{ "id": 2592369, "name": "ROBERT G. PRYOR, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Rockwell International, Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Pryor v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1990-08-08", "docket_number": "No. 5-89-0005WC", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "10", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "505 N.E.2d 1062", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3609337 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3097695 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 N.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474046 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 N.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3589455 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 1185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3466073 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3466735 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5494602 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 N.E.2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 880", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499734 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0880-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 N.E.2d 1026", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179453 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3097695 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0030-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 812, "char_count": 19320, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.290150911590347e-08, "percentile": 0.5121758063887122 }, "sha256": "6b692311e0e2a51e1a6786f1c7dc076986b48b3993f93cb1f846762f6fd88d11", "simhash": "1:6a2b289d3d664a6c", "word_count": 3106 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:55.467533+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROBERT G. PRYOR, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Rockwell International, Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nClaimant, Bob G. Pryor, sought worker\u2019s compensation benefits following an alleged accident while working for respondent Rockwell International. An arbitrator awarded $219.74 per week for 236/v weeks as temporary total disability benefits, plus $7,829 for medical expenses. The Industrial Commission (Commission), with one member dissenting, reversed the arbitrator\u2019s decision, finding no award should be made because claimant failed to prove he sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment. The circuit court of Marion County reversed, finding the Commission\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nClaimant began working for respondent in October 1983. In 1985, he was a molder, and his job required bending over to pick up six to eight pounds of material from a box, cut it, and bend over to hand the material to a trimmer every 90 seconds. In late July 1985, one of the two molder jobs, and one of the two trimmer jobs, were eliminated. Claimant, therefore, asserted that his workload doubled. He soon noticed pain shooting down his lower back and right leg.\nOn August 19, 1985, claimant saw Dr. Michael Murphy, a neurosurgeon. He gave no history of a work-related injury.\nOn September 4, 1985, claimant felt increased pain at work. He testified that he reported the problem to the plant nurse, the plant supervisor, Frank Franczyk, and several other employees. Claimant was told he would need a doctor\u2019s authorization to go on medical leave. He stopped working on that day.\nOn August 19 and September 12, 1985, claimant signed group insurance claim forms which stated that no accident was involved. Claimant testified that Franczyk told him it was too late to file a worker\u2019s compensation claim, and that an accident was only when, e.g., an object fell on the worker and injured him. Claimant testified, however, that he understood accidents could occur in other ways.\nOn September 24, 1985, claimant returned to Dr. Murphy. On October 19, 1985, back surgery was performed. On April 10, 1986, claimant returned to work for respondent. Claimant testified at the arbitration hearing that he continued to experience leg and back problems.\nClaimant also testified regarding a preexisting condition. In 1976, claimant injured his back when he was pinned between two trucks. He was treated by Dr. Murphy. In 1978, both legs became numb and he could not walk. After six months of treatment, Dr. Murphy performed a laminectomy in July 1978. From that time until the time of the arbitration hearing, claimant experienced some numbness in his left leg. He had no further problems with his back until July 1985, although he worked at several laborer jobs during the intervening years.\nClaimant denied any leg injuries since 1978. He agreed, however, that in January 1984 he reported to his supervisor that he had injured his knees. In 1983, claimant passed a preemployment physical with respondent.\nAnn Marie Pryor, claimant\u2019s wife, testified that in late August 1985 claimant began having physical difficulty working around the house and getting up from the couch.\nFrank Franczyk testified for both parties. He denied speaking with claimant on September 4, 1985, about a work injury. In October 1985, he spoke with a union representative and claimant about filing the worker\u2019s compensation claim.\nDr. Murphy testified at a January 28, 1986, evidence deposition. In 1978, claimant had a herniated disc at L4-L5 and L5-S1 levels.