{ "id": 2586741, "name": "In re JOHN LAMB, Asserted to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. John Lamb, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lamb", "decision_date": "1990-09-07", "docket_number": "No. 2-89-1153", "first_page": "725", "last_page": "731", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 725" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2462167 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/200/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2462234 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/200/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2481557 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" }, { "page": "558-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/197/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3031635 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. App. 3d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498674 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" }, { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/194/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3643677 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 960", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3576510 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "961-62" }, { "page": "961" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0960-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "194 Ill. App. 3d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498674 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/194/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2681444 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/189/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "194 Ill. App. 3d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498674 ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/194/0391-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 675, "char_count": 15301, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7252704842408092e-07, "percentile": 0.7045499563874187 }, "sha256": "5cc62c954602a09479ee336e6678b567e56ee84471c9b57f6cc558c74e10fa0b", "simhash": "1:1bef9e9a700c7e76", "word_count": 2511 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:29:37.094110+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re JOHN LAMB, Asserted to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. John Lamb, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent John Lamb appeals from an order of the circuit court finding him to be a person subject to involuntary admission. Respondent raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court\u2019s order must be reversed because the State failed to follow provisions of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 1\u2014100 et seq.); and (2) whether the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was reasonably expected to inflict injury either on himself or on another. Because the State did not comply with statutory procedural requirements, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.\nOn August 17, 1988, respondent, a 42-year-old male, was transferred from the Du Page County jail to the Elgin Mental Health Center (EMHC) because he was adjudicated unfit to stand trial. Respondent was arrested for violating an order of protection which prohibited him from having contact with his parents. Respondent had a history of threatening to kill his parents and burn down their house.\nOn December 1, 1988, the State filed the first petition for involuntary admission. The petition asserted that respondent was psychotic, delusional and grandiose. In addition, respondent was uncooperative with treatment and refused to take medication. His doctors described respondent as paranoid and having no insight into his condition. On December 9, 1988, the trial court ordered that respondent was subject to involuntary admission.\nIn the second petition, dated February 8, 1989, the State asserted that respondent had a history of failing to follow through with outpatient treatment and had refused to be interviewed. This was his seventh involuntary admission since 1983. On February 2, 1989, respondent had become combative and had to be restrained. Respondent was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. In addition to the certificates of two health professionals from EMHC, the State also filed a treatment plan dated February 3, 1989. On February 14, 1989, respondent was again found to be a person subject to involuntary admission.\nThe State filed a third petition for involuntary admission on April 10, 1989. In addition to the petition, the State filed the two EMHC certificates and a treatment plan. The court, on April 28, 1989, found that respondent was subject to involuntary admission.\nThe next set of documents in the record is the subject of this appeal. On October 25, 1989, the State again filed the two EMHC certificates and a petition for involuntary admission. In addition, a notice to respondent of the hearing was also filed. The State did not file a treatment plan.\nOn October 27, 1989, the court held a hearing on the petition. Dr. Arturo Fogata, respondent\u2019s psychiatrist, testified that he evaluated respondent. According to Dr. Fogata, respondent had delusions of persecution and continually talked about being brought to the mental health center without a court order or witnesses. Respondent was argumentative and had a history of aggression. He was also found hoarding large straightened paper clips, a four-inch screw, a door stopper with a sharp edge, and a flat stone with a sharpened edge.\nDr. Fogata further testified that respondent did not follow aftercare treatment plans and did not take his medication. Respondent\u2019s last act of physical aggression was in April 1989, when respondent hit a staff member. Respondent had been forced to take medication and, since July 1989, had been voluntarily taking his medication and participating in the EMHC programs. Dr. Fogata was of the opinion that, if respondent was released, he would go into a cycle characterized by the failure to take medication and by aggression. Dr. Fogata based his opinion on respondent\u2019s pattern of noncompliance with outpatient treatment in conjunction with the onset of delusions after failure to take medication. Dr. Fogata believed that respondent could not provide for his basic needs and that he would again harass his parents if he were released. According to Dr. Fogata, the mental health center was the least restrictive environment for respondent.