{ "id": 2587661, "name": "LAURENCE N. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Smith v. Department of Professional Regulation", "decision_date": "1990-08-15", "docket_number": "No. 1-89-1926", "first_page": "279", "last_page": "290", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 279" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 1020", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5479848 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/1020-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 56", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3160348 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3192693 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 N.E.2d 770", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3279721 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.E.2d 617", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2427752 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/344/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 N.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. App. 2d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2577968, 2578619 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/75/0109-02", "/ill-app-2d/75/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2797363 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/23/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 N.E.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3515887 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 N.E.2d 11", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 2d 925", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2533517 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/132/0925-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 N.E.2d 1351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3597494 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 984", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173273 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 1048", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. App. 3d 826", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3477901 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/173/0826-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 N.E.2d 342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Ill. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2768758 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/14/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 1166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 Ill. App. 3d 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2621735 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/182/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.E.2d 722", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "412 Ill. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2666140 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 N.E.2d 1356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 806", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2607689 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 N.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383801 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5493288 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0444-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 930, "char_count": 22432, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4196296139573043e-07, "percentile": 0.8008644519429511 }, "sha256": "5fc2009221d01119854d604a32775f54dde85fc4dd939c03af46309bf922c8f5", "simhash": "1:e8a20856238045f5", "word_count": 3521 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:29:37.094110+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LAURENCE N. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Laurence N. Smith, appeals the affirmance of the administrative decision of defendant, Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, to suspend him from the practice of chiropractic medicine for an indefinite period.\nDefendant\u2019s amended administrative complaint against plaintiff charged him with several violations of section 16 of the Medical Practice Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. Ill, par. 4401 et seq.). Specifically, it charged that, in the course of treating four different patients in 1983, plaintiff engaged in conduct which constituted: (a) dishonorable, unethical or unprofessional conduct of a character likely to deceive, defraud or harm the public; (b) willfully making and filing false records and reports in his practice; and (c) gross, willful and continued overcharging for professional services, including but not limited to the filing of false statements for collection of fees for services not rendered. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. Ill, pars. 4433(5), (21), (24).\nAfter an evidentiary hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) who conducted .the hearing issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommendation that plaintiff\u2019s license be suspended. Subsequently, defendant\u2019s Medical Disciplinary Board (Board) found that, based upon the evidence, plaintiff knew, at the time of their submission, that the bills he submitted to the insurers of the four patients whose treatment formed the basis of the complaint against him contained charges for services not rendered. Consequently, it recommended, and defendant\u2019s Director ordered, that plaintiff\u2019s license be suspended for an indefinite period.