{ "id": 2461066, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLEMENT VAUGHN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Vaughn", "decision_date": "1990-06-29", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201488\u20141460", "first_page": "765", "last_page": "772", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 765" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "508 N.E.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 805", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3466392 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0805-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3409000 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3218603 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 N.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3514909 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 N.E.2d 441", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "analyzing courtroom \"workgroups\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2856293 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "analyzing courtroom \"workgroups\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 N.E.2d 617", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201362 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 475", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2258 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "1178-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 N.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2971212 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 N.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill. 2d 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5320860 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 N.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 2d 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2910155 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/49/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 N.E.2d 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3102209 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 213", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" }, { "page": "218" }, { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3467836 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" }, { "page": "593" }, { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 N.E.2d 1269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1274" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538082 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 U.S. 60", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 374640 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75-76" }, { "page": "702" }, { "page": "467-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/315/0060-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 788, "char_count": 17292, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.898308687406944e-07, "percentile": 0.7299686197921191 }, "sha256": "6d3622563a2ec3d7eead48704a953a59994f3bbb582e52595974f3ed9123b1a6", "simhash": "1:a9dc4097735e8ff4", "word_count": 2873 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:01:37.473766+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLEMENT VAUGHN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COCCIA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Clement Vaughn, was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 12\u201414(a)(2), (b)(1)), and pled guilty to that charge on February 19, 1988. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment.\nOn March 16, 1988, defendant filed a pro se motion to vacate the guilty plea, alleging that his attorney, Assistant Public Defender Viola Rouse, had rendered ineffective assistance when she advised him to plead guilty. On March 18, 1988, a hearing was held on the motion, at which the trial court advised defendant that he had the right to the services of an attorney. The court informed defendant that it would appoint Assistant Public Defender Steve Helis if defendant desired representation. The defendant requested an attorney from the Chicago Bar Association, noting that Helis had been his attorney\u2019s trial partner when his case was first heard. The trial court denied the request, and the defendant proceeded pro se.\nAt the hearing, defendant claimed that he was misled by his attorney because she failed to explain particular aspects of his case before he pled guilty. The court concluded that defendant\u2019s claim had no merit and that he was seeking to withdraw his guilty plea because he had simply changed his mind. The court then denied defendant\u2019s motion.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that he should have been allowed to file a new motion to vacate his plea. He argues that the trial court failed to admonish him in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 605 (107 Ill. 2d R. 605); that the court failed to advise him of his right to an attorney and to a copy of the plea transcript for use in the preparation of the motion to vacate the plea; and, finally, that defendant\u2019s waiver of counsel on the motion to vacate was invalid because the court failed to consider defendant\u2019s argument that the attorney the court offered to appoint had a conflict of interest and because the court failed to warn defendant of the dangers of proceeding pro se. For reasons which follow, we reverse the-trial court\u2019s order and. remand for further proceedings.\nDefendant pled guilty to aggravated criminal sexual assault but-then sought to vacate the plea. (107 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).) He filed a timely pro se motion to do so, and at the hearing on the motion, the court offered to appoint Assistant Public Defender Helis or allow defendant to proceed pro se. The following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Mr. Vaughn, you have a right if you wish to have the services of [sic] attorney to represent you during these proceedings, and if you wish I would appoint Mr. Steve Helis to represent you if you want that. Otherwise you are free to speak up on your own behalf in connection with your motion to withdraw your guilty plea.\nMR. VAUGHN: Well, your Honor, I would like to be, if I can, be appointed a bar association lawyer.\nTHE COURT: No, I won\u2019t do that.\nMR. VAUGHN: This case is a matter of ground points, Point 4, good reasons \u2014 .\nTHE COURT: Tell me what those reasons are. You didn\u2019t get along with Miss Rouse it appears?\nMR. VAUGHN: No, sir, I didn\u2019t.\nTHE COURT: Mr. Helis is not Miss Rouse. If you want his help, but I can\u2019t force it on you.\nMR. VAUGHN: I figure that they working together, and that is the chance that I didn\u2019t want to take in this matter of time.\nTHE COURT: There has been a recent Supreme Court case, and the name of it escapes me, in which the Supreme Court said unless there are specific reasons for showing that there is a conflict of interest between the two attorneys, there is no per se conflict of interest just because they happen to be in the same office. In this case I know of no per se conflict, so I am not going to appoint anyone from the bar association. I will appoint someone from the Public Defender\u2019s Office, and Mr. Helis is from the Public Defender\u2019s Office. If you wish his services, I will be more than happy to appoint him to represent you, because you certainly don\u2019t want Miss Rouse, and I understand that.