{ "id": 2588219, "name": "JOSEPH VILLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROWN CORK AND SEAL COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Villa v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.", "decision_date": "1990-09-05", "docket_number": "No. 1-89-1832", "first_page": "1082", "last_page": "1090", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 1082" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "382 N.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5440793 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 N.E.2d 925", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3578993 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5429143 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 1285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3603966 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 1067", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3496998 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 N.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2741040 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/129/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5435843 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" }, { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5431684 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3590563 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 N.E.2d 1038", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 870", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3633591 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "872" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0870-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3648442 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 1053", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 1077", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2609616 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1085" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/1077-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3129681 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3560027 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 835", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3523454 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "844" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0835-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 N.E.2d 1313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3520414 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 N.E.2d 1364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5668183 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" }, { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866138 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0494-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 822, "char_count": 16240, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.2455758951387e-07, "percentile": 0.9412834493439579 }, "sha256": "5322c79f21b913c8277fe7d1b41434ed901585e596cf0de48d003bb6ca11ada4", "simhash": "1:bff670b75c040e65", "word_count": 2647 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:29:37.094110+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JOSEPH VILLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROWN CORK AND SEAL COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE FREEMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Joseph Villa, brought this action in the circuit court of Cook County to recover damages for injuries he sustained in a car-truck collision. Following a jury trial, a verdict was rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants, Crown Cork & Seal Company and Ronald Kukla. The jury attributed 99% of the fault to plaintiff and he now appeals.\nThe collision occurred on an unnamed two-lane road connecting Lawndale Avenue and Pulaski Road in Chicago. According to defendants, the road runs in a general east-west direction and contains some sharp curves, which temporarily lead traffic in a north-south direction. At the comer of Pulaski Road and the unnamed road, a sign is posted which states \u201cCity of Chicago, private road, city vehicles only.\u201d The city Department of Streets and Sanitation vehicle garage is located at the Lawndale end of the road.\nOn October 16, 1984, at about 3:15 p.m., plaintiff, who was employed by the Department of Streets and Sanitation, left work driving south on the unnamed road. Although visibility was good, it was drizzling. The road was wet and had been made slick because of oil and debris from other vehicles. According to plaintiff, he was travelling at a rate of about 10 to 15 miles per hour. As he entered a curve on the road, he slowed his speed to 10 miles per hour. In an attempt to negotiate the curve, plaintiff applied his brakes. Defendants\u2019 truck was over the center, yellow line, in plaintiff\u2019s lane. Plaintiff\u2019s car slid into the center of defendants\u2019 trailer.\nDefendant Kukla\u2019s version of facts differs. According to him, at the time of the collision, he was driving a truck with a 12/2-foot-wide, 45-foot-long trailer. Defendant was travelling in the opposite direction of plaintiff on the unnamed road. He approached the curve slowly, in first gear, travelling at about two miles per hour. As plaintiff\u2019s car entered the curve, it slid and began to fishtail. It hit the trailer section of the truck, stopping underneath it. After the collision, defendant told plaintiff not to move his vehicle, in order that the police or any other investigators could take pictures of the scene. However, plaintiff refused and moved his car away from the truck. At the time of the collision, plaintiff, according to defendant\u2019s estimate, was travelling at about 20 miles per hour.\nDefendant Kukla farther testified that he had been driving semi-tractor trailer trucks for 30 years. Additionally, he had negotiated this curve many times in the past, sometimes three or four times a day. He stated that at no time did his truck cross the center line on the road.\nEdward Bloom, a photographer, took photographs of the scene of the collision in October 1984 and again in March 1989. In explaining his photographs, he testified that he had measured the road surface, which, from the center of the curve, was 500 feet. According to him, in order for defendants\u2019 trailer to maneuver to the left on the curve where the collision occurred he would have to go farther right, into the other lane of traffic. On cross-examination he stated that his measurement of the road surface was done by foot-to-heel, and was only an approximation, which did not include the gravel shoulder of the road.