{ "id": 2593606, "name": "ANITA FILIP, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE NORTH RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Filip v. North River Insurance", "decision_date": "1990-06-29", "docket_number": "No. 1-88-1503", "first_page": "351", "last_page": "355", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 351" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "498 So. 2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7586619 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/498/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ariz. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 1455205 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/155/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.W.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10661384 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/402/0758-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 N.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 2d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5280669 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/52/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 855", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5658128 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0855-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 N.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3605041 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3467934 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" }, { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Or. App. 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or. App.", "case_ids": [ 5855530 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/70/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141899 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 1168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3649190 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0648-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 462, "char_count": 9184, "ocr_confidence": 0.735, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9271473266113245e-07, "percentile": 0.7337601535842437 }, "sha256": "2e9fda1655d4866fb03a6c57aeade1ce8744e7bc9f285dd78460de93c798f19f", "simhash": "1:80afa1dba54ce3e4", "word_count": 1459 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:55.467533+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ANITA FILIP, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE NORTH RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CAMPBELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, The North River Insurance Company (North River), appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, Anita Filip, named insured on an automobile liability policy issued by North River (the Policy), in an action seeking a declaratory judgment as to North River\u2019s obligation under the Policy for plaintiff\u2019s claim for loss of consortium due to the physical injuries suffered by her husband, George, also a named insured on the Policy, when he was struck by an uninsured motorist. The sole issue on appeal is whether the loss of consortium suffered by plaintiff constitutes a \u201cbodily injury\u201d within the terms of the Policy. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nThe following facts are relevant to this appeal. The Policy provides for maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident for bodily injury. George Filip submitted a claim to North River for his physical injuries, and plaintiff submitted a claim for loss of consortium. North River paid George Filip $100,000, the maximum per person liability. However, it denied plaintiff\u2019s claim on the ground that its payment to George had fulfilled its obligations under the Policy. Consequently, plaintiff filed a verified complaint for declaratory judgment as to the rights and liabilities of the parties regarding her loss of consortium claim.\nNorth River moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiff was not entitled to recovery because she had not been involved in the accident and had sustained no direct injury. In response, plaintiff filed a countermotion for summary judgment, arguing that pursuant to the Policy\u2019s definition of \u201cbodily injury,\u201d loss of consortium is covered. The trial court denied North River\u2019s motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment. In reaching its decision, the trial court stated:\n\u201c[T]he term bodily injury is, in the instant case, defined to mean injury among other things, and *** loss of consortium [is] *** a \u2018personal injury.\u2019 \u201d\nNorth River\u2019s timely appeal followed.\nIt is well accepted that parties to an insurance policy are bound by the agreements that they make (Giardino v. Fierke (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 648, 513 N.E.2d 1168) and definitions contained within the Policy are controlling. (Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 486, 475 N.E.2d 872.) This is particularly true when an insurance policy defines terms in a manner which differs from the ordinary understanding of the terms. (Allstate Insurance Co. v. Handegard (1984), 70 Or. App. 262, 688 P.2d 1387.) In the present case, the Policy broadly defines \u201cBodily injury\u201d as \u201cinjury, sickness, disease or death.\u201d \u201cLoss of consortium\u201d has been consistently defined by Illinois courts as an \u201cinjury.\u201d (Creamer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 223, 514 N.E.2d 214; Pease v. Ace Hardware Home Center (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 546, 498 N.E.2d 343; Brown v. Metzger (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 855, 455 N.E.2d 834.) Therefore, by its own terms, the Policy includes loss of consortium as a compensable bodily injury.\nIn arguing against this interpretation, North River relies on Gass v. Carducci (1964), 52 Ill. App. 2d 394, 202 N.E.2d 73, Creamer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 223, 514 N.E.2d 214, and Lepic v. