{ "id": 2582776, "name": "CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JACQUELINE ROSE, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Chicago Housing Authority v. Rose", "decision_date": "1990-09-14", "docket_number": "No. 1-89-1640", "first_page": "208", "last_page": "219", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 208" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "352 N.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2967734 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.E. 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2410127 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/275/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549839 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 1126", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082489 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 N.E.2d 126", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 2d 5", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1587078 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/116/0005-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3303862 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" }, { "page": "192-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/247/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3375491, 3379272, 3372682, 3372779, 3372332 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/243/0627-03", "/ill-app/243/0627-02", "/ill-app/243/0627-05", "/ill-app/243/0627-01", "/ill-app/243/0627-04" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. App. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3092028 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" }, { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/232/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 982", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "985" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3543204 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5257476 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/37/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 1349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1359-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3610946 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 N.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 1020", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2490306 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1022" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/1020-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1088, "char_count": 25215, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1566686066486368e-07, "percentile": 0.7692828809710528 }, "sha256": "189a27addb16561497ac911dcfebf11094243638d77f1e8778011a949f186d6f", "simhash": "1:b123b30212460bd2", "word_count": 4217 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:06:38.828019+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JACQUELINE ROSE, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE EGAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), filed a complaint against the defendant, Jacqueline Rose, seeking possession of the defendant\u2019s apartment in the Cabrini-Green public housing project. The CHA maintained that the discovery by the police of two shotguns in the defendant\u2019s apartment constituted a violation of her lease. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff assigns error regarding a jury instruction and limitations on its examination of a police officer.\nOn December 21, 1987, the CHA filed a complaint against the defendant seeking possession of her apartment in the Cabrini-Green public housing project. According to the \u201cNotice Of Termination of Tenancy,\u201d the CHA maintained that the defendant had violated her lease by creating a threat to the health and safety of others. Specifically, the notice stated that the lease was violated when the defendant \u201cJacqueline Rose, leaseholder, and Charles Gardner, unauthorized occupant in leaseholder\u2019s apartment, was [sic] found in possession of a *** sawed-off shotgun and a *** Pump shotgun while at [the defendant\u2019s apartment], which is CHA property.\u201d\nThe lease provisions alleged to have been violated stated in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201c(9) The Tenant shall *** (c) use the premises solely as a private dwelling unit for the Tenant, and the Tenant\u2019s household as identified in the lease, and not use or permit its use for any other purpose; (d) abide by necessary and reasonable regulations promulgated by Management for the benefit and well-being of the housing project and the tenants which shall be posted in the Project Management Office and incorporated by reference in this lease; *** (k) conduct himself and cause other persons who are on the premises with his consent to conduct themselves in a manner which will not disturb his neighbors\u2019 peaceful enjoyment of their accommodations and will be conducive to maintaining the development in a decent, safe and sanitary condition; (1) refrain from illegal or other activity which impairs the physical or social environment of the development.\u201d\nThe relevant regulation incorporated into the lease provided that \u201c[n]o one is permitted to bring explosives, guns, ammunition, air rifles or any other weapons into the buildings or use them on CHA grounds. *** TO DO SO VIOLATES YOUR LEASE AND YOU RISK THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EVICTION.\u201d Finally, regarding termination, the lease stated, \u201cManagement shall not terminate *** the lease for other than serious or repeated violation of material terms of the lease such as failure *** to fulfill the Tenant obligations set forth in paragraph 9 or for other good cause.