{ "id": 2595224, "name": "BENJAMIN F. MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF DRIVER SERVICES et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Moore v. Department of Driver Services", "decision_date": "1990-07-20", "docket_number": "No. 1-89-1622", "first_page": "587", "last_page": "594", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 587" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "437 F. Supp. 1041", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5730971 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/437/1041-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 N.E.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2969889 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 N.E.2d 929", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12131608 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 N.E.2d 1215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3617003 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/171/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 N.E.2d 151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5604329 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 N.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. App. 3d 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3272783 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/75/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 1151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5072709 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 N.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2834792 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0332-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 725, "char_count": 17575, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.380125665320789e-08, "percentile": 0.3927478011266294 }, "sha256": "d980d1efd307bf73dbc2c00b3eccb339b96d5227c48aa06690ef63c2ba8dd242", "simhash": "1:228794e73d53d5ed", "word_count": 2869 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:55.467533+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BENJAMIN F. MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF DRIVER SERVICES et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Benjamin F. Moore, sought review pursuant to the Secretary of State Merit Employment Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 124, par. 101 et seq.) of a notice of proposed discharge which was issued to him by defendant Illinois Secretary of State Department of Driver Services (Department). Following a hearing, a hearing officer recommended that Moore be discharged. Plaintiff filed exceptions to the recommended decision with defendant Illinois Merit Commission of the Secretary of State (Commission). The Commission agreed with the hearing officer\u2019s recommended decision to discharge Moore. On administrative review (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 101 et seq.), the trial court reversed the decision of the Commission.\nIn February 1988, Moore received a notice of proposed discharge from the Department. The notice charged that Moore had: unlawfully and without authority solicited $500 for a fraudulent driver\u2019s license from Mary Woolery; unlawfully and without authority completed a driver\u2019s license application in the name of Gary C. Young for Gralyn Simpson without obtaining or reviewing proper identification; conspired with Eugene Richardson, Eddie Jones, Andrew Farmer and James Cokely to prepare and issue fraudulent driver\u2019s licenses to Mary Woolery, Gralyn Simpson and other persons in return for various amounts of money; and neglected his duties as a public service supervisor by participating in, allowing to occur and failing to report the illegal sale of fraudulent driver\u2019s licenses, and by failing to properly supervise his subordinates.\nInitially, we note that two of the foregoing charges are not involved in this appeal. The hearing officer found that the charge that Moore had completed a fictitious license application in Simpson\u2019s behalf and that the charge of conspiracy had not been proved. The officer based his rulings on the basis that Simpson was a deceptive witness and, accordingly, that Simpson\u2019s testimony was incredible. The Department does not appeal these rulings and, therefore, the testimony concerning those charges will be discussed only to the extent it affects the charges at issue in this appeal.\nAt the hearing, Moore testified that on February 1, 1988, he was employed as a driver\u2019s license facility supervisor at the Charles Chew, Jr., facility. Moore had been a Department employee for 14 years and had been a supervisor for 11 of those years. Moore\u2019s responsibilities as a supervisor included handling day-to-day operations of the facility, employees, evaluations, and accounting procedures. Additionally, he wrote up applications, checked identification and handled general problem solving. On occasion, Moore administered written tests and eye tests.\nMoore stated that the correct procedure for issuing a driver\u2019s license required that a Department employee review an applicant\u2019s identification. He testified that a supervisor may have the authority to issue a license without the proper identification. He indicated that this was a longstanding practice. If an applicant did not have the proper physical identification, Moore would make telephone calls, check computer records, or somehow verify that the applicant was telling the truth. Moore had issued licenses in this manner on 400 to 500 occasions.\nMary Woolery, a special agent for the Illinois State Police, Department of Criminal Investigations, testified that she first visited the Chew facility on March 24, 1987, with Andrea Harris. She went there in order to plan the purchase of a fictitious driver\u2019s license which would include her photograph along with a false name and address.\nWoolery stated that on March 24, she and Harris met with James Cokely, an examiner, and Eugene Richardson, a supervisor at the facility. The two women brought a television set with them. The television set had been purchased by the police and was to be given to another Department employee, Gloria Williams, as payment for a previously purchased fraudulent driver\u2019s license. Cokely took the set out of Woolery\u2019s car. Woolery saw Moore on March 24, but she did not meet with him. She observed Harris meet and talk with Moore, but could not hear the conversation.\nOn March 25, Woolery and Harris returned to the Chew facility to purchase a fraudulent driver\u2019s license. They met with Richardson, and then Harris and Moore conversed. On this occasion, Woolery was able to hear their conversation. She heard Moore say that \u201cJohn was all over him today and he can\u2019t do anything today.