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. (Iowa 1987), 402 N.W.2d 758. A review of these cases finds them to be distinguishable and unpersuasive. In Gass and Lepic, the courts construed the terms \u201cone person\u201d and \u201ceach person\u201d as they appeared in the respective policies. In the present case, an entirely different term, i.e., \u201cbodily injury,\u201d is at issue. In Creamer, the policy defined \u201cbodily injury\u201d as \u201cbodily injury to a person and sickness, disease or death which results from it.\u201d (Creamer, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 224.) Predicated on that definition, the Creamer court held that \u201cbodily injury,\u201d as defined by the relevant policy, did not include loss of consortium, which was a type of personal injury. In contrast to the policy in Creamer, the Policy in the present case defines \u201cbodily injury\u201d as \u201cinjury,\u201d thereby broadening the ordinary definition of \u201cbodily injury\u201d to encompass all types of injury, including the personal injury of loss of consortium.\nNorth River further argues that section 143a of the Insurance Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 73, par. 755a) provides extrinsic evidence as to its intent not to include loss of consortium in its definition of \u201cbodily injury.\u201d Section 143a provides, in relevant part:\n\u201c[N]o policy *** insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be renewed or delivered or issued *** unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death set forth in Section 7 \u2014 203 of The Illinois Vehicle Code for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 73, par. 755a(2).\nNorth River argues that its Policy language \u201cmimics almost exactly the language of\u201d section 143a. North River is correct in stating that its Policy definition \u201calmost\u201d replicates the language of section 143a. However, it is the Policy\u2019s deviation from the exact language of section 143a which renders North River\u2019s argument unpersuasive. Unlike the Policy, section 143a does not define \u201cbodily injury.\u201d Rather, it merely sets forth separate circumstances which will trigger an insurer\u2019s liability for damages, i.e., \u201cbodily injury, sickness or disease, including death.\u201d Although North River\u2019s Policy incorporates the same language, it changes the meaning of section 143a by defining \u201cbodily injury\u201d as \u201cinjury, sickness, disease, or death.\u201d By doing so, North River demonstrates an intent to broaden the circumstances which trigger liability rather than an intent to \u201cmimic\u201d section 143a.\nNorth River further argues that it would be against public policy to hold that loss of consortium is payable under a separate \u201cper person\u201d limit of liability because that decision would effectively double the amount of potential recovery for each automobile accident involving an insured motorist. In addition, North River contends that the word \u201cinjury\u201d was intended to reiterate \u201cthe type of traumatic physical injury to one\u2019s body that insurers and insureds alike understand to be encompassed by the term \u2018bodily injury.\u2019 \u201d However, not only is this intent not evidenced by the Policy\u2019s definition, a contrary intent is evidenced by use of the broader term \u201cinjury.\u201d As previously stated, parties to an insurance policy are bound by the agreements they make. (Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 486, 475 N.E.2d 872; Giardino v. Fierke (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 648, 513 N.E.2d 1168.) If North River desires to limit its liability under the Policy, it has the option of amending the definitions of the terms.\nFinally, North River argues that by \u201cplacing undue emphasis upon the word \u2018injury\u2019, plaintiff has distorted the purpose of the Policy and the intent of the parties.\u201d Specifically, North River contends that if \u201cbodily injury\u201d is construed to include all injuries, then \u201csickness, disease and death\u201d would be redundant. In light of the fact that insurance policies consistently define \u201cbodily injury\u201d as \u201cbodily injury,\u201d North River\u2019s argument as to the impropriety of redundancy in insurance policies is unpersuasive. (Creamer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 223, 224, 514 N.E.2d 214 (\u201cbodily injury\u201d defined as \u201cbodily injury to a person\u201d); Giardino v. Fierke (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 648, 654, 513 N.E.2d 1168 (\u201c \u2018Bodily Injury\u2019 means bodily injury to any person\u201d); Campbell v. Farmers Insurance Co. (1987), 155 Ariz. 102, 745 P.2d 160 (\u201cBodily injury\u201d is defined as \u201cbodily injury\u201d); Albin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (La. 1986), 498 So. 2d 171 (\u201cBodily Injury-means bodily injury to a person\u201d); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Handegard (1984), 70 Or. App. 262, 688 P.2d 1387 (\u201cBodily injury\u201d is defined as \u201cBodily injury\u201d).) As these cases indicate, in order to limit its liability in the present case, North River should have defined \u201cbodily injury\u201d by its own term rather than by a term which broadened its ordinary meaning.\nFor the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019CONNOR and MANNING, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CAMPBELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Johnson, Cusack & Bell, Ltd., of Chicago (Scott W. Hoyne, of counsel), for appellant.", "Milton M. Blumenthal & Associates, of Chicago (Michael L. Blumenthal, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ANITA FILIP, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE NORTH RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1-88-1503\nOpinion filed June 29, 1990.\nJohnson, Cusack & Bell, Ltd., of Chicago (Scott W. Hoyne, of counsel), for appellant.\nMilton M. Blumenthal & Associates, of Chicago (Michael L. Blumenthal, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0351-01", "first_page_order": 371, "last_page_order": 375 }