\u201d\nThe defendant testified as an adverse witness that on May 14, 1987, at approximately 9:30 p.m. her half-brother, Charles Gardner, who is also known as \u201cLittle Charles,\u201d came to spend the night at her home because he had a summer job interview scheduled for the next day at a nearby day-care center. The defendant met Little Charles in front of her friend Michelle Brewer\u2019s apartment, which was across the street from the defendant\u2019s apartment; she handed him her key, saw him go up to the apartment, and saw that the light was turned on. The defendant had never seen her brother with guns; she did not learn about the guns\u2019 presence in her apartment until the police found them and did not know they belonged to her brother until Little Charles so informed the police at the police station.\nOfficer Dennis Davis testified that at approximately 9 a.m. on May 15, 1987, he talked with a confidential informant. After that conversation, he went to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office where he obtained approval of a complaint for a search warrant. Armed with a search warrant, Davis went to the defendant\u2019s apartment on May 15, 1987, knocked on the door, and was admitted. The defendant was in the apartment with several other women. Little Charles was not there, nor was there any indication (e.g., men\u2019s clothes) that he lived there. The officer first searched the defendant\u2019s couch and found a sawed-off shotgun; this gun was about 20 or 22 inches long and was \u201cup in the cushions in the back of the sofa.\u201d Then Davis searched \u201cthe bedroom, where the rifle was supposed to have been up under the mattress *** [but tjhere was no rifle.\u201d Then Davis searched the closet in the living room and found another shotgun. This gun had been \u201cbroken down\u201d into two pieces and was in a Christmas tree box. Neither gun was visible before the search. When questioned, the defendant indicated that she did not know who owned the shotguns. Approximately 30 minutes later, at the police station, Little Charles admitted that the shotguns belonged to him. Little Charles also told Davis that he lived at the apartment where the guns were found.\nDavis, who specializes in gang activity in north-side housing projects, had never met nor heard of Charles Gardner, nor did he have any information that the defendant was involved in gangs. In his experience, however, Davis knew that gang members hide guns in various places, including the apartments of unsuspecting family members, and that gang members frequently do not disclose the presence of these guns to their relatives. Davis also indicated that hundreds of additional guns are stored in vacant apartments in Cabrini-Green. The gangs claim various public housing buildings as their own, and it is difficult for a young man who lives in a building claimed by a gang to stay out of the gang, because the gang will beat him up and threaten his family. Often new gang members hide guns as their \u201cfirst step\u201d with the gang. Davis opined that a person in possession of a sawed-off shotgun and another shotgun at Cabrini-Green is likely to be a gang member.\nThe CHA rested, and the judge denied the defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict. The judge held that, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the CHA, the CHA had met its burden of proof of showing that the defendant knew or should have known of the guns and thus violated her lease.\nMichelle Brewer, the defendant\u2019s friend who lived across the street, testified that she and her six-year-old daughter and the defendant and her four-year-old daughter often stayed together overnight at each other\u2019s homes because of the crime and violence in the projects. On May 14, 1987, the defendant and Brewer were in front of Brewer\u2019s building, and she saw Little Charles. Little Charles asked the defendant for her key and told the defendant that he was ready to go upstairs and that he had a job interview the next morning. The defendant gave him the key, told him she did not want anyone in her apartment, and told him to turn on the lights in the apartment to let her know that he was inside. Little Charles was alone; he was not carrying any bags and did not have anything in his hands. He went into the building, and the lights went on three or four minutes later. The defendant and Brewer then went up to Brewer\u2019s apartment and stayed there for the night. The next time they saw Little Charles was about 10:30 a.m. the next day at Brewer\u2019s apartment; he gave the defendant her key and told her that he had been to the interview and was going home. Brewer had never known Little Charles to be in a gang or to have a gun.\nThe defendant testified to substantially the same facts elicited during her earlier testimony. She added that before May 14, Little Charles had not stayed at her apartment. She confirmed that she and Brewer often stayed together because of the crime in Cabrini-Green. The defendant also confirmed that she told Little Charles that she did not want anyone in the apartment but him, and that she told him to turn on a light when he got into the apartment; after he went in, she waited until she saw the light go on. She did not see any guns in Little Charles\u2019 possession at this time or at any time. She did not see Little Charles again until around 10:30 a.m. the following day, when he came to Brewer\u2019s apartment and returned the key. Shortly after noon that day, Officers Davis and Joyce Gordon came to the defendant\u2019s apartment. The defendant read the officers\u2019 search warrant and invited the officers into the apartment. They searched the apartment and found a gun first in a Christmas tree box in the closet, then another in the sofa. The defendant had never seen the guns before and did not know how they got in her apartment until she heard Little Charles admit at the police station that the guns were his. She would not have let Little Charles into her apartment had she known he was going to bring guns in there.