{ "id": 2582231, "name": "JEANETTE COATES, Indiv. and as Guardian of the Estate of Alonzo H. Coates, a Disabled Person, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W.W. BABCOCK COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Coates v. W.W. Babcock Co.", "decision_date": "1990-09-13", "docket_number": "No. 1-89-0948", "first_page": "165", "last_page": "171", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 165" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 542", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3638983 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 54", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937585 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 N.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. 2d 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2883616 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 N.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2609301 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660-61" }, { "page": "662", "parenthetical": "listing 10 factors considered significant in determining whether an owner \"ha[d] charge of\" the work" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5539821 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 1257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. App. 3d 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3508563 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/162/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 N.E.2d 1005", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. App. 3d 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2475584 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/198/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 N.E.2d 1011", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3590259 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 N.E.2d 1053", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. App. 3d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3539571 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/151/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3255179 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 N.E.2d 1023", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156283 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0278-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 688, "char_count": 14251, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0438629731933437e-07, "percentile": 0.55158099951001 }, "sha256": "66ff30adc797c9a756dc0acd134912ebdffcf823f5876eb0027535061c7ba185", "simhash": "1:7ba36cd54e499ef7", "word_count": 2306 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:06:38.828019+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JEANETTE COATES, Indiv. and as Guardian of the Estate of Alonzo H. Coates, a Disabled Person, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W.W. BABCOCK COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nJeanette Coates (plaintiff), individually and as guardian of the estate of her disabled husband, Alonzo Coates (Coates), appeal from the trial court\u2019s dismissal with prejudice of the counts of her complaint against Reverend James Goodwin (Goodwin) and the Mount Olive Baptist Church (the Church) (hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants), alleging violations of the Premises Liability Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 80, par. 301 et seq.), the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, pars. 60 through 69), and loss of consortium. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged that Coates was injured when he fell from a ladder while installing ceiling fans on the Church\u2019s premises pursuant to the defendants\u2019 direction and supervision.\nBecause the high ceiling on the Church\u2019s premises was an open and obvious danger, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff\u2019s claim under the Premises Liability Act. In addition, although Coates volunteered to install the ceiling fans for no benefit or compensation to him and provided the ladder from which he fell, we determine that his status of volunteer did not warrant dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s claim under the Structural Work Act. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.\nAs ultimately amended, plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged the following pertinent facts. Prior to July 1986, the Church board of directors learned that its air conditioning unit was irreparably damaged. Coates was willing to donate and install ceiling fans, free of any cost to the Church, so that the Church would not have to purchase a new air conditioning system. Coates was a member of the board of trustees of the Church at the time, and Goodwin was Church pastor.\nCoates began to install the ceiling fans, with the Church\u2019s approval, on July 24, 1986. Defendants retained the right and authority to supervise and control his installation of the fans. Although not alleged in the counts of the complaint directed against defendants, it appeared from other allegations in plaintiff\u2019s complaint that the ladder used by Coates had been obtained by him from his employer, a window cleaning company. Coates fell from the ladder while installing the ceiling fans, suffering serious injury.\nIn count III of her amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants owed Coates a duty of reasonable care for his safety while he was on Church premises, in accordance with the Premises Liability Act. Plaintiff alleged that defendants breached this duty because they failed to use reasonable care in overseeing Coates\u2019 work and failed to provide adequate equipment to enable Coates to safely install the ceiling fans.\nCount IV of plaintiff\u2019s suit alleged that the defendants violated the Structural Work Act. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendants failed to provide a safe, suitable and proper ladder for Coates\u2019 support and weight, and that the ladder used by Coates was otherwise unsafe or unsuitable. Plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint also included a derivative action for loss of consortium (count VIII).