{ "id": 2594324, "name": "ILLINOIS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Gerald VeVea, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Illinois Mutual Insurance v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1990-08-24", "docket_number": "No. 3-89-0709WC", "first_page": "1018", "last_page": "1039", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 1018" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "502 N.E.2d 1178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. App. 3d 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3538866 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/151/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 N.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448305 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 1031", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3465100 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/1031-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 1025", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3578163 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/1025-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 N.E.2d 1255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3596886 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 963", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163104 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515514 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5516453 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0382-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1699, "char_count": 53680, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0834329090197794e-07, "percentile": 0.5630795463364853 }, "sha256": "4c1e6cc9b66aa8d17ef4acac3fdc45692e951d381a0e8b34f1c58cba3699ec6d", "simhash": "1:6aa12081b6832cf3", "word_count": 8921 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:55.467533+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ILLINOIS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Gerald VeVea, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LEWIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe employer, Illinois Mutual Insurance Company, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court confirming the decision of the Illinois Industrial Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission). Affirming the decision of the arbitrator, the Commission found the claimant, Gerald VeVea, permanently and totally disabled under section 8(f) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the Act). Following a hearing concluded on July 9, 1986, the arbitrator found the claimant entitled to receive the sum of $358.95 per week for life, commencing April 23, 1983, because of accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment on November 4, 1980, which had caused his complete disability and had rendered him wholly and permanently incapable of work from April 23, 1983. The arbitrator found further that claimant was intermittently temporarily totally disabled from November 4, 1980, through April 22, 1983.\nThe employer presents two issues for review: whether the Commission erred in finding that the claimant was permanently and totally disabled under section 8(f) of the Act and whether the Commission erred in finding that the claimant suffered accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment on November 4, 1980. We consider these issues together.\nAt the hearing before the arbitrator, the claimant testified that on November 4, 1980, when he was 43 years old, he had been employed by the respondent for eight years and was on that date serving in the capacity of vice-president of respondent\u2019s benefits department. That afternoon he was driving alone from Peoria to Freeport in a company-owned car, assigned to him, to make a call upon an insured by the name of Russell Hyder, who claimed to be disabled but whose claim was questioned and was being investigated. The trip from Peoria to Freeport required 2 to 21k hours. Claimant said that he had left his office at about 11:15 or 11:30 a.m. and had stopped for lunch. After he had resumed his trip, in the area of Buda, about 40 miles from Peoria, he saw an animal in the road and \u201cput the car in the ditch to avoid hitting the animal,\u201d adding that he does not know what happened \u201cother than I bounced around in the car.\u201d His next recollection is of someone tapping on the window of the automobile, at which time he realized that his glasses were broken and that his head was sore \u201caround my eyes or right above the forehead, above the eyes.\u201d Although he needs his glasses to drive, he drove back to Peoria alone and arrived there, he thought, at about 3 p.m. He had gone straight to his home without returning to his office:\n\u201cI took some aspirins. I made myself a stiff drink, I called the office. And I laid down and by that time I was really starting to feel real bad. And I made another drink thinking maybe that would help. And my son came home and he took one look at me and suggested that we go to the hospital.\u201d\nDuring the drive back to Peoria he had noticed that his eyes were \u201cpretty swollen shut, were almost closed, and I was awfully concerned about the traffic.\u201d At home he noticed that one eye was \u201ctotally swollen shut, and the other eye was also puffy and swollen.\u201d\nClaimant was hospitalized for about 25 days. The final diagnosis stated by his physician on November 29, 1980, upon his discharge from Proctor Community Hospital in Peoria was as follows: right temporal lobe contusion and hemorrhage, fracture of the base of left frontal bone, possible cerebral concussion, and bilateral periorbital ecchymoses. While he was in the hospital, he said, he \u201ccould not get rid of the headache,\u201d primarily in the area of his forehead.\nIn February of 1981 he returned to work. Upon his return he \u201cnoticed what I call thought processing, I expect there is a medical term for it, I call it thought processing, was slowed down. In order to be able to think or concentrate on something would exacerbate the headache.\u201d He worked approximately half days from February until December of 1981 during which time he noticed \u201cjjjust intense, just an intense headache, vomiting.\u201d At the end of December, he testified, Robert McCord, respondent\u2019s president, told him \u201cat a meeting by the board of directors I either had the choice of resigning my position, or take some time off and come back at a reduced capacity.\u201d He chose, he said, to return at a reduced capacity.\nIn April of 1982 he returned to work in the capacity of a benefits manager. He noticed upon his return to work:\n\u201cAgain using my term the thought processing, it just, it just wasn\u2019t there. It would take so much effort, so much concentration to do the most simple things, the routine things, the things that I would do automatically. And there was a lot of vomiting, a lot of nausea. A feeling of the left side of the body being cold.\u201d\nHe had, he said, \u201c[cjonstant and severe headaches, which would get worse as the day progressed.\u201d He testified that he vomited between one and three to four times daily. Prior to vomiting \u201cthe headache would really start to get worse,\u201d he said, and he would have a feeling of nausea. Prior to November 4, 1980, he had had none of these problems.