\nFollowing closing arguments, the court instructed the jury as follows:\n\u201cThe Chicago Housing Authority has the burden of proving all of the following: [First, that on] May 15, 1987, Charles Gardner was a guest in Jacqueline Rose\u2019s apartment ***. [Second, that on] May 15, 1987, Jacqueline Rose or Charles Gardner were [sic] in possession of a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun and a 12-gauge shotgun while at the above location. Third, that Jacqueline Rose knew or should have known that a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun or a 12-gauge shotgun was in her apartment May 15, 1987, before that time that the police saw the guns; and, four[th], that the actions of Jacqueline Rose on May 15, 1987 violated *** her lease with the Chicago Housing Authority.\u201d\nThe CHA contends that the instruction was erroneous because it provided that the CHA had the burden of proving that the defendant \u201cknew or should have known that a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun or a 12-gauge [pump] shotgun was in her apartment [on] May 15, 1987, before that time that the police saw the guns.\u201d The CHA argues that a tenant\u2019s knowledge of a lease violation is not a requisite element for an eviction based on such a violation. However, if knowledge is required, the CHA argues in the alternative that the defendant had the burden of disproving knowledge and failed to meet this burden.\nWe first consider the defendant\u2019s argument that the CHA waived the issue of the propriety of the \u201cknew or should have known\u201d jury instruction. Before trial the CHA moved in limine to bar any evidence that the defendant did not know that any person had or brought a gun into her home. The defendant argued that such knowledge was a necessary element of the alleged violation, i.e., permitting weapons on the premises. The judge denied the CHA\u2019s motion and, as noted, the judge instructed the jury that the CHA had the burden of proving that the defendant knew or should have known of the guns\u2019 presence in her apartment.\nAn appellant must request transcripts of the reports of proceedings that the appellant desires to be included in the record on appeal. (107 Ill. 2d R. 323(a).) If no transcript is available, \u201cthe appellant may prepare a proposed report of proceedings from the best available sources, including recollection.\u201d (107 Ill. 2d R. 323(c).) Neither a file-stamped set of proposed instructions filed by the CHA nor a transcript of the instruction conference appears in the record on appeal. In addition, the trial transcript evidences no objection of record to the instruction requiring knowledge. The CHA, as an appellant who failed to provide a transcript or other report of the instructions conference, may not attack the instructions on appeal as no timely objection to the tender of the instructions appears of record. Moreover, the objections in the CHA\u2019s post-trial motion came too late to preserve the issue for appeal. (Finfrock v. Eaton Asphalt Co. (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1022, 355 N.E.2d 214, 216.) Consequently, the CHA has waived this issue. See also Dillon v. U.S. Steel Corp. (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 186, 201, 511 N.E.2d 1349, 1359-60; Russo v. Kellogg (1962), 37 Ill. App. 2d 336, 341-42, 185 N.E.2d 377, 380.\nEven if the CHA\u2019s failure to make a record of its objections to the \u201cknew or should have known\u201d standard did not waive the issue, the CHA\u2019s argument must fall. The CHA first claims that the \u201cknew or should have known\u201d standard applied by the trial court is not required by due process and, in fact, improperly interferes with the CHA\u2019s fulfillment of its goal to provide safe public housing; instead, the CHA supports a \u201cstrict liability\u201d (i.e., no knowledge required) standard. The defendant, on the other hand, argues that a strict liability standard would violate due process by allowing evictions of parties lacking any \u201ccausal nexus\u201d to alleged lease violations. However, resolution of these constitutional questions would not resolve whether the lease gives the CHA authority to evict the defendant regardless of whether she knew or should have known that the guns were in her apartment. This court has recognized that \u201ca court should not decide a cause on constitutional grounds if it can be determined on other grounds.\u201d (Lake Louise Improvement Association v. Multimedia Cablevision of Oak Lawn, Inc. (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 713, 716, 510 N.E.2d 982, 985.) For reasons to be discussed later, we conclude that the trial court correctly interpreted the lease to require some knowledge on the defendant\u2019s part, and we therefore find it unnecessary to discuss the constitutional questions raised by the parties.\nIn arguing that the defendant\u2019s lack of knowledge is irrelevant under the lease, the CHA relies principally on three cases interpreting leases in which the tenant covenanted not to permit the premises to be used for an unlawful purpose. In the earliest case, Arado v. Maharis (1924), 232 Ill. App. 282, the court determined that the plaintiff had waived his right to terminate the lease by accepting rents after learning of the breach, the subtenants\u2019 sale of liquor in violation of the law. (232 Ill. App. at 285.) The court reversed the judgment of possession for the plaintiff and added the following obiter dictum:\n\u201cThere is no merit in the defendant\u2019s contention that the plaintiff could not terminate the top lease, unless it appeared that he (the defendant[-tenant]) knowingly permitted the subtenant to violate the law, because the original lease provides that the tenants will not use nor permit the premises to be used for any unlawful purpose. If the premises were used for an unlawful purpose by the subtenant without the knowledge of the top tenant, it would not affect the landlord\u2019s right to terminate the lease.