\nI\nOn appeal, plaintiff first contends that defendant\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, plaintiff challenges four findings of fact by the ALJ which, along with his other factual findings and conclusions of law, were adopted by the Board: (a) that he engaged in a \u201cpattern of bill padding\u201d; (b) that the four patients whose treatment was at issue were more credible than plaintiff\u2019s records on the issues of what services plaintiff rendered to them and when he rendered them; (c) that plaintiff performed medically unnecessary procedures on the patients; and (d) that plaintiff submitted inaccurate and misleading bills to the patients\u2019 insurers.\nA\nIn challenging the ALJ\u2019s finding that a \u201cpattern of bill padding\u201d was evident from plaintiff\u2019s patient records and the testimony, plaintiff notes or argues that: (1) in treating the four patients whose treatment was at issue, pursuant to his practice of not requesting co-payments from them, he merely accepted what their insurers paid him, even if that amount was less than the entire bill; (2) Dr. Guzzo, defendant\u2019s expert, stated that the practice of not receiving co-payments from patients with insurance and merely accepting what their insurers paid on their chiropractic bills did not constitute fraud and that the market determined the propriety of charges for chiropractic services; (3) \u201cthe uncontroverted testimony\u201d was that he charged all of his patients the same fees, based solely on the services rendered, whether or not they participated in his \u201cno co-payments\u201d program; (4) there was simply no record evidence to support a conclusion that his \u201cno co-payments\u201d practice was improper or fraudulent; and (5) there was insufficient evidence as to what the proper fees for the four patients involved should have been so as to allow a finding that the fees charged to their insurers were grossly excessive.\nWe believe that the foregoing evidence noted and arguments made by plaintiff relate to \u201cbill padding\u201d in the sense of charging higher than customary fees for services rendered. However, in so construing the term \u201cbill padding\u201d as used by the ALJ and, implicitly, the term \u201covercharging\u201d as used in defendant\u2019s amended complaint, plaintiff has ignored that the overcharging which the complaint alleged against him specifically included overcharging in the sense of charging for services not actually rendered. As such, the fact that the evidence may have been insufficient to support a finding that plaintiff had engaged in overcharging by charging higher than customary fees for his services is of no avail to plaintiff in demonstrating that he had not overcharged in the specific sense alleged in the amended complaint.\nFor this same reason, we find unavailing plaintiff\u2019s further argument that the ALJ\u2019s finding that his charges \u201cwere too high\u201d did not satisfy the statutory requirement of a finding that they constituted gross, willful and continuous overcharging. This argument too reveals that plaintiff has myopically focused upon the amount of the fees he charged for discrete services rather than his alleged charging of fees for services not rendered. Given the abundant record evidence that plaintiff repeatedly charged for services not rendered and the ALJ\u2019s references to that evidence in his factual findings, the finding that plaintiff\u2019s charges were \u201ctoo high\u201d was merely incidental to the findings which did satisfy the statutory requirement of gross, willful and continuous overcharging. In this regard, we believe that \u201covercharging\u201d as used in the Medical Practice Act, like the phrase \u201cbill padding,\u201d may mean charging too much for services rendered and/or charging for services not actually rendered. It is clear from the allegations of defendant\u2019s amended complaint that it was \u201covercharging\u201d in the latter sense which was mainly at issue in this case. The evidence adduced by defendant abundantly proved those allegations.\nB\nRegarding the second challenged finding of fact, plaintiff argues, essentially, that his business records were entitled to greater weight than the testimony of the four patients whose treatment was at issue, with respect to the issue of what services he actually rendered to them. Specifically, with respect to the conflict between his records and the testimony of one of the patients, Thomas Cihlar, as to the dates of Cihlar\u2019s visits to plaintiff, plaintiff asserts that Cihlar\u2019s testimony was not credible given his uncertainty about the months in 1983 in which he was treated by plaintiff. We cannot agree.