\nHe worked eight-hour days in the reduced capacity of benefits manager for approximately one year, until April of 1983 when he was, he said, \u201cjust totally exhausted.\u201d His job required a certain amount of travel:\n\u201cIf it were, if it were rainy or if there were heavy traffic, the traffic coming at you, or the cross traffic as you wait at a stop sign or stop light or the windshield wipers would cause nausea and some type of dizziness. And, I would get lost. I would know where I would be going, and I would end up somewhere else.\u201d\nSince he left the respondent\u2019s employ in April of 1983, he has had no other employment.\nHe testified at the hearing on October 16, 1985, that he still suffered from\n\u201c[cjonstant headache, again for an all purpose term, lack of thought processing, I go to one room, do something and by the time I get there I forget where, why I\u2019m there. I\u2019ll make myself lunch and I\u2019ll put the milk in the bread box or put the bread in the refrigerator, it just, the thought processing is just all, it\u2019s not very good.\u201d\nOn cross-examination he testified that he had one bottle of beer with his lunch on the day of the incident. He had had a second drink at home, he stated, because he \u201cthought maybe the alcohol would help numb the pain.\u201d He had had no appointment with Russell Hyder because he was making what he described on redirect examination as a \u201csurprise call.\u201d On cross-examination he stated that he had told his immediate boss, the senior vice-president, C.S. Martin, now retired, where he was going. He described the animal he swerved to avoid as \u201ca larger animal, like a pig or a horse or a deer or a large dog. I cannot tell you what it was. It happened rather fast.\u201d He described the day as clear and sunny and the highway as two lane. Initially he swerved to the left but then to the right. The car stopped in the ditch beside the road. He described the ditch as being as wide as the car was and his approach to the ditch as being at a 45-degree angle. He had not required assistance to get the car out of the ditch. After having determined that the car was drivable, he was able simply to back it out of the ditch and to proceed. He stated that as a result of the incident the car had sustained minor damage \u201cto either three of or all four corners of the automobile.\u201d Also damaged, he said, were the \u201cplastic strips between the grill and the bumper.\u201d There was a dent on the rear fender of the driver\u2019s side of the automobile. He testified that he had reported the damage to the car to respondent after he had returned to work in February of 1981. At the time of the repair, in September of 1981, the panel in back was starting to rust. He described the position of manager as one step below that of vice-president. He testified that in April of 1983 he had told Mr. Summers, the vice-president of the benefits department, that \u201cI was unable to continue at the present time, I had to leave.\u201d He has sought no employment elsewhere since that time.\nDr. Dennis Garwacki, a board-certified neurologist who treated the claimant, testified on his behalf by evidence deposition taken on May 15, 1984. Dr. Garwacki stated that he had first seen claimant on May 5, 1981, by referral because of a chronic headache. The claimant had told him that he had had chronic headaches since the automobile accident in November of 1980 and that he was having problems\n\u201cas far as what he called getting his act together, that is, trying to get his cognitive functions proper.\nHe was having problems with concentrating, being able to perform activities, because he couldn\u2019t seem to put all the information together.\u201d\nThe witness had reviewed claimant\u2019s medical history and records prior to May 5,1981, obtaining the following information:\n\u201cWell, probably the most important part was the CT scans, which reports I have here, which were multiple, the first one being on the day of the apparent injury, 11/5/1980, which showed basically the intracerebral hematoma on the right side.\nAnd the subsequent CT\u2019s, one to two weeks for a series of four showing resolutions of these abnormalities on the scan itself.\u201d\nInterpreting these reports, the witness stated that they showed\n\u201can area of hemorrhage in the right side of the brain that we call the frontal area, the front part of the brain, and measured about two centimeters by two centimeters.\nAnd along with it, there was some brain swelling or what we call edema. There is also a slight shift of the structures due to the swelling of the brain that was present.\u201d\nThe structures shifted from the right side to the left because of the swelling of the brain. These findings on the CT scan were, he said, consistent with the claimant\u2019s history of an automobile accident on November 4, 1980.\nThe witness had also reviewed prior to May 5, 1981, a report of psychological testing that \u201chelps substantiate the fact that the patient did have some problems with some of the cognitive functions, you know, some of his tasks with memory and things.\u201d Dr. Garwacki observed, \u201cAnd I thought that the psychological testing plus the CT findings and everything else would certainly \u2014 were severe enough and advanced enough to be able to give me some clue that this was an organic problem to some degree.\u201d Asked whether the results of the psychological testing showed any neurological dysfunction, Dr. Garwacki answered that they showed a tendency toward \u201csome problems with the immediate memory,\u201d important because one of his main complaints was the inability to \u201corganize his immediate memory to bring his thought processes to a good conclusion.\u201d Dr. Garwacki considered the claimant\u2019s memory problems to be a neurological dysfunction. Asked whether he had an opinion as to how the accident described by the claimant could result in this neurological dysfunction, the witness responded:\n\u201cCertainly showed with the findings of the CT that he certainly had enough of the injury to the brain to cause him to develop in a sense intracerebral hematoma, and also there was some bruising, contrecoup, so it showed not only a direct injury but also an injury to the opposite side to some degree, which meant that the, basically the impact would have had to be severe enough to cause distortion of the brain contents so that the opposite side was also affected.\u201d\nSuch distortion of the contents of the brain can be reflected, he said, in the neurological dysfunctions he had described. His diagnosis of the claimant\u2019s condition on May 5, 1981, was a \u201csevere head injury, closed head injury, with cerebral hematoma and contusions.\u201d He noted that the claimant was both anxious and depressed \u201cand I couldn\u2019t tell if it was primary or secondary to the head injury and to the headaches he was having, and to the fact that he couldn\u2019t function in his work.\u201d\nIn approximately June of 1981 Dr. Garwacki obtained a repeat CT scan, which showed \u201c[continuing resolution\u201d of the \u201cprimary process\u201d and was \u201cnormal.