{ "id": 2592644, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY TRAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Traylor", "decision_date": "1990-08-13", "docket_number": "No. 3-89-0608", "first_page": "86", "last_page": "91", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 86" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 1262", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3117397 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 N.E.2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5379633 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 N.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12124713 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 N.E.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2621079 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/30/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 1121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. App. 3d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3184791 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/86/0278-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 589, "char_count": 11727, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.03500568831472e-08, "percentile": 0.42439173094647603 }, "sha256": "cc8e367068fe27d9b3996b8df73c3d1052b4aa56bc7d51e26eed61d8f847f260", "simhash": "1:da07b6557e4b0c80", "word_count": 1885 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:55.467533+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY TRAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GORMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Larry Traylor was indicted and charged with two other men (Nobles and Robinson) with one count of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance containing cocaine in violation of sections 401(a)(2) and 401.1(a) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 56%, pars. 1401(a)(2), 1401.1(a)). The defendant was tried separately and, following a jury trial, was convicted and sentenced to a 10-year term of imprisonment. The defendant appeals his conviction. We reverse the defendant\u2019s conviction and remand for a new trial.\nThe record reveals that the State\u2019s only occurrence witness, Roberto Flores, testified that, in conjunction with several different law enforcement agencies, he had arranged to pick up a package of cocaine from Nobles on October 13, 1988. Flores had been in contact with Nobles for months regarding a drug transaction. When Flores arrived at the designated rendezvous point, however, he was met by Robinson, who was standing outside his car. Robinson indicated to Flores to get into the back seat of Robinson\u2019s car. Flores complied, and Robinson got into the front seat on the driver\u2019s side.\nWhen Flores entered Robinson\u2019s car, he noticed a passenger in the front passenger seat. Although Flores did not know the passenger\u2019s name, he did recognize him as someone he had seen before. At trial Flores identified the defendant as being the passenger in the car on October 13, 1988.\nRobinson and Flores engaged in a brief discussion, during which Robinson indicated that Nobles had sent Robinson to meet with Flores. Robinson retrieved a package from under the driver\u2019s seat and handed it to Flores. Flores opened the package and quickly examined the contents. Flores testified that no money changed hands during the delivery. Flores further testified that the entire meeting took between 30 seconds and 1 minute.\nFlores testified that the defendant said nothing during the meeting. Flores testified that the defendant was in possession of a gun and alternated between looking at Flores and Robinson and outside the automobile. Flores further testified that after receiving the package, he exited the vehicle and gave the package to the police. He also testified that he picked the defendant\u2019s photo out of a police photo array.\nOn cross-examination, Flores admitted that he had not been in contact with the defendant prior to the delivery. He further testified that he had failed to initially tell the police about the defendant\u2019s gun. Flores testified that he later remembered the gun while they were at the police station but could not recall which police officers he told about the gun.\nJoliet police officer Donald Edgerly testified that on October 13, 1988, he was in continual contact with Flores from noon until after Flores\u2019 meeting with Robinson. Edgerly and Officer Phillip Valera met with Flores within approximately three minutes of Flores\u2019 meeting with Robinson. Flores handed a package to Valera and indicated that Robinson was the driver and that he could identify the passenger from police photographs. Edgerly did not recall Flores mentioning that the passenger had a gun, and this information was not contained in the report Edgerly filed regarding the evening\u2019s activities.\nOfficer Phillip Valera testified that he and Edgerly met with Flores shortly after the delivery. He received a package from Flores that included eight individual packets of a white substance later identified as containing cocaine. Valera also testified that he had no recollection of Flores ever mentioning the passenger\u2019s possession of a gun.\nThe State\u2019s final witness was a forensic expert in drug chemistry who testified that her analysis of the substance received from Edgerly resulted in the conclusions that the total weight was 119.1 grams and contained cocaine.\nThe defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict was denied. Robinson then testified for the defense. He indicated that he had pleaded guilty in the case. He testified that the defendant was not the man present with him in the October 13,1988, meeting with Flores.\nDuring cross-examination, the State called Robinson\u2019s attention to his guilty plea proceedings. The jury was excused. The defendant made a motion to preclude the State\u2019s use of certain statements from that earlier proceeding. The defendant argued that the State would attempt to improperly impeach Robinson with portions of the transcript from his earlier guilty plea hearing in which the State\u2019s Attorney had elicited Robinson\u2019s agreement with a statement of facts which the State expected its case against Robinson could prove. This statement of facts referred to defendant Traylor being in the car when Robinson made the delivery to Flores.\nThe defendant argued that Robinson\u2019s prior agreement with the State\u2019s evidence against him should not be interpreted as an acknowledgement of Traylor\u2019s presence by Robinson for purposes of impeachment. The trial court denied the defendant\u2019s motion.\nThe State proceeded to ask Robinson if he had expressed agreement, at his guilty plea proceeding, with the fact that Traylor was present in the car during the delivery to Flores. Robinson initially denied expressing such agreement. The following exchange then took place:\n\u201cSTATE\u2019S ATTORNEY: Q. Mr. Robinson, did you or did you not agree before this judge that Larry Traylor was with you on the night of October 13,1988?