\nMR. VAUGHN: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: But I am not going to appoint an attorney from the bar association unless you \u2014 .\nMR. VAUGHN: So I will go along pro se.\u201d\nAfter hearing further arguments by defendant, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion. The record does not include any statements by, or to, attorneys Rouse or Helis which would indicate their attendance at this hearing. The assistant State\u2019s Attorney was present and gave a brief argument in opposition to defendant\u2019s motion.\nThe right to effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the Federal Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV), and the State Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a78), includes the right to have the undivided loyalty of counsel, free from any conflict of interest. (Glasser v. United States (1942), 315 U.S. 60, 75-76, 86 L. Ed. 680, 702, 62 S. Ct. 457, 467-68; People v. Free (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 154, 167, 492 N.E.2d 1269, 1274; People v. Sanchez (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 586, 591, 515 N.E.2d 213, 216.) Here, the trial court offered only to appoint attorney Helis, despite defendant\u2019s concern that a conflict existed because Helis had been Rouse\u2019s partner when the case was first heard by the trial court.\nWhile the record before us does not indicate that the two were partners at the time, we take judicial notice of the contents of the records on appeal in People v. Carter (1st Dist.), No. 1\u201488\u20143102, and People v. Clayborn (1st Dist.), No. 1\u201488\u20141968, which do reflect a working relationship between the two attorneys during the time in question. Specifically, as reflected in the record in Clayborn, Rouse stated, \u201cI have spoken to Mr. Helis, who is my partner in this courtroom.\u201d In granting defendant\u2019s motion to supplement the record with documentation from these cases, we have reconsidered our prior order permitting same, and have again concluded that we have the authority to do so. (See People v. Williams (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 309, 314-15, 444 N.E.2d 136, 138; People v. Siglar (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 491, 495-96, 274 N.E.2d 65, 67; Fox v. Fox (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 509, 517-18, 138 N.E.2d 547, 552; People v. Alexander (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 457, 460, 352 N.E.2d 245, 247; M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7202.2 (5th ed. 1990).) While taking judicial notice of these records to the extent that they are of assistance in clarifying defendant\u2019s contentions, we wish to make two observations. First, we are considering these documents only as they reflect that the same two attorneys involved in this case, Helis and Rouse, have apparently provided joint representation to other defendants before the same trial judge who heard Vaughn\u2019s plea and motion, and that at least once during February of 1988, Rouse, in addressing the court, referred to Helis as \u201cher partner in [that judge\u2019s] courtroom.\u201d This much is a matter of public record, and we accept the authenticity of the aforementioned records on appeal. However, we state no opinion whatsoever as to the specific working relationship of the two attorneys at the time of, prior to, or subsequent to, defendant\u2019s hearings, the nature of that relationship as creating a potential conflict of interest precluding Helis\u2019 unfettered advocacy of defendant\u2019s claims, or the possible merits of defendant\u2019s underlying ineffective assistance claim as it relates to Rouse. These are matters for the trial court to determine. Furthermore, we wish to point out that defendant\u2019s expressed fear of representation by attorney Helis because he and Rouse were \u201cworking together,\u201d however inarticulate, was sufficient, without further factual substantiation by defendant at that point in the hearing, to meet the legal standards discussed below, so as to require further inquiry by the trial court as to whether a potential conflict of interest existed.\nIn Holloway v. Arkansas (1978), 435 U.S. 475, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426, 98 S. Ct. 1173, the Supreme Court determined that if counsel brings a conflict to the trial court\u2019s attention, the trial court is under a duty to either appoint separate counsel or determine whether the conflict is so remote that separate counsel is not necessary. (Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 434, 98 S. Ct. at 1178-79.) While Holloway involved multiple defendants and counsel\u2019s bringing the conflict to the trial court\u2019s attention, rather than a defendant acting pro se, its rationale is applicable here. Accordingly, once the defendant raised specific facts supporting the existence of a conflict, the trial court had a duty to conduct an inquiry to determine the necessity of appointing alternate counsel. The trial court here failed to consider defendant\u2019s contention that the relationship between the two assistant public defenders presented a serious conflict of interest. While it is true that assistant public defenders may argue the ineffectiveness of one another, the fact that these two attorneys were alleged to be working together as trial partners created sufficient circumstances to indicate the possible presence of an actual conflict of interest. People v. Banks (1987), 121 Ill. 2d 36, 520 N.E.2d 617; People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109, 239 N.E.2d 441; see generally J. Eisenstein & H. Jacob, Felony Justice: an Organizational Analysis of Criminal Courts (1977) (analyzing courtroom \u201cworkgroups\u201d).\nThe State argues that under the rule of People v. Banks (1987), 121 Ill. 2d 36, 520 N.E.2d 617, no per se conflict of interest existed and therefore defendant\u2019s right to conflict-free counsel was not violated. The court in Banks, however, did not hold that there could never be a conflict of interest when one assistant public defender must assert the ineffectiveness of another; rather, it held that a case-by-case inquiry should be conducted to determine if any special circumstances indicate the existence of a conflict. (People v. Banks, 121 Ill. 2d at 44, 520 N.E.2d at 621.) Thus, the analysis is twofold. First, the trial court must determine whether a per se conflict exists, so as to preclude representation. Such a conflict exists where defense counsel has professional commitments to others having interests clearly antagonistic to the interests of the accused. \u201cPer se conflicts arise because' defense counsel\u2019s professional commitments to others would by their nature subject counsel to subtle pressures which could adversely affect counsel\u2019s representation of the accused.