{ "id": 2593652, "name": "BOARD OF REVIEW OF GRUNDY COUNTY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board", "decision_date": "1990-08-10", "docket_number": "No. 3-89-0567", "first_page": "999", "last_page": "1005", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 999" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 948", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "450 N.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782, 783" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3558832 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374, 376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 1331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1334-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3427780 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. 2d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5362508 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2789044 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.E.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2787969 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 Ill. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313970 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 953", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "954" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156560 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456-57" }, { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0443-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 667, "char_count": 12780, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.527646540942415e-08, "percentile": 0.3465420184728917 }, "sha256": "45a1dd21d9bdacba637517a43e8ce842055920d37c00ad25b93e974caf8b903a", "simhash": "1:72f3c75a46289d82", "word_count": 2088 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:55.467533+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BOARD OF REVIEW OF GRUNDY COUNTY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCOTT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Commonwealth Edison Company, sought review of the 1979 real property assessments for its Collins generating and Dresden nuclear power stations via the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB). After extensive proceedings resulting in a voluminous record, the PTAB determined on April 6, 1983, that the fair market value of the Collins station was $601,401,700; Dresden was valued at $219,954,924.\nEdison\u2019s ability to earn a return on its invested capital is regulated by the Illinois Commerce Commission; no purchaser would pay more for these facilities than a sum on which he could reasonably expect to earn a rate of return. Accordingly, the PTAB began its decision by noting that because the subject properties were \u201cregulated,\u201d the method of deriving market value would be historic original cost, less accumulated depreciation with, however, certain adjustments. The controversy before the PTAB was principally concerned with the \u201cadjustments.\u201d None of the parties sought judicial review of the PTAB determination of market value. The only issue in this appeal is the formula for reducing, or debasing, fair market value to assessed value.\nThe Department of Revenue\u2019s (Department\u2019s) sales ratio studies showed assessment levels for the years 1976, 1977 and 1978 of 30.76%, 25.97% and 25.74%, respectively, giving a three-year average level of assessment prior to the 1979 assessment year of 27.49%.\nThe PTAB was of the view that, having received \u201cprobative evidence of fair market value,\u201d it was required by section 111.4 of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 592.4) to use a one-year sales ratio study (25.74%) rather than the three most recent years (27.49%) preceding the 1979 tax assessment year in order to determine the proper level of assessment. Accordingly, the PTAB fixed the assessment at $154,800,800 ($601,401,700 x 25.74%) for the Collins station and $56,616,395 ($219,954,924 x 25.74%) for Dresden.\nIt appears, then, that utilization of the one-year sales ratio study in lieu of the three-year average results in a combined lower real property assessment for these facilities of a little over $14 million for the year 1979. On May 11, 1983, the Board of Review of Grundy County, Illinois, together with four other local taxing bodies, filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Grundy County asking that the assessments be computed based on the three-year study method, or 27.49% of fair market value. On August 2, 1989, the Grundy County circuit court affirmed the PTAB decision.\nThe Grundy County Board of Review, joined by Morris Community High School District No. 101 and Morris Elementary School District No. 54 \u2014 the Collins station is included in the territory of these school districts \u2014 appeal. Their sole contention is that the PTAB\u2019s use of a one-year sales ratio study rather than the three-year average is error.\nDefendant Commonwealth Edison has cross-appealed, urging the use of a third ratio (24.38%) calculated by its statistical expert, Dr. Purushottam Laud, to determine the assessment level for the Collins and Dresden stations.