\nAs a result of the collision, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants for injuries which he sustained. A jury verdict was returned in favor of plaintiff and against defendants. The jury determined the damages to be $50,000 and attributed 99% of the fault to plaintiff, which reduced plaintiff\u2019s award to $500. Plaintiff appeals, contending that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; (2) the trial court erred in permitting a non-IPI instruction to be read to the jury; and (3) the trial court erred in.denying his motion for a new trial. We affirm.\nPlaintiff first contends that the trial court should have entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict, with no reduction for comparative negligence. He correctly recites the applicable standard that judgments notwithstanding the verdict ought to be entered only in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 511, 229 N.E.2d 504.) However, plaintiff\u2019s application of the standard is fundamentally flawed.\nFirst, plaintiff attempts an analogy between this case and Pedrick. In Pedrick, the plaintiff\u2019s testimony concerned whether railroad crossing signals were flashing properly. Significantly, the plaintiff\u2019s testimony, which was comparatively ambiguous to that of the defendant, went to the issue of causation.\nIn this case, plaintiff points to defendant Kukla\u2019s testimony concerning his reason for having used the road on the day of the collision and the fact that defendant testified that he used the road with great regularity and yet had failed to notice the signs posting the road as private. He reasons that since the defendant\u2019s testimony on these issues was equivocal and ambiguous, like in Pedrick, the trial court should have entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We disagree.\nInitially we note that the only testimony that was contradictory was that which concerned defendant\u2019s reason for using the road. Additionally, the fact that defendant Kukla testified that he had often used the road without giving attention to the posted signs does not render his testimony on that issue ambiguous. Moreover, the testimony targeted by plaintiff in support of his motion was neither relevant nor probative on the issue of defendants\u2019 negligence.\nUnlike the testimony in Pedrick, the testimony to which plaintiff here points bears no relationship to any ultimate fact or issue in the case. Clearly this testimony does not compare, either in character or calibre, to the questionable testimony in Pedrick. Consequently, even if we were to agree with plaintiff\u2019s characterization that the testimony was ambiguous, such a finding carries no weight to shift the balance of the evidence in plaintiff\u2019s favor. Facts unrelated to essential elements of plaintiff\u2019s cause are immaterial, no matter how sharply controverted, and cannot support a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.\nAlso, in his analogy, plaintiff compares defendant Kukla\u2019s testimony concerning the reasons and frequency with which he used the road, with his (plaintiff\u2019s) \u201cunequivocal and unambiguous\u201d testimony concerning the events which immediately preceded the collision.\nPlaintiff here attempts to compare apples and oranges. Defendants\u2019 motive for using the road may have been contradictory; however, this nonessential testimony cannot logically be compared to testimony relating to ultimate facts. In Pedrick, the holding did not simply rest on the fact that some testimony was ambiguous and equivocal; the relevant and comparative testimony related to the same essential facts.\nHere, each party\u2019s version of the facts as to how the collision occurred, while different, was clear and consistent. Those differences merely created questions of fact and issues of credibility for the jury, not a mandate for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Moreover, where, as here, the evidence demonstrates a substantial factual dispute, or where the assessment of credibility of the witnesses or the determination regarding conflicting evidence may be decisive of the outcome, it is error to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. (Lee v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co. (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 500, 509, 492 N.E.2d 1364; Wright v. Yellow Cab Co. (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 242, 451 N.E.2d 1313.) Based on all of the evidence presented, we do not find any to be so compelling as to support a verdict in plaintiff\u2019s favor. We hold that the denial of plaintiff\u2019s motion was proper.\nPlaintiff next contends that the non-Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI) was erroneously given. He claims that the instruction overemphasized the nature of the road and prejudiced his case. Further, he argues that the instruction was not supported by evidence. Defendants have responded that the instruction was a necessary clarification to the jury on how to treat the issue of the private road.\nThe questionable instruction provided:\n\u201cThe fact that the Defendant was operating his vehicle on a private roadway should not be a factor for you to consider in deciding the issues presented in this case.\u201d\nThe trial court has the discretion to determine which instruction shall be given, and the exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed on review unless it has been clearly abused. (Tuttle v. Fruehauf Division of Fruehauf Corp. (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 835, 844, 462 N.E.2d 645; Clarkson v. Wright (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 230, 459 N.E.2d 305, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 129, 483 N.E.2d 268.) The standard for determining the adequacy of jury instructions is whether they were sufficiently clear to avoid misleading the jury, while at the same time fairly and correctly stated the law. (Nolan v. Elliott (1989), 179 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1085, 535 N.E.2d 1053; Black v. Peoria Marine Construction Co. (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 357, 513 N.E.2d 622.) However, care should be taken to prevent instructions overemphasizing any particular matter. (Malek v. Lederle Laboratories (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 870, 872, 466 N.E.2d 1038; Robinson v. Greeley (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 720, 449 N.E.2d 250.) Finally, a particular jury instruction given by the trial court is proper if it is supported by some evidence in the record, and the trial court has discretion in deciding which issues are raised by the evidence. Black, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 364.