\u201d She saw Moore give Harris a piece of paper, and heard Moore tell Harris to call him later. Harris gave Woolery the slip of paper, which had a Chew facility telephone number on it.\nOn March 26, Woolery returned to the Chew facility. Another agent was with her, but remained in the car while Woolery went inside. Woolery met with Moore in the parking lot between the two buildings which housed the facility. Woolery asked Moore if \u201che could do anything today.\u201d Moore replied that he could not because there were a lot of things going on around the facility. Woolery asked when would be a better time, and Moore responded that he did not know, but that he could not do it that day. She asked if she could contact him at another time, and he replied that she could do so. Woolery did not at any time give Moore money for a fraudulent driver\u2019s license.\nHarris also testified at the hearing. She explained that she had become involved in this investigation after being stopped by a police officer with a fictitious driver\u2019s license in her possession. In exchange for her cooperation in the investigation, the Secretary of State, through Special Agent Frank Murphy, gave her $100 for every fictitious license she bought. Harris stated that she had been convicted of forgery in the past and was currently incarcerated on pending forgery charges to which she had pleaded guilty. Harris stated that she had not been promised anything in return for her testimony.\nHarris testified that she knew Moore because she had bought fraudulent licenses previously at the Chew facility. She never paid Moore directly for these licenses. Harris stated that on March 24, 1987, she and Woolery went to the Chew facility. They brought $500 to purchase a fraudulent license, and a television set which Harris owed to Williams as payment for a previously purchased fictitious license.\nHarris stated that when she and Woolery arrived, Harris met with Cokely and told him that she wanted to do some business and to straighten out her tab with Williams. Cokely informed her that Williams was angry about the television set and felt that Cokely, Richardson and Moore owed Williams some money for providing Harris with a license. Cokely then brought Richardson to meet with Harris and Woolery. Richardson left shortly thereafter, explaining that he had to talk to Moore. When he returned, Moore was with him. Moore told Harris that Williams was angry about the television. Harris told Moore that the television was in her car. She told Moore that she wanted to keep doing business and also asked him how much the license would be. Moore told her it would be $500. Harris did not give Moore the $500, and Moore did not give her a fictitious driver\u2019s license. Harris later purchased a fictitious driver\u2019s license from Cokely and Richardson for $500. Moore was not present during the transaction.\nSpecial Agent Murphy testified that he and another agent interviewed Moore at the Chew facility on January 22, 1988. They read Moore his rights, and Moore agreed to talk to them. Moore indicated that he was not aware that fraudulent license sales currently were occurring at the facility. Murphy showed Moore a group of photographs of women. Moore recognized Woolery\u2019s picture and said that he might know her because he thought she was the woman he had told not to hang around the facility.\nMurphy stated that Moore told him he had no authority to write up a license application without checking the applicant\u2019s identity. Moore also stated that three forms of identification generally are required, but in special cases, two forms are sufficient when the applicant is known by the supervisor or the employee. Moore told Murphy that he would never write up an applicant without at least two forms of identification and verification.\nWhen asked about the conversation with Murphy, Moore stated that he told Murphy the application requirements sometimes were waived. Moore also informed Murphy that he had reported certain rumors that a fictitious license had been sold in 1986 or 1987. Moore stated Murphy had acknowledged that Moore had done so.\nWith regard to the charges involved in this appeal, the hearing officer found that the Department proved that Moore had indirectly solicited $500 from Woolery. Additionally, the hearing officer found that Moore had failed to report suspicions regarding the illegal sale of fraudulent licenses and the illegal sale transaction involving the television set. The Commission adopted the hearing officer\u2019s findings except that the Commission found that Moore had no duty to report rumors.\nWe believe that a fundamental error occurred in that there was a substantial variance between the administrative charges against Moore and the proof presented at the hearing. As to the first charge, Moore was accused of soliciting $500 from Woolery in exchange for a fraudulent license, yet the proof adduced at the hearing established that Moore never solicited $500 from Woolery. The trial court noted that this variance was key and serious. In fact, the trial court believed the variance to be a denial of due process and, therefore, to be fatal to the claim. The court nevertheless based its decision to reverse the Commission\u2019s decision on its conclusion that the Commission\u2019s findings were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\nWe hold, however, that the variance between the charge and the proof adduced at the hearing denied Moore procedural due process and requires reversal of the Commission\u2019s finding that Moore was guilty of soliciting a bribe from Woolery.\nProcedural due process in an administrative proceeding does not require a proceeding in the nature of a judicial proceeding but is satisfied by a form of procedure that is suitable and proper for the nature of determination to be made and conforms to fundamental principles of justice. (Telcser v. Holzman (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 332, 201 N.E.2d 370.) In administrative proceedings, a complaint need not state the charges with the' same refinements and selectivity as a complaint in a court of record. (Ballin Drugs, Inc. v. Department of Registration & Education (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 520, 519 N.E.2d 1151; Irving\u2019s Pharmacy v. Department of Registration & Education (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 652, 394 N.E.2d 627.) Nonetheless, an administrative complaint must reasonably apprise the party of the case against him so that he will be able to intelligently prepare his defense. Talman v. Department of Registration & Education (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 450, 397 N.E.2d 151; see also 107 Ill. 2d R. 133(a).