{ "id": 2462402, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF KIMBERLY ANN LOMBAER, Petitioner-Appellant, and FOREST LOMBAER, JR., Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Lombaer", "decision_date": "1990-06-27", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201489\u20142929", "first_page": "712", "last_page": "725", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 712" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3071990 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5500261 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 N.E.2d 1289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1293" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 901", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3206220 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "906" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0901-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 N.E.2d 1093", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1095" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 1046", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3567243 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 N.E.2d 533", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1576575 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/126/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 1153", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1156" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3373841 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/48/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 N.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2716891 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0689-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1026, "char_count": 24425, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8204258215847209e-07, "percentile": 0.7191399961928282 }, "sha256": "d398d3b67891b3781b18ab6b9c72eaf72309bb22576e14f3d70f1e72fcdef304", "simhash": "1:8bada40371c4861e", "word_count": 3866 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:01:37.473766+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF KIMBERLY ANN LOMBAER, Petitioner-Appellant, and FOREST LOMBAER, JR., Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RIZZI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis matter is before the court as an interlocutory appeal from orders entered directing the deposition of a psychiatrist, the tendering of hospital records, exclusive possession of the marital residence, supervised visitation and temporary custody of the children. On appeal, petitioner-appellant, Kimberly Ann Lombaer (Kimberly), argues that the trial court erred (1) in ordering the discovery deposition of her psychiatrist and the turnover of hospital records; (2) in awarding temporary custody of the minor children to the respondent-appellee, Forest Lombaer, Jr. (Forest); (3) in ordering supervised visitation; and (4) in awarding exclusive possession of the marital residence to respondent. We reverse and remand.\nThe parties married in 1978. Their two children were born in 1983 and 1987, respectively. Kimberly became a full-time homemaker after the birth of their second child.\nIn January of 1989, Forest, a practicing attorney for 11 years, was notified by his law firm that his position would be terminated at the end of the year. Forest did not tell Kimberly of his termination until August of 1989. The parties discussed dissolving their marriage during the summer of 1989.\nAccording to Kimberly, on July 31, 1989, Forest struck and beat her. Forest denied these allegations and averred that he had to \u201cphysically restrain her to prevent her from harming herself by avoiding [prescribed] treatment.\u201d On August 1, 1989, Forest called the police and had Kimberly taken to Northwestern Memorial Hospital, where she remained until August 9,1989.\nOn August 25, 1989, Forest again summoned the police and Kimberly was taken to Illinois Masonic Medical Center. Kimberly was hospitalized from August 25 until October 23, 1989. While hospitalized, Kimberly spoke to the children everyday. She talked to the older child about her homework, school projects and her brother. Approximately once a week, Forest brought the children to visit Kimberly.\nKimberly learned that Forest had transferred over $45,000 from their joint banking account to an account in his name. She responded by transferring approximately $15,000 to an account in her name. In her petition for dissolution of marriage which she filed while hospitalized, Kimberly alleged that Forest subjected her to extreme cruelty, including striking and beating her and threatening to have her confined to a mental hospital. Kimberly requested custody of the children, restoration to and exclusive possession of the marital residence, support, an injunction restraining Forest from abusing her and interfering with her personal liberty and an order directing the redeposit of all funds into joint accounts.\nOn September 26, 1989, on a pass from the hospital and in anticipation of her immediate release, Kimberly presented an emergency motion for temporary child support, custody and exclusive possession of the marital apartment. The court set her motion for hearing on September 29, 1989, and granted Forest until September 28, 1989, to respond.