\nWe agree with defendants and find that the instruction was proper. Our review of the record reveals that in her opening statement and on direct examination of plaintiff, plaintiffs counsel made repeated references to the fact that the road was private. Additionally, plaintiffs counsel attempted, by referencing the posted signs, to bring up the issue in her examination of defendant Kukla, Bloom and the investigating officer, Cynthia Cummings. Plaintiff, however, never presented any evidence to show that that fact had any connection with the level of defendants\u2019 duty of care. In fact, plaintiff agreed that no greater duty was required by virtue of the fact that the road was posted as private.\nThe court\u2019s non-IPI instruction, which was clear, brief, and free from argument (see Zieger v. Manhattan Coffee Co. (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 518, 445 N.E.2d 844), was necessitated by plaintiff\u2019s references to the fact that the road was private. We believe that it would have been error for the court not to have given the instruction. Since plaintiff made repeated reference to the fact that the road was private, absent some clarification concerning the irrelevance of that fact, the jury could have erroneously inferred a greater duty of care based on the fact that defendants were in a place where they had no right to be. Plaintiff should not now be heard to complain about the necessity of the court to clarify a potentially prejudicial issue which he himself presented. (Ervin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 140, 144, 357 N.E.2d 500; Noncek v. Ram Tool Corp. (1970), 129 Ill. App. 2d 320, 264 N.E.2d 440.) We find no abuse of discretion in the giving of this instruction.\nMoreover, we believe that not every error in giving instructions necessitates a new trial. A reviewing court will ordinarily not reverse a trial court for giving faulty instructions unless they clearly misled the jury and resulted in prejudice to the appellant. (Amstar Corp. v. Aurora Fast Freight (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 705, 710, 490 N.E.2d 1067.) As defendants point out, the fact that the road was private, had it been relevant, would have gone to the issue of defendants\u2019 liability, not plaintiff\u2019s. The jury determined that defendants were negligent; thus, the fact that the private road instruction was given was of no consequence to plaintiff. Since plaintiff was not prejudiced by the instruction, even had it been erroneous, reversal would not be required.\nPlaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. In support of his argument, he adopts the arguments stated in sections I and II of his brief (contentions 1 and 2 in this opinion).\nIt is within the sound discretion of the trial court whether to grant a motion for a new trial, and, absent a clear abuse of that discretion, its decision will remain undisturbed. (Ervin, 65 Ill. 2d at 144; Cadral Corp. v. Solomon, Cordwell, Buenz & Associates, Inc. (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 466, 497 N.E.2d 1285.) A new trial will not be granted merely because the evidence is conflicting. The relevant inquiry, when such a motion is presented, is whether the verdict rendered is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Mizowek v. De Franco (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 303, 310, 356 N.E.2d 32.) A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon any of the evidence. Monier v. Winkler (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 724, 729, 511 N.E.2d 426; Anderson v. Beers (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 619, 393 N.E.2d 552.\nThe substance of plaintiff's argument in section I of his brief, as has already been stated, is that defendant\u2019s testimony regarding his reason for using the road was ambiguous and contradictory, there was a sign which posted the road as private, and there was corroborative testimony concerning the posting of the road as private. Additionally, included in that section of plaintiff\u2019s brief is his version of the facts concerning the collision.\nWe fail to see how this evidence supports plaintiff\u2019s argument that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Further, the fact that plaintiff\u2019s version of how the collision occurred conflicted with defendant\u2019s is not decisive. The jury was not obligated to reject defendant\u2019s version of the facts because it differed from plaintiff\u2019s.\nThe jury heard the testimony of the witnesses and viewed the evidence presented. It was its prerogative to draw reasonable inferences and ultimate conclusions from that evidence. (Finley v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 428, 436, 167 N.E.2d 212.) As we have stated previously, an election between conflicting evidence and the assessment of credibility of the witnesses were properly questions for the jury\u2019s resolution. (Brooks v. City of Chicago (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 459, 464, 435 N.E.2d 1182; Sunseri v. Puccia (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 488, 422 N.E.2d 925.) The verdict will not be altered merely because the jury could have found differently. (Lee, 143 Ill. App. 3d at 512; Jardine v. Rubloff (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 31, 382 N.E.2d 232.) We have reviewed the record, and we find the jury\u2019s verdict to have been properly supported by the evidence. Thus, we have no basis upon which to disturb its findings.\nPlaintiff\u2019s next argument (section III of his brief) concerned the non-IPI jury instruction. As we have already stated, we believe that the instruction in this case was not only proper, but necessary, and that plaintiff was not prejudiced thereby. We deem further discussion on the issue to be superfluous.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nCERDA, P.J., and RIZZI, J., concur.\nBloom\u2019s testimony on direct examination, wherein he attempted to reconstruct the collision, was objected to by defendant on the basis that the witness was not an expert on reconstruction. The court sustained the objection and permitted defendant limited cross-examination on that testimony.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE FREEMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gabrielle S. Davis, of Heller & Richmond, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Robert R Harris, of Harold A. Harris, Ltd., of Chicago (John Sanchez, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOSEPH VILLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROWN CORK AND SEAL COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20141832\nOpinion filed September 5, 1990.\nGabrielle S. Davis, of Heller & Richmond, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nRobert R Harris, of Harold A. Harris, Ltd., of Chicago (John Sanchez, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "1082-01", "first_page_order": 1104, "last_page_order": 1112 }