\nSection 20(1) of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 501(1)) requires that real property \u201cbe valued at 331/s% of its fair cash value.\u201d Section 1(24) of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 482(24)) provides that the term \u201c331/3%\u201d means one-third of actual value \u201cas determined by the Department\u2019s assessment to sales ratio studies for the 3 most recent years preceding the assessment year, adjusted to take into account any changes in assessment levels implemented since the data for such studies were collected.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nSection 111.4 of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 592.4) requires the PTAB to make its decisions \u201cbased upon equity and the weight of evidence and not upon constructive fraud.\u201d The PTAB apparently interpreted the word \u201cequity\u201d to require use of a one-year study where there was \u201cprobative evidence of fair market value.\u201d One consequence is that by the very act of appealing to the PTAB, a taxpayer will be assessed according to a different process. The result here would be a reduction in taxes because of the use by the PTAB of a different debasement method. We also observe that public utility real property in general, and the Collins and Dresden properties in particular, are different from residential and commercial properties in that public utility property is ordinarily valued at historic original cost less depreciation, while other property is typically valued by a comparable sales analysis. It also appears that public utility property is not considered in the Department\u2019s computation of assessment levels or equalization factors.\nPublic Act 81 \u2014 894, enacted September 21, 1979, effective January 1, 1980, amended section 111.2 of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 120, par. 592.2) by adding the following language: \u201cThe board may use a one-year assessment level to be based on relevant sales during the previous year.\u201d The foregoing sentence, however, was deleted from the Revenue Act of 1939 via Public Act 86\u2014 977.\nSubsequent to the filing of the instant case in the circuit court of Grundy County, the Illinois Supreme Court decided Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Property Tax Appeal Board (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 443, 468 N.E.2d 953, a Lake County case involving the proper level of assessment of Edison\u2019s Zion generating station for the tax years of 1975 and 1976. The court discussed at length the statutory provisions above set forth (Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Property Tax Appeal Board (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 443, 456-57, 468 N.E.2d 953). The first issue in that case is identical to the issue in the instant case; namely, whether the PTAB was required to use sales figures for the three years prior to the year of assessment in arriving at assessed valuation. Edison argued that there was significant inflation in Lake County during the years in question (that argument is also made in the instant case) and that a one-year approach would be closer to the tax assessment date. The supreme court\u2019s answer was as follows:\n\u201cThe legislature has the power to define the terms, within a statute, in any reasonable manner. (Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue (1952), 413 Ill. 55, 66.) In section 1(24), the General Assembly defined 33^3% in terms of the Department\u2019s assessment-to-sales ratio studies for the three most recent years preceding the assessment date. In so doing, the legislature was attempting to effectuate the constitutional mandate requiring uniformity in levels of taxation. Its definition must be sustained to the exclusion of Edison\u2019s nonstatutory alternative.\nAdditionally, we find the Board\u2019s use of a one-year sales ratio study to be inequitable. Under the Act the local assessor, the board of review, and the Department were required to use the three-year average, which produced a median level of 31.75% for 1975 and a median level of 31.93% for 1976. Whereas, the Board\u2019s use of a one-year approach resulted in levels of assessment for 1975 and 1976 of 27.29% and 28.22%, respectively. These levels are far below the statutory target levels set by section 146(2). The inequity of this result prompts us to find that, given the facts and figures of this case, the proper assessment of the property in question can only be reached by application of the three-year approach.\u201d Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Property Tax Appeal Board (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 443, 457, 468 N.E.2d 953, 954.\nOn June 6, 1984, following the Commonwealth Edison decision discussed above, the PTAB issued a policy statement to all Illinois assessing officers, acknowledging that this decision required the use of the three-year average except in the rare circumstance where the evidence would show conclusively that equity would be served only by use of the one-year assessment level.\nOn May 20, 1987, all of the parties appeared before the circuit court of Grundy County for oral argument. The assistant Attorney General representing the PTAB stated at that time that the PTAB \u201cerred in using that one-year level of assessment and they properly should have used the three-year level of assessment.