{
  "id": 2586771,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARK FRANCISKOVICH, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Franciskovich",
  "decision_date": "1990-08-31",
  "docket_number": "No. 2-89-0740",
  "first_page": "693",
  "last_page": "696",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 693"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 520",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        2505975
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "524-25"
        },
        {
          "page": "525"
        },
        {
          "page": "525"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/192/0520-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 19",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3535015
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "21"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/145/0019-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 725",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3553502
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "728"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/175/0725-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 283",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3501497
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "285"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/150/0283-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 377,
    "char_count": 6531,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.758,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 9.147722822590857e-08,
      "percentile": 0.5081460347688225
    },
    "sha256": "3e6b09cedd25b3a561c1881349dfd366dc9b2b85a292178db836512d7e22a1c3",
    "simhash": "1:b4bb9ecd55c9bc75",
    "word_count": 1076
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:29:37.094110+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARK FRANCISKOVICH, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE GEIGER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Mark Franciskovich, was charged with the offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in violation of section 11 \u2014 501(d)(3) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501(d)(3)). He was convicted following a stipulated bench trial. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in admitting the results of his breath-alcohol test into evidence, because he did not voluntarily consent to the test.\nIn July 1988 the defendant was driving a truck which struck a pedestrian. The police administered field sobriety tests and took the defendant to the Du Page County jail. During the trip to the jail, the officer told the defendant that he had to take the breath-alcohol test and suggested that the defendant would probably pass the test. At the jail, the officer read the defendant the Code section 11 \u2014 501.1 implied consent \u201cWarnings to Motorists\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(c)). The defendant took the test, and his breath-alcohol concentration result was .15%, showing presumed intoxication (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95^2, par. ll-501.2(b)(3)).\nPrior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and to suppress the results of the test, as well as the statements he made to the police. The court initially granted the motion to suppress the test results, finding that the test was not taken voluntarily. On the State\u2019s motion to reconsider, however, the court reversed its ruling and denied the motion to suppress in its entirety. The defendant brought this appeal.\nThe defendant contends on appeal that the results of the test should not have been admitted into evidence because his consent was not voluntary. We find that he relies on inapplicable language of section 11 \u2014 501.1 and on a misinterpretation of our decision in People v. Kissel (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 283, and we affirm.\nKissel was the State\u2019s appeal. There, the court upheld the trial court\u2019s decision to suppress evidence against the three defendants, who had been arrested individually for DUI on private property. Two of the defendants had refused to take a breathalyzer; one had taken the test and shown a legal level of intoxication. The court found that the implied-consent statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95V2, par. 11\u2014 501.1(a)) established an implied consent to chemical testing only when there was a nexus between driving upon a public highway and a statutory demand for testing. 150 Ill. App. 3d at 285.\nDespite its findings on implied consent, the Kissel court did not fully affirm. Rather, pursuant to the State\u2019s request it remanded the cause for, among other things, an evidentiary hearing as to the voluntariness of the consent given by the one defendant who had submitted to testing. In so doing, the court implied that that defendant\u2019s test results would not be admissible if his consent to testing was involuntary. It did not, however, contrary to the defendant\u2019s assertion, hold \u201cthat absent implied or voluntary consent, evidence obtained from the breathalyzer test is inadmissible.\u201d\nIn People v. Brown (1988), 175 Ill. App. 3d 725, we reconsidered Kissel in light of statutory change. In Brown, the police read the defendant the implied consent \u201cWarnings to Motorists\u201d but also explained that the warnings did not apply to him because his alleged offense had occurred on private property. Defendant Brown submitted to chemical breath analysis but argued on appeal that he had not given voluntary consent to the breath analysis because the police warnings had confused him.\nThis court in Brown held that voluntary consent was not a prerequisite to the admissibility of breathalyzer results in a DUI prosecution. That holding referred to the decision in Village of Algonquin v. Ford (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 19, 21. The court also specifically overruled its decision in Kissel to the extent that that holding conflicted with Ford\u2019s ruling that consent was not necessary for test-result admissibility in a DUI prosecution. Brown, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 728.\nSection 11 \u2014 501.1, from which the defendant infers a legislative intent to allow an accused the option to refuse chemical-intoxication testing, is the basis for the defendant\u2019s argument. Section 11\u2014 501.1 provides that a driver who is requested to submit to chemical-intoxication testing must be warned of the consequences of refusing to submit. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95^2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(c).) In part, the defendant asserts that Brown must not be read to judicially remove that statutory option to refuse. We find that the defendant\u2019s argument improperly relies on section 11 \u2014 501.1.\nIn People v. Giere (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 520, 524-25, we held that section 11 \u2014 501.1 did not require the defendant\u2019s consent to taking a blood sample for intoxication testing. There, the defendant had refused testing, but the police caused a nurse to draw an involuntary blood sample. In Giere, we did not rely on section 11 \u2014 501.1, and we commented that that section governs only the implied consent to test a DUI arrestee and the statutory summary driver\u2019s license suspension, which may result from failure to both submit to testing and show a result of less than .10% blood-alcohol content. Giere, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 525.\nHere, as in Giere, summary suspension was not at issue and section 11 \u2014 501.1 thus was not involved. (Giere, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 525.) The defendant\u2019s arguments are based upon statutory language which does not apply in this DUI prosecution.\nThe defendant urges that we should distinguish Brown because defendant Brown was arrested on private property and thus was offered a real option not to submit to chemical testing. Despite the alleged police conduct here, we find no reason to depart from our decision in Brown. Any lack of consent was no basis to prohibit admission of the defendant\u2019s blood-alcohol test results. Brown, 175 ffl. App. 3d at 726-28.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nINGLIS and WOODWARD, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE GEIGER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Bruce A. Brennan, of Kalinich, McCluskey, Sullivan & Boylan, P.C., of Glen Ellyn, for appellant.",
      "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and David A. Bernhard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARK FRANCISKOVICH, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201489\u20140740\nOpinion filed August 31, 1990.\nBruce A. Brennan, of Kalinich, McCluskey, Sullivan & Boylan, P.C., of Glen Ellyn, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and David A. Bernhard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0693-01",
  "first_page_order": 715,
  "last_page_order": 718
}