\nIt is for the finder of fact to evaluate all evidence, including the testimony and medical records produced; to judge the credibility of witnesses; to resolve conflicts in medical evidence; and to draw reasonable inferences and conclusions from the facts. (See Millis v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 444, 433 N.E.2d 662.) Moreover, there is always a possibility that business records are in error, and they deserve no special presumption of credibility as compared to the opposing testimony of a witness. (Nowakowski v. Hoppe Tire Co. (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 155, 158, 349 N.E.2d 578.) In this latter regard, the fact that plaintiff\u2019s records were positively shown to contain material errors and omissions regarding the treatment and services rendered the four patients provided even more reason to find them less credible than the testimony of those patients. The ALJ\u2019s finding of the testimony of the four patients as more credible than plaintiff\u2019s business records was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIn the same vein, plaintiff further asserted that the ALJ erred in denying his request for subpoenas for records of other physicians who had treated the four patients. Plaintiff intended to use the records of the other physicians to impeach the four patients\u2019 recollection of the services which he rendered to them. This argument is unavailing to plaintiff. Preliminarily, we note that plaintiff fails to cite any authority whatsoever to support his right to such subpoenas. As such, we may consider this argument waived. (In re Marriage of Talmadge (1989), 179 Ill. App. 3d 806, 534 N.E.2d 1356.) Equally as important, however, is plaintiff\u2019s failure to address his right to such records in the face of the physician-patient privilege which, given his asserted intent to have questioned the four patients on \u201cthe specifics of medical care\u201d rendered by other practitioners, might very well apply to such records. The denial of the requested subpoenas was not error.\nC\nWith respect to the third finding of fact which plaintiff challenges, he argues that the evidence did not reveal that he violated the Act by performing medically unnecessary procedures. Plaintiff grounds this argument on the inconsistency between the ALJ\u2019s lengthy discussion, in his findings of fact, of the allegedly unnecessary X rays and blood tests performed on some of the four patients, on one hand, and the ALJ\u2019s conclusion, on the other, that this case did not involve plaintiff\u2019s failure to use or apply his skills in compliance with the standards of his profession. As further evidence of this inconsistency, plaintiff also cites the ALJ\u2019s statement at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing that the issue of unnecessary X rays was the only substantive issue concerning plaintiff\u2019s professional practice, \u201cmeaning whether he was competently performing his duties as a treating practitioner.\u201d\nWe find this argument unavailing. Plaintiff\u2019s argument, in essence, seems to be that, in order to conclude that he violated the Act by performing unnecessary X rays and other tests, the ALJ also had to conclude that the performance of such procedures evidenced that plaintiff either did not possess or apply the skills of a competent practitioner. We must concede that the ALJ\u2019s characterization of the issue of unnecessary X rays as the only issue concerning plaintiff\u2019s competency lends credence to his argument. However, in finding the argument ultimately unpersuasive, we must note that the ALJ so characterized the issue of the unnecessary X rays only for the purpose of informing the Board as to the issues in plaintiff\u2019s case. That is, the ALJ was not, in our view, making a binding pronouncement of the elements of proof of plaintiff\u2019s violation of the Act by performing the unnecessary X rays. As such, the failure to find that plaintiff had either not possessed or applied the skill required of a competent practitioner did not preclude the ALJ from finding that the unnecessary procedures nonetheless constituted a violation of the Act.\nThe difference in the plaintiff\u2019s view and our view on this question is akin to that between negligent and intentional conduct. That is, plaintiff asserts that, not having found negligence on his part, the ALJ could not find a violation of the Act. We, however, believe that, given the evidence before him, the ALJ must have ultimately based his finding of a violation of the Act in performing unnecessary procedures on intentional, not negligent, conduct by plaintiff. Viewed in that light, the ALJ\u2019s finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nD\nWith respect to the finding that he submitted false and misleading bills to the four patients\u2019 insurers, plaintiff argues, essentially, that regardless of the fact that he designated both the procedure of hands-on manipulation and the procedure of intersegmental traction as \u201cmanipulation\u201d on his bills to the insurers, he provided all of such services for which he billed them.\nPreliminarily, we disagree with plaintiff that \u201cnothing in the record demonstrates\u201d that he billed for manipulation on dates when he did not perform either hands-on manipulation or intersegmental traction. We find the record in this case rife with evidence that, indeed, plaintiff billed for services, including but not limited to manipulations (whether hands-on or mobilizing \u2014 as plaintiff refers to inter-segmental traction) supposedly rendered on dates when, in fact, he had not provided any such services to the four patients. Defendant thus acted properly in choosing to believe that evidence rather than plaintiff\u2019s contradictory evidence.