\nSeptember 28, 1989, Forest filed an answer to the petition for dissolution of marriage and a counterpetition for dissolution in which he alleged that he had been forced to call for police assistance to get Kimberly to the. hospital to prevent her from harming herself by avoiding treatment, that she had several episodes of mental illness, needed psychiatric care, was unable to care for the children and should not be allowed exclusive possession of the residence. Forest also served notice that on the next day, he would be presenting a petition for order of protection and for change of venue.\nOn September 29, 1989, the trial court, instead of hearing Kimberly\u2019s motion for temporary relief, granted Forest\u2019s motion for a change of venue and the matter was reassigned to another judge. The new judge set Kimberly\u2019s emergency petition for temporary relief, as well as Forest\u2019s petition, for hearing on October 26,1989.\nOn October 10, 1989, Forest filed the petition for an order of protection, motions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 215(d) (107 Ill. 2d R. 215(d)) for a psychiatric examination of Kimberly, and for the issuance of subpoenas for the discovery depositions of psychiatrists Dr. Carl Jackson and Dr. Harry Whiteley.\nOn October 23, 1989, after her release from Illinois Masonic Medical Center, Kimberly arrived at the marital residence, accompanied by two police officers, and attempted to enter her home. Forest refused to allow her to enter, stating that it was not in the children\u2019s best interest to be disrupted by her arrival at 10:30 p.m. because a \u201cscene\u201d might take place or the children might be damaged. Kimberly tried to return to Illinois Masonic Hospital, but since there were no beds available, she went to Charter Barclay Hospital, where she stayed for two days prior to the October 26,1989, hearing.\nOn October 24, 1989, notwithstanding the scheduled October 26, 1989, hearing, Forest filed an emergency motion seeking to restrain Kimberly from communicating with their daughter\u2019s school, taking custody of the children and returning to the marital home. Within the motion it is stated that Kimberly\u2019s counsel would not return from vacation until October 25, 1989, and that Forest\u2019s attorney gave telephonic notice of the motion to the office secretary. The motion states that \u201c[t]here is a need for ex parte relief for the protection of the children and the stability and preservation of the status quo until the next court hearing.\u201d\nForest and his attorney presented the motion ex parte. Forest\u2019s counsel advised the court that Kimberly\u2019s counsel was on vacation; that the previous evening after her release from the hospital she returned home at 10:30 p.m., and had \u201cconstantly\u201d called the school. They sought exclusive possession and temporary custody for two days. The testimony elicited during this October 24, 1989, hearing was as follows:\n\u201cTHE COURT: You want exclusive possession? Does your wife have some facility? Does she have a place to live?\nTHE WITNESS [Forest]: I attempted to talk to her.\nTHE COURT: Does she have any relatives or friends?\nTHE WITNESS [Forest]: She has a couple of friends. That may be who she stayed with.\nTHE COURT: She stayed with one?\nMR. LOMBAER [Forest]: Yes.\u201d\nThe court granted the emergency motion ex parte allowing Forest exclusive possession of the residence, temporary custody of the children and an injunction forbidding Kimberly from harassing, entering or calling the school.\nDuring the October 26, 1989, hearing, Kimberly informed the court that she had no place to go and that a women\u2019s shelter had advised her on the night of October 23, 1989, to have the police escort her home. Forest\u2019s counsel argued that Kimberly\u2019s mental condition was at issue because she had been confined to psychiatric hospitals for 21k months; that the hospitalization was evidence that Kimberly would harm the children; and that he had a right to examine her treating physician because she had waived any privilege.\nDuring the October 26, 1989, hearing, when asked by the court, \u201cHave you exerted a privilege as to confidentiality between you and your doctor?\u201d the following exchange occurred:\n\u201cTHE WITNESS: I don\u2019t understand that question.\nTHE COURT: Well, the question is did you tell the doctor not to discuss your condition with your husband?\nTHE WITNESS: Yes, I did.\nTHE COURT: That is all the question is.\n[COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT]: What medication are you on? 1\nA. None.\nQ. None?\nA. None.\nQ. Was any medication prescribed to you while you were in the hospital?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. What medication was prescribed to you while you were in the hospital?\nA. This is sort of private.\n[COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER]: Just a moment. That is going to open the door on the question of waiving the privilege. I would have to object to that.\n[COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT]: There is no privilege on that kind of a question. This is not a confidential statement.\n[COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER]: The doctor had to prescribe something and that opens the door to the basis for his prescription.\nTHE COURT: I don\u2019t believe so. The objection is overruled. If she knows what medication she got, she should answer the question.\u201d\nThereafter, in response to the court\u2019s request for evidence that the mother\u2019s presence in the residence would harm the children, counsel stated that Kimberly had engaged in bizarre behavior, such as being awake all night, walking and waking the children. The court noted that even if Kimberly\u2019s conduct was unusual, it would not necessarily be harmful to the children and therefore the only condition under which he would exclude her from the residence would be for one week in order for her to participate in an independent medical examination.