\nHere, the charge filed against Moore, alleging that he had solicited $500 from Woolery, did not reasonably apprise him of the case against him. On March 24, 1987, Woolery and Harris went to the Chew facility and brought with them $500 to purchase a fraudulent license for Woolery, and a television set to pay another employee for a previously purchased fraudulent license. According to Harris, she met with Moore and he told her that a license would be $500. Woolery was not present at this meeting. The next day, Woolery and Harris returned to complete the transaction. Woolery heard Moore tell Harris that he could not do anything that day. Moore gave Harris a piece of paper with a Chew facility telephone number on it. No transaction occurred. Woolery returned to the facility the following day and asked Moore if he could do anything for her. He said that he could not because there were a lot of things going on, but he told her she could contact him at another time. Again, however, no transaction occurred. Thus, Moore met with Woolery only once. He did not discuss with her the price of a fictitious license or accept $500 in exchange for a fictitious license. At no time did Woolery pay Moore $500 for a fraudulent license.\nThe Department\u2019s case against Moore varies significantly from the charges which it filed against him and denied him due process of law. The charge that Moore solicited $500 from Woolery cannot be said to have reasonably apprised him of the case against him when that case involved proof that he solicited a bribe from Harris. The substance of the two situations is distinct and a charge outlining one situation could not have informed Moore of the conduct involved in the other. (See Northtown Ford v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 479, 525 N.E.2d 1215 (stating that an amended charge adequately apprised defendant of the charges against him when the substance of the action alleged remained the same); Slager v. Pollution Control Board (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 332, 421 N.E.2d 929 (stating that a charge which incorrectly defined refuse as \u201cgarbage and other discarded materials\u201d rather than as \u201chazardous wastes, liquid wastes and sludges\u201d adequately apprised defendant of the case against him as the charge specifically informed the defendant of the manner in which his conduct was alleged to violate the Environmental Protection Act).) We do not believe that Monroe was able to intelligently prepare his defense with respect to that charge. See Wierenga v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 270, 352 N.E.2d 322 (stating that plaintiff could not be discharged for violating a section of the municipal code when the statutory violation was neither alleged in the charges filed against plaintiff, nor mentioned at the hearing).\nAccordingly, we find that the trial court properly reversed the Commission\u2019s determination that Moore solicited a bribe from Woolery.\nWith regard to the remaining charge, that Moore was derelict in his duties as a public service supervisor, we find that there was also a failure of proof. The charge that Moore was derelict in his duties because of his failure to report the illegal sale of fraudulent licenses is not supported by the record.\nThe charge provided as follows:\n\u201cThat you were, at various times between at least January 1, 1987, and continuing until January 21, 1988, derelict in your duties as a Public Service Supervisor in the Chicago South facility by participating in, allowing to occur, [sic] to properly supervise you [sic] subordinates, and failing to report the illegal sale of fraudulent Illinois drivers license ***.\u201d\nThe hearing officer determined that the charge had been proved by evidence that Moore was suspicious of certain employees and had failed to report his suspicions, and that he was made aware of an illegal transaction involving another employee and a television set but had failed to report the transaction. The Commission limited the hearing officer\u2019s conclusion and found only that Moore had a duty to report the conversations he had with Harris regarding the television set transaction and the price of a driver\u2019s license.\nEven if we were to assume that Harris\u2019 testimony was credible, and in view of her past record and her taking of the fifth amendment during her testimony that is difficult, her testimony does not establish the charge of failing to report the illegal sale of fraudulent driver\u2019s licenses. (See Prince Manufacturing Co. v. United States (E.D. Ill. 1977), 437 F. Supp. 1041 (burden of poof is on complainant in a complaint proceeding before an agency).) The conversation regarding the television set was in no way connected to any such sale. The testimony merely established that Moore knew Williams was angry about a television set. There was no testimony that Moore was informed of the underlying transaction. Furthermore, although Harris testified that she asked Moore how much a license would be, and that he replied $500, this conversation, even if true, does not establish that a sale occurred. And, although Harris testified that she purchased a fictitious license from Cokely and Richardson later that day, she did not testify that Moore was in any way involved in that transaction. Rather, Harris testified that Moore would not agree to the sale of a fictitious license on either day. Thus, the testimony did not establish that Moore sold a license or that he was aware of any such sale. Moore cannot be said to have failed to report a sale which never occurred, nor can he be said to have failed to report a sale of which he was not aware.\nWe find that the trial court properly reversed the Commission\u2019s decision to discharge Moore based on dereliction of his duties as a Public Service Supervisor. Because we have so concluded, we need not determine whether there was a sufficient basis for the conclusion that cause for discharge existed.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nEGAN and RAKOWSKI, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Linda J. Hay, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.", "Julius Lucius Echeles, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BENJAMIN F. MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF DRIVER SERVICES et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1-89-1622\nOpinion filed July 20, 1990.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Linda J. Hay, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.\nJulius Lucius Echeles, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0587-01", "first_page_order": 607, "last_page_order": 614 }