\nROBINSON: A. I pled guilty to that charge.\nSTATE\u2019S ATTORNEY: Your Honor, would you please instruct the witness to answer the question?\nTHE COURT: Will you answer the question yes or no, sir?\nROBINSON: Yes.\nSTATE\u2019S ATTORNEY: Q. You did agree that Larry Traylor was there that night?\nROBINSON: A. Oh, man.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I\u2019m going to \u2014 .\nTHE COURT: The question\u2019s been asked and answered.\u201d\nThe State\u2019s Attorney then read the literal words spoken from the transcript and asked Robinson if he recalled the statement that included an implication of Traylor. Robinson testified that he did not notice Traylor\u2019s name being mentioned therein at the time. Robinson then responded, however, that he had answered affirmatively to a question from the court on January 30, 1989, asking whether he agreed that evidence in a trial against him would be substantially as was stated by the State\u2019s Attorney beforehand.\nOn redirect, Robinson testified that he wasn\u2019t paying attention to the part about the other person being present. Defense counsel then attempted to question Robinson about statements he made during his arrest. The State\u2019s objection to this was sustained. The court held that no prior statements made by Robinson, either before or after his guilty plea hearing, were admissible for rehabilitation purposes.\nThe defendant was the final witness in the trial. He denied being present at the meeting between Robinson and Flores.\nOver defendant\u2019s objection, the court determined that the standard Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction concerning a witness\u2019 prior inconsistent statement should be given.\nFollowing jury deliberations, the defendant was convicted and a 10-year prison term was imposed. The defendant appeals.\nThe defendant raises two issues on appeal. Initially, the defendant argues that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant maintains that while the State\u2019s evidence may have shown him to be at the scene, it failed to demonstrate that he either knew that a crime was taking place or that he aided or abetted the crime.\nFlores testified that the defendant was looking at him and Robinson, as well as outside the automobile. Flores also testified that the defendant had a gun. The clear implication is that the defendant was not merely present but served the function of serving as a lookout/ armed guard. If this was true, then the defendant certainly could be convicted under an accountability theory. People v. Jones (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 278, 282, 407 N.E.2d 1121, citing People v. Krouse (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 446, 333 N.E.2d 17.\nWhile it is true that the two officers did not recall Flores telling them about the gun and Flores himself could not remember which officer he had told about the gun, this was brought up for the jury to consider. Any inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses, any bias or interest affecting the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the testimony are for the trier of fact to determine since the trier of fact is in a better position to observe the witnesses and to weigh discrepancies in their testimony. People v. Kirwan (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 121, 124, 421 N.E.2d 317, citing People v. Henderson (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 502, 348 N.E.2d 854.\nIn the instant case, the jury chose to believe Flores. We are of the opinion that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendant was present at the scene and participated as a lookout/armed guard.\nWhile we have concluded that there exists sufficient evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict, the defendant has raised a second issue contending that the trial court erred in admitting the statement from Robinson\u2019s guilty plea hearing. We agree.\nThe defendant cites People v. Henderson (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 291, 419 N.E.2d 1262. In Henderson, the defendant, together with Ricky Hurt, was charged with the theft of a snowblower from a hardware store. At Henderson\u2019s trial, the State presented an entirely circumstantial case. Hurt, previously convicted pursuant to a guilty plea, testified on Henderson\u2019s behalf. He testified that Henderson was not his passenger on the day he was caught fleeing the hardware store with the stolen goods. No other witnesses were able to identify Henderson as having been Hurt\u2019s accomplice that day. In an effort to impeach Hurt on the issue of the identity of the passenger seen fleeing the car just prior to Hurt\u2019s arrest, the State questioned Hurt regarding portions of his guilty plea proceedings. The State focused on a factual basis statement pertaining to Hurt\u2019s guilt, which had been made in Hurt\u2019s presence prior to his plea. The statement contained a reference to the defendant (Henderson) having been a passenger in the car. The witness (Hurt) denied any acknowledgement of, or agreement with, the portion of the guilty plea statement of facts which inculpated the defendant.\nThis court, in reversing Henderson\u2019s theft conviction, held that this method of cross-examination improperly introduced matters of a substantially prejudicial nature into the defendant\u2019s trial. Henderson, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 296-97.\nHenderson controls the introduction of Robinson\u2019s guilty plea statement into these proceedings. The State urges this court to overrule Henderson or, in the alternative, hold the error to be harmless.\nWe reject the State\u2019s argument to reverse Henderson. As to the \u201charmless error\u201d argument, without the statement, there is no evidence rebutting Robinson\u2019s testimony. Accordingly, it is a question as to who is the more credible witness \u2014 Flores or Robinson. Accordingly, we fail to see how the inclusion of this evidence could be considered harmless.\nWe reverse the defendant\u2019s conviction and remand to the trial court for a new trial.\nThe decision of the circuit court of Will County is reversed and remanded.\nReversed and remanded.\nSTOUDER and SCOTT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GORMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas A. Karalis, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Edward Burmila, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Michael C. Rolinski, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY TRAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3-89-0608\nOpinion filed August 13, 1990.\nThomas A. Karalis, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nEdward Burmila, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Michael C. Rolinski, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0086-01", "first_page_order": 106, "last_page_order": 111 }