\nIn response to plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint, Goodwin and the Church filed a motion to dismiss the counts of the amended complaint directed against them pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014 619). Following a hearing, the trial court granted the defendants\u2019 motion and entered an order that dismissed with prejudice counts III, IV, and VII as to defendants Goodwin and the Church. The court\u2019s dismissal order found no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal. (107 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).) Plaintiff\u2019s timely appeal followed.\nUpon review, plaintiff asserts that defendants\u2019 arguments regarding count III of the complaint, which alleges negligence on the part of the defendants under the Premises Liability Act, should be construed as contentions that this count was insufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615.) Defendants concede on appeal that their motion to dismiss count III should have been brought under section 2 \u2014 615, rather than under section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code pertaining to affirmative matter that defeats the well-pleaded allegations of a plaintiff\u2019s complaint. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619(a)(9).) Accordingly, we consider whether the allegations of count III sufficiently state a claim for negligence under the Premises Liability Act to withstand a motion to dismiss brought under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\nUnder the Illinois Premises Liability Act, a possessor of land owes a duty to entrants to exercise \u201creasonable care under the circumstances regarding the state of the premises or acts done or omitted on them.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 80, par. 302.) Plaintiff argues that the Church\u2019s high ceiling was unreasonably dangerous because of the negligent manner in which defendants supervised Coates\u2019 work and failed to provide him with proper equipment.\nPlaintiff did not allege facts showing a defect in the premises which would cause an unreasonable danger to persons entering thereon. The condition which allegedly created an unreasonable danger and caused injury was the height of the ceiling, in excess of 20 feet, and the placement of the ladder by Coates to install the ceiling fans. However, it is well established that a landowner is not liable for injuries resulting from open and obvious dangers on the premises, including the open and obvious danger of falling from high places. (See, e.g., Cope v. Doe (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 278, 464 N.E.2d 1023.) We determine that Coates\u2019 attempt to install the ceiling fans in the Church\u2019s high ceiling by positioning his ladder in the Church pews was an open and obvious danger, and his injuries are therefore not recoverable from the defendants under the Premises Liability Act. Consequently, the trial court properly dismissed count III of plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint.\nPlaintiff attempts to invoke an exception to the general rule of nonliability for open and obvious dangers, i.e., that a landowner is liable for injuries resulting from open and obvious dangers on the land, where the landowner knew or should have known that the entrant would be distracted and momentarily forget the danger. (See, e.g., Ward v. K mart Corp. (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 132, 142, 554 N.E.2d 223.) There is nothing in plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint to indicate that defendants should have realized that Coates would be distracted and, forgetting the height from which he was working, act in such a manner that he would inadvertently fall from the ladder.\nPlaintiff contends on appeal that she should be granted a remandment in order to amend count III of her complaint. However, the record indicates that the trial court offered plaintiff an opportunity to continue the court\u2019s hearing with respect to defendants\u2019 motion and that plaintiff declined the court\u2019s invitation. It is readily apparent that plaintiff could have taken advantage of this continuance in order to draft amendments to count III of her complaint. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that defendants\u2019 use of a hybrid motion to dismiss, relying upon both sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure, prejudiced plaintiff in her response to defendants\u2019 dismissal motion. Consequently, we do not believe that the trial court\u2019s dismissal of count III should be reversed and remanded to provide plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint. See, e.g., Downers Grove Associates v. Red Robin International, Inc. (1986), 151 Ill. App. 3d 310, 502 N.E.2d 1053.\nBased on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court\u2019s dismissal of count III of plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint.\nPlaintiff also challenges the trial court\u2019s dismissal with prejudice of count IV, which alleged that defendants violated the Structural Work Act. The trial court dismissed this count on the ground that Coates was not a \u201cprotected person\u201d under that Act.\nDefendants argue that Coates did not come within the purview of the Act because he volunteered to install the ceiling fans. The Structural Work Act protects \u201cany person *** employed or engaged\u201d on a ladder while undertaking the repair of a building. (Emphasis added.) (111. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 60.) It is well established that the Act should be liberally construed in order to carry out its legislative purpose to protect persons engaged in extra-hazardous activities on or near a worksite. See, e.g., Ashley v. Osman & Associates, Inc. (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 293, 448 N.E.2d 1011.\nIn O\u2019Brien v. Rogers (1990), 198 Ill. App. 3d 341, 555 N.E.2d 1005, the court held that the provisions of the Structural Work Act are applicable to one who volunteers to provide services that necessitate the use of a structural support to construct or repair a building. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the Act does not expressly limit its coverage to those who are paid for their labor. The court observed that the Act governs those who are \u201cengaged\u201d on a structural support as well as those who are \u201cemployed\u201d thereon. The court reasoned that the term \u201cengaged\u201d would be rendered \u201ccompletely superfluous,\u201d and the beneficial purposes of the Act frustrated, if the Act were limited to those who use a structural support in the course of their employment. The court concluded that \u201cthe critical inquiry under the Act is the type of activity in which an individual is involved, not whether he receives compensation for that involvement.\u201d 198 Ill. App. 3d at 348.\nBased upon this precedent, we conclude that Coates was a protected person under the Act notwithstanding the voluntary nature of his services. The cases cited by defendants do not conflict with our conclusion. Holley v. Badgerow (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 572, 515 N.E.2d 1257, and Brown v. Village of Shipman (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 162, 411 N.E.2d 569, recognize that a sole proprietor who is personally in charge of the work performed on the owner\u2019s premises is not a protected person under the Structural Work Act. However, there is nothing in the instant record to indicate that Coates was a sole proprietor personally in charge of installing the ceiling fans on the Church\u2019s premises. Consequently, Holley and Brown are inapposite to the case at bar.\nDefendants also argue that count IV of plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint was insufficient because it does not allege specific facts to show that defendants were \u201cin charge of\u201d Coates\u2019 activities. The Structural Work Act states in pertinent part that an \u201cowner *** having charge of the *** repairing *** of any building * * * shall comply with all the terms\u201d of the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 69.) It has been held that mere ownership is insufficient to impose liability under the Structural Work Act and resolution of the issue of whether one is in charge of the work is a fact question that calls for an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. (Zukauskas v. Bruning (1989), 179 Ill. App. 3d 657, 660-61, 534 N.E.2d 680.) In Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 316, 321, 211 N.E.2d 247, the Illinois Supreme Court explained, \u201cThe term \u2018having charge of\u2019 is a generic term of broad import, and although it may include supervision and control, it is not confined to it.\u201d See also ZukausJcas, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 662 (listing 10 factors considered significant in determining whether an owner \u201cha[d] charge of\u201d the work).\nPlaintiff\u2019s amended complaint alleged that on the day of the incident, the defendants owned, operated, managed, maintained and controlled the Church premises. Plaintiff alleged that defendants retained the right and authority to supervise and control Coates\u2019 installation of the ceiling fans. Plaintiff further alleged that defendants were in charge of the installation of the ceiling fans. Allegations such as these have been found sufficient to state a claim that an owner \u201cha[d] charge of\u201d the work under the Structural Work Act. (See, e.g., Warren v. Meeker (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 108, 302 N.E.2d 54.) We conclude that plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint is factually sufficient in this regard.\nDefendants also assert that count IV of plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint was deficient because it failed to state specific factual allegations showing that their alleged violation of the Structural Work Act was wilful. The Act states that \u201c[f]or any injury to person ***, occasioned by any wilful violations of this Act, or wilful failure to comply with any of its provisions, a right of action shall accrue to the party injured, for any direct damages sustained thereby.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 69.) It has been held that the term \u201cwilful\u201d means \u201cwith knowledge,\u201d and may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the incident as alleged in the complaint. (See, e.g., Shaheed v. Chicago Transit Authority (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 352, 484 N.E.2d 542; Fedt v. Oak Lawn Lodge, Inc. (1985), 132 Il. App. 3d 1061, 478 N.E.2d 469.) Based upon our review of plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint, we conclude that it is sufficient to demonstrate that defendants\u2019 alleged violation of the Structural Work Act was wilful.\nBecause we find count IV of plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint sufficient to overcome defendants\u2019 dismissal motion, we conclude that plaintiff\u2019s derivative action for loss of consortium was also improperly dismissed.\nFor the reasons stated, the trial court\u2019s dismissal of count III is affirmed, the trial court\u2019s dismissal of counts IV and VII is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.\nLINN and JIGANTI, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McMORROW" } ], "attorneys": [ "Donna Del Principe and Michael J. Kane, both of Kane, Obbish & Propes, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Tribler & Marwedel, P.C., of Chicago (D.J. Sartorio and Michael R. Stiff, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JEANETTE COATES, Indiv. and as Guardian of the Estate of Alonzo H. Coates, a Disabled Person, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W.W. BABCOCK COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u2014 89\u20140948\nOpinion filed September 13, 1990.\nDonna Del Principe and Michael J. Kane, both of Kane, Obbish & Propes, of Chicago, for appellant.\nTribler & Marwedel, P.C., of Chicago (D.J. Sartorio and Michael R. Stiff, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0165-01", "first_page_order": 187, "last_page_order": 193 }