\nForest\u2019s counsel further argued for temporary custody, supervised visitation, and exclusive possession of the residence. In support thereof, Forest stated that Kimberly was restless, losing weight, irritable, nervous and short-tempered with the children. Forest stated that Kimberly did not properly supervise the children. He stated that their son, who was an extremely active toddler, had the \u201crun of the apartment\u201d with the result that it was messy when he arrived home in the evening.\nWhen further describing her bizarre behavior, Forest related that Kimberly looked out of binoculars at other high-rise buildings, ate baby food, and after a \u201cstop-smoking\u201d class, felt someone had drugged her water. Forest acknowledged, however, that throughout most of their lives, Kimberly had been a good mother to the children, bathing, cooking and managing their activities and schooling.\nForest\u2019s counsel argued that Kimberly\u2019s refusal to take prescribed medications caused problems and requested the court to order Dr. Jackson\u2019s deposition, stating that because he was no longer Kimberly\u2019s treating psychiatrist, deposing him would not interfere with the patient-physician privilege. The court agreed and ordered Dr. Jackson\u2019s deposition.\nThe court ordered that \u201cuntil further order of court the status quo shall remain\u201d and granted Forest temporary custody of the children and ordered supervised visitation based upon Kimberly\u2019s failure to take the prescribed medication. The court stated: \u201cAnd I have observed Kimberly, but I am not a doctor. She seems to me to be able to care for her children and she doesn\u2019t seem to be under any problem at this time. If a doctor recommends that a patient take medication upon release from a mental ward, there is a good reason for it. And the fact that there is no problem today doesn\u2019t mean that there won\u2019t be a problem later.\u201d Given Forest\u2019s promise to provide housing, the court entered an order continuing his exclusive possession of the residence.\nThis court stayed enforcement of the trial court\u2019s orders pending the resolution of this interlocutory appeal. In Illinois, the confidentiality of patient-physician communications, and the medical records relating to the resulting treatment, are protected by the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 911/2, par. 810) and the physician-patient privilege (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 8 \u2014 802). Information contained in such communications or records may be ordered under the specific exceptions listed in the statutes or after a conscious waiver of the privilege by the patient. Gottemoller v. Gottemoller (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 689, 695, 346 N.E.2d 393, 397.\n\u201cNo physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any information he or she may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character, necessary to enable him or her professionally to serve such patient, except *** in all actions brought by or against the patient *** wherein the patient\u2019s physical or mental condition is an issue.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 8\u2014802.) In the event of a conflict between this section and the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act shall control. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 8 \u2014 802.\nThe Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act provides that all records and communications shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed except as provided in the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 911/2, par. 803(a).) The records and communications may be disclosed only with the written consent of the recipient. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. QV-k, par. 805(a)(3).\nIn any civil, criminal, administrative or legislative proceeding, or in any proceeding preliminary thereto, a recipient, and a therapist on behalf and in the interest of a recipient, has the privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent the disclosure of the recipient\u2019s record or communications, except where the recipient introduces his or her mental condition or services received for such condition as an element of his or her claim or defense, and the court finds, after in camera examination of testimony or other evidence, that it is relevant, probative, not unduly prejudicial or inflammatory, and otherwise clearly admissible; that other satisfactory evidence is demonstrably unsatisfactory as evidence of the facts sought to be established by the evidence; and that disclosure is more important to the interests of substantial justice than protection from injury to the therapist-recipient relationship or to the recipient or other whom disclosure is likely to harm. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91V2, par. 810(a)(1).\nIn any action brought or defended under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 101 et seq.), however, mental condition shall not be deemed to be introduced merely by making such claim and shall be deemed to be introduced only if the recipient or witness on his behalf first testifies concerning the record or communication. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 9IV2, par. 810(a)(1).) Any order to disclose or to not disclose shall be considered a final order for purposes of appeal and shall be subject to interlocutory appeal. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 9IV2, par. 810(b).\nForest argues that this appeal was improperly filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1). (107 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1).) We disagree and find that we have jurisdiction to review the orders directing the doctor\u2019s deposition and the production of the medical records, which, in effect, enjoin Kimberly and her physician from asserting their privilege. In addition, we will review the orders enjoining Kimberly from entering and residing in the marital home, and having custody of and unsupervised visitation with her children.\nMost importantly, Kimberly did not first testify concerning the privileged communications or records. She did not introduce her mental condition into the proceedings. Rather, Kimberly and her counsel tried to assert her right to confidentiality and her physician-patient privilege. Therefore, we reverse the order directing the deposition of Kimberly\u2019s psychiatrist, Dr. Carl Jackson, and the disclosure or production of the hospital records relative to her psychiatric treatment. We are not persuaded by the argument that since the physician-patient relationship had been terminated, the privilege no longer exists.\nThe statutory privilege is a legislative balancing between relationships which society thinks should be fostered through the shield of confidentiality and the interests served by disclosure of the information in court. The legislature has determined that, except for limited purposes, there is more value to encouraging and sustaining this kind of relationship. (In re Westland (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 172, 176-77, 362 N.E.2d 1153, 1156.) The beneficent purposes of psychiatry can only be fully realized when the patient knows that what is revealed in the evaluation conferences or communications are free from judicial scrutiny unless the patient affirmatively places her mental condition into issue. (Tylitzki v. Triple X Service, Inc. (1970), 126 Ill. App. 2d 144, 149, 261 N.E.2d 533, 536.) This patient-physician privilege should not be eroded by judicial construction. (Tylitzki, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 150.) We are mindful of the welfare of the children and note that psychiatric testimony deemed necessary in order to determine the best interests of the children may be obtained via the court-ordered psychiatric examination.\nIn addition to the trial court\u2019s failure to observe Kimberly\u2019s decision not to introduce her mental condition into the proceedings, the trial court did not comply with the other statutory requirements when it compelled the therapist\u2019s deposition and the production of the records. The record reveals that an in camera examination did not take place. There were no findings that the testimony and/or evidence was relevant, probative, not unduly prejudicial or inflammatory; that other satisfactory evidence was demonstrably unsatisfactory; and that disclosure was more important to the interests of substantial justice than protection from injury to the therapist-recipient relations or to the recipient. We cannot condone such disregard of the statutory mandate.\nSimilarly, the trial court erred when making the temporary child custody determination. The court may award temporary custody under the standards of section 602 and subsection (a) of section 602.1, after a hearing, or, if there is no objection, solely on the basis of the affidavits. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 603(a).) The standards within section 602 provide that the court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child giving consideration to:\n\u201c(1) the wishes of the child\u2019s parent or parents as to his custody;\n(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;\n(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the child\u2019s best interest;\n(4) the child\u2019s adjustment to his home, school and community;\n(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; and\n(6) the physical violence or threat of physical violence by the child\u2019s potential custodian, whether directed against the child or directed against another person but witnessed by the child.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 602.\nThe trial court failed to conduct a hearing in accordance with these statutory requirements. While specific findings of fact are not required under section 602, there must be some indication in the record that the court considered the various factors. (In re Marriage of Slavenas (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 581, 585, 487 N.E.2d 739, 741.) Here, there is no indication that the court considered the various factors. Virtually no evidence was adduced as to the children\u2019s best interests. Rather, the court \u00bfwarded Forest temporary custody based upon Kimberly\u2019s failure to take medication. Since there was no fair or adequate consideration of all of the aforementioned factors, we reverse the order granting Forest temporary custody of the children and remand for a determination of temporary custody based upon the best interests of the children in accordance with the statutorily mandated considerations. Parenthetically, we note that when making a custody determination an important consideration is which parent provided the primary care to the children. Cooper v. Cooper (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 943, 951, 497 N.E.2d 805, 810.