\u201d 232 Ill. App. at 287.\nIn the next case, Lubliner v. Gaston (1926), 243 Ill. App. 627 (abstract of opinion), the appellate court upheld judgment of forfeiture of a lease in favor of the lessor in an action against the tenants where the evidence established that a subtenant operated a house of prostitution.\nIn the third case, First Trust & Savings Bank v. Raklios (1928), 247 Ill. App. 183, the court affirmed a determination that the tenant\u2019s covenant not to permit the premises to be used for an unlawful purpose was a covenant running with the land. Thus, the court held that both the defendant-tenant and the subtenant were bound by the covenant, \u201cyet, in violation of that obligation, [the defendant] sublet the premises to one who *** pretended to run a radio business *** [as] a cover for the operation of an illicit still.\u201d (247 Ill. App. at 193.) The court refused to allow the defendant to \u201cprofit by, what seems to be, his own wrong\u201d by setting up the seizure of the premises by the United States Marshal as a defense to an action for rent. (247 Ill. App. at 192-93.) In so doing, the court\u2019s only Illinois citation was to the abstract opinion in Lubliner for the proposition that a tenant is responsible to the lessor for a lease violation by his subtenant, regardless of whether the tenant knew of the violation.\nThus, although these cases involved lease language similar to that at issue here, the reasoning of these cases addressed the issue of the accountability of a commercial tenant for a subtenant\u2019s violation of criminal laws which was allegedly unknown to the tenant. Those cases are distinguishable from this case, which involves a guest who used the tenant\u2019s residential apartment for one night to conceal weapons from the defendant and others. We will not extend the application of the holdings in the cases cited by the CHA to the facts of this case. To do so would require every tenant under similar leases to be a guarantor of the conduct of anyone invited by the tenant onto the premises.\nIn construing a lease the primary objective is to ascertain the intent of the parties. The intention of the parties must be ascertained if possible from the language of the lease, and the words used should be given their common and generally accepted meaning. Where the language of a lease is ambiguous, the court may consider the position of the parties, the surrounding circumstances which existed at the time of the execution of the lease and the facts in connection with it. Moreover, where there is any doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the language used in a lease it should be construed most strongly against the lessor and in favor of the lessee. American National Bank, & Trust Co. v. Lembessis (1969), 116 Ill. App. 2d 5, 253 N.E.2d 126.\nIn common usage, \u201cpermit\u201d means \u201cto consent to expressly or formally: grant leave for or the privilege of; ALLOW, TOLERATE ***[; or] to give (a person) leave: AUTHORIZE ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1683 (1981).) A further definition for the term is \u201cTo suffer, allow, consent, let; to give leave or license; to acquiesce, by failure to prevent, or to expressly assent or agree to the doing of an act.\" (Emphasis added.) (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1028 (5th ed. 1979).) Considering the relative positions of the CHA and the defendant in negotiating this lease and construing the lease most strongly against the lessor and in favor of the lessee, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that, in order to find for the CHA, the jury had to find that the defendant knew or should have known of the presence of the guns in her apartment. This instruction is consistent with the meaning of the term \u201cpermit\u201d as incorporated into the lease by way of the CHA\u2019s regulation.\nAs the trial judge noted in ruling on the CHA\u2019s motion in limine, after the CHA showed that the guns were in the defendant\u2019s apartment, a rebuttable presumption that the defendant knew of the guns\u2019 presence arose, and the defendant had the burden of showing a lack of knowledge in this regard. The CHA argues in the alternative that, if the trial judge applied the correct knowledge standard, then \u201cthere was no evidence presented to show that the tenant did not or could not foresee the obvious consequences of the activity taking place in her apartment.\u201d We disagree. Both the CHA and the defendant produced evidence that neither the defendant, nor Michelle Brewer, nor Officer Davis had any knowledge of Little Charles\u2019 involvement with gangs or guns. The defendant\u2019s testimony that she did not know of the presence of the guns was not contradicted by testimony or by circumstances, it was not inherently improbable, and her testimony was not impeached. Consequently, her testimony may not be disregarded, even by a jury. (People ex rel. Brown v. Baker (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 81, 430 N.E.2d 1126.) Moreover, the guns were not visible before the officer\u2019s search of the couch and closet and were, in fact, hidden to avoid detection. This evidence satisfied the defendant\u2019s burden of rebutting the presumption of knowledge.\nThe CHA\u2019s other claim of error is the trial judge\u2019s exclusion of the testimony of Officer Davis regarding statements made to him by a confidential informant concerning the presence of guns in the defendant\u2019s apartment. As a basis for admission of such testimony the CHA claims that it is probative on the question of the defendant\u2019s knowledge, that it was relevant to show the officer\u2019s reasons for searching the defendant\u2019s apartment, and that the defendant\u2019s cross-examination of the officer opened the door for admission of the officer\u2019s complaint for a search warrant, which contained the informant\u2019s statements.