\nDr. Fogata also explained the treatment plan for respondent. Under the treatment plan, the mental health center would find respondent a place to stay so his outpatient treatment could be monitored. Dr. Fogata hoped that respondent would be placed in a community service program within four to six months.\nThe trial court found that respondent suffered from a mental illness and, as a result of that illness, could reasonably be expected to inflict serious physical harm on himself or another. Respondent was therefore subject to involuntary admission, and EMHC was determined to be the least restrictive environment. Respondent timely filed his appeal.\nRespondent first contends the order for involuntary admission must be reversed because it is apparent on the face of the record that certain provisions of the Mental Health Code were not followed. In support of this contention, respondent first argues that the State failed to follow the Code provisions when it served the notice of hearing on him. Section 3 \u2014 706 of the Mental Health Code provides that the circuit court shall set a hearing date within five days after receipt of the second certificate and \u201c[t]he court shall direct that notice of the time and place of hearing be served upon the respondent.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014706.) Here, the State filed the notice of hearing at the same time as the certificates and the petition for involuntary admission. Thus, the State made two errors: first, the State, instead of the court, set the hearing date; and second, the State served the notice on respondent without the court\u2019s direction.\nRespondent cites two cases for the proposition that where notice has been issued and served before the petition is filed and the hearing is set by the trial court, the order of involuntary admission must be reversed even though the respondent never objected to the improper service. (In re Price (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 960, 961-62; In re King (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 741, 746.) This court, following Price and King, reiterated the rule that \u201cany noncompliance with statutory involuntary admission procedures renders an involuntary admission judgment erroneous and ineffective.\u201d In re Splett (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 391, 393.\nThe State argues, however, that we should reconsider our reliance on Price and King because those opinions are \u201cill-reasoned.\u201d According to the State, the lack of formal notice is \u201can empty formality.\u201d The State urges us to apply the rationale of In re J. W. (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 56, 62 (in a juvenile proceeding, formal notice may be considered waived where the interested parties have actual notice and participate in the proceedings) to involuntary commitment proceedings.\nWe disagree with the State\u2019s characterization that formal notice of the hearing is an empty formality. As we explained in Splett, the mandatory notice requirements of the statute are meaningful in protecting against the last-minute, oral notification of a possibly sedated, involuntarily committed respondent. Splett, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 393.\nWe also disagree with the State\u2019s assertion that the involuntary commitment procedure can be equated with a juvenile hearing. In a juvenile case, the court must hold a hearing within 120 days of a written demand for a hearing. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 805\u2014 14.) In addition, if the minor is adjudicated delinquent, the court may release the minor to the custody of his parents. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 805\u201423(1)(a)(1).) By contrast, in an involuntary admission proceeding, the hearing must be held within five days of the filing of the second certificate. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3\u2014706.) If the court finds the respondent to be subject to involuntary admission and the least restrictive alternative for treatment is the mental health center, the court must order that the respondent remain hospitalized. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3\u2014811.) In an involuntary admission proceeding, the time to prepare for the hearing is significantly shorter, and the liberty interest at stake is much more compelling than in a juvenile proceeding. Therefore, strict adherence to the statutory requirements of the Mental Health Code is necessary.\nRespondent further argues that the judgment must be reversed because the State failed to file a treatment plan as required by section 3 \u2014 813 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3\u2014813). The State responds that the failure to file a treatment plan was not reversible error because a treatment plan was in effect for respondent.\nA treatment plan formulated in April 1989 does not qualify as a \u201ccurrent\u201d treatment plan for a hearing held in October 1989. The statute requires that \u201cthe facility director shall file with the court a current treatment plan which includes an evaluation of the patient\u2019s progress and the extent to which he is benefiting from treatment.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3\u2014813.) The testimony at the hearing showed that respondent\u2019s condition had improved since the April hearing. Thus, the April treatment plan was not sufficient.\nThe State further asserts that the failure to file a current treatment plan is excused because Dr. Fogata testified about the treatment plan and the discharge plan. We recently held, in the context of section 3 \u2014 810, that such cursory testimony is not a substitute for a treatment plan incorporated in a formal report. (In re Blume (1990), 197 Ill. App. 3d 552, 559 (\u201c[T]he statute does not suggest that substantial compliance would be sufficient, and we cannot condone the failure to prepare and present a formal report which was intended to assist the trial court in making a disposition\u201d).) The failure of the State to file a formal report which was prepared by the facility director or by a person directed to do so by the court results in an error which is neither harmless nor waived. Blume, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 558-59.