\nOn August 19, 1985, he saw claimant. A patient information sheet indicated that he had a worker\u2019s compensation claim. Objective findings were present, including some residuals from the 1978 surgery. An August 19 letter which Dr. Murphy wrote to claimant\u2019s physician made no mention of trauma at work.\nOn September 24, 1985, claimant told Dr. Murphy he had suffered back pain when pulling material from a box at work. Tests revealed a herniated disc at L4-L5 and L5-S1 levels. On October 18, 1985, a lumbar fusion was performed.\nDr. Murphy opined: \u201cI don\u2019t think [the back condition] was caused by [the work activities], but I suspect it was pre-existing and was aggravated by it.\u201d He also said that the condition could \u201coccur with as little as the activities of daily living\u201d because the condition was \u201ca time bomb\u201d waiting to go off. The disc condition was degenerative in nature and could be long standing. The diagnostic findings could be there without trauma and were consistent with post-operative changes. The 1985 surgery revealed a calcified disc fragment, which could result from the prior injury.\nThe arbitrator found claimant had suffered an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with respondent. The arbitrator relied on Dr. Murphy\u2019s opinion that claimant\u2019s condition was related to the work activities and that his preexisting condition was aggravated by the work duties.\nThe Commission reversed, finding insufficient evidence of a compensable injury. It relied on the fact that initially claimant did not report a work injury to Dr. Murphy; that the medical insurance forms did not specify a work accident; and that Dr. Murphy \u201csuspected the work history of pulling of materials described by [claimant], aggravated the preexisting herniated disc, not caused it.\u201d A dissenting member asserted that the majority erred in relying on claimant\u2019s failure to classify his repetitive injury as an \u201caccident.\u201d\nThe trial court reversed the Commission, finding its decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court pointed out that from 1978 until July 1985, claimant was without symptoms and that the new symptoms coincided with the doubling of claimant\u2019s workload. The court found that the evidence, including Dr. Murphy\u2019s opinion on causation, established that claimant had suffered a repetitive injury which aggravated a preexisting condition.\nWhether a work-related accident occurred and whether it caused a worker\u2019s condition of ill-being are questions of fact for the Commission. (Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 607, 531 N.E.2d 174.) The Commission must weigh the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom. This court may not overturn the Commission\u2019s decision merely because it might have drawn different inferences. Niles Police Department v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1981), 83 Ill. 2d 528, 416 N.E.2d 243.\nRecovery is properly denied where the employee\u2019s health has so deteriorated that any normal daily activity is an overexertion, or where the activity engaged in presents risks no greater than those to which the general public is exposed. (Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 30, 440 N.E.2d 861.) Where a preexisting condition is aggravated, the employee must show that the employment significantly contributed to the injury by placing the employee in a position increasing the dangerous effects of the physical act which revealed the condition of ill-being. See Elliot v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 238, 505 N.E.2d 1062.\nOnce claimant\u2019s physician testified without contradiction that any normal daily activity could produce the herniated disc, this court should not step in and prohibit the Commission from relying on that expert opinion.\nClaimant argues that the work duties significantly contributed to the back injury because petitioner was bending over every few minutes to lift six to eight pounds of material out of a box. The Commission was entitled to rely on Dr. Murphy\u2019s opinion that the work might have aggravated but did not cause the herniated disc. Dr. Murphy agreed that the condition of petitioner\u2019s back was a \u201ctime bomb\u201d waiting to go off. Interestingly, he added that any employer was \u201cnuts to hire him\u201d because they would not \u201cget their money\u2019s worth.\u201d Dr. Murphy emphatically stated that the disc would herniate without any trauma at all. It could occur with \u201cas little as the activities of daily living,\u201d such as sneezing, or bending over to tie his shoes, or \u201canything.\u201d Dr. Murphy testified that he expected the disc problems to show up again after the 1978 surgery \u201cone way or the other.\u201d\nThus, the Commission could reasonably infer that petitioner could have herniated the disc by bending over to pick up a newspaper, bending over at the grocery store to pick up food, or bending over at the gas station to check his tires. The need to bend over, even repeatedly, is not unique to petitioner\u2019s work. It is not sufficient that the pain from a condition of ill-being might have been experienced at work. The act of bending over does not establish, as a matter of law, the existence of a risk greater than those faced outside of work. See Elliot v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 153 Ill. App. 3d 238, 505 N.E.2d 1062.