{ "id": 2461875, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT PRUSAK, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Prusak", "decision_date": "1990-07-27", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201488\u20141234", "first_page": "146", "last_page": "150", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 146" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5605566 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126284 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 1066", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3596631 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1070" }, { "page": "1070" }, { "page": "1070" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/1066-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2927159 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0447-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 525, "char_count": 9817, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.72068185004404e-07, "percentile": 0.8938372468819611 }, "sha256": "80611491949cee70f7e3b089da823abec3f6306618586c52b16e592113822363", "simhash": "1:ad8e5d1a915d1280", "word_count": 1578 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:01:37.473766+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT PRUSAK, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Robert Prusak, appeals from a circuit court order revoking his probation and sentencing him to a five-year term of imprisonment. Prusak argues that the court erred in determining that he violated the terms of his probation and the five-year term of imprisonment is excessive. We reverse and remand.\nOn October 28, 1986, Prusak pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 16(b)). This charge was based on allegations that Prusak knowingly fondled his daughter\u2019s breasts. The court sentenced Prusak to a three-year term of probation. As a condition of his probation, the court ordered that Prusak \u201cshall seek psychiatric evaluation in Sinnissippi Mental Health Center and shall cooperate with any treatment and recommendation made by that agency.\u201d\nShortly after his guilty plea, Prusak was evaluated by Robert Riley, the clinical supervisor of the center. Riley recommended that Prusak attend weekly meetings of the center\u2019s sexual offenders group. Prusak attended these meetings regularly until April 1987. At that time, Prusak was asked to leave the group due to his continued persistence that he did not remember having any inappropriate sexual contact with his daughter.\nOn May 21, 1987, the State filed a petition for revocation of Prusak\u2019s probation. The State alleged that Prusak failed to satisfy a condition of his probation because he was \u201cdiscontinued from services at Sinnissippi Mental Health Center due to his lack of cooperation.\u201d On June 4, 1987, Prusak denied the allegations in the petition and requested additional time to arrange alternative treatment at another facility. The court granted Prusak\u2019s request for a continuance. On July 1, the court again granted Prusak a continuance so he could undergo epilepsy treatment studies. On March 4, 1988, Prusak\u2019s counsel advised the court that Prusak also suffered from alcohol-related problems and had agreed to enroll in an appropriate program at the center. The State did not object to continuing the matter so long as the status of Prusak\u2019s treatment was reviewed within 90 days to determine if he was \u201cdesirous of participating.\u201d The State also informed the court that Prusak was complying with the other conditions imposed upon his probation.\nOn October 31, 1988, a hearing was held on the petition to revoke Prusak\u2019s probation. The court heard testimony from Robert Riley. Riley testified that he asked Prusak to leave the sexual offenders group in April 1987 due to Prusak\u2019s denial of \u201cany specific memory of any contact for the purposes of sexual arousal.\u201d Riley stated that this memory lapse affected Prusak\u2019s treatment because \u201cwe cannot treat a person very long for a problem he denies having.\u201d However, Riley did state that denial is \u201calmost universal\u201d amongst persons accused of sexual offenses. Riley also confirmed that Prusak had mental problems relating to trauma, alcohol abuse and past sexual abuse. Riley testified that Prusak was taking dilantin and phenobarbital during the time he was attending the group sessions and these drugs could have affected Prusak\u2019s memory functions.\nAdditionally, Riley testified that Prusak\u2019s presence in the group \u201cbecame somewhat disruptive to the group because he was the only person in the group who persistently maintained his innocence of sexual misconduct for such an extended period of time.\u201d However, Riley did state that he did not believe Prusak was making a conscious effort to be disruptive. Riley also stated that Prusak did everything that was required of him in the group sessions other than \u201caccept responsibility for his sexual misconduct.\u201d Prusak did, however, relate to the group particular incidents of physical contact with his daughter that Prusak thought his daughter may have misconstrued.\nThe court revoked Prusak\u2019s probation stating, \u201cThe defendant has, maybe has followed the letter of the order but certainly not the spirit of the order of probation.\u201d The court then set the matter for a sentencing hearing and stated, \u201cPeople tell me that you have reports from various hospitals, etc. I want to see all of those reports.\u201d The court also required Prusak to submit to a mental and physical examination.\nDuring the sentencing hearing, the court noted that there was a credibility problem regarding Prusak\u2019s loss of memory. The court concluded that \u201cthe defendant is a manipulator. *** Mr. Prusak, its [sic] the finding of this court that you are a manipulator, that you are not telling the truth and that you are a sexual deviate.