\nWe conclude that the failure (1) to strictly follow the requirements for notification of the hearing and (2) to file a current treatment plan requires this court to reverse the judgment of the circuit court. In view of our disposition of these issues and the passage of time, we need not consider respondent\u2019s other appellate contention.\nIn conclusion, we are deeply disturbed with the recent trend of cases concerning involuntary admission at the Elgin Mental Health Center (EMHC). See In re Hatala (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 163; In re Walker (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 159; In re Blume (1990), 197 Ill. App. 3d 552; In re Splett (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 391.\nThe common link between each of these cases is that the State, for unknown reasons, has not followed the relatively simple procedures outlined in our Mental Health Code to keep potentially dangerous, mentally unstable persons in a facility where they can receive appropriate treatment without jeopardizing the public\u2019s safety. The Mental Health Code has sections dealing with notice of court proceedings to the patient (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3\u2014706), duration of the initial admission period and when a petition for an additional period of treatment must be filed (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91, par. 3\u2014813), along with the need to include a current treatment plan with the petition (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3\u2014813(a)). These provisions are all very detailed given that liberty interests are involved in these cases. (See In re Price (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 960, 961.) The State must be willing to follow the statutory mandates in order to eliminate the possibility that dangerous persons will be released from the EMHC without first receiving the necessary treatment. The State may wish to implement a procedure whereby it files a petition to continue an involuntary admission well in advance of the expiration of the previous period, thus eliminating some of these \u201clast-minute\u201d problems.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed.\nReversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" }, { "text": "INGLIS, J.,\nspecially concurring:\nI concur with the holding of the opinion filed in this case. I am also very disturbed with the recent trend of cases concerning involuntary admission at the Elgin Mental Health Center. I agree with Justice McLaren that something must be done to protect the public from the release of potentially dangerous persons, without first receiving the necessary treatment, due to the State\u2019s failure to comply with statutory requirements.\nI also note that I agree with Justice Reinhard\u2019s dissent in In re Splett (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 391, 394 (Reinhard, J., dissenting), appeal allowed (1990), 132 Ill. 2d 553. Although I agree with the dissent, I will follow the majority opinion in Splett pursuant to stare decisis et non quieta movere, at least until the supreme court decides the case. I do so in order to avoid further confusion in this difficult area.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "INGLIS, J.," }, { "text": "JUSTICE REINHARD,\ndissenting:\nFor the reasons which I stated in In re Splett (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 391 (Reinhard, J., dissenting), appeal allowed (1990), 132 Ill. 2d 553, I continue to dissent from the holding that the failure of the record to show that notice of the time and place of the involuntary admission hearing was served on respondent and his attorney requires reversal of the commitment even where respondent and his attorney appeared at the scheduled hearing and did not raise any issue of the lack of proper notice.\nI also dissent from the balance of the opinion which holds that the judgment must be reversed because the State failed to file a current treatment plan as required by section 3\u2014813 of the Mental Health Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3\u2014813). Although the record does not show that a current treatment plan was formally filed in strict compliance with section 3 \u2014 813 of the Code, the point was not raised below, and the transcript of Dr. Fogata\u2019s testimony at the commitment hearing indicates that a current treatment plan exists on which he was questioned by the assistant State\u2019s Attorney and defendant\u2019s counsel. While I do not approve of the failure to file formally the treatment plan, I would find there has been substantial compliance with the statute, and respondent has not suggested how he was prejudiced in these circumstances. Cf. In re Smoots (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 289, 292.\nFinally, although not reached in the majority opinion, the respondent contends that the trial court\u2019s order for involuntary admission was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. On this record, I disagree and would affirm the order of commitment.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE REINHARD," } ], "attorneys": [ "William E. Coffin, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Gary V. Johnson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (William L. Browers and Marshall M. Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re JOHN LAMB, Asserted to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. John Lamb, Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201489\u20141153\nOpinion filed September 7, 1990.\nINGLIS, J., specially concurring.\nREINHARD, J., dissenting.\nWilliam E. Coffin, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Elgin, for appellant.\nGary V. Johnson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (William L. Browers and Marshall M. Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0725-01", "first_page_order": 747, "last_page_order": 753 }