\u201d The claimant continued to complain of headaches. In July of 1981, because of these complaints, Dr. Garwacki thought that the claimant would have difficulty \u201cfunctioning adequately with the severity of the headaches, according to his subjective complaints.\u201d In September of 1981 claimant had told him that he was working but was unable to work more than half a day because of his headache problems. Asked whether there was \u201cmedical justification\u201d for the claimant\u2019s comments about the headaches and their effect upon his ability to work more than half a day, the witness answered,\n\u201cI can only go on his complaints, and he had subjective complaints. But his complaints of headaches and the type they were and the severity, the fact that they were associated with severe nausea and vomiting, very frequently made me feel that he was having problems, preventing him from working.\u201d\nDr. Garwacki testified that it would be possible for claimant to have organic damage that is not discernible by means of the medical tests now available.\nDr. Garwacki described a continuing series of approximately monthly visits to him by the claimant in which he complained of severe headaches. Apparently in January of 1982 claimant advised Dr. Garwacki that he \u201c \u2018was being forced to quit his job as vice-president because he could not perform the work on a full-time basis.\u2019 \u201d In March of 1982 claimant was not working, having stated that \u201che couldn\u2019t function so he stopped working.\u201d The witness had not made the recommendation that claimant stop working. Asked if he had an opinion as to whether there was a medical basis for claimant\u2019s feelings that he could not perform his occupational duties, the witness responded, \u201cI can only go on his, you know, his subjective complaints, the severity of his headaches. If they were as severe as he mentioned they were, and if he did have as much nausea and vomiting as he stated that he had, then he probably would have problems functioning in his capacity.\u201d In September of 1982 claimant stated to Dr. Garwacki that he was having problems \u201cactually working\u201d because of the severity of the headaches, which were causing him to vomit two or three times a day. The witness testified that nausea and vomiting can follow a very severe headache.\nOn January 10, 1983, the witness saw the claimant again:\n\u201cBasically, at that time he had expressed the fact that he was continuing to work, although around that time, he was not doing the job he was used to doing. He was in a lesser capacity and seeming somewhat frustrated. He was angry that he couldn\u2019t really do the job that he was used to doing before, and he was getting a lot of inward pressure about work. He was at that time still having a lot of symptoms with the headaches, and he was wondering if he would be able to continue working.\u201d\nIn April of 1983 claimant reported to Dr. Garwacki that\n\u201che had quit work about a week prior to seeing me. He didn\u2019t feel, however, that his headaches were any better, but he apparently felt that he could cope with them better because he could lie down, could be a little more \u2014 have more relief symptomatically. He felt the headaches were more on the right side of his head at this time, and he continued to take the medicine that I prescribed.\u201d\nConcerning claimant\u2019s ability to perform his job on April 27, 1983, Dr. Garwacki stated that \u201cif he really indeed was having as many headaches as he said he had and was uncomfortable with nausea and vomiting, then it would be very hard to function in a job with that type of complaint.\u201d He testified that he thought on May 13, 1983, the claimant could not work because of his complaints, the main ones being \u201csevere headaches that were associated with nausea and projectile vomiting on occasion.\u201d The doctor testified that these headaches were a \u201ccontinuation of the same types of headaches that he had complained about since the accident.\u201d With respect to causation the witness stated: \u201cI can only say that his headaches have continued since the above mentioned injury, and that if they have continued since that time, I can only say that there seems to be a causative effect because of the time sequence.\u201d The witness suggested that claimant go to the pain treatment center of the Scripps Medical Group because \u201c[w]e tried all types of approaches, psychological, and I had tried various medications. And I didn\u2019t think we were getting anywhere.\u201d Dr. Garwacki last saw the claimant on May 14, 1984. Concerning claimant\u2019s ability at that time to perform his job with the respondent, he stated, \u201cAgain, with his complaints, I did not feel he probably could work with those complaints.\u201d\nOn cross-examination the witness testified that he understood that the claimant\u2019s job was clerical when he last worked. He stated further:\n\u201cWe had talked it over the time I had seen him prior to that about his ability to work, and he was basically having quite severe headaches. And he was not sure if he would be able to continue the work much longer because of the severity of his headaches. He felt he was not doing a good job. He felt somewhat frustrated. He felt like he was not the person he used to be. And with all this frustration with the severity of his headaches, he was not certain he could continue to work.\u201d\nHe said that whether the claimant could perform his job would be dependent upon whether he was actually having the symptoms he had expressed \u201cbecause he had no neurological abnormalities that would prevent him from working. Just the severity of the headaches which is a subjective complaint, of course.\u201d Dr. Garwacki had performed 10 to 12 clinical neurological examinations of the claimant; on each examination there was an absence of any organic or pathological basis for the complaints he expressed. He had performed \u201cmany brain scans and CT scans and after the initial ones they merely showed resolution of his, you know, original hematoma or contusion.\u201d Claimant had had a headache during several visits to Dr. Garwacki\u2019s office and \u201clooked very sick by looking at him.\u201d As to whether claimant should seek less stressful employment Dr. Garwacki testified:\n\u201cIf he was having headaches with the severity he was, I would certainly have to say that he should be under less \u2014 in a situation under less stress, although, after he stopped working, he still continued, to have very severe headaches and supposedly was not under stress at that point.\u201d\nAsked whether he would put any limitations upon the claimant\u2019s ability to work, based upon organic findings alone, the witness responded,\n\u201cBasically, on a physical basis, the patient had nothing to limit his work. But I do know that in past experience, that subjective complaints of headaches can be very excruciating, and they can limit one\u2019s ability to work if they indeed are present. And, they can be present without any, really organic findings being present.