\u201d (People v. Sanchez (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 586, 593, 515 N.E.2d 213, 218.) Second, if no per se conflict exists, the defendant must show the existence of an actual conflict and actual prejudice resulting from the appointed attorney\u2019s representation. (Sanchez, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 594, 515 N.E.2d at 217.) Here, the court declined to even consider defendant\u2019s contention that a conflict existed because of the working relationship of the two assistant public defenders, or to conduct any further investigation into that contention. The defendant was certainly prejudiced when forced to choose between potentially conflict-ridden counsel or no counsel before proceeding with the hearing. Because the trial court failed to conduct an inquiry as to the existence of the conflict, the trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion must be reversed and the case remanded so that the trial court may conduct such an inquiry.\nWhile this case must, in any event, be remanded for a determination regarding the conflict of interest question, we further observe, with regard to defendant\u2019s other contentions, that Illinois courts have long supported and protected a criminal defendant\u2019s right to counsel at each critical stage of any trial proceedings. (People v. Ledbetter (1988), 174 Ill. App. 3d 234, 237, 528 N.E.2d 375, 377.) As our supreme court has recently stated:\n\u201c[T]he rules adopted by this court concerning criminal defendants and guilty pleas are in fact rules of procedure and not suggestions. It is incumbent upon counsel and courts alike to follow. them. Rules 402, 604(d) and 605(b), which concern guilty pleas, are meant to mesh together not only to ensure that defendants\u2019 constitutional rights are protected, but also to avoid abuses by defendants.\u201d (People v. Wilk (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 93, 103, 529 N.E.2d 218, 221.)\nMoreover, this court has specifically held that a defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel in the preparation of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea, which is a critical stage of the proceedings, and has remanded a case with directions to appoint an attorney for this purpose where the trial court failed to do so. (See People v. Black (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 417, 420, 371 N.E.2d 71, 73.) It is apparent from the trial record that the judge, in accepting defendant\u2019s guilty plea on February 19, 1988, failed to advise defendant that (1) a copy of the transcript of the plea and sentencing proceedings would be provided free of charge to him, and that counsel would be appointed to assist him in the preparation of the motion to vacate (107 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)(5)), and (2) any issue or claim of error not raised in the motion to vacate the judgment and to withdraw his guilty plea would be deemed waived on appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)(6)). While the record does not indicate that Assistant Public Defender Rouse ever officially withdrew from defendant\u2019s case following his guilty plea, it is obvious that defendant did not receive an attorney\u2019s assistance in preparing his motion to vacate and the accompanying affidavit. Defendant nonetheless made a valiant effort to express his claims of error, without benefit of attorney or transcript, and managed to properly file his motion within the 30-day period required to preserve his right of appeal. However, without the assistance to which he was entitled, defendant was operating at a great disadvantage which was inconsistent with the adequate protection of his rights. We therefore hold that the trial court\u2019s failure to advise defendant in accordance with Rules 605(b)(5) and (b)(6) was error. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to an attorney\u2019s assistance in amending or completely redrafting his original motion to vacate.\nFor the above-stated reasons, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order of March 18, 1988, denying defendant\u2019s motion to vacate his guilty plea. We further remand this case to the trial court, with directions to take the following steps. The trial court will conduct its own investigation to determine whether there are facts and circumstances, in this particular case, which indicate a conflict of interest which would preclude attorney Helis\u2019 representation of defendant in preparing and arguing a motion to vacate which, inter alia, alleges the ineffective assistance of attorney Rouse. In conducting this inquiry, the court should also receive the opinion of attorney Helis as to the presence of any potential or actual conflict of interest. If hearings are held in the course of this inquiry, defendant should have the assistance of other counsel in voicing his concerns and should not be permitted to proceed pro se. After the court has reached its determination as to whether the facts and circumstances indicate a conflict of interest precluding Helis\u2019 representation of defendant, it will state its findings of fact and its conclusions for the record, and will appoint an attorney, other than Rouse, to assist defendant in amending or entirely redrafting his motion to vacate. Defendant may include any appropriate legal grounds in support of his motion, and any claim appearing in either his original or redrafted motion will not be waived on appeal to this court. We would caution defendant that it would be in his best interest to accept the assistance of the attorney so appointed. We further note that although Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (107 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) provides for counsel to be appointed for indigents when they seek to withdraw a guilty plea by presenting a motion to the court, it does not accord any right to proceed pro se. Whether a defendant is permitted to represent himself at a hearing under Rule 604(d) is a matter within the trial court\u2019s discretion. (People v. Hanna (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 805, 813-14, 508 N.E.2d 765, 771.) Defendant\u2019s appointed counsel should also file the required certificate of compliance as provided in Rule 604(d) and represent defendant at hearings on the motion to vacate, following which the court shall enter an order granting or denying defendant\u2019s motion.\nAccordingly, the trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nLORENZ and MURRAY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COCCIA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Maria Harrigan, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Bonnie Meyer Sloan, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Renee Goldfarb and Donna J. Norton, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLEMENT VAUGHN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201488\u20141460\nOpinion filed June 29, 1990.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Maria Harrigan, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Bonnie Meyer Sloan, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Renee Goldfarb and Donna J. Norton, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0765-01", "first_page_order": 787, "last_page_order": 794 }