{ "id": 5347091, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Carr, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Carr", "decision_date": "1974-06-06", "docket_number": "No. 58771", "first_page": "838", "last_page": "839", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "20 Ill. App. 3d 838" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "279 N.E.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill.App.3d 1022", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2838619 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/1022-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2790543 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 N.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill.App.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8499014 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/88/0071-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 249, "char_count": 3170, "ocr_confidence": 0.721, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.658532773261018e-08, "percentile": 0.4519798258508508 }, "sha256": "08093982642bcd338d44cc20cb4f8c79b18fa8d2885f7eb67bf9f0ce80eb2513", "simhash": "1:903accd8fa4d4b8d", "word_count": 532 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:58:20.277928+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Carr, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE DEMPSEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe mezzanine section of Tumer-Fagman Clothiers, a clothing store located in the Sherman Hotel, Chicago, was broken into on a weekend in June 1970, and a quantity of merchandise was taken. The defendant, Richard Carr, was arrested for the crime, tried by a jury, found guilty and sentenced. The evidence proved him to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but two trial errors impel the reversal of his conviction and the remandment of his case for another trial.\nA fur coat with a Tumer-Fagman label was found in Carrs apartment. At this trial a motion was made to suppress this evidence. The court denied the motion without conducting a hearing to determine if the search and seizure was constitutionally permissible. The State concedes that this was error, but suggests that the case be remanded instead of reversed, with directions to vacate the judgment and to hold a hearing on the motion to suppress, and if the motion should be allowed to grant the defendant a new trial and if it is denied to enter a new judgment of conviction.\nThis is approved procedure (People v. Thomas (1967), 88 Ill.App.2d 71, 232 N.E.2d 259) and would be proper if the failure to conduct a hearing on the motion were the only trial error. However, it was not. A police officer injected into the case intimations that Carr had committed criminal offenses other than the burglary for which he was being tried. In his testimony the officer related a conversation he had with Carr after his arrest. He quoted Carr as saying that he worked with a person named Scott \u201cwho is buying all my stolen property * * The defendant\u2019s objection was overruled and the officer continued to testify that Carr said, \u201cScott, who was buying this stolen property, \u2022 * * was waiting out in the back of his [Carr\u2019s] building now to pick up the machines that were up in his apartment, the office machines.\u201d\nA defendant is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely with reference to the crime with which he is charged and evidence of other offenses unrelated to the crime from which he is on trial is incompetent. (People v. Gregory (1961), 22 Ill.2d 601, 177 N.E.2d 120; People v. Brown (1972), 3 Ill.App.3d 1022, 279 N.E.2d 765.) The references to all Carr\u2019s stolen property and to the office machines which were in Carr\u2019s apartment (no such machines had been taken in the Tumer-Fagman burglary) implied that Carr had been involved in other burglaries or thefts. There was no legal justification for informing the jury of this damaging portion of Carr\u2019s statement and its inclusion in the officer\u2019s testimony was prejudicial and denied the defendant a fair trial.\nThe judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcNAMARA, P. J., and McGLOON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE DEMPSEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Elliott T. Price, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., and John B. Adams, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Carr, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 58771;\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nJune 6, 1974.\nElliott T. Price, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., and John B. Adams, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0838-01", "first_page_order": 860, "last_page_order": 861 }