\u201d\nOn redirect examination Dr. Garwacki testified that people do, in fact, have incapacitating headaches without the presence of any organic findings. He stated with respect to stress that \u201c[b]asically, the picture that seemed to evolve from all the times we\u2019ve talked was that whenever he would tend to be more active physically, that he would tend to have more complaints of more severe headaches.\u201d Upon recross he stated, \u201cI still thought that a lot of his problems were psychological, but I couldn\u2019t explain why.\u201d He said further that \u201cwe see headaches as a consequence of psychological problems.\u201d\nDr. Dietra Teichmann, a psychologist employed by the Institute of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation in Peoria, testified on claimant\u2019s behalf by evidence deposition taken on July 24, 1985. Having first seen claimant in the spring of 1981, she had been in charge of certain neuropsychological tests given to him in order \u201c[t]o clarify the effects of the head injury in terms of his behavior.\u201d The tests that were administered were the Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Battery, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the Wechsler Memory Scale, and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. In summary, she said, \u201cthe results showed that there was some impaired functioning.\u201d Concerning claimant\u2019s test results that demonstrated abnormal functioning of the brain, she testified:\n\u201cSpecifically, there was some evidence of frontal lobe impairment in terms of poor decision making, difficulty testing hypotheses, perseverating on incorrect responses, impaired short-term memory. There was also some evidence of difficulty with proprioception, knowledge of where the body is in space which may be related to impaired functioning of the cerebellum. Short-term memory, in addition to being related to impairment of the frontal lobe, can also be related to temporal lobe impairment, or hippocampal impairment or some of the subcortical structures.\u201d\nConcerning the claimant\u2019s short-term memory problems shown by the tests, the witness said that he was one standard deviation below the average for a person of his age in terms of being able to remember relevant information from a paragraph. Another specific example of abnormality was displayed by the claimant in the categories test:\n\u201c[This] is a problem-solving test in which a slide was shown to Jerry, he was to respond to it in a manner to test a certain hypothesis, and if he was correct, then he would assume that he might work on the next slide. If he was incorrect, he\u2019d have to remember what the hypothesis was, throw it out and try something different on succeeding slides.\nJerry was \u2014 had extreme difficulty even recalling what the previous slide was much less what hypothesis he had already tested out.\u201d\nThe witness had never recommended that plaintiff not work or not return to his job as a vice-president.\nShe described the claimant as he appeared the week before the taking of her deposition:\n\u201cNot really much change from what I\u2019ve been seeing all along. Difficulty expressing himself, trouble groping for words, decision-making problems, memory problems, not quite as depressed as when I had seen him earlier in the spring, at which point I was really concerned about the possibility of suicide.\u201d\nAbnormalities she observed at that time included decision-making problems, short-term memory problems, perseveration, impulsivity, and poor frustration tolerance. Asked whether these conditions could have been related to the accident described by him as having occurred in November of 1980, she responded, \u201cTo the best of my knowledge, that\u2019s when it all started.\u201d She gave as a diagnosis \u201c[cjlosed head injury.\u201d She indicated that head-injured persons have a typical behavior pattern that includes, for example, short-term memory problems, planning problems, difficulty dealing with abstract and complex concepts, verbal expression difficulties, verbal receptive difficulties, and difficulty understanding complex grammatical structures. The claimant, she said, exhibited all of these problems. Asked whether he could perform the duties of a vice-president of an insurance company, she answered, \u201cI don\u2019t think he could do it,\u201d adding, \u201cI would assume that an executive would have to be able to make decisions, and Jerry is not capable of doing that right now.\u201d Another reason she gave for his inability so to perform was his memory problem: \u201cIf Jerry doesn\u2019t have it written down on a piece of paper that he can refer to readily, he\u2019s not going to remember it, whatever it might happen to be.\u201d She expressed her view that \u201c[o] ver all, [claimant\u2019s condition] appears to be getting worse\u201d and described his prognosis as \u201c[v]ery poor at this point.\u201d She expressed her doubt that, even if claimant were to participate in certain pain management or cognitive retraining programs, he would ever be able to return to his work as an insurance executive: \u201cI think he could return to something, but I doubt that he would ever be employable at that level again, and that\u2019s being optimistic.\u201d She stated her opinion that claimant was not employable in the field of insurance claims or as vice-president of an insurance company, adding:\n\u201cDuring the first few months of treatment when he was under the care of Dr. Mermis, there was some hope that he would be able to return [to the job he was performing prior to his accident] and, in fact, he was encouraged to try to return to work. Following that trial \u2014 During the time that I have been actively involved with Jerry, since that time, no, I do not think he was ever able to go back.\u201d\nOn cross-examination this witness testified that when claimant was retested in February or March of 1983 he improved \u201c[i]n some ways\u201d but \u201cin many respects he did not.\u201d She stated that she had been aware that he had returned to work but had been unaware that he had, in the words of counsel, \u201cperformed to the satisfaction of his employer.\u201d Her understanding of the reason claimant terminated his employment was \u201cthat it was a combination of pain complaints and the impaired memory.\u201d Asked, \u201cAnd therefore were you aware that any evidence of organic brain damage that was demonstrable on either CT scan or EEG had cleared within one year of the original injury?\u201d she answered, \u201cSure, but that\u2019s a very typical picture.\u201d\nOn redirect examination she described the limitations of some medical tests, such as the CT scan and electroencephalogram:\n\u201cThe [CT] Scan specifically can only register gross changes in the brain. It cannot register micro changes that happen at the cellular level, or at the, whatever the next higher level is called. In a closed head injury, the way the brain is situated, it\u2019s encased in a fluid inside the skull. And in Mr. Vevea\u2019s [sic] case, he was moving forward. Something caused him to stop. The brain would rattle around causing a coup and a contrecoup, and that\u2019s where you might be getting things like the frontal lobe injury and the cerebral injury. In addition though, a lot of shearing takes place in the brain, so it\u2019s not just the two areas that are impaired. It affects the subcortical structures. It affects not just the two areas of impact, but it can affect \u2014 it can affect other parts of the brain. And in a closed head injury, the typical pattern is that we see this more diffused kind of pattern.