\nIn support of its argument, the CHA cites Wigmore on Evidence \u00a7266 (3d ed. 1970), which provides:\n\u201cWhen a person\u2019s knowledge *** is a fact in issue, *** word utterances may betray the knowledge *** of the *** speaker, insofar as the specific act or utterance is of a tenor which cannot well be supposed to have been willed without the inner existence of that knowledge or belief.\n* * *\nThe important thing is that, so far as the evidential fact consists in an utterance of words, it is receivable for the present purpose, as circumstantial evidence; and that, so long as it is offered for that purpose only and not as an assertion to be credited like testimony, it is not obnoxious to the hearsay rule. For example, A\u2019s mention of X\u2019s insolvency is receivable as circumstantial evidence of A\u2019s knowledge, but not as testimonial evidence of X\u2019s insolvency.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (2 J. Wigmore, Evidence \u00a7266, at 97, 100 (Chadbourn Rev. ed. 1979).)\nThe CHA sought to admit the statements of the informant, not to show that the speaker, that is, the informant, had knowledge of the guns, but, as the CHA states in it\u2019s brief, \u201cas circumstantial evidence that defendant had knowledge of the guns.\u201d (Emphasis added.) This purpose, according to Wigmore, is exactly the purpose prohibited. The CHA also argues that the judge committed reversible error in refusing to allow testimony regarding the reason the police officer went to the defendant\u2019s apartment, citing the following at trial:\n\u201c[CHA\u2019s attorney]: Why did you go [to the defendant\u2019s apartment]?\n[Officer Davis]: I received information that\u2014\n[Defendant\u2019s attorney]: Objection to the content.\nTHE COURT: He didn\u2019t \u2014 Let the record reflect that there has been a motion in limine, which was presented prior to the testimony at trial. Counsel, you\u2019re admonished that paragraph three was sustained. Make sure you make no inquiries that would violate that term.\n[CHA\u2019s attorney]: Right. I\u2019m advised. I\u2019m aware of that.\u201d\nAfter that exchange, the- CHA\u2019s attorney proceeded to question the officer on whether he had a search warrant, what such a warrant was generally, how one generally obtained such a warrant, and what happened when the officer went to the apartment. Contrary to CHA\u2019s argument, the judge did permit the officer to explain why he went to the apartment; he went to execute a search warrant. The judge properly limited the officer\u2019s testimony to the fact that he had a conversation with an individual and that the officer subsequently acted upon information received during that conversation without revealing the substance of the conversation. There was no error in the judge\u2019s ruling. See People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 221, 522 N.E.2d ,1146.\nFinally, the CHA argues that the judge improperly prevented it from questioning the officer on redirect examination regarding the complaint for a search warrant after the defendant allegedly opened the door to such questioning on cross-examination. After the officer indicated that his recollection was exhausted on cross-examination as to when he talked with the confidential informant, the defendant, with leave of court and over the CHA\u2019s objection, handed the officer his two-page complaint for search warrant, which did refresh the officer\u2019s recollection as to when the conversation occurred. Following cross-examination the CHA pursued redirect of the officer. At no time during redirect did the CHA attempt to question the officer regarding the complaint for search warrant. Thus the CHA waived this issue.\nEven if this issue were not deemed waived, a refusal by the court to allow redirect examination which would elicit the contents of the complaint for search warrant is not reversible error. A witness\u2019 recollection may be refreshed even by a document which itself is inadmissible. (Scovill Manufacturing Co. v. Cassidy (1916), 275 Ill. 462, 114 N.E. 181; People v. Van Dyk (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 275, 352 N.E.2d 327.) After a party uses a document to refresh a witness\u2019 recollection, the other party may use the document subject to the court\u2019s discretion. But \u201c[njeither inspection of the document nor its employment upon cross-examination makes the document admissible on behalf of the proponent of the witness.\u201d (M. Graham, Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7612.1, at 458 (5th ed. 1990).) The judge did not err in denying the plaintiff the right to introduce the contents of the search warrant.\nIn summary, we conclude that no error was committed in the giving of the defendant\u2019s instruction nor in the examination of the witnesses. For these reasons the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nLaPORTA, P.J., and RAKOWSKI, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE EGAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Keck, Mahin & Cate, of Chicago (F. Willis Caruso, Jill E. Evans, Catherine A.T. Nelson, and Katherine M. Clark, of counsel), for appellant.", "Cabrini Green Legal Aid Clinic, of Chicago (Richart T. Cozzola and Helen Barrett, law student, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JACQUELINE ROSE, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u2014 89\u20141640\nOpinion filed September 14,1990.\nKeck, Mahin & Cate, of Chicago (F. Willis Caruso, Jill E. Evans, Catherine A.T. Nelson, and Katherine M. Clark, of counsel), for appellant.\nCabrini Green Legal Aid Clinic, of Chicago (Richart T. Cozzola and Helen Barrett, law student, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0208-01", "first_page_order": 230, "last_page_order": 241 }