\nMoreover, we find without merit plaintiff\u2019s attempt to avoid the expert testimony that in chiropractic the term \u201cmanipulation\u201d is not used to designate other than hands-on manipulation. There is abundant record evidence to support the conclusion that the standards, applicable to chiropractors in the Chicagoland metropolitan area in 1983, required the use of the term \u201cmanipulation\u201d to refer only to hands-on or manual manipulation of a patient\u2019s spine. The standards further called for billing as \u201cmanipulations\u201d only such manipulations performed on a patient. As such, to the extent that plaintiff designated intersegmental traction as \u201cmanipulation\u201d in billing the insurers of the four patients, defendant properly found that he knowingly misled the insurers and filed false records and reports to support his requests for payments.\nII\nPlaintiff next contends that the ALJ applied an incorrect standard in denying his motion for directed verdict. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that, in concluding that \u201cthere\u2019s a way that the facts in the record could now be read or found to meet [the] clear and convincing evidence standard,\u201d the ALJ applied a less stringent standard than that of clear and convincing evidence, which defendant was required to meet to make out a prima facie case against plaintiff (Smith v. Department of Registration & Education (1952), 412 Ill. 332, 106 N.E.2d 722; Cicmanec v. Department of Registration & Education (1989), 182 Ill. App. 3d 710, 538 N.E.2d 1166). We cannot agree.\nPreliminarily, we agree with defendant that, by failing to raise this issue before the ALJ or Board, plaintiff has waived it on appeal to this court. (Leffler v. Browning (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 225, 151 N.E.2d 342; A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Department of Revenue (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 826, 527 N.E.2d 1048.) The fact that the issue of the standard of proof which the State was required to meet implicates plaintiffs due process rights (see Board of Education v. State Board of Education (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 173, 497 N.E.2d 984) does not require a contrary result. The rule of waiver applies equally to issues involving constitutional due process rights. (See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Department of Local Government Affairs (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 277, 466 N.E.2d 1351; Quinn v. Department of Registration & Education (1971), 132 Ill. App. 2d 925, 271 N.E.2d 11.) Moreover, plaintiff\u2019s argument that he preserved the error for appeal by raising it in the circuit court is meritless. The waiver rule specifically requires first raising an issue before the administrative tribunal rendering a decision from which an appeal is taken to the courts. (Leffler, 14 Ill. 2d 225, 151 N.E.2d 342; A.R. Barnes, 173 Ill. App. 3d 826, 527 N.E.2d 1048.) Given that, in administrative review cases, including those involving defendant, the circuit courts act as the first-tier courts of review (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, pars. 3\u2014104, 3\u2014110; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. Ill, par. 4447), the reason and logic behind that requirement are clear.\nAssuming, arguendo, that plaintiff did not waive the instant issue, we find it substantively without merit. In arguing that the ALJ applied a less stringent standard than clear and convincing evidence, by allowing that \u201cthere\u2019s a way that the facts in the record could now be read or found to meet [the] clear and convincing evidence standard,\u201d we believe that plaintiff has misconstrued the meaning of that standard. That is, we do not believe, as plaintiff implies, that to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard, defendant was required to adduce evidence from which only one conclusion, viz., plaintiff\u2019s guilt of the charges against him, could conceivably result. As such, the ALJ\u2019s implicit recognition, in the language quoted, that more than one conclusion was possible from defendant\u2019s evidence did not amount to the application of a lesser standard against that evidence than \u201cclear and convincing.\u201d Prior construction of the meaning of the clear and convincing evidence standard buttresses our analysis.\nClear and convincing evidence or testimony has been defined, inter alia, as not synonymous with uncontradicted or unimpeached testimony nor crystal clear and perfect. (People v. Monk (1988), 174 Ill. App. 3d 528, 528 N.E.2d 1063.) This definition, we believe, reveals that clear and convincing evidence is not, as plaintiff implies, such evidence as from which only one conclusion can logically flow. Moreover, the fact that it may be such evidence from which the trier of fact may have to draw inferences and, thus, as the ALJ recognized in this case, from which it might conceivably draw differing inferences is established in In re Browning (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 483, 179 N.E.2d 14, Bilyeu v. Plant (1966), 75 Ill. App. 2d 109, 220 N.E.2d 513, and Kimbrough v. Parker (1951), 344 Ill. App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617.\nIn Browning, a disbarment action, the court stated:\n\u201cThese inferences, which the respondent would have us draw, are not the only ones that flow from this record, and the question to be determined is whether there are other inferences, so natural and probable as to amount to clear and convincing proof of misconduct, which support the finding of the Commissioners.\u201d (Browning, 23 Ill. 2d at 494.)\nUpon reviewing the evidence and the applicable law, the trial court affirmed the disbarment order.