\u201d\nThe witness testified that there can be abnormalities in the brain that a CT scan or an electroencephalogram are unable to detect.\nDr. Bernie Mermis, another psychologist at the Institute of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, testified on behalf of the claimant by evidence deposition taken on October 5, 1984. This witness was in overall charge of claimant\u2019s care and treatment at the institute. Dr. Teichmann, he said, was the supervisor in the area of neuropsychological testing. The witness had first seen claimant in the spring of 1981 upon referral, the purpose of which was to aid in a diagnosis. Claimant had two areas of difficulty: a headache since the accident.in November of 1980 and problems related to \u201cfunctioning cognitively and intellectually.\u201d The witness defined \u201cfunctioning cognitively\u201d as \u201c[b]eing able to think, being able to problem solve, being able to remember readily various events that occurred.\u201d The witness testified that, although claimant\u2019s \u201cimpairment index was below the cutoff to indicate brain damage, other bits of evidence of his performance indicated that he, in fact, was experiencing some impairment in brain function.\u201d The witness drew this conclusion because of the pattern of his complaints and the level of his \u201cpremorbid\u201d functioning. Claimant\u2019s functioning on the testing was inconsistent with what one would expect in light of his level of premorbid functioning, as indicated by his prior performance in school and in the workplace. Addressing some of these inconsistencies more specifically, the witness stated that on the portion of the Hal-stead-Reitan called the category test, which is a concept formation test and involves \u201ca lot of very complicated thinking processes,\u201d he showed \u201ca great deal of difficulty,\u201d unexpected from someone \u201cas, assumed to be as bright as Mr. Vevea [sic], as capable cognitively, intellectually, as Mr. Vevea [sic]. That was one of the surprising areas of deficit.\u201d The witness considered the testing to include both objective and subjective components.\nThe witness\u2019 diagnosis of claimant\u2019s condition was organic brain syndrome subsequent to closed head injury. Dr. Mermis\u2019 judgment was that the condition was associated with the accident of November 4, 1980. With respect to the course of treatment initially planned for claimant, the witness testified that claimant had been \u201cvery much interested in\u201d returning to work and that they had suggested he do so and see if he \u201cwas able to function,\u201d using extensive note taking and tape recording to compensate for his difficulties with memory. Concerning the requirements of claimant\u2019s job, the witness stated that claimant had reported \u201cgreat difficulty in even carrying out the duties that he had done very readily in the past.\u201d With reference to the effect of a condition like the claimant\u2019s upon a person functioning at a high intellectual level, as opposed to one functioning at a lower intellectual level, Dr. Mermis explained,\n\u201cWith brain injury, I think one sees the most dramatic impairments with people who have been very high in their level of functioning prior to injury. As an example, someone who is of average intellectual cognitive skills and is carrying out fairly routine kinds of job activities, after a minor brain injury can very often go back to that kind of a job and carry it out successfully because it really wasn\u2019t requiring all that much of the individual to do the job in the first place. There\u2019s enough left to be able to do the job.\nWhen one deals with a highly technical job, one that requires a great deal of and facility in cognitive functioning, even minor impairments can be devastating. An example of that would be somebody in a job like my own where I need to be constantly attending to various cues, recollect a great deal of information about what\u2019s being presented to me to be able to synthesize that into some conclusion. When you have a brain injury of some sort, even minor, those are the functions that get hit, that are impaired.\nSo I think that the individuals that we see here who have been very high level functioning individuals premorbidly are the ones who are both personally and functionally most devastated by the brain injury.\u201d\nDr. Mermis saw the claimant about 60 times, seeing him for the last time in December of 1983. His final diagnosis was unchanged, that is, that claimant suffered from the sequelae of a closed head injury, from an organic brain syndrome, and from a chronic, continuous post-traumatic headache. He was of the opinion that the claimant\u2019s condition was related to the accident and that he could not perform the duties of his job. He based this opinion \u201c[bjasically, upon the self report of Mr. Vevea [sic] as to the difficulties he was having with the job and the impact that he was experiencing from trying to function on the job.\u201d\nConcerning claimant\u2019s prognosis the witness testified, \u201cI don\u2019t think there\u2019s any way to predict with certainty what\u2019s going to happen with Jerry.\u201d He explained that most of the improvement that is going to occur in brain-injured persons such as claimant will take place within the first 6 to 12 months after injury. Progress for such a patient after the first year is very slow and very small. Therefore, he concluded that claimant \u201cwill not make remarkable changes from where he is right now.\u201d He stated that the claimant\u2019s memory function had improved slightly over the cl1k years in which he saw him and that some of his cognitive functioning had improved slightly, but his \u201cpain problem\u201d remained unchanged and, in fact, had deteriorated. The witness testified that, with respect to claimant\u2019s discontinuing work, he had recommended to him \u201c[t]hat he discontinue his position to see whether it would be helpful for him in terms of both the headache and in terms of working more specifically on some of the cognitive intellectual deficits that he was experiencing.\u201d He said that \u201c[s]everal of the physicians seeing him and I suggested numerous times that he consider withdrawing from the job for a period of time to see if that would produce any improvement\u201d and that claimant had done so for a time \u201cwith no improvement.\u201d He described claimant as having continued \u201cto push himself to be on the job.\u201d\nOn cross-examination Dr. Mermis testified that the category test had been given to claimant originally on April 24, 1981, and had been repeated by Dr. Teichmann in March of 1983; upon retesting, the score was still within the impaired range. \u201cThe change that did occur,\u201d he said, \u201caccording to Dr. Teichmann, was that Mr. Vevea [sic] was much less agitated on this occasion, calmer in dealing with the test materials than he had been on the first occasion.