\u201d Nevertheless, the circuit judge affirmed the PTAB decision without any memorandum opinion or any effort to distinguish the above Commonwealth Edison decision.\nIn support of its cross-appeal, Edison argues that the railroad assessment cases of the early 1960\u2019s, People ex rel. Hillison v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 88, 174 N.E.2d 175, People ex rel. Kohorst v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 104, 174 N.E.2d 182, People ex rel. Wenzel v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 205, 190 N.E.2d 780, support use of the nonstatutory sales sampling technique done by its expert, Dr. Purushottam Laud. In the Burlington, Gulf, and North Western cases, the railroads were being assessed at full value by the Department of Revenue while locally assessed property was being assessed at not more than 55%, and less than that in some areas, even after giving effect to a multiplier certified by the Department of Revenue. The railroads\u2019 claims of discrimination were allowed; appropriate tax refunds were ordered.\nHowever, unlike the railroad cases, nothing in this record would support a claim of discrimination against Edison. Dr. Laud may be correct in his assertion that the median ratio of all 11,049 nonfarm tax parcels throughout Grundy County as of January 1, 1979, did not exceed 25.74%, but by definition, the assessments of about half of the other tax parcels in Grundy County would have had to exceed 25.74%. No nonstatutory statistical samplings were done by the railroads such as was done by Edison in the instant case. Indeed, in North Western, the court remarked as follows:\n\u201cOur statute requires only that the Department use such means as it deems \u2018proper and reasonable\u2019 to make its studies on assessed valuations, and a mere difference in opinion as to what is the best or most reasonable method is not sufficient to bring the matter within the range of judicial review\u201d People ex rel. Wenzel v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 205, 216, 190 N.E.2d 780, 786.\nCommonwealth Edison Co. v. Property Tax Appeal Board (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 228, 233, 463 N.E.2d 1331, 1334-35, involved the 1979 assessment of Edison\u2019s operating equipment at two plants in Will County, Illinois. The PTAB refused to apply the 24.41% assessment level Edison sought to establish via use of an expert in the field of mathematics and statistics. The circuit court reversed the PTAB on this point. This court reinstated that PTAB determination on the ground that it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nA similar nonstatutory statistical argument by Edison urging that the level of assessment should be determined by an analysis of data for the year immediately prior to and the year subsequent to the tax date was rejected in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Property Tax Appeal Board (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 371, 374, 376, 450 N.E.2d 780, 782, 783, aff'd (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 443, 468 N.E.2d 948.\nEdison\u2019s cross-appeal being without merit, the ruling of the court below respecting same must be affirmed.\nThe decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in the above Commonwealth Edison case is dispositive of this appeal. Section 1(24) of the Revenue Act of 1939, as amended, must be implemented. That part of the August 2, 1989, judgment of the circuit court of Grundy County affirming the use of a one-year sales ratio study by the PTAB is vacated. This cause is remanded to the circuit court of Grundy County with directions to remand same to the PTAB with instructions to use the 27.49% level of assessment mandated by the Department\u2019s assessment to sales ratio studies for the three most recent years preceding the 1979 tax assessment year to determine the proper level of assessment applicable to the Collins and Dresden generating stations.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded with directions.\nHEIPLE, P.J., and BARRY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCOTT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Frederic S. Lane, of Sonnenschein, Carlin, Nath & Rosenthal, of Chicago (Jacqueline S. Glassman, of counsel), for appellants.", "Hopkins & Sutter, and Minard E. Hulse, Jr., Robert A. Creamer, and Thomas J. McNulty, all of Keck, Mahin & Cate, both of Chicago, and James R. Fleming, of Coal City (Paul F. Hanzlik, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BOARD OF REVIEW OF GRUNDY COUNTY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nThird District\nNo. 3-89-0567\nOpinion filed August 10, 1990.\nRehearing denied September 24, 1990.\nFrederic S. Lane, of Sonnenschein, Carlin, Nath & Rosenthal, of Chicago (Jacqueline S. Glassman, of counsel), for appellants.\nHopkins & Sutter, and Minard E. Hulse, Jr., Robert A. Creamer, and Thomas J. McNulty, all of Keck, Mahin & Cate, both of Chicago, and James R. Fleming, of Coal City (Paul F. Hanzlik, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0999-01", "first_page_order": 1019, "last_page_order": 1025 }