\nSimilarly in Bilyeu, the court, after noting that a resulting trust must be proven by clear, convincing, unequivocal and unmistakable evidence, reasoned that \u201cunless the trial judge could find that the plaintiffs\u2019 evidence was so clear, convincing and unequivocal as to enable him to draw the inferences and reach the conclusions necessary to a finding that there was a resulting trust, defendant\u2019s motion for judgment was properly allowed.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Bilyeu, 75 Ill. App. 2d at 119.\nFinally, in Kimbrough, a fraud case, the court, after reviewing the testimony, stated:\n\u201cWe think this testimony, and the justifiable inference that defendants did not intend to do what was represented, is sufficient for our conclusion that there was evidence which tended to show clearly and convincingly that defendants made false representations upon which the [plaintiffs] relied.\u201d Kimbrough, 344 Ill. App. at 488.\nThe foregoing cases, especially Browning, amply reveal that the fact that inferences may have to be drawn from evidence and that, as is inherent in the nature of inferential cogitation, they may be differing does not preclude the evidence from which they are drawn from being clear and convincing. We believe that the statement of the ALJ which plaintiff cites as evidencing his application of a lesser standard than that simply recognizes the foregoing fact. Plaintiff\u2019s contention of prejudice is meritless.\nIII\nPlaintiff lastly contends that the participation of Dr. Lawrence Levin in an investigative interview conducted by defendant prior to the commencement of the administrative hearing and in the administrative hearing as an advisor to the Board was improper. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the doctor\u2019s participation in the investigative interview gave rise to the possibility that his report to the Board contained evidence which he learned in that interview, contrary to the rule that an administrative decision be based strictly upon the evidence presented at the administrative hearing. Landenheim v. Union County Hospital District (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 90, 394 N.E.2d 770.\nWe find plaintiff\u2019s contentions without merit. Preliminarily, we find that plaintiff waived any error in Dr. Levin\u2019s participation in the investigatory and adjudicatory phases of plaintiff\u2019s case for the same reason that he waived any alleged error in the ALJ\u2019s formulation of defendant\u2019s burden of proof. Moreover, as with that alleged error, we find the instant contentions of error without substance.\nWith respect to any conflict of interest under which Dr. Levin may have been laboring, as plaintiff himself notes, Landenheim establishes that the combination of the investigative and adjudicative functions does not violate due process where no actual personal bias resulting therefrom is demonstrated in the record. (Landenheim, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 95.) Given plaintiff\u2019s burden of proof on the issue of personal bias, we find his mere assertions that any use by Dr. Levin of any information gathered during the investigative interview \u201cwould be improper\u201d insufficient to demonstrate the doctor\u2019s actual personal bias.\nLastly, plaintiff contends that, without regard to any conflict of interest, Dr. Levin\u2019s appointment as an advisor to the Board was improper because defendant\u2019s own rules do not grant it authority to appoint advisors.\nBeyond finding that plaintiff waived this issue as well, we believe that defendant\u2019s power and authority to make such an appointment is implied in its statutorily granted powers. It is well established that express, legislative grants of powers or duties to administrative agencies include the power to do all that is reasonably necessary to execute those powers or duties. (Lake County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 419, 519 N.E.2d 459.) Moreover, administrative agencies are to be given wide latitude in determining what actions are \u201creasonably necessary,\u201d and a court may not overturn an agency policy or action simply because the court considers the policy unwise or inappropriate. (Oak Liquors, Inc. v. Zagel (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 379, 413 N.E.2d 56.) Given plaintiff\u2019s failure to cite any authority expressly prohibiting defendant\u2019s appointment of advisors such as Dr. Levin, we will abide by the foregoing rules. For that same reason, we find inapposite Heavner v. Illinois Racing Board (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 432 N.E.2d 290, which merely holds that administrative agencies must strictly comply with their promulgated rules.\nFor all of the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court affirming defendant\u2019s decision to suspend plaintiff\u2019s chiropractic license.\nAffirmed.\nRIZZI and WHITE, JJ, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Fioretti & Des Jardins, Ltd., of Chicago (Robert W. Fioretti, of counsel), for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Ralanda Webb, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LAURENCE N. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20141926\nOpinion filed August 15, 1990.\nFioretti & Des Jardins, Ltd., of Chicago (Robert W. Fioretti, of counsel), for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Ralanda Webb, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0279-01", "first_page_order": 301, "last_page_order": 312 }