\u201d On the first administration of the category test claimant made 60 errors; on the second he made 58 errors, \u201ca very slight change,\u201d according to Dr. Mermis, who testified that \u201c[t]he impairment cut I believe occurs at approximately 50 errors.\u201d Dr. Mermis stated that most of the results of claimant\u2019s intelligence test were in the \u201csuperior\u201d range but there were \u201csome exceptions.\u201d The \u201ctotal summaries\u201d' of the portions of the tests were all within the superior range, but there were subscales of tests that were not within that range. The result of the Wechsler Memory Scale fell within the \u201caverage\u201d range.\nDr. Mermis testified further that, if a person has abnormal neuropsychological test results, one would not expect to have abnormal results from \u201cobjective\u201d tests such as brain imaging, CT scan, and neuroencephalogram because such techniques depend upon structural findings. Although damage from bleeding and from a tumor, for example, shows up very readily with the use of such techniques, damage as a result of toxic conditions, for example, does not. \u201cClosed head injury problems rarely show up on the testing techniques *** described,\u201d he said, because such injury appears to cause multiple small injuries undetectable by these techniques.\nDr. Mermis stated that the claimant had become impaired, with respect to functioning in his job, \u201cin having quick access\u201d through his memory to information necessary for making decisions. Further, Dr. Mermis said,\n\u201c[h]is memory difficulties were quite significant in that he had to resort to extensive note taking and tape recording of phone conversations in order to be able to recall that he had spoken to a client.\nHe reported that he would at times have a phone conversation, and five minutes later would be unable to recall any components of that phone conversation.\u201d\nThe claimant had two areas of difficulty: \u201cMemory and also the problem solving component of the job. That is, being able to put bits of information together to form conclusions about specific questions.\u201d The claimant has, he said, problems with both \u201cretrieval\u201d and \u201cstorage\u201d: \u201cHe tended to have a great deal of difficulty incorporating new information, so he was unable to build new information into his system that would help him out. To put it in simpler terms, he wasn\u2019t learning the material very well at all when he tried to.\u201d Dr. Mermis expressed the view that the claimant was able to function cognitively \u201cat some level, but it\u2019s my opinion that he\u2019s not able to function the way he did before the injury.\u201d Asked whether claimant would be suited to employment of a routine, repetitive nature requiring little application of the cognitive functions, the witness answered, \u201cI think he would be able to handle that from the perspective of cognitive intellectual demands. What would impair him would be the headache ***.\u201d He described the headache as \u201ca significant impediment to his job performance at Illinois Mutual\u201d and something that \u201cwould present a problem in almost any kind of employment for him.\u201d Dr. Mermis testified that there was \u201cno way\u201d of knowing whether the claimant actually suffered from the complaints he described.\nAdmitted as one of claimant\u2019s exhibits is a Vocational Information Systems Evaluation Report, dated July 31, 1985, and prepared for the employer. The evaluator of this report about claimant was Thomas Frederick, who stated that the report was a continuation of an assessment made by him on August 22, 1984, at the request of respondent\u2019s counsel. Mr. Frederick stated further:\n\u201cThe first report concluded that, based on his work history, he has many skills which would easily make him employable, but considering his reactions to simple stresses, the headaches, the memory problems, and the psychological implications, he was seen as unemployable.\u201d\nCounsel for the employer had requested, Mr. Frederick said, \u201ca second job title search to determine what jobs would be available to Mr. Vevea [sic] assuming the considerations mentioned above are not present or have been overcome.\u201d\nDr. Alex J. Arieff, board certified in the specialties of both neurology and psychiatry, testified on behalf of the employer by evidence deposition taken on October 3, 1985. This witness had examined claimant on October 3, 1983, at the request of the employer. He stated that he had not found a reason for claimant\u2019s headache either \u201corganically or objectively.\u201d Asked whether he had found any organic or objective basis for his complaints concerning a lack of concentration, the witness answered, \u201cNot on my examination except for his mood disturbance, which can produce symptoms of lack of concentration.\u201d He testified that he had found no basis \u201cin an objective or organic sense\u201d of his complaints of memory loss. He said further that \u201c[i]n a purely objective sense\u201d he had found no residuals of a closed head injury, with the exception of things like arm swinging that Dr. Arieff thought were voluntary on claimant\u2019s part. This witness had recommended that claimant have a \u201cgood psychological evaluation,\u201d apparently by Dr. Jack Ar-bit, with whom the witness \u201cusually work[s].\u201d The witness concluded that claimant needed psychiatric therapy.\nOn cross-examination Dr. Arieff testified that organic brain damage \u201cmay\u201d affect the brain\u2019s powers in the role of regulating chemicals which, when imbalanced, can cause depression. He expressed the view that claimant\u2019s symptoms were due to a depression for which he was not receiving \u201cproper treatment.\u201d He stated that claimant had suffered organic brain damage \u201coriginally after the injury; but people do recover.\u201d Difficulty in concentration is, he admitted, a \u201c[possible\u201d symptom of organic brain damage, but usually a person with organic memory deficit is not aware of it and rarely complains about it. \u201cIt may be,\u201d he said, \u201cbut it\u2019s rare.\u201d\nTestifying on behalf of the employer by evidence deposition taken on October 3, 1985, was Dr. Jack Arbit, a psychologist, who had examined and tested claimant on June 12, 1985, at the employer\u2019s request. He had administered to claimant the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the Wechsler Memory Scale Form I, the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Designs test, the Memory for Designs test, and the Halstead-Wepman Aphasia Screening test. He testified that the findings with respect to the test results did not appear to be consistent with a diagnosis of an organic brain disturbance. The claimant\u2019s scores on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale were in the \u201cbright normal\u201d range. Concerning the results of this test, the witness stated further:\n\u201cWhile [claimant] had difficulty with some of the organic sensitive tasks and while this score seemed to be reduced from what had been obtained at prior evaluations, the particular discrepancies noted were not of a pattern that would consistently bespeak a meaningful organic brain disturbance, in that while he obtained lower scores on immediate memory and one of the visual motor tasks, he obtained his highest scores on other tests that are equally sensitive to the presence of an organic brain disturbance.