\nDr. Murphy\u2019s testimony apparently undermined claimant\u2019s contention that the change in workload triggered claimant\u2019s October condition. Significantly, Dr. Murphy believed the work duties \u201caggravated\u201d the preexisting condition only because he found calcification on the disc fragment nerve root during the October 1985 surgery and assumed it had been there for some time. \u201cIt takes a while, and I can\u2019t tell you how many days for something to calcify. I assume that\u2019s over a period of time, and I think maybe six to twelve months.\u201d Dr. Murphy, of course, was apparently unaware of the timing of the change in the workload. The only detail he recited regarding the work duties and their aggravation of the back condition was a vague statement that the possibility of aggravation \u201cseems to be consistent with the story that [claimant] told.\u201d In fact, petitioner complained of pain within weeks after the workload changed, and within two months underwent the operation which revealed the longstanding calcification. Dr. Murphy also stated that it would be \u201cunusual\u201d for trauma-induced herniation to result in calcification within only two months.\nThe Commission was also entitled to rely on the fact claimant delayed reporting to his physician a history of trauma at work for over a month, until September 24,1985.\nAlthough there is an early reference to a worker\u2019s compensation claim, the Commission could also rely on the fact that in August and September 1985, claimant completed insurance forms stating he did not claim a work-related accident. It is true that a worker need not understand the exact meaning the law imparts to the term \u201caccident,\u201d particularly in a repetitive trauma case. However, while not fatal to the claim, the Commission, as trier of fact, was free to disbelieve claimant\u2019s explanation as to why he failed to tell his physician the pain was work related and failed to note on the insurance claim forms that a work-related injury was involved.\nWe hold that the Commission\u2019s decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Marion County is reversed, and the Commission\u2019s decision, awarding no benefits to claimant, is reinstated.\nJudgment reversed.\nMcCULLOUGH and LEWIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BARRY and JUSTICE WOODWARD\ndissenting:\nWe respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The majority treats this appeal as merely a determination of whether the Commission\u2019s decision, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We cannot agree. As the dissenting Commissioner and the circuit court noted, the Commission\u2019s majority decision misapplied the law to the facts. When the law is correctly applied to the Commission\u2019s factual findings, which came from the nearly uncontroverted evidence, it is clear that the petitioner proved his case.\nAs noted by the majority, the arbitrator found that the petitioner had sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment. Specifically, she found that the petitioner\u2019s back problems developed at work after he was required to work alone on an Aerostar press. That job consisted of bending over every minute and 45 seconds to pull six to eight pounds of material out of a box, cutting it, then bending over a 460\u00b0F, waist-high die without touching it and handing the cut material to the trimmer on the other side of the six-foot-wide die. Based on her finding, the arbitrator ruled that the petitioner was temporarily totally disabled from September 4, 1985, through February 18, 1986, the date of the arbitration hearing.\nOn review before the Commission, the parties stipulated that as of April 10, 1986, the petitioner had returned to work and was engaged in his normal duties for the respondent. No further new evidence was presented.\nThe Commission reversed the arbitrator\u2019s decision, finding that the petitioner had failed to prove he sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Commission expressly found that on August 19, 1985, the petitioner had not told Dr. Murphy that his back problems were work related. It further found that \u201cDr. Murphy suspected the work history of pulling of materials described by the Petitioner, aggravated the preexisting herniated disc, not caused it.\u201d Additionally, it specifically noted that on the August 29 and September 12, 1985, medical insurance claim forms the petitioner filled out, he \u201cdid not claim a specific accident.\u201d Commissioner Ted Black, Jr., dissented, contending that the majority had erred in basing its decision on the petitioner\u2019s failure to categorize his injury as an accident and in ignoring the repetitive trauma law set forth in Peoria County Belwood Nursing Home v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 524, 505 N.E.2d 1026.\nThe circuit court found that the Commission\u2019s majority decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the dissenting Commissioner was correct. The court noted that the petitioner\u2019s preexisting condition was undisputed, as was the evidence that the petitioner was asymptomatic until July of 1985, when the amount of pulling he was required to do on the job approximately doubled. The court found inappropriate the Commission\u2019s consideration of the medical forms in which the petitioner had failed to refer to a specific accident. Regarding the petitioner\u2019s being a time bomb, the court stated that an employer takes an employee as it finds him. It further found that the only medical evidence of causation was Dr. Murphy\u2019s opinion that the repetitive pulling of material at work had aggravated the petitioner\u2019s preexisting condition. Based on its findings, the circuit court reinstated the decision and award of the arbitrator.