\nAlthough we are remanding this matter for a determination of temporary custody, we will address the visitation issue. This discussion, however, in no way suggests which parent should be awarded custody or excludes the possibility of joint custody. Custody determinations are for the court below after consideration of the previously referred to proper factors.\nDeficiencies occurred when the court ordered supervised visitation. \u201cA parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger seriously the child\u2019s physical, mental, moral or emotional health.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 607(a).) \u201cThe court *** shall not restrict a parent\u2019s visitation rights unless it finds that the visitation would endanger seriously the child\u2019s physical, mental, moral or emotional health.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 607(c).) The custodial parent bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that visitation would seriously endanger the children. (In re Marriage of Neat (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1048, 428 N.E.2d 1093, 1095.) The court must conduct a hearing on the issue of restricted visitation and grant supervised visitation only after making the extraordinary finding that visitation would endanger seriously the child\u2019s or children\u2019s physical, mental, moral or emotional health. In re Marriage of Solomon (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 901, 906, 405 N.E.2d 1289, 1293.\nWe find as a matter of law that the evidence of Kimberly\u2019s hospitalization and failure to take medication is insufficient to meet the onerous standard of serious endangerment, particularly in light of the absence of expert testimony that the medication was necessary to prevent her from harming herself or others, Forest\u2019s acknowledgment that Kimberly had been a good mother over the years, and Kimberly\u2019s testimony that she was not required to take the medication. (In re Marriage of Johnson (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 767, 427 N.E.2d 374.) Accordingly, we reverse the order providing for Kimberly\u2019s supervised visitation of her children.\nThe right to exclusive possession of the marital residence may be granted only upon the party\u2019s presentation of sufficient evidence that the \u201cphysical or mental well being of either spouse or their children is jeopardized by occupancy of the marital residence by both spouses, and only upon due notice and full hearing, unless waived by the court on good cause shown.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 701.\nWe find that the evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish that the mental or physical well being of the parties or the children would be jeopardized by Kimberly\u2019s presence within the marital residence. (In re Marriage of Hofstetter (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 392, 430 N.E.2d 79.) Likewise, we find the evidence insufficient to establish a risk of abuse by Kimberly and/or that the balance of hardships favors Forest. Specifically, there is nothing in the record to support the October 24, 1989, finding of the trial court that: \u201cThe Court has considered the nature, frequency, severity, pattern and consequences of past abuse and the likelihood of future abuse to Petitioner or any member of Petitioner\u2019s or Respondent\u2019s family or household.\u201d\nAdditionally, we find no basis for the ruling that the harm that the protective order was intended to prevent would have been likely to occur if respondent had been given prior notice or greater notice than that which was given, particularly because no evidence of harm was presented. The order prohibiting Kimberly from entering and calling her daughter\u2019s school was overly restrictive and not within the parameters of the court\u2019s discretion. Accordingly, we reverse the October 26, 1989, order and the October 24, 1989, protective order, granting, inter alia, exclusive possession of the marital residence, and remand for hearing in accordance with the statute.\nIn summation, we reverse the orders of October 24, 1989, and October 26, 1989, granting temporary custody, exclusive possession and supervised visitation; prohibiting Kimberly from entering and calling the school; directing Dr. Jackson\u2019s deposition; the production of the hospital records; and remand for hearing consistent with this opinion. The provision of the October 26, 1989, order granting the psychiatric examination pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 215(a) was not addressed on appeal and that provision of the order remains in effect.\nReversed and remanded.\nCERDA, RJ., and FREEMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RIZZI" } ], "attorneys": [ "Schiller, DuCanto & Fleck, Ltd., of Chicago (Charles J. Fleck and Sarane C. Siewerth, of counsel), for appellant.", "Handel, Lipton & Stevenson, of Chicago (Richard L. Handel, R. Peter Carey, and Uve R. Jerzy, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF KIMBERLY ANN LOMBAER, Petitioner-Appellant, and FOREST LOMBAER, JR., Respondent-Appellee.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20142929\nOpinion filed June 27, 1990.\nSchiller, DuCanto & Fleck, Ltd., of Chicago (Charles J. Fleck and Sarane C. Siewerth, of counsel), for appellant.\nHandel, Lipton & Stevenson, of Chicago (Richard L. Handel, R. Peter Carey, and Uve R. Jerzy, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0712-01", "first_page_order": 734, "last_page_order": 747 }