\u201d\nIn his opinion, if an organic brain disturbance were, in fact, present, there would have been a \u201ccorrelation or consistency.\u201d The witness stated that, \u201c[i]n terms of the associate learning subtest of the Memory Scale, the pattern of results also seems inconsistent in terms of an organic brain disturbance, since he does not perform in the way one generally finds and comes to expect of people with an organic brain involvement.\u201d He observed that claimant \u201cperforms slowly, and to some extent his difficulties seem related to that,\u201d adding:\n\u201cBased upon the slowness and this inconsistent function on the associate learning subtest, it was my opinion that the seeming reduction in the memory quotient was not related to an organic problem but to a conscious control of his functions with this instrument.\u201d\nBy \u201cconscious control,\u201d he said, he meant \u201cvolitional\u201d control by the claimant.\nDr. Arbit testified that the Rorschach Psychodiagnostic test, that is, the \u201cinkblot\u201d test, was also administered, the results of which provided \u201ca reasonable and viable alternative explanation for the symptoms and complaints reported by Mr. VeVea.\u201d This alternative explanation, as opposed to one based upon organic brain dysfunction, was \u201cfunctional,\u201d he said, \u201cmeaning that there is a conscious component to the focus upon the somatic complaints that he subjectively reports.\u201d The results of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, also administered, \u201cwere a very marked preoccupation with endorsing items that would indicate a most notable agitated depression and fixation upon a rather extensive array of unrelated and inconsistent complaints as to body functions.\u201d Although the witness could give no examples of the complaints about body functions to which he referred, he testified,\n\u201cBut clearly, in order to get the scores as high as he does on the scales of hypochondriasis and hysteria, he must endorse an inordinate number of items as to bodily ailments, complaints, disturbances, distress that seem to involve an awesome host of physical systems, none of which seem particularly related to each other or consistently present, and none likely to be a manifestation \u2014 I\u2019m sorry, and few a manifestation of the kind of injury which he purported to have.\u201d\nThe terms \u201chypochondriasis\u201d and \u201chysteria\u201d he said \u201c[i]n the current instance, *** refer to a fixation and preoccupation with somatic complaints that would seem to bespeak the presence of some need to enhance, to overelaborate, to become obsessed and preoccupied with his physical functioning to an extent greater than would seem objectively reasonable.\u201d He indicated that these test results with respect to hypochondriasis and hysteria support the opinion that from a psychological perspective there is not consistent evidence of organic brain dysfunction because \u201cthey show a man who takes great pains and care to elaborate symptoms and complaints that simply don\u2019t fit together in a meaningful fashion.\u201d\nOn cross-examination Dr. Arbit testified that claimant\u2019s test results showed some overall reduction and some specific difficulty with some of the more organic sensitive material which would \u201c[n]ot necessarily\u201d but \u201ccould be\u201d evidence of some organic problem in the brain. He testified further that, assuming that prior intellectual test scores were in the superior range, his own finding indicated a lessening of abilities; he stated that these types of test scores would decrease if a person suffered from organic brain disturbance \u201c[ajmong other things.\u201d Assuming such a decline in an individual\u2019s intellectual test scores, the witness stated that \u201c[a]s a hypothetical instance,\u201d it is \u201calways a possibility\u201d that such a decline would indicate a problem affecting that individual\u2019s learning capability. However, a person\u2019s intellectual test scores can decline in the absence of a problem affecting his learning capability \u201c[w]hen the person is either malingering or consciously distorting so that his performance does not reveal the maximum that he is capable or she is capable of doing.\u201d The witness stated that, based upon his review of the claimant\u2019s records and examinations, he could not rule out the presence of some residual organic brain disturbance.\nOn redirect examination he testified that the significance he ascribed to claimant\u2019s difficulty with \u201csome organic brain sensitive material\u201d was \u201c[t]hat it was the result of his efforts to enhance the degree of difficulties he was experiencing.\u201d He stated that, if there were, in fact, \u201cevidences\u201d of mild organic brain disturbance, they could not account for the extensive array of complaints manifested by claimant on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and during the conduct of the witness\u2019 examination of him.\nThe employer called as a witness Lloyd Reed, who is the respondent\u2019s senior vice-president, responsible for, among other things, company property, including the acquisition, sale, and use of automobiles. He stated that he and a subordinate, Charles Kellogg, had inspected the automobile issued to claimant for physical damage shortly after claimant\u2019s return to work in about February of 1981. He testified that upon his inspection he had observed no damage \u201cwhatsoever\u201d of any kind to either the exterior or the interior of the vehicle. On cross-examination he testified that this automobile was repaired on September 15, 1981. The witness indicated that he had no knowledge of any damage to this vehicle reported as having occurred after the time of his inspection of it. Although the invoice for these repairs was admitted into evidence as claimant\u2019s exhibit No. 25, it does not appear to be included in the record for review. Testifying about this exhibit, the witness indicated that the repairs that were made to the vehicle on that date by Ron\u2019s Autobody, which regularly serviced the respondent\u2019s vehicles, included repairs to the left door, a taillight, and a park lamp assembly, which is, he said, \u201cpart of the corner of the vehicle.\u201d Other repairs made to the vehicle on that date about which the witness testified include aligning and touching up the front bumper fillers, painting the right front fender, and \u201cSTR left quarter,\u201d which he stated meant probably to \u201cstraighten corner.\u201d The cost of the repairs paid by the respondent was, he said, $350. He testified that he had no information concerning the vehicle\u2019s having been involved in any other incident or accident.\nAlso testifying on behalf of the respondent was Charles Kellogg, Jr., respondent\u2019s manager of the home office services department in charge of transportation and communications. He stated that in 1980 and 1981 claimant had had a company car issued to him. This witness said that on February 1, 1981, he had had occasion to inspect claimant\u2019s company car with \u201cBill Reed.