\nThe law provides that an employee may be \u201caccidentally injured\u201d under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.) as the result of repetitive, work-related trauma even absent a final, identifiable episode of collapse. (Peoria County Belwood Nursing Home v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 880, 487 N.E.2d 356, aff\u2019d (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 524, 505 N.E.2d 1026.) Employers take their employees as they find them; when a worker\u2019s physical structure, diseased or not, gives way under the stress of his usual tasks, the law views it as an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. (General Electric Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 432, 433 N.E.2d 671.) The sole exception to this rule is to deny recovery where the employee\u2019s health has so deteriorated that any normal daily activity is an overexertion, or where the activity engaged in presented risks no greater than those to which the general public is exposed. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 30, 440 N.E.2d 861.\nA claimant need not show that the work accident was the only causative factor, or even the principal causative factor. He need only show that the accident was a causative factor. (Smith v. Indus trial Comm\u2019n (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 383, 512 N.E.2d 712.) Further, as found by the circuit court, a claimant is not expected to know the unique meaning of the word \u201caccident\u201d under the Act. Luckenbill v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 106, 507 N.E.2d 1185.\nWe find very few discrepancies in the evidence presented in this case. It is undisputed that following the petitioner\u2019s 1978 back surgery, he worked in a number of physically demanding jobs without incident. Prior to starting work with the respondent, he passed a preemployment physical examination. He then worked for almost two years without any back pain, though he did experience some numbness in his left leg. That numbness was merely a residual of the 1978 surgery. The onset of his current back problems coincided with the cutting of two workers from the press crew, which doubled his workload.\nDr. Murphy testified that during his August 19, 1985, visit, the petitioner filled out a form stating that worker\u2019s compensation was involved. While the petitioner did not at that time tell the doctor that his work was causing his back problems, Dr. Murphy did not ask the petitioner for a cause. Instead, the doctor merely examined the petitioner and ordered a CAT scan. Further, as the dissenting Commissioner and the circuit court noted, under the circumstances of this case it was unreasonable to expect the petitioner to believe that he had suffered an \u201caccident.\u201d When Dr. Murphy did take a history from the petitioner, the petitioner stated that he believed his work had caused his back problems.\nWhile the majority places considerable weight on the doctor\u2019s agreement with the respondent\u2019s attorney\u2019s statement that the petitioner was a time bomb, we do not find it indicative of the doctor\u2019s testimony as a whole. Dr. Murphy plainly stated on several occasions that he believed the petitioner\u2019s work had aggravated his back condition and led to the herniated disc.\nInterestingly, the Commission\u2019s factual findings were generally consistent with the overwhelming weight of the evidence. It was only when the Commission applied the law to its findings that it seriously erred in two respects. First, it erroneously relied on the petitioner\u2019s failure to call his injury an \u201caccident.\u201d Second, it completely ignored Peoria Belwood. Regarding the first error, contrary to this court\u2019s majority opinion, the Commission\u2019s reliance on the petitioner\u2019s failure to recognize his injury as an \u201caccident\u201d directly contradicts our holding in Luckenbill. Regarding the second error, the Commission\u2019s reliance on the fact that Dr. Murphy suspected that the petitioner\u2019s work had \u201caggravated the preexisting herniated disc, not caused it,\u201d showed its misunderstanding of the law of repetitive trauma as set forth in Peoria Belwood. That finding should have led the Commission to uphold the arbitrator\u2019s award.\nWe therefore conclude that the circuit court correctly found that the Commission\u2019s opinion was against the manifest weight of the evidence and correctly reinstated the arbitrator\u2019s decision and award.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BARRY and JUSTICE WOODWARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "John B. Adams and Jeffrey B. Huebsch, both of Kubiesa & Power, Ltd., of Westmont, for appellant.", "James H. Cooksey, of Crain, Cooksey & Veltman, Ltd., of Centraba, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROBERT G. PRYOR, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Rockwell International, Appellant).\nFifth District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 5-89-0005WC\nOpinion filed August 8, 1990.\nBARRY, P.J., and WOODWARD, J., dissenting.\nJohn B. Adams and Jeffrey B. Huebsch, both of Kubiesa & Power, Ltd., of Westmont, for appellant.\nJames H. Cooksey, of Crain, Cooksey & Veltman, Ltd., of Centraba, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 21, "last_page_order": 30 }