lights which were in operation that night.\nAfter defendant and his two companions had been in the store for approximately 10 minutes, defendant approached the check-out counter with a bottle of wine. As Piunti stated the amount of the purchase, he looked up and saw defendant pointing a revolver at him. Means, who was standing at the back of the store, observed defendant pointing a revolver at Piunti. Following defendant\u2019s orders, Piunti placed the money from the cash register into a bag.\nMeans related substantially the same story as Piunti, adding that once he observed defendant pointing a revolver at Piunti, he was confronted by one of defendant\u2019s companions. This individual told Means to lie down on the floor and raise his hands. Once Means was on the floor, one of the men took his wallet. While defendant was still at the cash register with Piunti, Means was ordered to get up and walk toward the front of the store.\nAt this time, defendant brought Piunti toward the rear of the store. Both Piunti and Means were ordered to he down on the floor. Defendant and his companions then left the liquor store.\nAfter the robbery, the police were called. Later that same evening, Piunti and Means were taken to the police station. After looking through 150 to 200 photographs, both men made tentative identifications of defendant as one of the robbers. Piunti then turned over the picture he had identified and observed the name \u201cHERBERT CATLETT\u201d on the back of the picture.\nOn October 28, 1971, Piunti and Means went to the police station to view a suspect held in police custody. Neither man could identify the suspect as one of the robbers.\nOn October 29 or 30, 1971, more pictures were shown to Means and Piunti. Defendant\u2019s photograph was not in this group. At this time no identifications were made.\nOne week after the robbery, on November 3, 1971, Piunti and Means were called down to the police station to view another suspect. As the two men descended the stairs to the police station they saw defendant inside. Means and Piunti nodded to each other as they recognized defendant as one of the robbers. The two men then entered the room where defendant was sitting. When defendant left the room a few moments later to make a telephone call, Piunti asked one of the police officers, \u201cWho is that man and where is he going?\u201d The officer said, \u201cThat\u2019s Herbert Catlett.\u201d Piunti then responded, \u201cWell, he\u2019s the one who held me up.\u201d\nAt the time of the identification, defendant was at the Chicago Heights Police Station in the custody of the Illinois State Police.\nDuring the course of his trial, defendant took the stand in his own defense. He stated that he was in Romano\u2019s Liquor Store between 7:30 P.M. and 8 P.M. on October 27, 1971. At that time he allegedly made some purchases and left the store. He then went to his brother\u2019s house nearby where he remained the rest of the night.\nOPINION\nDefendant contends that the in-court identifications of the witnesses were improperly admitted and constituted a denial of due process because they were the product of an unduly suggestive pre-trial confrontation. In support of his argument, defendant cites Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 87 S.Ct. 1967; People v. Blumenshine, 42 Ill.2d 508; Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 88 S.Ct. 967; People v. Fox, 48 Ill.2d 239; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926; and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 87 S.Ct. 1951. The State argues that the pre-trial identification of defendant at the police station was coincidental and not the product of a show-up as proscribed by such decisions. In People v. Pardue (1972), 6 Ill.App.3d 430, it was recently held that an inadvertent out-of-court confrontation leading to the identification of the accused need not in and of itself mandate the suppression of the out-of-court identification. An accidental confrontation does not vitiate the out-of-court identification, especially \u201cwhere the identification was immediate, spontaneous, unprompted and positive.\u201d See 6 Ill.App.3d 430 at 432, supra.\nIn the case at bar, the identification following the accidental confrontation was immediate, spontaneous, unprompted and positive. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the confrontation was anything but accidental. At the time of the confrontation defendant was in the custody of the State Police for violation of a traffic law. There is no evidence whatsoever that the identification of defendant in the police station constituted a staged show-up. Each witness based his positive in-court identification upon his actual view of the defendant at the scene of the robbery. At that time, the opportunity to observe was excellent, including the lighting and the length of time defendant was in close proximity to the witnesses. We find that the in-court identification of the defendant was reliably predicated upon observations independent of any pre-trial confrontation and that the trial court properly admitted such evidence.\nDefendant next argues that the indictment was defective in that it described the weapon as a dangerous weapon, without specifically naming it. It is a well established rule of law that an indictment framed in the words of the statute defining the offense is sufficient to inform the defendant of the nature of the charge against his. (People v. Mikota (1971), 1 Ill.App.3d 114.) Framed in the language of sections 18 \u2014 1 and 18 \u2014 2 of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, pars. 18 \u2014 1, 18 \u2014 2), the indictment sufficiently charged every element of the offense of armed robbery.\nNext it is argued that the sentence imposed was improper and contrary to the principles of indeterminate sentencing. Defendant was sentenced to a minimum of 7 years to a maximum of 7 years and a day. Because there is no appreciable \u201cspread\u201d between the minimum and the maximum sentence, defendant alleges error.\nThe most convincing fact militating against defendant\u2019s argument is that he requested the sentence imposed upon him. In addition, armed robbery is a Class 1 felony in Illinois. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 18 \u2014 2). For a Class 1 felony, any indeterminate sentence in excess of 4 years is appropriate. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141). Clearly the sentence of 7 years to 7 years and 1 day falls within the prescribed limits of the statute.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred in not following the American Bar Association recommendations for indeterminate sentencing. The American Bar Association advocates a one-to-three ratio between minimum and maximum sentences. Although the recommendations have been adopted by the State of Illinois (Illinois Unified Code of Corrections, ch. 38, arts. 1003 \u2014 3, 1003 \u2014 8, 1003 \u2014 9, 1003 \u2014 10, 1003 \u2014 11, 1003 \u2014 13), they are to be considered as a guide and not as a mandatory requirement for imposition of a proper sentence. People v. Hulvey (1972), 3 Ill.App.3d 617.\nBecause the sentence falls within the limits imposed by statute and was expressly requested by defendant it should not be disturbed.\nDefendant also presents a number of points which, when considered together, he believes show that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nWe cannot agree. The robbery occurred in a well-lighted liquor store. The robbers made no attempt to conceal their identity so that they were observed by the witnesses for almost a half hour. The conditions on which witnesses based identification of defendant were optimal. Considering all of defendant\u2019s argument as a whole, we find no reason to interfere with the trial court\u2019s finding of guilty. It is our opinion that defendant was afforded a fair trial and was convicted of the crime of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.\nFor the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nDRUCKER and LORENZ, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE BARRETT" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Shelvin Singer, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth L. Gillis and Linda West Conley, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Herbert Catlett, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 58499;\nFirst District (5th Division)\nJune 7, 1974.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Shelvin Singer, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kenneth L. Gillis and Linda West Conley, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0832-01", "first_page_order": 854, "last_page_order": 858 }