\u201d He testified that at that time he found no interior or exterior damage, including any of the four corners of the car and the fenders or quarter panels. He testified further that when he examined the automobile in February of 1981 none of the \u201cmatters\u201d shown on claimant\u2019s exhibit No. 25, which is the invoice for repairs made by Ron\u2019s Autobody, were present on the car. He described Ron\u2019s Autobody as \u201cour autobody specialist. Up where we have all our work done on all of our company cars.\u201d\nOn cross-examination he testified that it is \u201cpossible\u201d that he could have overlooked the dent requiring straightening of the quarter panel. He stated that he did not work on Saturdays or Sundays. He said that he knew of no indication in the respondent\u2019s file that the car was involved in any accident or incident after February of 1981 and before the September date of the invoice.\nThe arbitrator noted in his highly detailed decision that the Commission was taking judicial notice that February 1, 1981, was a Sunday, when Mr. Kellogg would not, according to his testimony, have been working. The arbitrator found that such testimony undermined this witness\u2019 credibility.\nUpon review the Commission made the following findings of fact:\n\u201c1. [Claimant\u2019s] testimony as to the accident is unrebutted and is corroborated by histories given to Respondent\u2019s claims examiner and to treating medical providers, and is found by the Commission to be credible. The Commission therefore finds that while travelling on November 4, 1980[,] to investigate a claim, [claimant] drove into a ditch to avoid hitting an animal in the roadway, and struck his head, sustaining a fracture of the frontal bone, contusions to the head and eye area with intracerebral hematoma.\n2. The Commission relies on [claimant\u2019s] testimony and that of his treating physicians, Drs. Garwacki, Teichmann and Mermis[,] in finding that as a result of the accident [claimant] suffers from headaches, impaired memory and ability to concentrate, such that he is unemployable. Respondent\u2019s vocational evaluation of [claimant] by Thomas Frederick confirms that given the presence of these conditions [claimant] is unemployable.\u201d\nIt is the function of the Commission to resolve disputed questions of fact, including those of causal connection, to decide which of conflicting medical views is to be accepted, and to draw permissible inferences. (Material Service Corp. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 382, 454 N.E.2d 655.) In the presence of conflicting medical opinion, the Commission\u2019s determination is given substantial deference and will be upheld unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (Material Service Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 382, 454 N.E.2d 655.) The Commission is the judge of the credibility of witnesses. (Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 35, 454 N.E.2d 252.) It is the peculiar province of the Commission not only to determine the credibility of witnesses but also to weigh the testimony and to determine the weight to be given to the evidence. (Berry v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 401, 459 N.E.2d 963; Dunker v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 349, 466 N.E.2d 1255.) A reviewing court should neither overturn the Commission\u2019s findings simply because a different inference could be drawn nor otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. Hoegger v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 512 N.E.2d 10.\nAn employee is totally and permanently disabled when he is unable to make some contribution sufficient to justify payment of wages. (Continental Drilling Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 508 N.E.2d 1246.) For purposes of section 8(f) of the Act, a person is totally disabled when he cannot perform any services except those for which no reasonably stable labor market exists; conversely, if an employee is qualified for and capable of obtaining gainful employment without seriously endangering health or life, such employee is not totally and permanently disabled. (E.R. Moore Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 353, 376 N.E.2d 206.) A claimant has the burden to prove that no employment is available for a person with his disability unless he is obviously unemployable or unless there is medical evidence to support a claim of total disability; if the employee can establish that although he is not altogether incapacitated for work, he is so handicapped that he cannot be employed regularly in a well-known branch of the labor market, the burden shifts to the employer to show that some kind of suitable work is regularly and continuously available to the employee. (Reynolds v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 695, 502 N.E.2d 1178.) Causation and the permanency and degree of disability are issues of fact for the Commission, and its award will be set aside only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Continental Drilling Co., 155 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 508 N.E.2d 1246.\nIn the instant case the Commission expressly found the claimant\u2019s testimony to be credible. As a consequence, it found that the unwitnessed accident occurred under the circumstances described by the claimant. In consequence of its finding that claimant\u2019s testimony was credible and of its reliance upon the testimony of his treating doctors, Drs. Garwacki, Teichmann, and Mermis, the Commission found that he did, in fact, suffer from headaches and impaired memory and ability to concentrate so that he is unemployable. Although the medical opinions were conflicting, there was abundant evidence in the testimony of these three witnesses in particular and the record as a whole to support these findings of the Commission. It was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the Commission to find that claimant was permanently and totally disabled under section 8(f) of the Act and that claimant suffered accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment on November 4, 1980.\nThe claimant\u2019s motion to strike the employer\u2019s statement of facts, taken with the case, is hereby denied, and the judgment of the circuit court confirming the decision of the Commission is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY, P.J., and McNAMARA, WOODWARD, and McCullough, jj., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LEWIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "David B. Mueller, of Cassidy & Mueller, of Peoria, for appellant.", "John Lesaganich and Mark Flannery, both of Goldfine & Bowles, P.C., of Peoria, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ILLINOIS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Gerald VeVea, Appellee).\nThird District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 3-89-0709WC\nOpinion filed August 24, 1990.\nRehearing denied October 2, 1990.\nDavid B. Mueller, of Cassidy & Mueller, of Peoria, for appellant.\nJohn Lesaganich and Mark Flannery, both of Goldfine & Bowles, P.C., of Peoria, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1018-01", "first_page_order": 1038, "last_page_order": 1059 }