\u201d The court then sentenced Prusak to a term of five years\u2019 imprisonment. Prusak appeals from the orders revoking his probation and sentencing him to a five-year term of imprisonment.\nIn a probation revocation proceeding the State must establish that the defendant violated a condition of his probation by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20146\u20144(c); People v. Crowell (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 447, 451; People v. Salamon (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1070.) The determination to terminate probation rests within the discretion of the trial court, and, absent a showing that the court\u2019s determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence, this court will not disturb the trial court\u2019s ruling. (Salamon, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 1070.) The decision to terminate probation is not per se against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because there is a conflict in the evidence. (Salamon, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 1070.) We find that the trial court\u2019s determination that Prusak violated a condition of his probation was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe facts in this case are not in dispute, and there is no conflict in the evidence. The trial court admitted that Prusak \u201cfollowed the letter of the order.\u201d However, the court found that Prusak did not follow \u201cthe spirit of the order of probation.\u201d The State has not cited, nor has this court found, any precedent that affirms the revocation of probation when the conditions imposed have been fully performed, but the \u201cspirit\u201d of the order has not been complied with.\nThe condition placed on Prusak\u2019s probation required him to seek treatment and \u201ccooperate with any treatment and recommendation made by [the Center].\u201d It is clear that Prusak submitted to an evaluation at the center. As a result of this examination, a treatment program was established pursuant to which Prusak was to attend weekly group counseling sessions. Riley testified that Prusak attended each and every counseling session required of him. Riley also testified that Prusak did everything that was required of him in the counseling sessions. The only thing that Prusak did not do was accept responsibility for his sexual misconduct. However, Riley stated that denial is \u201calmost universal\u201d amongst sex offenders. It appears that Prusak was simply exhibiting a common behavior of persons convicted of sexual misconduct. It seems paradoxical to classify an individual as a sex offender and sentence him to probation and then revoke his probation because he exhibits behavior commonly displayed by sex offenders.\nThis decision becomes more troubling when Prusak\u2019s physical and mental condition is taken into consideration. While it is true that even insanity is not a defense to a petition for revocation (see People v. Allegri (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 309, 317), the mental condition of the defendant is a factor to be considered in a revocation proceeding. (See People v. Welch (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 184.) The record indicates that Prusak does suffer from physical ailments that affect his mental abilities, including his ability to remember clearly. By denying any memory of the sexual misconduct for which he was convicted, he is again only exhibiting conduct expected from a person in his condition.\nApproximately one week after Prusak was dismissed from the group, Riley wrote a letter to Prusak\u2019s probation officer stating:\n\u201cBefore any more specific recommendations can be made, I believe that Robert needs to be referred to a medical facility for an exhaustive neurological and medical examination to determine if there is any medical condition present which could account for his impulsive behavior and extensive periods of (claimed) memory loss. Until said evaluation is completed, I do not believe that it is safe to the children now in the household for Robert to be living with them. Regardless of the outcome of such an evaluation, Robert has shown that he will not benefit from outpatient sexual offender services.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nSimply because Prusak did not benefit from fulfilling the condition imposed upon his probation does not mean that he did not satisfy the condition. The trial court improperly interpreted the condition of probation to mean that not only did Prusak have to undergo treatment, but he was also required to be \u201ccured.\u201d\nFor the reasons set forth above, we find that Prusak did not violate the conditions imposed upon his probation. Therefore, the order of the circuit court of Lee County revoking Prusak\u2019s probation and sentencing him-to a five-year term of imprisonment is reversed. This case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nINGLIS and REINHARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, Beth Katz, and Robert C. Cooper, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Daniel A. Fish, State\u2019s Attorney, of Dixon, and Richard E. Zulkey, of Zulkey, Pikarski & Gordon, Chartered, of Chicago (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT PRUSAK, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201488\u20141234\nOpinion filed July 27, 1990.\nG. Joseph Weller, Beth Katz, and Robert C. Cooper, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nDaniel A. Fish, State\u2019s Attorney, of Dixon, and Richard E. Zulkey, of Zulkey, Pikarski & Gordon, Chartered, of Chicago (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0146-01", "first_page_order": 168, "last_page_order": 172 }